ML19261B366
| ML19261B366 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1979 |
| From: | Gray J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902210016 | |
| Download: ML19261B366 (49) | |
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UiilTED STATES OF A IERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO.'.11.IISSION
-['
BEFORE TIiE ATO:.IIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the.'.latter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-344 PORTLAND GENERAL ELECTRIC
)
(Proposed Amendment to Facility CO:.1PANY, ET AL.
)
Operating License NPF-1 to
)
Permit Storage Pool ?.fodification)
NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN OPI OSITION TO EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR '3 TATE OF OREGON January 29, 1979 7 9 0 2 210 0 l(o
/ ~ 1 n TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I.
INT R O D U CTION -- - - - - - -- - - - - -- -- - --- - - - - - - - -- - -- - - - - - -
1 II.
STAFF POSITION A.
Need for Technical Specifications-----------------
3 1.
The Licensing Board Was Correct In Not Imposing Water Chemistry Controls As A License Condition - Exception 1--------
8 2.
The Licensing Board Was Correct In Not Requiring The Licensee To Imple-ment A Corrosion Coupon Program As A License Condition - Exception 2-----------
13 3.
The Licensing Board Was Corect In Not Requiring The Storage Of Freshly Discharged Fuel In Alternate Storage Cavities In The SFP As A License Condition - Ex c ep tion 3 ------------- ------
15 4.
The Licensing Board Was Correct In Not Requiring A Limit On SFP Water Temperature As a License Condition -
Ex c e p ti o n 4 - --- -- -- - - - --- - -- - - - -- -- -- --- - - - 18 5.
The Licensing Board Was Correct In Not Requiring The Maintenance of 2000 ppm Baron In The SFP - Exception 5----
20 6.
The Licensing Board Was Correct In Not Requiring The Maintenance or Full Core Reserve Capacity As A License Condition -
Ex c e p tio n 6 - - - - - - -- - - -- - - -- -- - - -- ---- - - ---- 2 7 3
' PAGE B.
Deferral of Full Use of the ?.!adified SFP Penting Issuance of the Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Spent Fuel Storage - Exception 7-----
30 1.
The GEIS Notice Does Not Require Deferral Of SFP License Amendments Unless Such Deferral Would Result In Substantial Harm To The Public Interest And The Licensing Board's Finding Of Harm Was Correct-------
31 2.
Cumulative Impacts Were Adequately Considered And The Five Factors In the CEIS Notice Were Adequately Applied, Weighed And Balanc ed-----------
3S III.
C ON C LU S ION - ----- - - - -- -- --- - -- -- -- -- -- --- - ---- - - - - --- 42
- iii -
i TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES PAGE Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nucle r Generating Station, Unit 1), ALAB -479, 7 NRC 74 ('"8)------------------
41 Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station),
ALA B - 8 3, 5 AEC 3 5 4 (19 7 2 ) ----------------------------------
6 Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 nd 2),
ALA B - 4 3 8, 7 N RC 15 5 (19 7 8 ) --------------------------------- 30 Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB - 3 5 5, 4 NRC 3 9 7 (19 7 6) --------------------- - ------------ 2 llanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.1972)--------------
39 Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Power Station, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB - 3 4 0, 4 S RC 27 ( 19 7 6 ) ------- ---------------------------- 30 Klepne v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 3 9 0 (19 76)--- ----------------- 36, 39 Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 5 41 F. 2d 12 92 (8 th Cir. 197 6) ---------------------------------- 39 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 7 9, ( 2 d C ir. 19 7 5 ) ---------------- --------- - --- -------- ------- 39 Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-455, 7 NRC 41 (1978)--------------
36, 39 Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-77-51, 6 NRC 265 (1977)------------- 36, 38, 39 Portland General Electire Co. (Trojan Nuclear Plant),
LBP NRC (Deccmb er 21, 19 7 8 ) -------------- 37 Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F. 2d 4 3 (5th Cir.1974)--------------
40 Sierra Club v. Morton 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir.1975)------------
39 Tennessee Vc.lley Authority (Hartsville Nuclear Plant, Units lA, 2A, 1B, 2B ), ALAB -3 67, 5 NRC 92 (19 77) ---------------------- 2 Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2), ALAB - 137, 6 AEC 4 91 (19 7 3)--------------------------
3 9
r
_ iv -
STATUTES PAGE Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 5 18 2 (a) ( 42 U. S. C. 3 2 2 3 2 (a) ) -------------------------- 9 5 18 6 (4 2 U. S. C. S 2 2 3 6 ) -------------------- ----------
9, 10 National Environmental Policy Act 4 2 U. S. C. 9 4 3 21 e t s e q. ------------------------------- 36 Regulations 10 C F R s 2. 2 0 2 -- - - - --- - - -- - - - -- - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - -- -- -- - - - - - - - 10 10 C F R S 2. 7 4 3 (i ) ---------- -- --- --- - - ---- --- ----------- - -- --- 37 10 C F R S 2. 7 6 2 - --- -- - - -- - --- -- -- -- - - -- -- - - -- -- - - - -- - - - - - -- - -
1 10 C F R S 5 0. 3 6 a ( b ) ----- ----- --- --------- ------------- - ----- -
6 10 C F R s 5 0. 4 0 (a ) ------------------- -------- ---- ------ ------ 12 10 C F R s 5 0. 5 7 ( a ) ( 2 ) ---------------------------------------- 10 10 CF R S 5 0. 5 9 ( a ) - ----------------- --- --- ----------- ------ --
11 10 CF R S 51. 5 ( a ), 51. 5 (c ) ----------------------------------- 34 10 C F R Pa r t 10 0 - - --- -- -- ---- - --- --- --- - -- - -- -- -- - -- - --- - -- -- 17 Federal Register 4 0 Fe d. R_eg. 4 2 8 01 - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - 2, 3 2 40 Fed. R3 4 2 8 0 2 ------------------------------------ ------ 3 2, 3 3, 3 4
UNITED STATES OF A!! ERICA fluCLEAR REGULATORY COM:11SSI0ft BEFORE THE AT0f1IC SAFETY AND LICEftSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No. 50-344 PORTLAND GEtiERAL ELECTRIC
)
(Proposed Amendnent to Facility COMPANY, ET AL.
)
Operating License NPF-1 to
)
Permit Storage Pool Modification)
NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN CPPOSITION TO EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR STATE OF OREGt I.
INTRCDUCTION On October 5, 1978, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Licensing Board or Board) in the captioned proceeding issued an initial decision authorizing an amendment of the Trojan operating license to permit an increase in the storage capacity of the spent fuel pool (SFP) at the facility from 280 to 651 spent fuel assemblies. On November 13, 1978, the State of Oregon (Oregon or Intervenor) filed exceptions to the initial decision pursuant to 10 CFR 52.762.U Oregon's Brief in Support of Exceptions was timely filed on December 13, 1978.
In its brief addressing its eight exceptions, Oregon argues that:
U or that of A.
the Appeal Board should substitute its judgement f
the Licensing Board by imposing on the licensee certain technical specifications suggested by Oregon but not imposed by the Licensing U
By motion filed October 18, 1978, Oregon requested an extension of time, until November 13, 1978, in which to file exceptions.
