ML19262C496
| ML19262C496 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/27/1965 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-R-0279, ACRS-R-279, NUDOCS 8002140088 | |
| Download: ML19262C496 (6) | |
Text
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h Cds/2- 0 2.79 PDL "l col 19 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20545 Draft 3/27/65 REPORT ON SITING OF PC'AR REACTORS IN METROPOLITAM CE! TIERS The Advisory C.cunittee on Reactor Safeguards has been inforced by the Director of Regulation that representatives of the nuclear power induscry have, in recent weeks, visited him to explore the possibility of locating large power reactors in metropolitan areas. This letter is in response to your inquiry as to the views of the ACRS on this mbject.
This subjec~.; was discussed with me=bers of the AEC Regulatory Staff during the 62nd ACRS meeting on March 11-13, and the Special ACRS Meeting on March 26 and 27,1955.
In addition, a subco=sittee cet with the Regulatory Staff on March 20th.
The ACRS offers the following co: cents on the questien of locaticg large power reactors in metropolitan areas:
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( Draft 1.
The engineering of reactor safety has been a process of evolution. Much has been accomplished; core remains to be done. The larger power reactors now under con-structicn or described in current license applications represent a large step in this process of evolution.
However, considerable further improvements in safety are required before large power recetors may be located on k
sites close to population centers.
None of the large power reactor facilities now under construction or described in current license applications are considered caitable for location in metropolitan areas.
2.
A flexible position with respect to locating reactors close to cities should be esintained. License applicants should be encouraged to use imagination and to ecploy icproved provisions for safety. A suitabic channel for the early consideration of new facility concepts should continue t
to be available.
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3-Draft 3.
Designers should be encouraged to develop engineered safeguards of extremely high reliability and with provision to assure that such reliability can be deconstrated at all times.
4.
The quality of operation, maintenance and adm*.nistra-tive control, upon which dependability of engineered f
4 safcguards relics, must be further inproved.
5.
Guidance for designers and operators should be developed for location of reactors in cities.
.in connection with the last item the ACRS is considering the following tentative points:
(1)
The design goal for reactors being considered for metropolita a use should be the elimination of any possibility of a severe
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reactor accident.
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-4 Draft (2)
It would seem prudent to operate in metropolitan areas only reactors of a proven type, which do not represent a large extrapolation in power, involving radi:a1 changes in reactor design from reactors already in service.
In other words, reactors in cetropolitan areas should closely duplicate reactors with de=onstrable and favorab'e operating experience.
(3)
It euct c=ount to a practical certainty that under no circumstances will significant amounts of fiscion produ.ta reach the public. Provisions taken should include con-tainment of the refueling operation, spent fuel storage area, and radioactive vaste.
(4)
In order to assure a reliable containment, it is necessa.7 to establish in some way an upper limit to the energy release in any possible accident. Lhis energy release
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Draft should include nuclear excursion energy, stored thermal energy and chemical reaction energy.
(5)
The contain=ent should be adequately protected from missiles both fro = within and without, including those arising tram the disintegration of equipment.
(6)
Reliance should not be placed on valves to effect isolation of normally cperating ventilation systems, e
k (7)
A design goal for instrumentation and control systems including all electronic cnd mechanical devices should be that all safety systems are fail-safe including consideration of effects of fire, steam, and other possible environments.
(8)
Improved reliability of e=ergency power supplies appears required. Or, in lieu of that, the facility should require no caergency electric power.
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. Draft (9)
The possibility of simultaneous independent failures should not be neglected in evaluating engineered safeguards.
(10)
Primary reliance for safety should not be placed en procedural control methods.
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