ML19262A397

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Responds to NRC Requesting Addl Info Re 761015 Analysis of RCS Response to Pressure Transients at Low Temp. Forwards Revised Analysis Answers to Questions
ML19262A397
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 03/22/1977
From: Arnold R
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO.
To: Reid R
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GQL-0332, GQL-332, NUDOCS 7910290463
Download: ML19262A397 (27)
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{{#Wiki_filter:NRCropu 195 U.s. nucle An aEcutarony couwissioN ocCKET NUMa# 8 jQ '2.% ). ss us NRC nlSTRIBU ilON con .T 50 DOCKET M ATERI AL FROM: DATE or cocuusNT TO: Metropolitan Ediscin Compan, 3/22/77 Mr. Robert W. Reid Reading, Pa. DATE nrcCivto R. C. Arnold 4/25/77 hrTE a Onoronizto PaoP INPUT FORM Nub 8ER OF COPIES RECEIVCo g ucLASs Fito gg jl c8NAL oESCRIP Tio N ENCLOSURE 1 Consists of'a" revised analysis of Reactor aj-Co o 1 a n % S wa t enea q.s pe'ns e t o. pr e.sou r e t.p ns.ia r.;4. .~ at low *f c: perature %ith attached drawings.....- )- 3[ .[ff-pr/#'? 4 ,348 4 035 (2-P) (31-P) ./ ) PI. ANT NAME- - ~ ~ Three Mile Isl td Un t No.' 1 44 I fn Li S LA.) I 'V c c g y. RJL S.'.FETY FOR ACTIOiJilNFOR?1 ATION r mfven ASSICNED AD: I / A99TcNen An. /BRANC.9 CHT7:! ! K 4.1 6 w nc-cur- ;. TPROJEITMANAGER; I 'c. w 4 f "Li % PROJECT MA"AGER: 3 Mj ved N) LIC. ASST. : M"LIC. /.SST. : i .lu _ _._ _ __INTE R fJ A L D_lST RI BU TalCN ~~ PJ W SYSTEMS SAFETY I I PLANT SYSTEMS I SIN SA7ETY f. ^ &C FDR HEINEMAN I TEDESC0________. L ENVIRO A'11 LYSIS 'I &.E (~L) SCHRCEDER - BJLNAROYA _. - DENT.ON & M'T T TS - l CELD LATU R e.___ COSSICK & STAPF I ENGINEERING IPPOLITO I I Et_* VIRO **ECR. / MIPC t MACARRY I KIRK;,'OCD I I E NST CASE B OS!Lt.** I l l BALLA.RD HANAUER SIlr4 :L l OPERATING REACTORS ! l YOU'iG3LOCD HARLESS PA'JLICKI I STELLO I I SITE TECH. PROJECT MANACEMENT I l REACTOR SAFETY I I OPERATING TECH. I CAMMILL BOYD ROSS 1/l EISENHUT STEPP P. CCLLINS NOVAK lif SHAO HULMAN ',% E R ~2.) HOUSTON ROSZTOC2Y 68" PETERSON CHECK N BLTLER SITE ANALYSIS MELT 2

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u / / A ~f M ' 5 m,araa m c m / / l METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY u sv:uar ar ca.e w. puwc ununes cc.,poner. 2.l POST OFFICE BOX 542 READING, PENNSYLVANI A 19603 TELEPHONE 215 - 929-3601 GQL 0332 March 22, 1977 ) Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attu: Robert W. Reid, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. h U. S. Nuclear Reactor Regulatory Coc=ission Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sir:

~ Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 Docket No. 50-289 Operating License DPR-50 An analysis of Reactor Coolar^, System response to pressure transients at lov te=perature was forwarded on October 15, 1976. Enclosed is a revised analysis and ansvers to remaining additional questions forwarded with your letter of Dece=ber 13, 1976. The aajor changes are as follows: 1. Appendix "A" has been added to the evaluation to respond to the lh additional NRC questions. 2. NRC vanted 10 minutes operator reaction time to be available before 550 PSIG vould be exceeded. This was achieved for the event of the makeup valve failing full open by the folleving two changes (in original evaluation, aressure reached 55C PSIG in 5.5 minutes): a. Re-calculation of the pressure transient using the compute.~ code DYSID which accounts for steam condensed in the pressurizer during compression of the stes bubble. This decreases the rate of p: essure rise. The previous calculation did not account for steam condensed,vhich was overly conservative. b. The initial pressurizer level was changed from Hi Hi level alars point to the Hi level alarm point. Levels up to the Hi Hi level alarm point vould satisfy the 10 =inute operator reaction time with RC System pressure of 100 PSIG or less. 1484 036

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn: Robert W. Reid, Chief Page 2 GQL 0332 3 The analysis of an erroneous addition of nit:rgen to the pressurizer has been revised to account for the use of a newly installed regulator. Based upon the results of this analysis, we have determined that no design =odifications are necessary. As indicated in our letter GQL 0020 of January 12, 1977, proposed additional ad=inistrative controls, if dee=ed necessary, vill be sub=itted by April 6,1977 Sincerely, Siped - R. C. Ameld R. C. Arnold Vice President RCA:JJM:rk Enclosure 1484 037 File: 02.0016.0C01.CC01.02