The requested time extension was granted on October 23, 1978.
U Where substantial evidence in the record can support more than one result and where the record, considered as a whole, will fairly sustain (F0OTNOTE CONTINUED ON tlEXT PAGE)
' Board. These proposed technical specifications, which relate to SFP water chemistry controls (exception 1), use of corrosion coupons (exception 2), use of alternate cavities for the storage of spent fuel freshly discharged from the reactor (exception 3), SFP water temperature limits (exception 4), minimun boron concentration in SFP water (exception 5), and maintaining a full core discharge capability in the SFP (exception 6), are allegedly necessary to protect the public health and safety.
B.
Although modification of the Trojan SFP may take place, it is unlawful, based on the Commission's flotice of Intent to Prepare General Environmental Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Power Reactor Fuel (GEIS flotice)
(40 Fed. Reg. 42801, September 16,1975), to authorize at this time use of the modified SFP beyond that authorized in the original Trojan operating license.
Rather, authorization of use should be deferred pending issuance of the GEIS.
(F00TriOTE C0tiTINUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE)
U a result deened preferable by the agency to the one selected by the licensing board, the appeal board may substitute its judgment for that of the licensing board.
Duke Power C0. (Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-355, 4 flRC 392, 402-405 (1976).
This is so even though the licensing board's decision is based on substantial evidence.
TennesseeValleyAuthority(HargvilleNuclearPlant, Units 1A,2A,18, 28), ALAB-367, 5 flRC 92, 94 at n.4 (1977).
Nevertheless, the licen_ing board's evaluation of the evidence and disposition of the issues is significant and, in any event, a decision by either the licensing board or the appeal board must be based on a preponderence of the evidence.
Catawba, suora.
_3-For the reasons set forth below, the NRC Staff (Staff) opposes these exceptions and the appeal based thereon.
II.
STAFF POSITION A.
Need for Technical Soecifications Oregon's arguments with regard to the asserted errors by the Licensing Board in not imposing the technical specifications suggested by Oregon are based on three common premises.
Oregon claims that:
(i) the Licensing Board's action in not imposing the technical specificaticns is contrary to the NRC's obligation to protect the public health and safety; (ii) the technical specifications in question are necessary to protect the public health and safety, and (iii) the Licensing Board applied an inappropriate " burden on the operator" and " rigidity" standard and, even then, applied it inconsistently.
Oregon is, of course, totally correct in its assertion that, consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Commission's regulations, technical specifications can and should be imposed where that is necessary to protect the public health and safety a:id to provide a clear, enforceable
basis for regulation to that end.
In fact, where the evidence in this proceeding has demonstrated that technical specifications or license conditions are necessary or would provide additional needed protection not otherwise available, the Licensing Board did impose such necessary requi rements.E Where the Staff parts company with Oregon in this regard is with respect to Oregon's claim that the technical specifications which it proposed and which the Licensing Board rejected are necessary for the protection of the public or to provide a clear, enforceable basis for regulation.
As will be discussed in detail with respect to each of Oregon's proposed technical specifications, the Licensing Board's assumptions as well as its conclusions on need for the proposed technical specifications are based on facts established either by uncontroverted evidence or by a preponderence of the evidence.
As to Oregon's claim that the Licensing Board declined to impose technical specifications because it found them to be too rigid or a burden on the licensee, the simple answer is that Oregon has misread and misapprehended the Licensing Board's decision and and the evidence cited in support of the findings in question.
For example, in rejecting Oregon's proposal for storing spent fuel in alternate storage cavities, the Licensing Board explicitly found that "the record does not justify" such a requirement, U
See Initial Decision, Slip Op. Order, pp. 74-75, Conditions 1, 2 and 3 and paragraphs 23-25, 52-54, 81.
. clearly indicating that it is not needed from a safety standpoint.O Similarly, in rejecting a 14 F SFP water temperature limit, the Board found that the " record doesn't reveal any serious consequences should 14*F be exceeded during an accident situation,"U again indicating clearly that the Board found no safety reason for imposing the requested limit.
In no instance has a proposed technical specification been rejected because it is "too rigid." In the same vein, Oregon's " burden on the operator" argument is without merit.
In imposing a technical speci-fication limiting impact energy for objects carried over stored fuel to 240,000 inch-pounds,U the Licensing Board noted that such a requirement would not pose a burden on routine operations, citing testimony at Tr.
4021.E From an examination of the cited testimony, it is obvious that what is referred to by the Board here is that the technical specification in question would not make impossible any operations that need to be done and that may, in fact, be required for other safety reasons.
The Board wanted to assure that cure was not worse than the disease.
Although this U
Initial Decision, Slip Op. p. 31 at n.8.
F
.IA-O The evidence shows that the new storage racks will not be overstressed for impact energies of less than 240,000 inch-pounds.
See Initial Deci-sion, Slip Op. paragraphs 22, 23 and evidence cited therein.
Absent the technical specification imposed by the Licensing Board, there would be no limit on impact energies that the new storage racks might sustain from dropped objects.
U Initial Decision, paragraph 25.
same Licensing Board concern is not clearly apparent in the other instance, cited by Oregon, in which the Licensing Board alluded to a burden on the operator, there is no situation in which the Board refused to impose a technical specification because it would be a burden to the license.U Oregon further argues that the Licensing Board was inconsistent in imposing technical specifications.
The basis for this claim is that the Board imposed a condition on boron concentration in the SFP during installation of the new storage racks to prevent criticality from some event having unknown probability but rejected Oregon's assertion that such a condition should be imposed for normal operation to prevent criticality from projec-tiles striking stored fuel, an event that allegedly has an identified probability.
First, it should be noted that, contrary to Oregon's asser-tion, the probability of projectiles striking stored spent fuel was not identified.E Secondly, while no mechanism was identified that could result in projectile impact and criticality as asserted by Oregon, an event resulting in criticality during reracking of the SFP is a definite F
Once it is detennined that a technical specification or license condi-tion is not necessary from a safety standpoint, a detemination as to whether a license requirement should nevertheless be imposed to provide additional assurances of safety can, in the Staff view, include con-siderations of operational flexibility, practicality and burJens on the licensee.
See, for example,10 CFR 350.36a(b) which allows a considera-tion of " flexibility of operation" in establishing and implementing technical specifications to maintain unrestricted releases of radio-activity "as low as reasonably) achievable."
See also Boston Edison Co.
(Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, ALAB-83, 5 AEC 354, 370 (1972).
U See Oregon Exh. 1, pp. 24, 26 and Attachment 1 and Tr. 5089-5094.
. possibility.
Fuel racks in the SFP are required to be seismically quali-fled.
In the event of an earthquake, rack-to-rack connections prevent any one rack or all rac'(s as a whole from turning over and spilling their contents (PGE Exh. 2, p. 3-7; Tr. 3625-26).
During reracking, however, the rack-to-rack connections are removed and individual racks are removed from the SFP one at a time.
Should an earthquake occur while the rack-to-rack connections are removed and while some racks are out of the SFP, racks containing fuel could upset, spilling stored fuel assemblies and resulting in a critical configuration.
(Lantz following Tr. 5112, response to Or. A6; Staff Exh. lA, p. 8).
