ML19261E935
| ML19261E935 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1968 |
| From: | Boyd R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Morris P US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910170989 | |
| Download: ML19261E935 (4) | |
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l.'0V 5 1958 Peter A. Morris, Director Divisicn of Reactor Licensing PCS"'-CONSTRUCTION-PER>CT REVIEW OF >SOPOLITA:i EDISON'S TERIE MILE ISLAND STATION (DCCKET 50-289, CPPR 40)
The items listed below are identified as follow-on items to the construction permit review of Met-Ed's Three Mile Island Station, for which a construction permit vac issued in May 1908.
A =ceting vill be held with the applicant to discuss the "cllow-on ite=s.
Your cc==ents are requested.
1.
Research and Develen=ent Items a.
Sodium Thicsulfate We stated in cur Safety Evaluation, en page 50, that we believe that the needed 5 2-reduction facter for the 2-hour dose could be achieved by the sodium thiosulfate-sedium hydroxide spray syste:::.
Since that ti=e (Februar/ 5,1968), we have adopted a more conservative evaluation procedure.
For exa=ple, the same spray system design was provided on Cr/stal River and, using our present =ethods of evaluation, was accorded a re=cval factor of 3 7 for the 2-hour dose.
We should advise Met-Ed that we require improvements in their spray syste= design (or, possibly, their containment design which now has a leak-rate specification of 0.2%
at desira pressure ).
b.
Other R&.D Progra=s The other programs include: once-thrcugh steam generator; control red drives; in-core neutron detectcrs; thermal-hydraulic programs; core cccling aspects; and xenon oscillations.
We plan to ask the applicant to present at the meeting a su==ar/ description of the prcgress to date on each ite: and the anticipated schedule for cc=pleticn.
2.
Initial recision of ASL3 No ite=s were raised in the Initic.1 Decision of a follev-cn nature.
3 Safety Evaluation (S.E. )
Cc=bined Seismic and LCCA ica Q (p. 11 of S.E.; also p. 35) a.
Additional information was presenced en Cr/stal River--answer to questica 9 11.
We vill ask for a prcgress repcrt and cc=pletion schedule.
Met-Id provided sc=e ver/ preliminar/ guidance in the answer to our Questica 15 2.
1483 272 gor 70N9
9 Peter A. Morris NOV 5 193g b.
Diversified Signal for ECCS (p.19 cf S.E. )
ELW initially agreed to provide ECOS signal diversification in Met-Ed's s"--ory at the hearing.
We require additional infor ation concerning the basis of selecting 10 psig P3 pressure es the alternate signal.
(Duke has prc=ised the information in their S a, to be submitted next su==er.)
Separation of Centrol and Safety (p.18 of S.E. )
c.
We said in the S.E. that we would review the final design of the instrumentaticn syste=s in which the same signal is used for control and safety, keeping in mind the ACES recc==endation of separation "to the fullest extent practicable."
At the Met-Ed meeting we should discuss changes, if any, Met-Ed proposes to =ake.
We shculd also state what information we vill require in a final detailed design (such as prints, test data, failure analyses, etc. ).
We should also infor Met-Ed of our current position.
~
d.
Reacter Building Fan Ccclers (S.E. p. 20)
We should review the status of design of the fan coolers, in particular the shaft seals and vinding insulation.
As stated in the S.E., we =ay impose further testing on a prototype unit.
Our review should cc=e in advance of the POL, and schedule should be discussed at the meeting with Met-Ed.
Dilution Syste= Centrols (S.E. p. 21-22) e.
We vill review the final design en boron dilution syste= controls for review against m s-279 We should discuss p:teliminary design at the meeting, as none was offered in the PSAR.
f.
GDC :To. 11 (S.E. p. 22 )
We need an expanded cutline as to the procedures to be used by Met-Ed in scing. to "ccld shutdcvn" frc= without the eentrol roc =.
Ya:-Ed shculd be encouraged to provide this at an early date as it could affect their final design.
Fat-Ed ccly reluctantly ag eed to cc= ply with cur interpretation.
1483 273
d Peter Morris NOV 5 1968 g.
Pressure Vessel Thermal Shock (S.E. 7 24)
We scid in the S.E. that we vould review the calculational details on pressure vessel thermal shock when available.
Since that state =ent was =ade, several E&W plants have been processed through the CP process.
We have continued to review this proble=, without final resolution.
We should notify Met-Ed that we require formal filing of the B&W calcu-lations to date.
We should also discuss possible design changes to
=ini=ine ther=al shock effects.
h.
Cuality Assurance (S.E. p. 29)
Since the CP for this plant was processed prior to the increased e=phasis by DRL, QA vill be a significant follow-on ite=.
(Per me=o frc= Boyd to Morris of September 23, 1968, Dr. Beck will be notified of the meet-ing.)
1.
Failed Fuel Element Detector (S.E. p. 43)
We stated that we veuld _ review any propesals =cdc by the applicant in this regard.
The applicant should provide us with his current status of design.
We should further state our infor=ation require =ents, which include ti=e response, sensitivity, redundancy, etc.
4.
Hearing m anscript Failed Fael: Element Detector (pp. 260-264):
See 3-1 above.
a.
Splitting Scra= Eus (pp. 315-319) b.
The applicant stated that he was going to =odify the scra= buses so that failure of one tus to release rods vould not prevent a reactor scra=.
We vill ask Met-Ed for design details.
Pressure Vessel Inspection (pp. 334-336) c.
We vill ask E&W if there is any progress on remote UI, or other means, for inspection of the reactor vessel.
d.
Cuality Assurance (pp. 342-347):
See 3-h abeve.
5 Follow-On Items on Airplane Hardening We need to review the design, or determine the schedule, for the a.
final analysis of all structures intended to survive the design basis crash.
Only the containment was reviewed during the CP review.
i483 274
O NOV 5 1968 Peter A. Morris b.
Cur consultant en fire protection reasures, Dr. Irving Pinkel cf ::ASA-LEO, recc= ended that the designer pay close attention to the fes spray syste= in the ventilation inlets. He also e=phasi:ei high q;ality and reliability in the explosive =ixture detectic instrumentation.
We shculd determine design progress in these areas.
Further details cf our expressed concerns are listed en page 7 of the Addendum to the Safety Evaluation.
c.
Our Safety Evaluation Addendu (of April 26, 1968) states on page 5 that detailed calculations vill be performed by the applicant during construction to illustrate the ability of the centainment.
to withstand an t.irplane strike on the cylinder vall.
(The dcce was considered previously.) These calculations should be reviewed.
W N
Roger S..3cyd, -AssistigDirector for' Reactor Projects v
Division of Reactor Licensing i483 275 O
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