EVALUATION OF POTE:CIAL REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATION 1. Purpose The p'a ae this evaluation is to exsmine the syste= design and operation fe M eeptabi ity to overpressurization events during start-up and shutdevn and to oeter=ine the pressure respcase of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) to potential avents which cause pressure increases. 2. jver.ts Evaluated The events examined in this evaluation were: Erroneobs actuation of the High Pressure Injection (HPI) System. a. b. Erroneous opening of the core flood tank discharge valve. c. Erroneous addition of nitrogen to the pressurizer. d. Makeup control valve (=akeup to the RCS) fails full open. AllpressurizerheSterserroneouslyenergized. e. f. Te=porary loss of the Decay Heat Re= oval System's capability to re::cve decay heat from the RCS. g. Ther=al expansion of RCS after starting an RC pump due to stored ther=al energy in the steam generator. 3 Results of Event Evaluatien 31 General For events which cause the RCS pressure to increase, the pressure vill increase significantly faster in a " solid water" system than it vill in a systes with a steam or gas space. The RCS always operates with a steam or gas space in the pressurizer; no operations involve a " solid water" condition, other than systes hydrotest. Two redundant and diverse =ethods will provide overpressure protecticn for postulated events. These are: (1) cperator action to ter=inate the ever.t, and (2) the pilot actuated relief valve located on the pressurizer. The steas or gas space in the pressurizer vill provide a time period of 10 minutes or more before the pressure vill exceed 550 PSIG thus providing the cont:cl room operaeor with a=ple time to ter=inate an event before an overpressurization condition is reacb9d. The pilot actuated relief valve vill terminate the pressure increase at 530 PSIG for an event without operator action. The overpressure protection provided complies with single failure criteria because the two =ethods are redundant and diverse. Considering the modest rate of pressure rise (because of non-solid pressurizer)from the events and the high level alar =s in the pressuri er and other alar =s that would nor= ally alert the operator, it is reasenable to expect the operator to terminate the event prior to reaching an overpressurization condition. However, without operator action, the pilot actuated relief valve located on the pressuriser vill ter=inate sny pressure increase, thus preventing an overpressurizatien conditien. 1484 038 - 1

EVALUATICU OF FOTE'ITIAL REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATION 31 General - continued minutes The original evaluation (submitted to NRC) indicated less than 10 for the pressure to exceed 550 PSIG in the event of the makeup valve to the RCS failing full open. Two changes have been =ade to lengthen the ti=e to 10 minutes or more, these are: (1) The original evaluation of the pressurizer pressure response assumed no condensation of the pressurizer steam on the cooler vessel vall or on the cooler liquid interface with the steam during the compression of the stea= bubble. The pressure response for the makeup valve failing full open event has been re-evaluated using the computer code DYSID which does account for the heat transfer from the higher temperature steam bubble to these cooler surfaces. No =ixing of the cooler insurge water with the hotter pressurizer liquid was used. (2) The original evaluation of the pressurizer pressure response was based on the initial pressurizer water level being at the high high level alarm point. In this re-evaluation,.the initial pressurizer water level has been changed to the high level alarm point. During the startup and shutdown conditions at te_'.peratures below the Decay Heat Remval System " cut-in" temperature, a level above the high level alarm point will be permitted only at RC pressures a of 100 PSIG or less. A dual setpoint is utilized for the pilot actuated relie f valve to provide overpressure protection during startup snd shutdown. conditions. The lover setpoint is enabled by actuation of a switch in the control room during the plant cooldown prior to startup of the Decay Heat Removal System at 250F RCS te=perature. Characteristics of this valve at the lower setpoint are: Open Setpoint 550 PSIG Close Setpoint 500 PSIG Steam capacity at 550 25,985 lb/hr FSIG Equivalent liquid insurge volume rate into pressurizer 2,650 GPM Liquid capacity @ 550 PSIG 550 GFM Nitrogen capacity @ 550 PSIG 32,h20 lb/hr Equivalent liquid insurge volume rate into pressurizer 2,35J GPM All events involving insurge to the pressurizer were evaluated with the pressurizer and =akeup tank vater levels initially at high levels. For the pressurizer an initial water level at the high level alar = setpoint uss used for an initial pressure above 100 PSIG and an 2 - 1484 039

EVALUATION OF PCTE7TIAL REACTCR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATION 31 General - continued initial water level at the high alar = setpoint var used for an initial pressure of 100 PSIG or below. The relationship of these levels to the other pressurizer water level setpoints are: 0" h00" Level Indicating range H1 h high le w alar = 315" 6 260" High level alar: 220" Nor=al level 200" Lov level alar = 80" Lov level interlock (heater cut-out) and alar = For the makeup tank, which is the nor=al suction source for the =aheup/ The HPI pu=p, a water level at the high level alar = setpoint was used. relationship of this level to the other makeup tank level setpoints is : 0" - 100" Level Indicating range 66" High level alar = T3" Nor=al level 55" Lov level alar = The initial pressurizer level used for the event affects the rate of pressitre increase; the lower the initial level, the slower the pressure increase vi:.1 be. The initial pressurizer level used does not affect the peak pressure reached except for events involving injection to the RCS; lover levels can result in peak pressures less than 550 psig where the source of injection water is exhausted before the pressure reaches the relief valve setpoint at 550 psig. 3.2 Erroneous Actuation of the HPI System This event is not credible because the circuit breakers for the closed HP injection motor operated valves are " racked out" during the plant cocidown prior to startup of the Decay Heat Re= oval System. These valves are MU-V16A,B, C&D on FSAR Figure 9-3 Startup of the Decay Heat Re= oval Syste= occurs at an RCS te=perature of 250 F. Erroneous Opening of the Core Fleed Tank Discharge Valve This event is not credible because this valve is closed and, the circuit breaker for the =otor operator is "r ked out" during the plant Noldown before the RCS pressure is decreased to 600 psig. Erroneous Addition of Nitrocen to the Pressurizer Nitro 6en is added to the pressurizer during plan cooldown at an RCS pressure of 200 psig or less. The nitrogen source is two banks of six bottles each. With the erroneous addition pressurizer water level at the high high level alar = setpoint, of the contents of all twelve bottles to the pressuri er vould not increase RG pressure to 550 psig. somet.=es us ed. Analysis of an erroneous addition frc= i A supplementary nitrogen supply it, this source is not yet co=plete, but vil'. be forwarded with f.d=inistrative Controls to be provided by April 6. 1484 040

EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATICM 3.5 Makeup Control Valve (Fakeup to the RCS) Fails Full Open This valve is MU-VIT on FSAR Figure 9-3 and is auto =atically contr:lled by the pressurizer level controller. The pressure response of the FCS to tais event is shown on Figures 1 and 1A. If it is assu=ed that the operator does not take action to terninate the event during the pressure increase, the peak RCS pressure 's li=ited to 550 psig by the pressurizer pilot actuated relief valve. Initial conditions used for the analysis were: 260" pressurizer water level (high alar = setpoint) for 275 PSIG initial a. pressure. b. 315" pressurizer water level (high high alar = setpoint) for 100 PSIG initial pressure 86" =akeup tank vater level (high level alar =) c. 32" GPM total seal injection flow to RC pu=ps (auto =atically controlled) d. e. h5 GPM letdown flow fro = RCS to =akeup tank to spray into pressurizer (nor= ally there vould be during cooldown). f. Figure 1 is for an initial RCS pressure of 275 PSIG. This is the RCS pressure at which the Decay Heat Re= oval Syste= is started up during plant cooldown or at which the RC pu=ps are started during plant heatup. Figure 1 depicts two pressure response curves. One pressure response curve is for the initial pressurizer vater level at the high aler= setpoint (260") and the cther pressure response curve is for the initial level at the nor=al level (220"). At this pressure (275 PSIG) during the startup or shutdown operation, the level vould normally be below the nor=al level of 220" which would result in e=ptying of the =akeup tank and ter=ination of the transient at a pressure much lover than 550 PSIG. Figure lA is for an initial RCS pressure of 100 PSIG vhich is about the lovest 'lCS pressure at which the =akeup syste= vould be in operation. Two pressure response curves are depicted; one for an initial level at the high high alar = setpoint ( 315") and one at the nor=al level (220"). The level during the cooldown operation at a pressure of 100 PSIG could be above the normal level of 220". The pressure response for Figures 1 and 1A vas determined by using the co=puter code DYSID as described previously. Relief through the pressurizer relief valve vi: . ter=inated by operator action (stop =akeup pu=p or close =akeup line isulation valve) or without operation action when the makeup tank water volene is exhausted. Peak insurge rate into the pressurizer is 245 GPM. In addition to the alar =s shown on Figures 1 and 1A, other alar =s and indications which would alert and aid the uperator in evaluating the event are: ?ressurizer high level alar =(s) a. (with initial level below high high setpoint which would be nor=al) b. Higher than nor=al =akeup line flev rate indication _ h - 1484 041

EVALUATICJ OF FCTENTIAL REAC"CR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATIO 3.5 continu2d Lover than nor=al makeup pu=p discharge pressure c. Full cpen indicating light for makeup valve d. High te=perature alar = for relief valve discharge line (after relief e. valve relieves) Hi6 er than nor=al RCS pressure indication h f. Higher than nor=al pressurizer level indication g. 3.6 All Pressurizer Heaters Errenecusly Energized If The pressure response of the RCS to this event is shown on Figure 2. it is assu=ed that the operator does not take action to terminate the event during the pressure increase, the peak RCS pressure limited to 550 psig by the An initial pressurizer water level pressurizer pilot actuated relief valve. of 90 inches (10 inches above icv level heater cut-out interlock) was used because the IcVer water level results in the fastest pressure increase. Even with the lov level, the pressure increase is very slev. The pressurizer water level vill not change during this event as it is being automatically The heaters are generating 1625 lbs, of steam per hour in the controlled. In additien to the alar:s shown en Figure 2, other 500 to 550 psig range. alarms and indication which would alert and aid the operator in evaluating the event are: Hidher than normal RCS pressure indication, Higher than nor=al letdevn flev rate indication to =akeup tank (due a. b. to increasing RCS pressure), Higher than nor=al makup lire flev rate indication due to increasing c. letdcen flev rate. High temperature alarm for relief valve discharge line (after reliof d. valve relieves), The "On" indicating lights " lit" for all pressurizer heater banks. e. Relief through the pressurizer relief valve vill be ter=inated by operator action (deenergize heaters). Without operation action, the heaters vill be deenergized when the pressurizer water level drops to the heater cut-out interlock setpoint. Since pressurizer water level is en automatic centrol, water is transferred autc=atically frc= the =akeup tank to the RCS to For an initial makeup replace that which is lost through the relief valve. tank level at the high alaru setpoint, it veuld take six (6) hours to empty the makeup tank and thus result in pressurizer water level decreasing to the heater " cut-cut" setpoint. Te=perary Loss of recay Heat Re= oval Sy ste=s Capability to Remove recay Heat 3.7 Frc= the RCS If it The pressure response of the RCS to this event is show= cn Figure 3 is asst =ed that the operator does not take acticn tc ter=inate the event during the pressure increase, the peak RCS pressure is limited to 550 psig Less of decay heat re=cval by the pressurf:er pilot actuated relief valve. capability could only be caused by less of flev in the Oecay Heat Re=cyal er in the ecoling water system serving the Decay Heat Re=cval Syste=. Syste: Loss of flew in either systen veull inmediately actuate lov flev alarm (s), 5-1484 042