- Also, during reracking both old and new fuel racks will be moved about the SFP.
Certainly in this situation, an accident in which an empty rack being moved collides with a rack containing fuel is a possibility.
In such a situation, a fuel laden rack could topple, spilling its contents and resulting in a critical configuration (Tr. 5181).
In view of this, the period during SFP reracking, when existing and new racks lack stability, is a period when criticality from an untoward event is a real possibility.
Recognizing this, the Licensing Board imposed the technical specification on boron concentration (Initial Decision, Slip Op. paragraphs 41, 52, 53).
The Board's action in this regard is not inconsistent with its refusal to impose the boron concentration requirement sought by Oregon.
Rather, the Board properly imposed the requirement where the evidence demonstrated that such requirement was needed to protect the public
. health and safety and refused to impose a requirement not shown by the evidence to be necessary.
Oregon's assertions of Licensing Board error with regard to specific technical specifications proposed by Oregon can best be addressed in the context of the specific technical specifications.
These are dealt with below in the order discussed by Oregon.
1.
The Licensino Board Uas Correct In Not Inposina Water Chemistry Controls As A License Condition - Exception 1 Oregon argues that the Licensing Board's findings that corrosion will not significantly affect materials in the SFP or endanger the public health and safety are dependent in large part upon the assumption that the licensee's proposed SFP water chemistry limits will be maintained, and that such limits should, therefore, be made a part of the Trojan
~
license.b It is certainly true that the maintenance of adequate SFP water quality is important to assure that acceptable levels of corrosion will not be exceeded in the SFP (Tr. 4588,4599).
At the same time, the licensee has affirmatively committed in its application for the SFP amendment to maintain SFP water quality and to implement a surveillance program which will assure that the proposed water chemistry limits are not exceeded (PGE Exh. 2, p. 3-15 and Table 3-6, 3-7).
E Intervenor State of Oregn's Brief in Support of Its Exceptions to the Initial Decision (Gregon Brief), p. 8.
. There is no dispute as to the adequacy of the water chemistry limits and surveillance program proposed by the licensee.
Oregon's own witness stated that corrosion will not be a concern if the water quality proposed by the licensee is maintained (Tr. 3458), and that the licensee's administra-tive controls for maintaining water quality are adequate for that purpose (Tr. 3445).
In fact, the evidence clearly demonstrates that, with regard to chloride and floride limits, which are the important parameters from a corrosion standpoint (Tr. 3074,4581-82),0.15 ppm limit comitted to by the licensee is much more stringent than the 1 ppm limit which is generally deemed to be adequate (Tr. 2329-30,3092,4532-83,4590-92,4593,4859-60).
The dispute, then, involves not the importance of having some water chemistry controls or the adequacy of the proposed controls, but, instead, whether the necessary water chemistry controls can be enforced.
In the Staff's view, the necessary water chemistry controls can be enforced here without resort to explicit license conditions or technical specifications.
Section 1E2(a) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5 2232(a)) provides, inter alia, that all applications and statements shall be signed by the applicant or licensee and made under oath or affirmation.E Section 186 of the Act (42 U.S.C. 3 2236) provides that:
[a]ny license may be revoked for any material false statenent in the application or any statement of fact required under section 182, or_
because of conditions revealed by such aoplication or statement of S This would include PGE Exh. 2 (in which the licensee commits to main-tain the proposed water chemistry limits), which is a part of the appli-cation for the SFP amendment.
. fact or any report, record, or inspection or other means which would warrant tne Coar11ssion to refuse to grant a license on an original application....
(emphasis added)
A failure by the licensee to naintain the proposed water quality would be contrary to the statements and commitnerts in its application for the SFP amendment upon which the NRC has relied in issuing the amendment.E The quoted portion of Section 185 gives a broad basis for the initiation of enforcement actions against the licensee in such circumstances.
Moreover, Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that the licensee prepare and implement written procedures for such things as the maintenance of adequate water chemistry (Tr. 4655-55) and the licensee's confomance with this requirement is monitored by the Office of Inspection and Enforce-ment (Tr. 4272,4656). Thus, the proposed water qality standards are directly enforceable under the general terms of the Trojan operating license.E 5 See Amendment No. 34 to Facility Operating License NPF-1 (SFP Amend-ment), Part 18, wherein it was found, in accordance with 10 CFR 550.57(a)(2),that:
[t]the facility will operate in conformity with the aoplication, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission... (emphasis added)
E Additional enforcement measures are available under 10 CFR 32.202, pursuant to which a proceeding to modify, suspend or revoke a license may be initiated for any "potentially hazardous conditions or other facts deemed to be sufficient ground for the proposed action." Failure to comply with water chemistry limits in such a way as to raise concerns about corrosion in the SFP (e.g. SFP chloride concentrations on the order of 10 to 15 ppm for a period of several weeks - Tr. 4640-41) could thus be deemed to give rise to "potentially hazardous" conditions resulting in a show cause order under Section 2.202.
. While it is true that, without an explicit technical specification on water chemistry, the licensee could modify its water chemistry limits to some extent without prior NRC approval,10 CFR 550.59 provides assurance that any such changa would be closely scrutinized and would be of such a nature that it would not increase the probability or consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety, create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated or othenvise involve an unreviewed safety question (Tr. 4597-98, 10CFR550.59(a)).
Such change would be subject to inspection by the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (Tr. 4597).
Failure to comply with the requirements of Section 50.59 would, of course, be a violation of the regulations subject to enforcement action.
This will thus assure that changes to the water quality that would significantly decrease corrosion protection will not be made withour prior NRC approval.
Thus, it is obvious that there is an abundance of methods available and actions which could be taken to assure that adequate water chemistry is maintained in the SFP without an explicit technical specification incor-parating the stringent water chemistry controls committed to by the licensee.
There is no evidence to the contrary and Oregon's assertion
- that a technical specification on SFP water quality is requiredb at this timeb s without merit, i
b There is no authority for the proposition that a technical specification is per se necessary fer all safety-related aspects of facility operation.
In fact, the regulations indicate that operating procedures and proposals for operation, apart from technical specificaticas, can be considered in authorizing operation.
See 10 CFR 350.40(a) which states that, in deternining whether to issue a license, the Commission will be guided by a consideration of whether:
[t]he processes to be performed, the coeratina nrocedures, the facility and equipner,, the use of tne facility, and other technical specifications, or the oroocsals in reaard to any of the forecoino collectively provide reasonable assurance
... that the public health and safety will not be endangered
.... (emphasis added)
E SFP corrosion is currently the subject of generic review, If it is determined as a result of that review that technical specifications on water chemistry ought to be imposed, such action will be taken (Tr. 4600-4603, 4657-58, Staff Exh. lA, p. 13).
In view of the uncontroverted evidence showing that the water chemistry limits committed to by the Trojan licensee are substantially more stringent than what is required to reduce corrosion in the SFP (Tr. 4590) and the fact that those water chemistry limits are enforceable, the imposition of those water chemistry limits as technical specifications at this time is unnecessary and would be premature in the Staff's view.
-==..-,,,m.-
2.
