ML19262C526
| ML19262C526 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/07/1980 |
| From: | Sanders K NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002140285 | |
| Download: ML19262C526 (45) | |
Text
'
L' INTERNATI0ftAL SAFEGUARDS By Kenneth E. Sanders U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wanington, D.C.
20555 (For presentation at the DOE Workshop on the riuclear Fuel Cycle and Technical Aspects of Nuclear Wnapons Proliferation, February 5-7, i980)
I.
Introduction International Safeguards have been developed and i glemented to meet man's concern about the connection between une peaceful uses of atomic energy and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The number of Nuclear Weapon States officially recognized by the IAEA has now increased to six; whereas, a total of 116 States were either party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of fluclear Weapons, or had entered into safeguards Agreements with the IAEA for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
This paper attempts to provide a broad perspective of International Safeguards and to identify how the I AEA provides a mechanism for implementing safeguards.
II. Origin and Authority of the IAEA Following the end of the Second World War, on 15 November 1945, the U.S.,
U.K., and Canada approached the problem of non-proliferation by agreeing to block the transfer of two things essential for nuclear development:
(1) technical knowledge, and (2) uranium.
In the case of technical knowledge, a policy of secrecy in the nuclear field was adopted until a system could be established for the effective international control of the new and for-nidable source of energy.
In the case of uranium, they decided to buy up all that was available.
800'2140 2 SS
On 14 June 1946, the U.S. proposed an international administrative body that would own, operate, and develop the nuclear industry on behalf of all nations.
The USSR, in particular, did not accept this proposal, and the first tentative efforts to establish control ended in failure. After ten more years of negotiations, the Statute for the IAEA was approved at the UN Headquarters in New York on 23 October 1956, and the IAEA came into being under the aegis of the United Nations on 29 July 1957.
It presently is recognized as the agency resoonsible for international activities concerned with the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
'he executive organ of the IAEA is the Board of Governors which is made up of 34 member States on a rotating basis. At the end of 1978, there was a total of 110 member States.
In the Department of Safeguards, alone, there was a total of 142 professional staff, of which 73 were designated inspectors.
III. The Function of the IAEA In particular, the Statute authorizes the IAEA to do the follcwing:
(1) " Establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose."
(2)
" Apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy."
(3)
" Send into the territory of the recipient State or States inspectors, who shall have access at all times to all places and data and to any person who by reason of his occupation deals with raterials, equipment, or facilities which are required to be safeguarded."
In addition to safeguards, the Statute also authorizes the IAEA to provide technical assistance on peaceful uses of atomic energy to:
(1)
" Encourage and assist research, development, and practical application."
(2)
"Make provision for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research, development and practical a; plication."
(3)
" Foster exchange of scientific and technical infonntion."
(4)
" Encourage the exchan-and training of scientists and experts."
(5)
" Establish, adopt, and provide for the application of nuclear safety and environmental protection standards."
These activities are related to programs in food, agriculture, physical cnd life sciences, and peaceful nuclear explosives.
IV.
Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials Closely related to, but distinctly sepirate from, safeguards is physical protection.
The protection of nuclear material and facilities against illegal acts is an essential supplement to any safeguards system that is based on material accountancy.
Physical protection addresses the question of theft of nuclear material and sabotage of installations by individuals or non-governmental groups for purposes ranging from personal economic gain to political blackmail.
In particular, the objectives of the IAEA with regard to physical protection are:
(1)
Provide recommendations on requirements for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, transit, and storage.
Such guidar:e, however, does not infringe on the sovereign rights of the states.
(2)
Provide advice, if so requested, to a State's authorities on their physical protection systems.
On the other hand, the objectives of the State's physical protection system are:
(1)
Establish conditions to minimize theft and sabotage.
(2)
Establish measures to locate and recover missing nuclear material.
V.