EVALUATION OF FOTENTIAL REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSURIaTICN 3.7 centinued Relief through the pressurizer relief valve thus alerting the operator. vill be terminated by operator action restoring the decay heat re= oval Insurge rate into the pressurizer is 120 gp= in the 500 to function. The pressure respense was deter =ined by the 550 psig pressure range.Conditions used in this pressure respense analysis co=puter cede DYSID. were: Event occurs during cocidown after startup of Decay Heat Re=cval a. Syste= and shutdevn of stea generaters. Pressurizer level at 260 inches, normally it vould be near 220 inches, b. Cooldown to the Decay Heat Re= oval Syste: " cut-in" te=perature at c. 100 F/hr., this produces =aximu= decay heat generation rate. All decay heat absorbed by reactor ecolant, no heat absorbed by the d. metal ec=ponents or by the stea generators. Actually, these are heat absorbing sinks. 32 gp= total seal injection flow to RC pu=ps (aute=atically controlled). e. h5 sp= initial letdevn for= RCS to makeup tank with no increase due f. to increasing pressure, g. No spray into pressurizer. 3.8 Start of an RC Pu=p with Stored Ther=al Energy in OTSG Secon:iary Several postulated situations have been exa=ined which =ay lead to pri=ary fluid expansion due to energy absorption frc= hot OTSG secondary water after The two types of situations which lead to possible star. of an RC pu=p. RCS pressurization have been identified as follows : Type A. Filling of OTSG secondary side with het vater with subsequesnt start of an RC pu=p, and Restart of an RC pu=p during heatup followin6 a period of stagnant Type 3. (no flev) conditions. 3.8.1 Start of an RC Pu=p Under Type A Cenditien Figure #h presents results of RCS pressure versus ti=e for the verst case Type A (see above) conditien. Initial cenditions for this transient are a result of filling of the stea generators with feedvater at h20 F. This te=perature is 'a result of the failure of the feedvater heating centrols causing auxiliary stea= flow to the heaters to produce a feedvater te=perature in excess of i the allovable value of 225 F for OTSG fill operations. The te=pera-i ture of the feedvater in the OTSG secondary side following the l filling operation reaches a te=perature of 2h0 F as does the primary vater contained in the RCS at elevatiens greater than the lower l This is a result of the heating of OTSG tubes OTSG tubesheet. j and primary water during CTSG filling where heated primary water circulates to a li=ited extent thrcush the FCS. At the end of the filling operatien, the RCS vater located telev the CTSG lever t tubesheet re=ains at the initial value of 1hC F. i _6_ .I484 043

EVALUATION OF FGTE7TIAL REACTOR VESSEL OVERPRESSWIZATION 3.8.1 centinued The pri=ary syste= pressure versus ti=e as shovt in Figure h is based en an initial pressurizer level at the =axinum value of the high-high level alarm for a 177 FA plant. The initial pressurizer level is nor= ally kept much lover to mini =1ze the heating require-ments for raising the pressurizer temperature and pressure in prepa-ration of starting an RC pump. The initial pressure is 300 psig, which is well above the nor=al pressure required prior to starting an RC pu=p. No credit has been take for pressurizer level control. The pressurizer level increased during the transient by 30 inches; the level veuld have to rise an additional 70 inches before entering the upper head. Other conditions of primary and secondary te=peratures which =ay exist prior to starting of an RC pump have been evaluated and are bcanded by the results of Figure 4. These conditions include the situation where the feedvater te=perature entering the OTSG's during filling operations is at the nor=al maxi =u= value of 225 F but the operator fills the stea: generators beyond the =aximum allevable level and completely fills the steam genrators. In addi-tion, the resulte presented here beund in the case where the initial RCS te=pertture is 50 F before filling the stea= generators. 3.8.2 Start of an RC Pump Under Type B Condition Figure #5 presents results of RCS pressure versus ti=e for the Type B conditions (see above). Initial conditions for this transient are a result of the accu =ulation of pu=p seal injection and makeup injection water in the RC cold leg piping during stagnant (nc flow) conditions. Although the operator is required to initiate = cool-devn of the RCS if RC p =pe are inoperable and RC temperature >250 F (Plant Limit and Precautions), the assu=ption is =ade that the operator fails to de so while allowing =akeup and seal injection water temperature to drop to 50 F, which is below the minimum value of RC te=perature less 120 F. The cold water is assumed to accu =ulate in the RC cold leg piping without =ixing with het RC vater. The RC pu=p is started felleving a period of one hour of stagnant (no flev) conditions in the RC System. The pri=ary system pressure versus ti=e as shown in Figure 5 is based en an initial pressurizer level at the maxi =u= value of the high-high level alar for a 177 FA plant. The initial pressure is h50 psig which is approximately midway between the Tech Spec and RC pu=p NPSH pressure limits at 275 F. No credit has been taken for pressurizer level centrol. The decrease in pressure at approxi- =ately 2 minutes is a result of hot RC primary fluid entering a steam generator which has been eccled by the passage of the slug of lov te=perature RC fluid ( the mixing of RC fluid and heat transfer through the OTSG tubing brings the RC fluid to a constant te=perature and produces a net contraction of the fluid and a decrease in system pressure at final eqc***4"- conditiens). The pressuri:er level increases during the transient by 13 inches; the level vcu'd have to rise an additional 37 inches bercre entering the upper head. 1484 044