The Licensing Board Was Correct In flot Requirino The Licensee to In '.eirant a Corrosion Couoon Procram As A License Condition - Exceotion _2_
Oregon argues that corrosion ccupons would be useful in discovering abnormal conditions in the SFP and that the Licensing Board erred in refusing to require the use of corrosion coupons as a condition of the SF?licenseamendment.E The basis for Oregon's position in this regard is that a number of Licensing Board findings related to corrosion and to the ability to repair components in the SFP are allegedly dependent, to some extent, on the ability to assess the effects of off-normal SFP water chemistry. There apparently is no dispute with regard to the fact that corrosion coupons are not necessary for detecting or evaluating general corrosion in the SFP (Tr. 3079-80, 3218-19, 3442-43, 3477, 4583, 4606, Frewing following Tr. 3049, p. 21).
In. fact, the evidence shows that there is simply no basis from a safety standpoint for requiring the use of corrosion coupons in the SFP.
Oregon's witness asserted that corrosion coupons could alert the licensee to the existence of some abnormal conditione and indicate to what extent additional inspections of fuel or racks might be warranted (Tr. 3442-43).
D Oregon Brief, pp. 9-10.
E The only mechanism for abnormal corrosion that was postulated was abnormal water chemistry brought about by the introduction of Columbia River water into the SFP during an emergency or by the dumping of impurties into the SFP (Or. Exh.1, pp.10,11). A situation requiring the use of Columbia River water in the SFP would be known to the licensee (Tr. 3095-96) and corrosion coupons would not be necessary to alert the (F00Tfl0TE C0t1TIriUED Oil fiEXT PAGE)
. This witness also admitted, however, that his assertions as to the effec-tiveness of corrosion coupons is based on his experience with coupons in a reactor a much more aggressive environment than an SFP (Tr. 3416-17, 3477-78).
This testimony is thus of little value in detemining the need for corrosion coupons in the SFP.
In fact, the evidence demonstrates that it would be very difficult to obtain from coupons any useful infomation on the type of localized corrosion which is of concern to Oregon (Tr. 3477-78) because such localized corrosion phenomena are highly dependent upon the precise physical characteristics at many local areas in the SFP which would be extremely difficult to duplicate with coupons (Tr. 3054-57,3478).
There are available techniques to evaluate the effects on corrosion of water chemistry upsets which would be much more reliable than corrosion coupons (Tr. 3081) and such local corrosion phenomena as local oxidation, stress corrosion cracking extending through fuel clad, pitting corrosion and corrosion behavior at fuel defects are observable by visual inspection (Tr. 2944-45). The uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that proper water chemistry, as committed to by the licensee, along with nomal (FOOINOTE CONTlfiUED FROM PREVIOUS PAGE)
E licensee to abnomal water chemistry in such circumstances.
Impurities intrduced into the SFP by other means should be detectable in a timely manner through the surveillance program committed to by the licensee (PGE Exh. 2, Tables 3-6, 3-7).
In addition, the highly conservative corrosion rates assumed in the evaluation of the corrosion performance of such SFP materials on Type 304 stainless steel and zircaloy-4 will more than compensate for deviations from the proposed water chemistry (Tr. 3294-95).
- visual inspection and radiation monitoring as proposed by the licensee is adequate to detect corrosion in the SFP (Frewing following Tr. 3049, p.
21; Frey following Tr. 3049, p. 4; Tr. 3168-69). There is no evidence to indicate that the use of corrosion coupons is required for safety reasons and, in fact, the s ly evidence on the matter is to the contrary (Tr.
4606,4583).
In view of this, a cc: rosion coupon requirement cannot be justified and the Licensing Board's decision in this regard is clearly correct.
3.
The Licensing Board Was Correct In flot Recuirina The Storage of Freshly Discharged Fuel In Alternate Storace Cavities In The SFP As i. License Condition - Exceotion 3 In its application for the SFP license amendment, the licensee committed to store freshly discharged fuel in alternate storage cavities in the SFP, thereby providing a greater center-to-center distance for such fuel than that which exist,s in the unmodified SFP (PGE Exh. 2, pp. 4-4, 4-5).E Oregon argues that reliance on this alternate storage method is " implicit" in the Licensing Board's finding that the consequences of projectile
$ The witness 'or the State of Oregon admitted as much when he testified that a technical specification requiring corrosion coupons is not determinative with regard to Oregon's position on the SFP license amendment (Tr. 3448).
E Alternate storage of freshly discharged fuel is directed toward reducing the level of releases of radioactivity should stored fuel be damaged since such releases are dependent upon the length of time that has elapsed since the fuel was discharged from the reactor (PGE Exh. 2, p. 4-5).
This method of storage thus does nothing to prevent or otherwise affect criticality should a projectile strike stored fuel and, as a consequence, it is unrelated to criticality considerations.
impacts are acceptable to the public health and safety and that such alternate storage nethod should, therefore, be imposed as a license requirement.EI Oregon has cited no instance in which the Licensing Board has relied upon this alternate storage method as a basis for finding that the consequences of a projectile impact will be acceptable and, indeed, the Staff has been unable to ascertain any such reliance by the Board.
The only instance in which the Board even acknowledged that this alternate storage method had been proposed is in a passing reference in paragraph 45 of its Initial Decision where the Board noted that "if freshly discharged fuel is stored on 26.6 inch centers as the Licensees have committed, the consequences (of a projectile damaging stored fuel) could be lower for the nodified pool since such a storage arrangement is not used in the existing pool This can hardly be viewed as reliance by the Licening Board.
Instead, a reading of the Initial Decision reveals that the basis for the 21 Licensing Board's determination that the radiological consequences / of a projectile impact are acceptable is:
1)
Uncontroverted evidence denonstrating that objects normally carried over spent fuel fuel could, at worst, rupture all fuel rods in a freshly discharged fuel assembly.
That particular accident is the design basis fuel handling accident for the Trojan SFP, the consequences cf which were previously evaluated, were found acceptable, and remain applicable and unchanged for the modified SFP (Initial Decision, paragraph 39).
20/ Oregon arlef, p. 10.
-21/ Storage of freshly discharged fuel in alternate storage cavities has no bearing on the likelihood of criticality.
See note 19 supra.
. 2)
Uncontroverted evidence demonstrating that, based on extremely conservative calculations, all fuel rods in at least 10 spent fuel assemblies could be ruptured immediately af ter their removal from the reactor without exceeding the offsite dose guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100.
Three and a half weeks after reactor shutdown, acceptableconsequences(InitialDecision, paragraph 40.).d2yith all fuel rods in an entire third of a core could be damage The protdbility that natural events such as tornados or earthquakes or other events such as turbine failure would result in projectiles freshly discharged fuel to lead to unacceptableconsequencesgt sufficient to damage enou 3f is so low as to be incredible (Initial Decision, paragraphs 42,43,45).
It it clear that Oregon's assertion that the Licensing Board depended on the alternate storage method is without merit.
The Board was correct in eschewing the imposition of the license condition suggested by Oregon E/ More realistic calculations show that the expected consequences are such that all fuel elements in an entire third of a core could be damaged immediately upon removal fron the reactor without exceeding Part 100 guidelines (Initial Decision, Slip Op. p. 27, n.7).