International Safeguards Agreements The IAEA has one safeguards system for non-flPT States and another for f1PT States. The first system is intended to ensure that the supply of nuclear material and assistance.(e.g., technical advice and research reactors) does not contribute in any way to non-peaceful activities, and it focuses more upon facilities than it does upon nuclear materials.
The second system covers the entire nuclear cycle within each NNW State.
Recently, a hybrid system has been conceptualized - " Full Scope Safeguards".
This system would be applied to all nuclear facilities in a NNW State (i.e., the entire nuclear cycle) even though the State has not signed the NPT.
Historically, Safeguards were first developed on a bilateral basis.
That is, nations attached safeguards to their exports of nuclear r.aterial to other countries.
For example, the U.S. included special clauses in bilateral cooperation agreements to reserve the right to verify uses that the recipient country made of the fissile material delivered in order to preclude possible use for military purposes.
U. S. inspectors were sent out to verify the use of nuclear material.
Early in tha 1950's, the U.S. (followed by the U.K., Canada, and France) began transferring the adm
.strat on of these bilateral safeguards to the IAEA.
However, sov bilaterally supplied plants, e.g., the Cirus reactor in Ind' and the De'... reactor in Israel, are not under IAEA safeguards.
In addition, the IAEA already was applying safeguards to naterial and equipment provided by it to Member States through project agreements.
Furthermore, certain Member States voluntarily subnitted nuclear installa-tions to IAEA safeguards through unilateral agreements with the IAEA.
Under these type agreements, only the particular material, equipment, or facility identified in the agreemant is safeguarded.
It is therefore possible, for example, for a State to have one reactor safeguarded against diversion to military use alongside an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment plant which could be put to uses other than for peaceful purposes.
~
On 1 July 1968, the Treaty on the fion-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed, and it entered into force on 5 Marcn 1970. Safeguards carried out by the IAEA under the fiPT apply to all nuclear material in any nuclear facility in all peaceful nuclear activities within each non-nuclear weapon (flNW) State.
Furthermore, each State party to the NPT agrees not to provide nuclear material or equipment to any NNW State unless the material is subject to safeguards.
By the end of 1978, there were 106 States party to NPT (103 inW States plus 3 NW States).
Sixty-one of these f4NW States had concluded agreements with the IAEA; whereas, for the NW States, the UK agreement is in force as of 14 August 1978, the US agreemen;. is awaiting ratification, and the USSR has not yet signed an agreement.
(France, which is a non-tiPT tiW State, signed an agreement on 27 July 1978.) flote that India is not considered to be a fN State for purposes of the NPT; by definition, a f;W State is a State that has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive prior to 1 January 1967.
In addition to these fiPT agreements, there still remained 10 project agreenents (with 8 States),14 unilateral agreements (with 9 States), and 18 trilateral agreements at the end of 1978.
VI.
IAEA Policy Objective for Safeguards The policy objective of safeguards is based on the objective explicitly stated for NPT type agreenents.
It has been extended to include any type of safegucrds agreemeit.
This objective is "the timely detection of,,
diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection." Practically speaking, " detection'might be by observation (direct or by camera) of an unauthorized activity or by discovery of a discrepancy in the reports or records.
" Diversion" refers to a removal of nuclear material from its declared and recorded status.
The inclusion of the expression "for purposes unknown" is very important for the practical application of safeguards for it means tnat the IAEA does not have to attempt to determine the use to which diverted material is put.
In particular, it does not have to determine whether the diverted nuclear material is for "the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices."
It should be noted that the IAEA responsibilities do not extend to detecting clandestine nuclear facilities.
i _
VII. IAEA Technical Objectives for Safeguards Implementation of the policy objectives requires more explicit definition and quantification cf the concepts of " timely detection" and "significant quantities." The "significant quantity" is related to the amunt of nuclear material needed for manufacturing a nuclear explosive device, whereas, the " timely detection" is related to the conversion time necessary to convert nuclear material to metallic components of a nuclear explosive device.