O EVALLATION OF POTCTIAL REACCCR '/ESSEL OVERPRESSURIZATI0!i 3.8.2 continued The pressure response calcualtion for Figures k and 5 did not assu=e any steam cendensation during ccepression of the pressurizer steam bubble. h. Conclusions The preceding evaluation e.nd ar.alysis de=enstrates that the reactor vessel is protected frc= cverpressuri:ation during events which cause increasing pressure ccebined with an assu=ed single failure of either of the two redundant methods cf everpressure protection. 1484 045

8 APPENDIX A RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FCR ADDITIONAL INFORMATICN Recuest No. 1 This requested the schedule provided on December 13, 1976. Recuest No. 2 The criteria discussed at the Nove=ber 5 =eeting are listed below:

1) Credit for operator action
2) Single failure criteria
3) Testabflity h) Seismic design and IEEE 279 criteria Provide infor:ation regarding how you intend to =eet t>2 design criteria as identified by the staff during the Nove=ber 5th =eeting. Where deviations from the criteria are contemplated, please provide a detailed justification including the technical basis for not =eeting the criteria and, when significant, the i= pact on the schedule for implementaticn. Describe all redundant and diverse systems which are available to provide overpressure protection.

Rescense Credit for coerator action - One of the redundant =ethods which provides over-pressure protection is operator action to terminate the event before an over-pressure condition is reached. As conservatively shown in Section 3, the operator has more than 10 minutes to take action for the most rapid event (Makeup ralve failing full cpen). If this event were to actually occur under realistic conditions rather than the conservative assu=ptions and initial conditions used for this evaluation, the operator would have a =uch longer time to react or may not even have to react at all. Sinele Failure criteria - The two =ethods which provide overpressure protection as described in Section 3 are redundant and diverse; thus single failure criteria is satisfied. Testability - The pilot actuated relief valve can be tested during the plant cooldown to de=cnstrate its operational capability. This can be done either by (1) opening and closing the valve using the re=ote controls in the centrol roc =, or (2) with the lover setpoint enabled, input a simulated high pressure signal to confir= that the valve autc=atically opens at the lover setpoint. Seis=le design - Detailed stress analyses have been perfor=ed for the pilot actuated relief valve in accordance with ASME Section III, Class I requirements. The valve design has been found to be adequate for Class 1 application. Stresses are shown to be within the allovables as specified in ASME Section III, 1971 Editien. Through conservative calculations, the natural frequency is shown to be greater than SCO H:, well above seis=ic exitation frequencies, and the =axi=wn axial plus bending stress in the pilot assembly connecticn pipe due to seis=ic motion of 3 0 g horizontal and 3.Cg vertical is significantly lover than the allowable. Testing with si=ulated seismic loadings has not been performed as this was not a require =ent at the time this plant was designed and constructed. The Makeup Syste= is the source cf a potencial increasing pressure transient but it can increase pressure to 550 PSIG cnly if the pressurizer level is 1484 046 initially above normal, as shcvn in Section 3. The Makeup Syste= is not

0 APPENDIX A Seismic design _- continued nor= ally operated with the plant in a cold shutdown condition. It is operating for only a few hours during the initial stage of plant heatup and the latter stage of cooldown operations when the RCS temperature is below the could It might be argued that a major seis=ic event reactor vessel RT'fDm. result in a non-o erable conditien for the pilot actuated rei_ef valve because it has not been demonstrated otherwise by actual testing. However, it is considered incredible that all of the following would occur concurrently. Plant is in initial stage of plant heatup or latter stage of plant 1 of vessel. cooldown with temperature below the RT777 2. A seis=ic event of large =agnitude occurs. 3 The pressurizer water level is above nor=al. h. The makeup tank water level is above normal. 5 The makeup valve fails full open. 6. The control roo= operator fails to take action. 7 The pilot actuated relief valve fails to open. For six plant shutdowns per year, the Makeup Syste: vould be operating for a It total of approx. 2 days per year when te=perature is below vessel RTis cons e vould not occur concurrently in a specific several hour period which occurs only six ti=es in a year. IEEE 270 criteria - The installed electrical control circuit for the pilot actuated relief valve was not designed to meet the requirements of IEEE 279 This was not a require =ent when the plant was designed and constructed, nor is it necessary to do so now. The overall overpressure protection syste= for postulated events during shutdown conditions consists of (1) a stea= or nitrogen bubble in the pressurizer which provides the control roo: operator sufficient ti=e to terminate an event, and (2) the pilot actuated relief valve located on the pressurizer. The two sub-systems are separate and independent and to-gether they are single failure proof. The actuation of the -relief valve is testable and its relief capacity has been deter =ined by test. Thus, the overall protection syste= =eets the intent of IEEE-279 There is no need or require =ent for one of the two redundant sub-systems individually to =eet the intent of IIII-279 _Recuest No. 3 Provide sche =atic piping and instrumentation diagrams of all syste=s which are shutdown and startup operations, indicate pri=ary and al-utilized during plant ternate flow paths, fluid and heat scurces, pressure and flow centro 11ers, RCS pressure protection syste=s, and ICCS and =ake up syste=s. A-2 1484 047