El In th'e event of a tornado, siding on the Fuel Building will fold around structural girders and will not become missiles that could impact the SFP (Tr. 4938).
Ar,alysis of the desi pound car, wood plank and steel pipe)gn basis tornado missiles (4000 shows that the impact energy of such projectiles on spent fuel will be less than the impact energy of the dropped fuel assembly in the design basis fuel handling accident for the SFP (Tr. 4949-51).
The only missiles that could be generated by an earthquake are those carried by the cranes in the Fuel Building (Tr. 4149-50) and these would impact only one stored fuel assembly at most (Donohew following Tr. 5030). The crane itself would not become a projectile (Tr. 4159-50).
The probability 1*f generating a o
turbine missile that would hit the SFP is 5.6 x 10 per year (Tr. 4985-86).
This is so low as to be incredible (Tr. a050, 4056).
Since the reactor will generally be shutdown and the turbine inoperable during the critical period when damage to freshly discharged fuel can result in high level releases of radioactivity, the probability of generating a damaging turbine missile during this period is essentially zero (Donchew following Tr. 5030, response to Oregon A8(a), p. 4).
- here, such a condition is not required for protection of the public health and safety, and the record does not justify its imposition.
4.
The Licensina Board Was Correct In Not Reouirina A Limit On SFP Water Tem 7rature As A License Cono1 tion - E>ception 4 Oregon next argues that implicit in various Licensing Board findings with regard to corrosion in the SFP and the effect of the proposed modification on SFP cooling and demineralizing equipment is the assumption that SFF water temperature will be maintained at or below 140 F.
Consequently, Oregon asserts that a technical specification limiting SFP water tempera-ture to 14 F should have been imposed.
As to corrosion, Oregon fails to note that the evidence presented on corrosion behavior in the SFP and the evaluation thereof was based on water temperatures substantially higher than 140 F.
In this vein:
(1) The Zircalo'y-4 corrosion rate assumed in the corrosion analyses was that found to exist at reactor coolant operating temperatures (Frey following Tr. 3049, pp.1, 2; Staff Exh. 2, p. 6; Tr. 3320-21; Tr. 2733; Tr. 2764).
(2) The Type 304 stainless steel corrosion rate assumed in the corrosion analyses was that found at reactor coolant operating temperatures (PGE Exh. 2, p. 3-15; Weeks following Tr. 4567, response to ricCoy A5(a), p.1; Staff Exh. 2, p. 5).
(3) The corrosion analyses assumed corrosion rates at reactor coolant operating temperatures for all otner materials in the SFP (Tr. 3320-21).
. The uncontroverted evi ence demonstrates that corrosion rates of materials in the SFP will be negligible even at reactor temperatures (',,'eeks following Tr. 4567, p.1 of response to McCoy A5(a), pp.1, 2 of response Garret A4, p. 1 of response to "cKeel A1).
Fron the standpoint of steadystate operation of the SFP, the additional six regions of spent fuel that can be stored because of the SFP nodifica-tion will result in an average steady-state water temperature increase of only 6 F.
For normal operation, both SFP cocling loops would be operated simultaneously for a period varying from one month to a maximun of four months following refueling (depending on how nuch spent fuel is stored in the SFP) to naintain the SFP water temperature at 125 F or less.
After the initial two-punp operation period, one pump will be sufficient to maintain that temperatu : (Lantz following Tr. 5257, response to McKeel A1(a)).
Analysis shows that under worst case storage conditions, SFP water temperature will be kept below 140 F and will exceed 125 F for a maximumofonly20 days (PGEExh.2,54.2).Thus,eventhe140FSFP water temperature that could result due to the modification would exist for only a short period of time.
The uncontroverted evidence denenstrates that the increase in water temperature due to the SFP modification will have no detectable affect on the corrosion rates of materials in the SFP (Weeks following Tr. 4657, p.
1 of response to McCoy A5(a), pp. 1, 2 of response to Garrett A4, p. 1 of response to McKeel A1) even assuming that SFP water temperatures exceed
. 140 F for a period of time following the discharge of spent fuel from the reactor (Tr. 4821,4852).
In view of all of the foregoing, it is clear that the Licensing Board's findings with respect to corrosion in the SFP are not dependent upon constantly maintaining SFP water temperature at or below 140 F.
The public health and safety does not require that such a limit be inposed from a corrosicn standpoint and the record does not justify such imposi-tion.
Similarly, the record does not justify the imposition of a water temperature limit because of the effects of the proposed modification on SFP cooling and demineralizing equipment, none of which will be burdened or otherwise impacted by the water temperature change from the SFP modi-fication (Lantz following Tr. 5256, pp. 1, 2 of response to McKeel A8; Lantz following Tr. 5257, p. 2 of response to !!cKeel A1(a)).
Oregon's arguments in this regard are thus without merit and the Licensing Board's rejection of a license condition on SFP water temperature is the only action that finds support in the record.
5.
The Licensing Board lias Correct In ?!ot Reauiring The Maintenance of 2000 com Baron In the SFP - Exception 5 Oregon next argues that tne closer spacing of spent fuel assemblies in the modified SFP increases the probability, relative to the unmodified pool, that a projectile from some untoward event might crush storage racks and stered fuel, cc:21 ting in criticality.
Oregon asserts that, to
9 prevent such criticality and its consequences, a technical specification requiring the maintenance of 2000 ppm boron in the SFP water should be imposed.EI It is idle and meaningless to simply postulate as Oregon does, the rearrangement of spent fuel resulting in criticality in the modified SFP without also indicating some credible or, at least, possible mechanism by.
which such rearrangement could occur.
An examination of all foreseeable mechanisms by which damaging projectiles might be generated reveals that none will result in the rearrangement of spent fuel costulated by Gregon.
1)
Handling of tools or fuel assembles A tool or fuel assembly being handled in or near stored fuel would, if dropped, impact only one stored fuel assembly at most.
After the initial impact, the dr10, cool or fuel assembly would not hit other stored fuel because the energy of the dropped object would be absorbed by the top structure of the fuel - acks (Donohew following Tr. 5030). Crushing of the storage racks to the extent that a fuel rearrangement resulting in cr ticality would occur is precluded by the technical specification on impact energy inposed by the Licensing Board.
This technical sp!cifi-cation prohibits the carrying of weights at such heights over El Note that such a technical specification would be superflucus if Oregon's request for the imposition of the licensee's water chemistry controls were granted since those water chemistry standards require the naintenance of at least 2000 ppm boron (PGE Exh. 2, Table 3-6).
. the SFP that the impact energy of the object, if dropped, would overstress the racks (Initial Decision, Slip Op. paragraphs
.23-25).
Criticality analyses for the modified SFP, conserva-tively assuming the use of unirradiated fuel (Tr. 3767A, 3768) and no boron in the water, show that criticality will not occur if a fuel assembly is dropped and comes to rest in its most reactive position on top of loaded fuel racks or between loaded fuel racks and the walls of the SFP as close as is physically possible to the loaded racks (Lantz following Tr. 5173, response to ficCoy A7, pp.1, 2).E/ Thus, normal fuel handling or tool maneuvering operations in the vicinity of the SFP will not cause a rearrangement of fuel resulting in criticality and this is not dependent upon the presence cf boron.