Although the " probability of detection" is not exnlicitly a part of the objectives, it is considered to be implicit in the con;ept of detection.
The a priori probability of detection which is scught is 90%
or higher and is most often 95%.
In an effort to further extend these technical objectives, " inspection goals" have been established.
VII.
Application of S.ifeguards The IAEA has varied experience with the different types of nuclear facil-ities.
For eyample, its experience in applying safeguards is extensive for power reactors (especially light water reactors), limited for fast breeder reactors and reprocessing plants, and virtually embryonic for enrichment plants.
Agreements have been discussed with 116 States.
Although negotiations are underway, by the end of 1978 safeguards were not yet implemented under the NPT agreements for any of the NW States.
The amount of nuclear material under IAEA safeguards can be seen to be quite significant.
(IAEA Press Release PR 79/15 goes here.)
IX.
State Systems for Accounting and Contro.'
Under the fiPT, the State is required to establish and maintain a State system for accounting and control of nuclear material.
This system is essential to the implementation of IAEA safeguards.
The State system is expected to include the following elements:
(1) Regulations must be promulgated, a licensing procedure established, and means of controlling compliance set up (e.g., State inspections).
(2) Ininformation system must be established and used for keeping records and providing reports.
(3) Technical support should be provided.
For example, this includes training programs, assistance to 'acility operators, and research and development programs for improving material accountancy and control at facilities.
All three eienents together mean, for example, that facility design informa-tion can be made available for use by the IAEA, and prescribed material control and accounting procedures are estabiished, maintained, and followed at the facilities. Also, reports can be provided to the IAEA fr n the State, and IAEA inspectors are permitted to inspect the facilities on the basis of the information received.
On the other hand, the IAEA has obligations to the States.
For >
'ple, IAEA safeguards are implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering economical and technological developments in the States, and the IAEA is obligated to take every preccution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information that the IAEA becomes aware of while implementing safeguards.
8-
X.
The Implementation of Safeouards (To be expanded based on INF/SECY/211)
NPT safeguards are finally implemented after following a path of documents negotiated between the State and IAEA.
The level of technical detail increases with each step along the path, finally leading to routine verification of information by inspectors.
Before safeguards can be applied in a State, an Agreement must be concluded and detailed Subsidiary Arrangements must be negotiated to elaborate the respective rights and obligations.
These consist of a General Part appli-cable to all peaceful nuclear activities in the State and a separate Facility Attachment for each installation that specifies in detail the application of safeguards.
Inspections (ad hoc) may begin before a Facility Attachment is wri t ten.
A.
The Basic Approach The basic approach to achieving the safeguards ob.iective is a verifica-tion process that consists of th'ree main aspects:
1.
Examination of the following types of information provided by the state:
a.
Desigr infarmation b.
Accounting reports Initial Report Inventory Change Report
- Material Balance Report
- Physical Inventory Listing c.
Special reports
- unusual incident or circumstance possibly leading to a loss
- change in containment making removal possible 9_
d.
Amplification and clarification of reports
- by IAEA request e.
Advance notifications of international transfers 2.
Collection of additional information by the IAEa from the following types of inspections:
a.
Design information verification b.
Ad hoc inspections
- Verify initial report Verify changes since initial report
- Verify international transfers c.
Routine inspections
- Verify repor ofrecords consistency (operating and accounting)
- Verify nuclear material (e.g., samples, identi fication, counting, non-destructive assay, seals, careras)
Verify MUF, Shipper / Receiver Differences, and book inventory uncertainties d.
Special inspections
- Verify information in Special Reports Inadequate information available.
3.
Evaluation of information provided by the State and collected during inspections to determine:
Completeness
- Accuracy
- Validity B.
Basic Means of Verification The right to conduct on-site inspections is considered to be the key to verification of the information provided by the State.