Response

These are enclosed. Request No. h Provide a failure = odes and effects analysis of the overpressure protection syste= for startup, 3h' tdown, and testing operations which defines the li=iting u ec=bination of initiating event and additional single failure or operator error subsequent to. initiation of the overpressure transient. Restense The li=iting single failure vould be failure of the pilot actuated relief valve to open. With failure of this subsyste= of the overpressure protection syetes, the redundant subsyste=, which is operator action, vill terminate the traisient produced by an initiating event. The initiating event which produces the fastest rate of pressure increase vill result in the shortest time available for the operator to ter inate the transient. Thus, the limiting co=bination of initiating event and additional single failure vould be an initiating event with the fastest rate of pressure rise ec:bined with single failure of the pilot actuated valve. For plant cooldown and heatup operations, the li=iting combination is failure of the =akeup control valve to the fall cpen position ec=bined with failure of the pilot actuated valve to open. For the =ost li=1 ting set of initial conditions, the operator has ten =inutes, which is = ore than sufficient, to terminate the transient. This transient is shown in Section 3 5 of the evaluation. In the plant shutdevn condition with the Makeup Syste= shutdown, the li=iting ec=bination is te=perary less of decay heat re=ov l ec=bined with failure of a the pilot actuated relief valve to open. Section 3 7 of the evaluation shows that the operator has 30 =inutes to ter=inate the transient based en an initial RCS te=perature and pressure of 250 F and 275 PSIG. In the plant shutdown conditien with the Makeup Syste= shutdevn, the operator veuld have = ore than 30 =inutes to ter=inate the transient because the decay heat 6eneration rate vould be less and the initial RCS te=perature and pressure would be less than 180F and 100 PSIG. During testing the operation of concern would be any test of HP injection into the RCS or operation of a makeup pu=p after =aintenance or for periodic operation. For operation of the =akeup pu=p the initiating event would be the open failure - of the =akeup valve, and the single failure is failure of the pilot a:tuated relief valve; hcVever, cperator action vill ter=inate the transient. The operator has longer than 10 =inutes because initial RCS pressure would be less than 100 psig. A-3 1484 048

0 APPENDIX A Recuest No. 5 Indicate for your lov te=perature overpressure protection syste= how the system has been designed to handle co==on failure =cdes such as those resulting frou loss of offsite power e=d seismic events. Describe the failure = ode of the air cperated =akeup flev control valve and the letdcun flow centrol valve upcn loss of air supply. Identify the events / failure = odes which cculd result in loss of air supply. Restense The two sub-syste=s (or =ethods) of the overpressure protection syste= are sufficiently independent and diverse so that there is not a kncvn failure = ode which' cc==caly could defeat bcth subsyste=s. A loss of offsite power vill not affect the pressurizer stea= bubble or the operator's action ability. A loss of off-site power also vill not affect cperation of the pilot actuated relieve valve. Fever for the instru=entation which controls the pilot actuated relief valve and other para =eter indications and alar:s vill be supplied either by the diesel generator or batteries for a loss of offsite power. A seis=ic event vill not affect the pressurizer stea= bubble or the operators' action ability. A seismic event also should not affect operation of the pilot actuated relief valve; refer to the Response to Request No. 2 for further discussion. The air operated =akeup flev control valve and the letdown flow control valves all fail closed upon loss of air supply. Since this failure mode is a safe =cde, identification of failure =cdes causing a loss of air supply is not necessary. Recuest No. 6 Discuss the basis for deter =ining the :: cst limiting initial conditions for analysis of the overpressure transient. Ite=s that must be considered include but should not be li=ited to: RCS pressure, valve opening time, stea= generator te=perature difference, reactor ecolant pu=p seal pressures, pressurizer level, =akeup tank level, accu =uaator pressure, relief valve water relief capacity, and pu=p heads and flevs.

Response

This infor=ation is contained in Section 3 of the evaluation and in the response to request No. 7 Fcileving is other infor=ation which is 'not contained in the locations noted above. Any valve involved in injection to the RCS has been assu=ed to open instantaneously. Actual opening ti=e vould be approximately 10 seconds. RC pump seal pressure is not involved in the initial condition other than the fact that the Makeup Syste= shculd be in operation to supply seal injection whenever RC pressure is abcve 100 PSIG. The. liquid relief capacity of the pilot actuated relief valve has been deter =ined by the basic for=ula for liquid capacity using a conservative value for backpressure. The resulting subeccled liquid relief rate of 550 GFM was confir=ed by an isentropic expansion analytical =cdel. Pu=p heads and flows used were taken frc= the =anuf acturers' certified test curve. A-4 1484 049

