ML19261F179
| ML19261F179 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/05/1974 |
| From: | Arnold R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| GQL-0132, GQL-132, NUDOCS 7910250599 | |
| Download: ML19261F179 (6) | |
Text
AEC DIc~~RI?U ICN FOR ? ART 50 COCKET h TIAL (TDtPORARY F0F.M)
CONTROL M:
6208 M,/.//
FILE:
DATE OF DOC DATE REC'D LTR T'a"X FJT' CTHER
_..qv aran Ediscn Company' Reading, PA R. C. Arnold 7-3-74 7-9-74 X
TO:
ORIG CC OT"rER SENT AEC PDR XXX,
Director 1 signed CLASS L7; CLASS PROP INTO INPUT NO CYS REC'D DCCKET NO:
XXX 1
50-239 E SCRIP'"I' N :
ENCLCSURES:
Ltr furn info re abnormal occurrence report OKNOWLEDGED
- 50-289/74-12 of 6-25-74 re high pressure injection valve MU-V16A failure to respond hQg to a signal from the control room pushbutton....
PLANT NAMF : THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT #1 FOR ACTIC: /I' JC72Lt. TIC:'
7 74 GMC BUTLER (L)
SCHWENCER (L)
ZIEMANN (L)
REGAN (E)
W/ CYS W/ CYS W/ CYS W/ CYS CLARK (L)
STOLZ (L)
DICKER (E)
LEAR W/ CYS W/ CYS W/ CYS W/ 7 CVS
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- HENDRIE GRIMES DIGGS (L)
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/CHROEDER GAMMILL GEARIN (L)
SALTZStei MUNTZING/ STAFF J CCARY KASTNER COULBOURNE (L)
B. HURT
/ CASE IGHT BALLARD KREUTZER (E)
GIAMBUSSO AWLICKI SPANGLER LEE (L)
PLUJS SOYD FHA 0 MAICR5T (L)
MCDONALD MOORE (L)(LWR-2) v5TELLO ENVIRO REED (E)
CHAPMAN DEYOUNG (L)(LWR-1)
OUSTON MULLER SERVICE (L)
DUBE w/ input KOVHOLT (L)
OVAK DICKER SHEPPARD (L)
E. COUPE OLLER (L)
CSS KNIGHTON SLATER (E)
P. COLLINS IPPOLITO YOUNGBLOCD
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!D. THOMPSON (2)
DENISE
/ EDESCO REGAN VTEETS (L)
/4LECKER ONG PROJECT MGR WILLIAMS (E)
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/ MORRIS ENAR0YA HARJ*sS
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY l _ ___
k ;OCT Ce:tCE BCX 542 ' RE.clNG, PENNSVLV ANI A 196C3 TELEPHONE 215 - 9 9CCc' s
July 5, 197h N.
GQL 0132
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Dear Sir:
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Operating License..?
_'.-7 Docket No. 50-2.
I In accordance with t te Technical Specifications for the Three Mile Island Nuclear Statien, Unit 1, we are reperting the following abnormal occur-rence:
(1) Report M=ber: A0 50-289/7h-12 (2a) Report Date: July 5, 197h (2b) Occurrence Date: June 25, 197h (3) Facility: Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1 (k) Identification of Occurrence:
TITLE: High Pressure Injection Valve MU-716A failure to respond to a signal frcs the centrol roca pushbutton.
""f ?E :
An abnormal occurrence as defined by the Technical Specifi-caticns, paragraph 1.8d, in that the incperable High Pressure Injection Valve MU-V16A threatened to cause the High Pressure Ccclant Injecticn System to be incapable of performing its intended function.
(5) Ccnditicns Frior to Oscurrence:
In the process of restoring the plant to normal hot shutdcun conditions folleving performance of the Loss of Offsite ?cwer Test (TF SC0/32), with major planc para-meters as follows:
REGULATORY DOCKET FILE COPY rever: core:
0 nec..
O 0
RC Ficv:
6h x 10 lbs/hr "2LI
\\48\\
096
Directorate of lice Ang Page 3 July 5, 1974 s,
a) post operating instructions on the control room console which caution operators to use the "stop" pushbutton prior to reversing the direction of valve motion; b) instruct the operator who improperly reversed the valve direction in the proper method of valve operation; and c) evaluate the control circuit for the valve ?.otor operator for possible modifications which could prevent future occurrences of a simil e nature.
(10' Failure Data:
(a) Previous Failures: Not Applicable.
(b) Equipment Identification: Not Applicable.
Sincerely, 4
1 ".4 '
R. C. AP50LD Vice President-Generation RCA:EFH:JFV:pa ec: Directorate of Regulatory Operations, Region 1 U.S. Atomic Energy Cor: mission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pa. 194c6 File: 7.7 3 5 1 20.1.1 1481 097
Directorste of Licens ing Page 2 July 5, 197L RC Pressure: 2000 psig RC Te p.-
520 F RPZR Level:
85" PRZR Temp..
6kOCF (6) Description of Occurrence: While in the process of restoring the plant to normal het shutdown conditions following performance of the Loss of Offsite Power Test, it was determined that additional reactor coolant make-up was required to raise the pressurizer level frca 85 inches to 100 inches. In order to raise the pressur-1:er level, the High Pressure Injecticn Valve associated with the cperating 1A =ake-up pu=p (MUV-16A) was signaled to open by use of the control roca console manual pushbutton.
The operator controlling the valve pushed the "cpen" pushbutton and then i=nediately pushed the "close" pushbutten in an attempt at limiting the valve travel. This action caused the valve's circuit breaker tc trip "cpen".
The valve was declared incperable until n investigation could be cenducted.
The required make-up vater sas then added using High Pressure Injection Valve MUV-163.
The redundant High Pressure Injection Valves C4UV-16C and D) vere subsequently tested and found to be satisfactory.
An investigation was commenced to determine the cause of the circuit breaker trip.
(T) Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Operatcr in that the control rocm console manual pushbuttons were improperly operated by operations personnel.
A possible contributing factor is Design in tha" the possiblity of s error was not excluded by adequate intericcks.
(8) Analysis of Occurrence:
It is believed that the inoperability of the High Pressure Injection Valve did not represent a threat to the health or safety of the public in that the High Pressure Injection System consists of two independent ficw paths and only one is required for core cooling during a LOCA. Each ficw path has two High Pressure Injection Valves and in the present case three of the four valves in the two flow path: were still operational.
(9) Corrective Action:
Immediate corrective actions censisted of:
a) restoring the pressurizer level by using High Pressure Injection Valve MU-7163; b) testing the redundant valves in the High Pressure Injecticn Systen (MU-V16 C and D); and c) starting an investigation to determine the exact cause of the valve =alfunctica.
The Plant Cperations Review Cc=mittee (PORC) met prcrptly after the incident and recetmended to the Station Superintendent that the following long-ters actions be taken:
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