Without independent verification of non-proliferation comitments, nations would not have assurance that their neighbors were nct secretly diverting nuclear materials from the nuclear fuel cycle to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
IAEA verification is achieved by the basic means of (1) material accountancy, and (2) containrrent and surveillance.
Material accountancy is the " safeguards measure of fundamental importance" and refers to a collection of measurements at Key Measurement Points (KMP) and other determinations that enable the IAEA to maintain a current picture of the location and movement of nuclear material into and out of facilities.
It provides knowledge of the identity, composition, quality and location of the nuclear material.
In practice, material accountancy starts with determination of the initial inventory in a Material Balance Area (MBA), continues with perpetuation of a book inventory (with verification and updating of this book inventory), and then periodic verification of inventory changes (material transferred into and out of the MBA) and of the physical inventory for the MBA and comparison of it to the book inventory.
Differences are referred to as " material unaccounted for" (MUF).
Containment and surveillance are "important complementary measures."
" Containment" refers to measures that ta':e advantage of existing s
structural characteristics, such as containers, storage vaults, or reactor vessels, to establish the physical integrity of an area or an item by preventing undetected movement of nuclear material or equipment.
For example, a tamper-indicating seal may be applied to a container, storage vault, or reactor vessel to ensure that any change to its con-tents would be detected.
" Surveillance," on the other hand, refers to both human and instrumental cbservation aimed at indicating the movement of nuclear material.
For example, cameras or personnel may be used to monitor containment measures or observe inventory changes.
XI.
Safecuards - Startina and Stopping Under NPT agreements, safeguards begin for nuclear material at a stage in the nuclear fuel cycle where it has "a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched." These conditions exist, for example, for the UF6 at a facility that converts yeilow cake (U 0 ) to UF.
Safeguards are explicitly not applied to material in mining 38 6
or ore processing activities.
There are several conditions under which safeguards on nuclear material m3y be terminated.
The simplest case is when one State transfers material to another State and this recipient State then assumes responsibility for the material.
Safeguards also may be terninated if the nuclear material has been consumed or diluted so it is no longer useable or if it has become practically irrecoverable.
Furthermore, the IAEA and the State agree on the extent of safeguards on material in non-nuclear activities, for example, the production of alloys or ceramics..
Another means of removing safeguards from uclear material is by exemption.
This may be done by one of two possible ways:
"use" exemption or " quantity" exemption. Any quantity of material may be exempted if it is used as one i
of the following:
1.
Special fissionable material used in gram quantities as sensing components in instruments.
2.
Nuclear material used in non-nuclear activities.
3.
Plutonium with Pu-238 isotope content more than 80%.
In addition, material used for any purpose may be exempted if the quantity does not exceed the following amounts:
1.
1 Kg Plutonium 2.
1 Kg U-235 isotope contained in High Enrichad Uranium (HEU) (based on element weight x enrichment) 3.
' Kg U-235 isotope contained in Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) (based on element weight x 5 x enrichment squared) 4.
10 metric tons Natural Uranium (NU) and Depleted Uranium (DU)
(enrichment above 0.5%)
5.
20 metric tons Depleted Uranium (enrichment below 0.5%)
6.
20 metric tons Thorium X11.
Disagreements and Irregularities It is possible that problems may arise during safegucrds implementation.
For example, there may be administrative disagreements over interpretation of an agreement or IAEA access, or there may be irregularities such as the inability to verify that all nuclear material is accounted for.
The first level of interfacing occurs during inspections between the facility opera-tor and IAEA inspector.
In the event that problems arise and they cannot be resolved at this level, consultation at the State /lAEA level may be necessary.
Subsequently, the matter may be carried to the Board of Governors, which is the executive body for the IAEA.
In more difficult situations, one may resort to the International Court of Ju'stice for arbitration.
Ultimately, the UN Security Council and Ger.eral Assembly may be notified.
