ML19261F028
| ML19261F028 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1972 |
| From: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19261F025 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910180644 | |
| Download: ML19261F028 (6) | |
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ENCLOSUPI I MEETING WITH METROPOLITA'i EDIS0N COMPANY - GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES THREE MILE ISLA'.!D UNIT 1 July 17,1972
SUMMARY
A meeting was held on July 17, 1972 in Bethesda during which the staf f discussed with the applicant the following items:
1.
Industrial Security Plan 2.
Conduct of Operations and Radiation Emergency Plan 3.
Initial Test and Operations 4.
Administrative Control Technical Specifications As a result of the meeting the applicant agreed to provide the requested additional information in the next amendment. The items remaining unresolved at this time are:
a.
Security force staffing b.
Offsite protective measures c.
Plant staffing during initial operat'on 1.
Industrial Security Plan Basis for discussion was the applicant's draf t revision of I.S.P.
prepared as a result of our questions and comments expressed in a previous meeting (March 22, 1972).
With the exception of staffing requirements, the I.S.P. is now acceptable.
2, Conduct of Operations and Radiation Emergency Plan In Amendment 26 (May 1,1972) the applicant had responded to our questions concerning Conduct of Operations.
Three questions had not been adequately answered and were discussed in the meeting:
Of fsite Protective Measures:
Applicant at present is negotiating with various state agencies to determine who has the authority and responsibility to declare an emergency that requires notification and possible evacuation of residents in the LPZ. The applicant believes that under no foreseeable circumstances would such steps have to be taken within less than about one hour af ter an accident. He will notify responsible authorities immediately af ter an accident or if the potential for an emergency does exis t, he will supply this authority with his advice. However, the applicant believes that a shif t foreman in charge of the facility can not declare such an emergency.
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_p Staffing during Initial Operation:
In the FSAR (page 12-1) the applicant states that the six designated supervisory personnel will obtain cold SR0 licenses prior to fuel loading. The applicant stated in the meeting that two SRO's will ~
staff each shif t in addition to future RO's.
We told him at least one more person qualified by training and experience but not necessarily licensed is required during the startup operation.
The third person could be from the applicant's staff, the NSSS vendor's staff (B&W), or a con altant.
The applicant will address our requirement in H-aext amendment. We also requested the applicant to provide more information in Section B on the qualifications and responsibilities of tha licensed reactor operators.
Health Physics:
Normal haalth physics operation is conducted by radiat ion protection personnel (supervisor and two technicians) during the day shif t.
During the other two shif ts, the auxiliary reactor operators will provide haalth physics coverage. The applicant will indicate this in the next amendment.
- 3. Initial Tests and Operations:
Section 13 of the FSAR was revised in Amendment 26 (May 1,1972).
We informed the applicant that their power escalation test program (Table 13-2) does not include the following essential tests which are listed in the " Guide for the PJ c2ing of Initial Startup Programs":
Loss of Offsite Power Shutdown from Outside the Control Room Natural Circulation Flow Tests Generator Trip Chemical and Radio-chemical Analysis Effluents and Effluent Monitoring Systems Dropped Rod Pseudo Rod Ejection Test We informed the applicant that the staff presently is considering issuing the above Guide with some revisions es part of the Federal Regulations.
4.
Administrative Control Technical Specifications:
We had transmitted our questions regarding this subject to the applicant by letter on February 28, 1972.
In the meeting, we discussed the applicant's proposed answers.
Based on our preliminary review of these answers, we commented on two items:
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Abnormal Occurrences (FSAR 15.1.8):
Applic. ant defines one of the abnormal occurrences as a plant condition which "Causes, as defined in 10 CFR 20, any uncontrolled or unplanned release of radioactive material from the site".
We requested that the reference to 10 CFR 20 be deleted and "any significant uncontrolled....." be subs tituted. Also the restriction "from the site" should be deleted (these changes were also made by Duke for Oconee 1). We explained to the applicant that such changes would cover as an abnormal occurrence e.g.,
a leaky drum containing radioactive waste on or offsite.
Access to High Radiation Area:
Applicant provided additional information regarding his proposed exception to 10 CFR 20 requiring a " control device" or " alarm signal" for high radiation areas. We informed the applicant that we will require, as an additional basis for the exception, a comitment that a high radiation work permit and an opnropriate radiation monitoring device will be required for a pcason entering a high radiation area.
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ENCLOSURE II ATTENDANCE LIST
!!etropolitan Ed'. son Connany - General Public Utilities J. R. Thorpe D. H. Reppert J. Kunkel R. Russo J. G. Herbein J. L. Wise AEC R. Van Niel D. F. Johnson B. K. McLeod H. Faulkner H. Schierling 9m
ENCLOSURE No. 3 0FF.CIAL USE Dl!LY Industrial Security Plan In the next revision the applicant will incorporate the following items:
-location of seven TV cameras used for surveillance of plant perimeter (four low light level and three day light cameras) will be indicated in Figure 1.
-Visitor and employee paik'ng lot outside of inner fence will be shown in Figures 1 and 2.
-Commitmen t to search vehicles and packages entering the inner fenced area when considered necessary.
-Commitment to test intrusion alarm and communication systems according to specified intervals.
-Written commitment to implement the I.S.P.,
to maintain records and to notify the AEC in case of threatened or actual sabotage.
The applicant provided the following additional information and explanation during discussion:
-Only the mainland gate on the permanent access bridge will be locked and controlled.
The isla;.d gate of the bridge will normally be open.
-Direct confrontation between security force and potential intruders will be avoided.
Instead local authorities will be notified immediately to cope with the situation.
-Shift foreman controls a master key used to gain. admittance to any building, except the service building, and which also opens the vcrious gates to the main plant area.
Staffing requirements for the security force were discussed in detail.
The I.S.P. is based on an extensive alarm and surveillance system with continuous monitoring.
One guard stationed in the security office in ti.e service building will be on duty at all times. Once per shif t he will inspect the plant perimeter.
During this or any other required absence from the security of fice, the alarm system will be switched to the control room which maintains contact with the guard via portable radio equipment.
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OFF CIAL USE ONLY
OFFICl!il. USE ONL We informed the applicant that at the present, two security guards per shif t and a plant perimeter inspection twice per shif t are the minimum requirements. However, more specific guidance is presently in preparation by an mis subcommittee.
Applicant believes that his extensive alarm and surveillance system is more reliable than an increased guard force and more frequent inspections.
With the exception of the security guard staffing requirements,the applicant's I.S.P. is acceptable.
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