2)
Reracking of the SFP - As was previously discussed, during the reracking operation, racks in the SFP are not seismically stable and coui; be overturned in the event of an earthquake or by contact with racks being moved into or out of the SFP. If racks containing spent fuel overturned, spilling their con-El While Oregon's witness stated in written testimony that criticality could result from such a load handling accident (Or. Exh.1, p. 20),
this was a mere conclusory statement unsupported by analysis of any sort.
The witness later indicated that he had done no criticality calculation (Tr. 5202) and that he did not know whether criticality would result if stored fuel assemblies were brought as close togetner as is possible (Tr. 5200).
. tents, a critical array of fuel assemblies might result.
To preclude criticality in such circumstances, the Licensing Board imposed a technical specification requiring the maintenance of 2000 ppm baron in the SFP during the reracking operation (Initial Decision, Slip Op. paragraphs 41,52,53). Thus, in the only postulated event that could foreseeably result in criticality, a technical specification was imposed so as to preclude such criticality.
3)
Tornado missiles - The entire Fuel Building in which the SFP is housed is a Seismic Category I structure designed to resist natural phenomena such as tornados and earthquakes (Frewing following Tr. 4936, p. 45). Metal siding on the Fuel Building will fold around structural girders in the event of a tornado and will not become missiles that could impact the SFP (Tr.
4938). Analysis of the design
- sis tornado missiles (4000 pound car, wood plank and steel pipe) shows that even if such missiles should enter the Fuel Building, their impact energies en storage racks would be less than the apact energy of the dropped fuel assembly in the design basis fuel handling acci-dent for the SFP (Tr. 4949-51).
This impact energy (on the order of 20,000 inch-pounds - see PGE Exh. 2, pp. 3-7, 3-8; Bushnel following Tr. 3538, p. 3; Initial Decision, Slip Op.
paragraphs 21, 22 and citations therein) is much less than the
. impact energy at which the racks will be overstressed (240,000 inch-pounds - Tr. 3545; Initial Decision, Slip Op. paragraph 22).
Thus, no rearrangement of fuel leading to criticality will result from a tornado.
4)
Seismic events - As previously mentioned, the entire Fuel Building is a Seismic Category I structure and there is no condition under which parts of the building structure could damage stored fuel in the event of an earthquake (Frewing following Tr. 4936, p. 45).
If an earthquake occurs, the Fuel Building cranes would not become projectiles (Tr. 4149-50).
The only missiles that could be generated by an earthquake are objects carred by the cranes (Tr. 4149-50).
As indicated in item (1) supra, such objects will not cause a rearrangement of stored fuel resulting in criticality.
5)
Turbine Failure - The probability of generating a turbine missile that could impact the SFP is 5.6 x 10-Il peryear(Tr.
4985-36). This is an incredible event (Tr. 4050,4056).
Criticality as a result of fuel rearrangement caused by a turbine missile is even less credible and turbine failure cannot be considered a possible mechanism for causing criticality in the SFP.
Based on the foregoing, which is uncontroverted, there is no credible mechanism by which projectiles which could result in the rearrangement of stored fuel and criticality could be generated.
No party, including Oregon, has been able to suggest such a mechanism and, indeed, it appears that none exists.
Oregon's basic premise underlying its assertion of need for a technical specification on SFP boron concentration is thus fatally defective.
By the same token, Oregon's arguments with regard to the storage of unirradiated fuel, the probability of criticality should some projectile somehow be generated, b and the absence of boron in 5 The Staff would note, in passing, that Oregon's arguments with regard to the alleged increase in probability of criticality for the modified SFP if a sufficient projectile is somehow generated (Oregon Brief, pp.11-12) appears to be inconsistent.
There is apparently no dispute that the change in spacing between fuel assemblies due to the SFP modification will have little affect on the probability of a critical rearrangenent of stored fuel from a very large projectile (Lantz following Tr. 5026, response to Oregon A3(a), pp. 1-2; Initial Decision, Slip Op. para-graph 46). Where spacing between stored fuel assemblies becomes important is for smaller high energy projectiles which could rearrange stored fuel either by crushing storage cavities or by wedging between cavities.
While the evidence shows that the probability of a critical configuration due to crushing increases as initial spacing between stored assemblies decreases (Tr. 5047-48), it also shows that the probability of criticality from a wedge-shaped projectile decreases (Lantz following Tr. 5026, p. 2).
Oregon argues that the wedging mechanism is inoperative because the tops of the storage racks are welded together.
It ignores the fact that this same structural characteristic of the racks would tend to resist crushing of the racks.
If it is assumed that a projectile with sufficient energy to crush storage racks (despite the structure at the tops of the racks) will somehow be generated, it cust also be assumed that a projectile with sufficient energy to wedge between storage cavities (despite the structure at the tops of the racks) will somehow be generated.
The Licensing Board's finding that the prcbability of criticality from a high energy projectile (Initial Decision, Slip Op. para-graph 46) is, therefore, correct, even though such a finding is not necessary as a basis for rejecting Gregon's proposed technical specification on baron concentration.
the SFP 7/ are immaterial.
The Licensing Board re ognized as much in its 2
Initial Decision E / and was totally correct in reje,.ing Oregon's proposed technical specification in this regard.
No other result is supportable on the record.
The uncontroverted evidence clearly demonstrates that for all foreseeable conditions in the modified SFPE' criticality is precluded even without 2_7,/
While it is '. rue that, absent a technical specification on SFP boran concentration, there is no iron-clad guarantee that 2000 ppa baron will be present in the SFP at all times (Oregon Brief, p.12),
existing Trojan technical specifications require that such boron concentration be maintained in the SFP during refueling.
Once in the SFP, this baron is not easily removed as it will not evaporate it is not removed in any signficant quantities by the filters an or demineralizers (Lantz following Tr. 5172; Tr. 5124-26; Tr. 5370).
El Slip Op. paragraph 51.
El This includes normal storage conditions assuming worst case tolerances and fuel assemblies offset in their storage cavities, bulk boiling conditions, Safe Shutdown Earthquake conditions, the condition in which a fuel assembly is dropped on *, of racks containing fuel, and the condition in which a fuel asa.ibl; is dropped alongside and as close as possible to loaded racks betwe3n the racks and the SFP walls (Lantz following Tr. 5173, response to McCoy A7, pp. 1, 2).
In each case, fresh, unirradiated fuel with the maximum permissible enrichment was assumed to be involved (Tr. 3767A, 3768; Staff Exh 1A, pp. 2-4).
e
- boron.3_0/ Since bor,i is not needed to preclude criticality in the modified SFP for normal operation or for foreseeable offnormal and design basis accider,t conditions (Frewing following Tr.5123, p. 52) and since there is no mechanism by which more severe conditions could be created, Oregon's proposed technical speci#
ition on boron concentration is not necessary to protect the public
.alth and safety and the Licensing Board must be affirmed in this regar.
6.