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O!!TLINE fH1 - PROLIEPATION OF NUClfAR hEJPWS INTERIATIONAL SAEGilARE IAEA (ALSO TECHlICAL ASSIST / NCE 8 PHYSICAL PROTECTIOrd SAEGUAPE AGPEETRS WJECTIVES ADPLICATION IMPlHEITATIW
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NATIONS WITH DEVELOPED NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES DECADE _
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1945-1954 U3A, U(, USSR 1955-1964 FRANCE, CHita (PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC) 1965-1974 HDIA (18 PAY 1974)
NUCLEAR GEf1ERATItJG CAPACITY YEAR TOTAL CAPACITY NO. OF COUNTRIES 19 s 5 EEMATTS 1
1974 54,000 EGAWATTS 19
EARLY f!ON-PROL'FERATION POLICY 15 ilo'aBER 1945 TECHNICAL F7DILEDGE IN NUCLEAR FIELD - POLICY OF SECRECY URN 11UM - EUY ALL OF IT
PROPOSED INTERNATIONAL ATCt11C ENERGY CONTROL AGENCY PROPOSED cN 14 JUE 1945 t"JCLEAR lt'DUSTRY WOULD BE ORJED OPERATED DEVELOPED BY THE AGENCY
RELKflONS OF THE IAEA
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- Germany, Mstsysis Sri Lanks Bang!sdesh Feder21F publi of Yali Sudan Belgium Ghans Mauritius Sweden Bolivia Greec:
Mexico Switzerland Brazil Guatemala Mon:co Syrian Ar:b Republic Bu!;;ria 1hiti Mongolia Thaihnd Burtr2 Holy See Mero:co Tunisis Bye!orussian Soviet Hung 2ry Netherlands Turkey Socialist Republic
!cehnd New Zealand Uganda Canada India Ni:2ragus Ukraini:n Soviet Socialist Chile Indonesia Niger Republi:
Colombia Itsn Nigeris Union ofSoviet Socialist Costa Rica Iraq Ner.vay Republics Cuba Ire!and Pakiesn United Arab Emirates Cyprus Ist::1 P:nsms United Kingdom of C:echoslovakia Italy P:raguay Grest Britain and Democr: tic Kampaches Ivory Coast Peru Northern Ireland Dernocrat:: People's Jamaica Philippines United Republic of Cameroon Republi: of Kores Japan Poland United Republic ofTanzania Denmark Jordan Portugs!
United States of America Domis:a Republic Kenya Qatar Uruguay Ecuador Kores. Republic of Romanis Vene:uela Egypt Kuwait Saudi Arabis Yugoslavia El Salvador Lebanon Senegal Zaire Ethiopia UFeria Sierra Leone Zambis
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IAEA SAFEGUARDS STAFF (Ef1D OF 1978)
PROFESSIONAL GENERAL STAFP STAFC DEPUTY DIRECTOR'S OFFICE 12 7
DIVISIONS OF OPERATIONS (2) 89 23 DIVISIONS OF DEVELOPMENT /INFORMAION (2) __S]._
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TOTALS 142 61 DESIGNATED INSPECTORS 79 TOTAL IAEA STAFF 507 777
If1TERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 29 JULY 1957 SAFEGUARDS STATUTE AUTHORITY:
ESTABLISH AND ADMINISTER PPLY INSPECT
If4TERNATI0ilAL ATOMIC Ef1ERGY AGEf1CY 29 JULY 1957 NON-SAFEGUARDS STATUTE AUTHORITY:
ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT APPLICATION PROVIDE MATERIALS EQUIPMENT SERVICES FACILITIES EXCHANGE INFORMATION EXCHANGE SCIENTISTS SAFETY AND ENVIRONME!4T PROTECTION STANDARDS ESTABLISH ADOPT PROVIDE
PHYSICAL PROTECTION ADDRESSES:
THEFT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SABOTAGE OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS IAEA OBJECTIVES:
GUIDANCE FOR NUCLEAR MATERIAL USE IN TRANSIT STORAGE ADVICE STATE OBJECTIVES:
