ML19261E855

Discusses Airport Proximity to Facility Site Per Telecon W/ W Lowe & 680206 Ofc Visit W/G Charnoff

ML19261E855
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	02/07/1968
From:	Grimes B US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:	US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 7910170897
Download: ML19261E855 (2)

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The followin; infor.ation was compiled frca a telephone conversation with W.

1.cwe and an of fice visit with 0. Charno f f on February 6, 1965.

1.

Metropolitan Edison personnel and consultants visited Olmsted State Airport, 2.5 miles north o f the site, en February 6,1?63. They learned fren the airport manager and free the F.u controller that no change in flight patterns from these new established is clanned.

Then shown the ansver to cuestion 2.6.3, Cupplement 1 ^ the F 3 A.',, the airport personnel cermented that the infor ation w is correct but scre-what ovarstated the probability of aircraf t cassin; ever the site.

2.

The terrain on the east shore o f the river is louer than on the west shore and approach and landing patterns are criented to the lower terrain (away frem the site).

3.

There are no plans for a new runway in the near future.

If another runway is eventually added, it would be parallel to the present rurv2y

.nd about one-half mile inland (away fre the site).

l.

Mr. Thcmas Gerusky, free the S tate of Pennsylvania, is still interested in evaluations of, lanes crashing at the site.

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files, February 2, 1963.)

His particular concerns are (1) a crash releasin3 radioactitity ani (2) the cooling tewer fog causing a visibility prebier.

cervention:1 plant with cooling towers near an airport was mentioned but the degree of interference with visibility at that airpcrt has not beer irvesti;ated ye t.)

3.

Metropolitan Edisen filed an apolication dated 'anuary 31, 1768 with the FA.i for pernission to build the cooling towers.

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a was a ver r " crushable" object except for the engines and that ths;2 cula be limitin~ in penetration depth calculations.

I asked abcut coincident ex-a plosions and he said that the overpressure generated would prchably net be significant, and the worst effec n' che explosion veuld be ar-* secondary missiles that mi;ht be enera*ad

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-1 y specific calculatiens which he a

has done :: date were ' upper limit' ty-e calculations done for the Ficrid2 Power and Li;ht case in which he c21culatad that a 3-52 vculd not penetrate the containment. He said he would be av2ilable this week for any additional calculations

• ,e might require.

In general it is y opinion that (1) the structural protection provided for vital sys tems, including the centrol room, and (2) the diversity in loc 2tien and method of 2cccaplishinc. a safe shutdown o. rovide a reasenable de 3ree of assurance that a radioactive release wculd not take place.

It is difficult, however, to design quantitatively aga'nst a plane crash since the specific course of fires and secondary missiles cannot be predicted.

The diversity in shutdown methods mentioned above is provided by (1) reacte station shutdown capability, (2) emer ercy diesels on the opposite side frca o

the switchyard, (3) feedwater pumped either by steam driven pumps (under concrete) or ncrmal electrical booster pumps, and (4) feedwater sources either frcm on-site storage er from the river.

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