The Licensino Board Was Correct In flot Reouirino The Maintenance Of Full Core Reserve Capacity As A License Condition - Exceotion 6 Finally, Oregon argues that to accomplish repairs in the SFP, it is necessary to continually retain enough empty space in the nodified SFP to allow the storage of fuel assemblies equivalent to a full reactor core EI While it is unnecessary to consider the need for boron to prevent criticality from a high energy projectile since there is no mecha-nism by which such criticality could result, the evidence neverthe-less shows that a technical specification gouiring 2000 ppm boron would not accomplish much.
For the 2.6% U fuel currentiy used at Trojan, boron is not necessary to prevent criticality, regard-less of the nature of the projectile iroact, if sucg3(uel has been irradiated for 1 1/3 years (Tr. 5174-75).
For 3% U " fuel depleted to 2/3 of normal average burnup, baron is not necessary to prevent criticality, regardless of the nature of the projectile impact (Tr. 5168-70).
These appear to represent the real fuel storage conditions from the standpoint of U'"gstic, expected load.j Only in the situation where 3% V'g and burnup of stored fuel.
fuel depletgj5to 2/3 of normal average burnup is interspersed with 3.5% U fuel that is unirradiated is 2000 ppm boron necessary to prevent criticality in the event of a high energy projectile from so:re unknown mechanism (Tr. 5168-70).
However, 2000 ppn boron would not prevent criticality if a high energy projectile wap~ to impact on a group of unirradiated fuel assemblies with a U'
loading of 3.5% (Tr. 5128-29, 5167, 5138).
. (full core reserve capacity of FCRC).
It is thus asserted that the Licensing Board should have required the maintenance of FCRC.E At the outset, it must be noted that the capability to offload a full core from the reactor is not required from a safety standpoint, though it may be desireable from an economic or operational standpoint (Staff Exh.
18, p. 1; Tr. 4485). Under all normal operation and credible upset conditions, adequate fuel cooling can be achieved with the core in the reactor vessel (Frewing following Tr. 5638, p.103; Tr. 6159).3_2/
The basic reason for maintaining FCRC is to perform reactor vessel inspec-tions involving the removal of vessel internals or to perform pressure boundary inspections (Tr. 4481; Frewing following Tr. 5638, p.103).
The first required inspections in this vein are scheduled for 1985 (Clark following Tr. 5692, p. 6).
If such inspections could not be performed when required, the reactor would have co be shutdown and maintained in the shutdown condition (Tr. 582425, 564043, Tr. 6243).
The only other S/ Oregon Brief, pp.12-13.
3_2/ Although Gregon's witness expressed a concern that FCRC may be necessary to allow cooling of the core in case of a reactor vessel failure, he stated that he did not know how such failure could occur or whether it was even credible (Tr. 6239-40).
tio reover, he indicated a concern that FCRC might be necessary to naintain a stable core geccetry to prevent criticality in the reactor under certain circumstances but admitted that criticality could be pre-vented by the injection of boron into the reactor (Tr. 6240-41).
Consequently, this testimony does not establish the need for FCRC from a safety standpoint.
In fact, Oregon's witness testified that he thought maintenance of FCRC was a " safety concern" only in a "ceneral sense" and that, in his judcment, " rudent planning" would call for maintenance of FCRC (Ir. 6237.
% reason for maintaining the capability to discharge a full core from the reactor that appears on the record is to allow continued operation in the face of unexpected core nuclear characteristics if such operation is desired (Oregon Exh. 1, pp. 8, 9).
That involves a natter of operational convenience however and is not a safety matter.
The thrust of Oregon's argument with regard to FCRC is that it is supposedly necessary to effect repairs to the SFP liner.
Such repairs might allegedly be required due to corrosion of the liner.3_3/
While it is true that liner repairs in the modified SFP could entail the removal of as many as 'our racks (Tr. 41994200), liner repairs in the unmodified SFP would also entail the removal of racks and the modifica-tions do not significantly alter the ability to accomplish repairs (Lantz following Tr. 4473, pp. 23; Tr. 4517).
In fact, if anything, the ability to repair the liner is improved by the SFP modification since the ability to shuffle fuel so that racks can be removed to gain access to the liner will be totally lost after four refuelings for the unmodified SFP but will not be lost for the modified SFP under worst case conditions (i.e.
where four racks must be removed frcm the pool) until after the sixth El Oregon makes the same argument with respect to repairs of storage racks.
Obviously, the need for FCRC to repair storage racks is unaffected by the SFP modification and this amendment proceeding provides no pretext or justification for requiring the maintenance of FCRC in that regard.
. refueling (Tr. 4334-35; Tr. 4202-03; Tr. 4483-84).
Thus, the changes brought about by the SFP modification do not justify maintaining FCRC from a repair standpoint and are actually beneficial in that regard.
fioreover, repairs can still be accomplished even if all racks are com-pletely filled and cannot be removed frcn the pool (Tr. 4202-03; Tr.
4480-81,4482).
Consequently, maintenance of FCRC is not required from a repair standpoint.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that maintenance of FCRC is not required based on considerations of public health and safety, including considerations of the ability to repair the SFP. While FCRC is desirable from an operational flexibility standpoint, such matters are properly left to the licensees judgment where, as here, no safety considerations come into play. E Thus, the Licensing Board was totally correct in eschewing any license requirement for FCRC. No other result is justified on the record.
B.
Deferral of Full Use of the ficdified SFP Pending Issuance of the Generic Environcental Imoact Statenent on Soent Fuel Storage - Exception 7 In its single remaining exception, Oregon contends that by reason of the Commission's GEIS flotice, the SFP modification may go forward but that the modified SFP may be utilized only to the extent of storing the amount b Cf. Consumer Power Co. (fiidland Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB 458, Tf1RC 155, 162-63 (1978); Illinois Power Co. (Clinton Pc',ter Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-340, 4 i;RC 27; 48 (1976).
. of fuel permitted to be stored under the orginal Trojan operating license.35/
The bases for Oregon's contention in this regard is its assertions that:
1) license amendments authorizing increased onsite storage of spent fuel cannot be issued prior to the completion of the GEIS unless deferral of an individual licensing action would result in substantial harm to the public interest and the Licensing Board erred in finding such substantial harm here.
2) the GEIS requires that five factors be applied, weighed and balanced and the Licensing Board erred in finding that the factor related to cumulative impacts was thoroughly considered, that harm to the public interest would result from deferral, and that the five factors were weighed and balanced by the Staff.E/
Each of these assertions are addressed below.
1 The GEIS Notice Does Not Reauire Deferral of SFP License Amendments Unless such Deferral Would Result In Substan-tial Harm To tne Public Interest and the Licensina Board's Findinc of Harm Was Correct In its GEIS Notice, published on September 16, 1975, the Commission reviewed the status, at that time, of spent fuel storage throughout the 35/ Oregon Brief, pp. 1, 13ff.
-36/ These asserticns are substantially identical to those pressed on appeal by Susan Garrett, another intervenor in this proceeding.
See NRC Staff's Brief in Opposition to Exceptions of Intervenor Susan M. Garrett, January 8, 1979, pp. 20-29.