CONDITIONS TO MINIMIZE THEFT SABOTAGE MEASURES TO LOCATE RECOVER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEiiENTS WITH THE IAEA PROJECT AGREEMENTS UNI - LATERAL SUBMITTALS MULTI
' LATERAL AGREEMENTS NPT AGREEMENTS
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PAPTY TO NPT 103 NMw STATES 3
NW STATES (USA, UK, USSR) 106 TOTAL NPT STATES N?T AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITH icEA 61 NNW STATES 3
NW STATES (USA, UK, FRANCE) 64 TOTAL STATES WITH NPT AGREEMENTS NON-NPT AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITW IAEA 10 PROJECT AGREEMENTS (8 STATES) 14 UNILATERAL AGREEMENTS (9 STATES) 18 TRILATERAL AGREEMENTS 42 TOTAL STATES WITH NON-NPT AGREEMENTS
IAEA POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR SAFEGUARDS TIMELY DETECTION OF DEVERSION OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES DETERRENCE OF DIVERSION BY RISK 0F EARLY DETECTION e--%
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IAEA TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES FOR SAFEGUARDS SIGNIFICANT NUCICAR MSTFDIAL QUANTITY (KG)
PLUTONIUM 8 (ELEMENT)
URANIUM (U-233 ISOTOPE) 8 (ISOTOPE)
(ENRICHMENT &20% u-235) 25 (Is0 TOPE)
(ENRICHMENT <20% u-235) 75 (Is0 TOPE)
URANIUM (NU)
(ENRICHMENT = 0.711% u-235) 10,000 (ELEMENT)
(ENRICHMENT 40.711% u-235) 20,000 (ELEMENT)
THORIUM 20,000 (ELEMENT) m -
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IAEA TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES FOR SAFEGUARDS NUCLEAR MATERIAL ESTIMATED AND FORM CONVERSTON TIME fPLUT0fi!UM METAL / HEU,
7 - 10 DAYS
,u-2.n NITRATE OXIDE s
?LUTONIUM 1 - 3 WEEKS NON-IRRADIATED PUREMIX[HEU U-233 SCRAP OTHERj IRRADIATEDFUEL,(HEU PLUT0NIUM 1 - 3 MONTHS (u-233 FLEU ALL FORMS y flu ABOUT 1 YEAR lDU
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MAIN INSPECTION GOAL LIGHT WATER REACTORS
" TIMELY DETECTION" 0F THE ABSENCE OF ONE OR MORE FRESH AND/OR SPENT FUEL ASSEMELIES, USUALLY CONTAIN!NG LESS THAN 1 "SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY."
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fiAI!! INSPECTION GOAL ON-LOAD REFUELLED REACTORS "IIMELY DETECTION" 0F THE ABSENCE OF A NUMBER OF FRESH AND SPENT FUEL BUNDLES CONTAINING ONE On MORE "SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY" 0F NUCLEAR MATERIAL (ABOUT 150IRRADIATEDNUFUELBUNDLES).
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e MAIN INSPECTION GOAL RESEARCH REACTORS AND CRITICAL ASSEMBLIES
" TIMELY DETECTION" 0F THE REMOVAL OF FUEL ITEMS (ASSEMBLIES, RODS, BUNDLES, PLATES, PINS, ETC.)
CONTAINING ONE OR MORE "SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY" 0F NUCLEAR MATERIAL.
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VAlti ItiSPECTI W CO L BULK-HANDLING FACILITIES (REPROCESSINC, ENRICHiEllT AND FABRICATION PLANTS)
" TIMELY DETECTION" 0F THE DISAPPEAPJf1CE OF A "SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY" 0F NUCLEAR t%TERIAL.
THIS TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE A.N'0UNT HANDLED AT THE FACILITY AND ON THE MEASUREMEffT UNCERTAINTIES.