0 APPENDIX A Rec _uest No. 7 Please provide a transient analysis of the reactor coolant syste= respense to inadvertent actuation of a single train of high pressure injection pu=ps. Describe what ad=inistrative centrols and precedures are used during startup and shutdown, and during ec=ponent and/cr syste= testing to justify the assu=; tion that in-advert =ent injection by = ore than ene high pressure train is net credible. Provide a si=ilar discussion and analysis of a core fleed tank discharge. For both situa-tiens indicate the basis for identifying the li=iting single failure or ecc=ca failure = ode. Respense Figure A-1, attached, presents the analysis requested. The pressure response of the RCS for actuation of one EPI train is shown for initial pressurizer water levels at the hi level alarn (260") and at nor=al level (220") for initial pressures of 275 PSIG and 100 PSIG. The pressure respense was calculated using the ec=puter code DYSID. Let devn flev was not used in the calculation. The pilot ectuated relief valve has a stea= (or nitregen) relief capacity greater than the injection rate of two EPI trains and a liquid relief capacity equal to or greater than the injection rate of one EPI train. This event is considered not credible because the circuit breakers for the nor= ally closed HP injection =otor operated valves are " racked cut" during the plant cocidown prior to starup of the Decay Heat Re- = oval System. The breakees would net be " racked in" during plant hec. tup until RC3 te=perature reaches 250F. An analysis of a core ficod tank discharge was perfor=ed. The conservative initial conditions used vere: 1. 6ho PSIA CF tank pressure (Tech. Spec. =aximu= pressure) 2. 400 Ft3 CF tank nitrogen volute (Tank Spec =aximu= level) 3. 315" (Hi Hi level alar =) pressurizer water level 4 275 PSIG RCS pressure (=iddle of pressure "vindow" or higher-pressure "vindev" is aliovable pressure band for startup of the ecay Heat Re= oval Syste= during plant cooldown). The calculation was perferned without stea= condensation in the pressuri er or nitregen te=perature decrease in the CF tank during the surge, both of which are conservative. The equilibriu= pressure reached (at the end of the discharge) is L,:0 PSIG vhich is significantly less than the 550 PSIG allevable. This event also is censidered not credible because the CT ;ank discharge valve is closed and the breaker racked cut during the plant co11down before the RCS pressure is decreased to 600 PSIG. 1484 050 A-5

APPENDIX A It is difficult to identify a limiting single failure for an event that is not censidered credible. If, sc=ehov, EPI could be ac:uated, the limiting single failure vould be failure of the pilot actuated relief valve to cpen. The centrol roc = operator veuld stop the EPI pu=ps to terminate the transient. This chain of events vould require the following to cccur: 1. Operators f ail to " rack-cut" circuit breakers for the =otor operators of the EP injection valves during plant cooldown eveh though this operation is under strict ad=inistrative centrol. 2. HP injection is erroneously actuated. 3. The pilot actuated relier valve fails to open. This chain of events is two failures plus an incident; two failures are not required by the design criteria. However, even with two failures plus an incident, the control rec = cperater is able to ter=inate the transient. There is not a known ec==cn failure mode affecting both the pilot actuated relief valve and the centrol rec = cperator(s) Since CF tank discharge does not re-quire action by the centrol rec = cperater or the pilot actuated relief valve to limit the RCS pressure to 550 PSIG, a discussion of li=iting single failure or ec==en failure = ode is not applicable. Request No. 8 Dces your plant have relief capacity installed in the decay heat re= oval syste= (CHRS) l that could provide additional p s*ectica in the event of an overpressure transient, j What is the water relief capacity c. the valve? Is the decay heat re=cval syste= l autc=stically isclated en RCS high pressure. What are the pressure set points for the OHR relief valve Opening and its autc=atic isolation?

Response

TMI-l does have overpressurication relief capacity installed en the Decay Heat Re= oval Syste=. It consists -f five separate relief valves, each with a =ini=u= rating of one gallen per =inute. Three of these valves, located between the let-dcun frc= the RCS and the DHRS pump suction, (Tags DH-7-37 and OH-V-13A/3) relieve system pressure at k95 psig. The other two valves, located between the OHRS pump discharge and the inlet to the RCS syste= (Tag CH-V-18A/3) vill relieve system pressure at 520 psig. 4a-c 1484 051