IAEA OBJECTIVES ACCURACY OF MATERIAL BALANCE AND FREQdENCYOFPHYSICALINVENTORYTAKING OPERATOR ACCURACY OPERATOR (7. OF THRUPUT FREQUENCY FACILITY TYPE OR INVCNTORV)
(NO,/YP.)*
ENRICHMENT 0.2 4
U FUEL FABRICATION 0.3 4/2/1 PU FUEL FABRICATION 0.5 4
POWER REACTORS 0.2 uPON REFUEL REPROCESSING, U 0.8 4
REPROCESSING, Pu 1.0 4
UNIRRADIATED SCRAP RECOVERY 2.0 4/2/1 STORAGE NA 4/2/1 RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT NA 4/2/1
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NUClfA9 INSTALLATIONS WIE IAEA SACEGWlDS AT E E END OF 1978 (t# PROX)
INSTALLATION TYPE FACILITY NLMEER (1977)*
(US)
F0WER REACTORS 112 (100)
(66)
CONVE:,SION/ FABRICATION 33 (36)
(13) eaICmENT 3
( 3)
(-)
REPROCESSINs 5
( 5)
(2)
RESEARCH REACTORS N O CRITICAL FACILITIES 170 (169)
(60)
SEPARATE STORAGE FACILITIES 22
(.12)
(7)
OTHER LOCATIONS 28
( 28)
(30)
SUBTOTAL 373 (353)
(178)
LOCATIONS OUTS!DE FACILITIES M1 EKG) 234 (206)
(---)
TOTAL E07 (559)
(178)
- N1143ERS FOR 1977 AND APPROXIt%TE US NUMBERS ARE SH0hH FOR REFERENCE.
I!UCLEAR PATERIAL lfEER 1AEA SAEGllV<DS
. AT TE 80 0F 1978 (TONNES)
TYPE
/4 OU'!T FLUTONIU4 (A) CONTAINED IN 1RRADIATED FUEL 21.3 (B) CONTAINED IN FUEL ELEMENTS *
(BUT NOT RECUlRED TO EE REPORTD) 25.0 (C) IN OTHER FCets 19.4 (D) TOTAL 65.7 URANilf1 (220% U-235)
(A)FISSILECONTENT 7.0 (B) TOTAL ELEMENT 11,8 URANIU4 ('20% U-235)
(A) FISSILE CONTENT 238,0 (B) TOTAL ELEMENT 10,318,0 SOURCE F%TERIAL (NU NO DU NO TH) 29,163.0
- FOR EXA9LE - FUEL NOT Y7 REMOVED FRCri CORE NO THEREFORE ESTIMATED SU IS NOT REPORTED.
i STATE SYSTFJS FOR ACCONIliG rid CWTiDL GF fiUCLEAR FATERIAL NPT REQUIRB4ENT ESTABLISH i'.* iNTAIN P14 SIC ELEM9JTS R EGU LAT I ONS/LI CEN S I NG/ COMP,LI ANCE INFORMATI0t SYSTEM TECFt1ICAL SUPPORT
tiPT IfffERNATION. S/FtGUARDS FRCM NEGOTIATION TO IMPLEt1ENTATION TREATY (NPT)
AGREEPE.NT (NPT T/PE)
SU3SIDIARYARRANGEMENTS(GENERALPART)
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS (PARTICU' AR FACILITY ATTAC!MEliTS)
INSPECTIONS
=
TiiE BASIC SAFEGUARDS APPROACli
- 1. EXAfilNATION CF INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE STATE.
- 2. COLLECTION OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AT INSPECTION.
- 3. EVALUATION OF ALL INFORMATION.
THE 2ASIC SAFEG'JARDS APPROACH
- 1. EXAMINATION DESIGN INFORMATION ACCOUf1 TING REPORTS (I R)
INITIAL REPORT (I C R)
ItNEffTORY CHANGE REPOPT (M 3 R)
MATERIAL BALANCE REPORT (P I L)
PHYSICAL IN{v'ENTORY LISTING SPECIAL REPORTS UNUSUAL INCIDENT OR CIRCUMSTANCE CHANGE IN CONTAINMENT AMPLIFICATION AND CLARIFICATION ADVANCE NOTIFICATIOf1S OF INTERtlATIONAL TRANSFERS N
h THE BASIC SAFEGUARDS APPROACH
- 2. COLLECTI0fl VERIFY DESIGN INFORMATION AD HOC VERIFY I R VERIFY CHANGES VERIFY INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS ROUTINE VERIFY REPORTS / RECORDS FOR CONSISTENCY VERIFY NUCLEAR MATERIAL VERIFY MUF, SRD, UNCERTAINTIES SFECIAL VERIFY INFORMATION IN REPORT INADEQUATE INFORMATION AVAILAFLE
THE BASIC SAFEGUARDS APPROACH
- 3. EVALUATION DETERMINE COMPLETENESS ACCURACY VALIDITY
ONSITE IilSPECTIONS --- KEY TO VERIFICATION OF INFORMATION BASIC MEANS MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY CONTAlt' MENT SURVEILLANCE 9
9 reg m -e.
MATERIAL ACCOUNTAf1CY (FUNDAMEllTAL) 1.
INITIAL INVEf1 TORY DETERMINAT!0ft 2.
PERPETUAL BOOK INVENTORY 3.
PERIODIC PHYSICAL INVEtlTORY VERIFICATION 4.
MATERIAL UNACCOUNTED FOR (MUF) we h w e a m.
CONTAlflMENT (COMPLEMENTARY) 1.
USES EXISTIt;G STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS 2.
ESTABLISHES PHYSICAL litTEGRITY 3.
PREVEitTS UNDETECTED MOVEMEtlT
6 SURVEILLANCE (C0tiPLEMENTARY) 1.
USES HUMAN OR ItJSTRUMENTAL OBSERVATION 2.
INDICATES MOVEMENT 9
6
THE STARTING POINT OF SAFEGUARDS
- 1. AFTER MINING AND ORE PRCCESSING 2
COMPOSITION AND PURITY SUITABLE FOR FABRICATION OR ISOTOPIC ENRICHMENT t
,,_L M
u&
THE TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS 1.
MATERIAL TRANSFERRED OUT OF STATE 2..
MATERIAL CONSUMED OR DILUTED NO L0t4GER USEAELE OR PRACTICALLY IRRECOVERABLE 3.
NON-t1UCLEAR ACTIVITIES (EXTEllT AGREED) em=.
--~~
a THE EXEMPTIOl1 FR0li SAFEGUARDS BASIS FOR EXEMPT!0t;:
USE CUAIJTITY
THE EXEMPTION FROM SAFEGUARDS EXEMPTION BASED ON USE 1.
GRAMS USED IN SENSORS 2.
N0ti-NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES 3.
PU WITH Pu-233 > 80
-m
. - -~~
t THE EXEMPTI0tt FROM SAFEGUARDS EXEMPTION DuE TO LIMITED GuANTITY 1.
1 KG Pu 2.
1 xc u-235 IN HEu (WEIGHT X ENRICHMENT) 3.
1 xe u-235 IN leu (wEicHT x 5 X ENRICHMENT SQUARED) 4.
10 TE NU AND Du (ENRICHMENT > 0.5%)
5.
20 TE Du (ENRICHMENT t,0.5%)
6.
20 TE TH
DISAGREEMEf1TS AllD IRREGULARITIES PROCEDURAL LEVELS 1.
OPERATOR / INSPECTOR INTERFACE 2.
STATE /IAEA CONSULTATION
- 3. BOARD OF GOVERNORS ll.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE TRIBUNAL 5.
un SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY
,