APPENDIX A The C'ecay Heat Re= oval System is autcmatically isolated frc= *he Reactcr Ccclant Syste= on a hign pressure setpoir.c signal of 400 psig, as described in FSAR sections 9 5.2.7 and 7.3.2.2.1.c. The two autc=atically closed valves, tagged DH-V-1 and 2, are in series en the single pipe branch letdevn frc= the RCS hot leg which provides suction to the DHRS pu=ps. The two individual discharge return lines are each protected frc= the RCS pumps. The two indivi:iual discharge return lines are each protected frm: 06 E CS pressure by two ch.eck valves in series, DE-V-22A/3 and CF-V-5A/B. 2.e discharge pipe to the pressurizer spray line is protected by a check valve, RC-V-23, in series vita a nor= ally closed isolation valve, RC-V-4. Recuest No. 9 During the November 5th =eeting, the possibility of li=iting the volu=e of water in the RCS =ake up tank was discussed. It was stated that this could preclude filling the pressurizer if the =ake up centrol valve should fail open. Is this precedure a viable optien at your facility? Is water level in the Makeup Tank generally centrolled aute=atically? Specify your assu=ptions for initial pressurizer level, =ake up tank vr.ter volu=e, and other design considerations which would result in li=iting RCS pressure to within Appendix G limits. Restonse For the event of the =akeup valve failing full open, there is a =axi=u= vater volume in the =akeup tank (cc=bined with initial conditions in the pressurizer) which would prevent exceeding 550 PSIG. This calculated value is as follows (no =argin added): Initial pressurizer level 260" (H1) 315" (Hi Hi) Initial RCS pressure 275 PSIG 100 PSIG Max. =akeup tank liquid 26h0 Gal, 2830 Gal. Indicated level 66.5" Th.2" This maxi =u= =akeup tank liquid volu=e is approximately 7 in. below the "nor=al" level of 73 inches. The advantage of =aintaining the =akeup tank level at 66 inches or belev is not apparent. With this level =aintained at the hi level alar = cr belev, two redundant =ethods of ovarpressure protection are provi: led. During cocidown, this tank is very involved in the operations. The pressurizer level centroller is auto =atically re=oving water frem the tank to =akeup for RCS con-traction. The operator is re=ote manually adding feed to the =akeup tank to =aintain its inventory. A =cre restrictive li=it on =akeup tank inventcry veuld appear to un-necessarily hinder the operator in controlling makeup tank inventory and ensuring that proper suction cenditions exist for the =akeup pu=p. Restriction of the =akeup tank level to 66 in. level or below is a possible solutien for providing everpressure protecticn for the infrequent case of a plant eccidown with the pilot actuated relief valve isolated because of =alfuncticn or high leakage which cannot be tolerated. Recuest No. 10 Describe what instru=entation and alar s are available to the operater to aid in detection and termination of an overpressure transient. 1484 052 ^-7

AFFENDIX A Restense to Request No.10 This is described in Section 3 and en the associated figures. Request No. 11 'a'nat precautions are taken during startup, shutdown and testing to verify that critical precedural steps are perfor=ed to reduce the likelihood of inadvertently initiating an overpressure transient and minimizing ehe impact of the transient on the RCS. Would steps such as lock out of pu=ps and accu =ulators and reducing the water level in the pressurizer and =ake up tank be accc=plished by double check off and sign off procedures to insure against error? What procedures nor ally are followed for alt? ring the status of pu=ps or valves under administrative restriction? Restonse Procedure steps (both prerequisite and procedure) require initialling next to each step to indicate satisfactory co=pletion. As a precaution critical steps which must be perfor=ed under ad=inistrative restri.. tion are listed in either the prerequisites of or body of the procedure. Request No. 12 If power is removed from valves as part of administrative controls used for overpressure protection, what status lights and indicators are available to verify their proper align =ent. What ad=inistrative controls call for re=oving power from a valve or a pu=p, is this accc=plished from the control roo= or from a =otor control center: Reseense Status lights are available in the centrol room. Re= oval of power from the valve vill cause the indication to go out. Power is re=oved at the =otor control center o* bus. Request No. 13 Describe any testing procedure proposed to insure operation of overpressure devices. At what times would these tests be perfor ed? A-c 1484 053 i

0 APPEND.X A Operating signal for the Fressuricer Electrenatic Relief Valve (FC-R7-2) origi-nates frc= the Integrated Control System Nennuclear Instrumentatien, as noted in FSA? paragraph 7.3.2.2.3.c. Tests have been run under te=porary approved proc.edures with the unit in cold shutdown ccnditions. A signal was introduced to sti=ulate test pressures and actuation of the valve was verified. As required, such a test can be formally instituted as a per=anent procedure. As the basic intent is to verify the lever set point operability of the valve, it is carried cut as seen as pressure of the RCS is lovered to atmospheric. Any ti=e that the valve is repaired er adjusted during the shutdown, the test conducted before the RCS is repressurized above atmospherie. Request No. IL The problem of pressurization relief valve =aintenance was also discussed at the Nove=ter 5th =eeting. The relief valve is nor= ally isolated and recoved during shutdown conditions if =aintenance is required. This vould reduca the level of protection available to =itigate the consequences of a pressure transient. Please discuss what =easures vill be taken at your plant to provide overpressure protection when the relief valve is removed frc= service and indicate how the criteria enu=erated at the November 5th meeting vill be =et. Respense If the pilot actuated relief valve has been re=cved fro = service during a plant cooldown because of =alfunction or untolerable high leakage, this does recove one of the two redundant overpressure protection =ethods. For all credible pressure increasing events, the centrol rec = operator has sufficient ti=e to ter=inate the event before 550 psig pressure is reached. To provide redundant protection in this situation for failure of the =akeup eentrol valve, the =akeup tank level cnid be.aintained at or belov a level of 66 inches. In ec=bination with a pressurizer level belev the high level alarm (260) until RCS pressure i' 100 psig or be10v (pressurizer level new below the high-high alarm - 315), the ECS pressure vill not exceed 550 psig for failure of the =akeup control valve even withcut operater action to terminate the transient. I The c;her credible events either do not increase Ecs pressure to 550 psig or the pressure increase to 550 psig takes so long that it is unreasonable to assu=e that none of the control roc = cperators ter=inate the transient. Eheking out of the circuit breakers for the electric =otor operators of the HP injection valves and HP injection pu=p motors vill ensure that erroneous HPI actuation does not cecur. A-9 1484 054

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