. country and stated that it foresaw a " possibility of a future shortage in licensed spent fuel capacity...."El The Commission also found that such shortage "could adversely affect [an] electric utility's ability to meet electrical energy needs or force [a] utility to operate other plants that are less economical to operate or which have greater environmental impact, and thereby adversely affect the public interest."El The Com-mission stated that the problem of spent fuel storage can adequately be addressed "on a case-by-case basis within the context of individual licensing reviews" and that it was not "necessary to develop an overall program of action to deal with the problem". E l flevertheless, the Commis-sion does have the " discretion to deal with issues of this type through the exercise of its rulemaking authority and/or the issuance of a ' generic' environnental impact statement...[which might]... serve as the context for the promulgation of more definitive criteria regarding size and design of spent fuel pools and/or the licensing of independent spent fuel storage facilities...."El Thus, the GEIS is to serve as a veFicle for profitably examining the issue of spent fuel storage in a broader context than indi-vidual licensing proceedings.al/
E / GEIS fiotice, 40 Fed. Reg. 42801 (emphasis added).
38/
Id_. at 40 Fed. Reg. 42802 (emphasis added).
39/ Id.
40/
Id.
41/ Id.
. The Commission also gave " careful consideration to the question whether licensing (-tions intended to ameliorate a possible shortage of spent fuel storage" should be deferred in the interim period prior to issuance of the GEIS.42/
In determining that individual licensing actions with respect to spent fuel storage should not be generally deferred but should proceed in the period prior to issuance of the GEIS, the Commission affirmatively foundb that:
(1)
It is likely that each individual licensing action of this type would have a utility that is independent of the utility of other licensing actions of this type; (2)
It is not likely that the taking of any particuler licensing action of this type during the time frame under consideration would constitute a commitment of resources that would tend to significantly foreclose the alternatives available with respect to any other individual licensing action of this type; (3)
It is likely that any environmental impacts associated with any individual licensing action of this type would be such that they could adequately be addressed within the context of the individual license application without overlooking any cumulative environnental impacts; (4)
It is likely that any technical issues t'iac wy
'se in ai the course of a review of an individual license application can be resolved within that context; and (5) A deferral or severe restriction on licensing actions of this type would result in substantial ham to the public interest.
As indicated, such a restriction 4S/ M. (emphasis added).
S/
The Commission characterized these findings as its " general conclusions".
40 Fed. Rec. 42802.
. or deferral could_ result in reactor shutdowns as existing spent fuel pools become filled.
It now appears that the spent fuel pools of as many as ten reactors could be fillea by mid-1978.
These ten reactors represent a total of about 6 million kilowatts of electrical energy generating capacity.
The removal of these reactors from service could reduce the utilities' service nargins to a point where reliable service would be in jeopardy, or force the utilities to rely nore heavily on less economical or more polluting forms of generationthatwouldimposeeconomicpenag.jesoncon-sumers and increase environmental impacts.-
The Commission directed, however, that since the five general findings noted above may not fit every individual licensing action undertaken in the interim period, such individual actions be accompanied by an EIS or an EIA which weighs and balances the five factors within the factual context of that particular licensing acticn.5/
S/ 40 Fed. Reg. 42802 (emphasis added).
5/ As set forth in the GEIS fiotice:
The Commission expects that any licening action intended to ameliorata a cossible shortage of spent fuel storage capacity during this interim period would be accompanied by an environmental icoagt statement (10 CFR s 51.5(a)) or impact appraisal (10 CFR 5 51.5(c)) tailored to the facts of the case.
Since the Commission's general conclusions with respect to the five factors, as set forth above, nay not fit the factual circunstances of particular licensing actions, the five factors will be applied, weighed and balanced within the context of these statements or appraisals in reaching licensing deter-minations.
40 Fed. Reg. 42802 (emphasis added).
. The plain language of the GEIS tiotice indicates that the Commission was concerned with a "possible" shortage of spent fuel storage capacity.
flowhere is there an indication that interim licensing should be deferred unless the reactor in question has no remaining spent fuel storage capacity and is about to shut down because there is no place to store its depleted fuel.
Such a requirement would obviously be the single important and controlling factor in determining whether interim licensing should proceed and, had the Commission intended to establish such a criterion for interim licensing, it most certainly would have said so.
Oregon also implies that the fifth factor - harm to the public interest - is controlling and that absent a strong showing of actual harm for a particular reactor, interim licensing cannot proceed.
Such an implication cannot be drawn from the GEIS flotice.
The Comaission did not single out the fifth factor for special consideration.
If it had intended to do so, this too would have been clearly stated in the GEIS tiotice.
There is no support for Oregon's assertion that a showing must be made that substantial ham to the public interest will result from deferral of full utilization of the modified SFP at Trojan or that the fifth factor is controlling in any way.
Similarly, Oregon's assertion that the GEIS flotice constitutes an tiRC "cenmit-ment" to complete the GEIS prior to implementing individual solutions E is
-46l Oregon Brief, p. 20.
without nerit.$ The Commission clearly stated ir, the GEIS flotice that the problem of spent fuel storage can adequately be addressed on a case-by-case basis and that the GEIS would serve simply as a vehicle by which the problem could be explored on a broader basis and more definitive criteria for licensing developed.5/ This is a direct contradiction of Oregon's " commitment" assertion.
Finally, while Oregon is correct that there is no evidence definitely establishing that Trojan will be forced to shut down if full utiliza-tion of the SFP is deferred until issuance of the GEIS, there is uncon-troverted evidence indicating that full core discharge capability for the unmodified SFPS / will be lost after the second refueling of 9 Oregon apparently concedes, as it must, that completion of the GEIS is not requjred under the flational Environmental Policy Act (flEPA)
(42 U.S.C. s 4321 et seo.).
In fact, the Commission has found it has "no overall program of action" with regard to spent fuel storage, ilorthern States Power Co. (Prairie Island fluclear Generating Plant, Un1_ts 1 & 2), LSP-7-51, 6 t'RC 265 (1977), aff'd in part, ALAB-455, 7 flRC 41 (1978), and that, as such, a generic or programmatic environmental impact statement is not required prior to the taking of any individual licensing action related to spent fuel storage.
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 399, 414 (1976).
S/ See notes 30-41 and accompanying text supra.
S/ Although the evidence and the Licensing Board's Initial Decision in this regard are directed toward the " unmodified SFP", Oregon's pro-posal that the licensee be permitted to use for storage of spent fuel only that much of the modified SFP as was authorized for the unmedi-fled SFP (i.e. 1 1/3 cores) nakes the term " unmodified SFP" as it is used on the record, in the Initial Decision and in the text in this regard synonmous with Oregon's pc;;cral.
P Trojans / and that there is a probability of 0.5 that a full core dis-charge fer inspection or maintenance purposes would be required in the period between the second refueling and the filling of the unmodified SFP.
If this situation were to arise, and there is a significant possi-bility that it might, shutdown of the reactor would occur before the unmodified SFP were filled from normal refuelings.5_1_/ While this possi-bility is not as imminent or certain as in the case where a facility's SFP is full, the Licensing Board found, and the Staff agrees, that there is a significant potential for substantial harm to the public interest here.
Thus, in the Staff's view, the Licensing Board was correct in its finding with regard to the fifth factor in the GEIS Notice, that factor weighs in favor of or, at worst, is neutral with regard to, issuance of the SFP amendment _2/ and the fifth factor does S
-50/ The first refueling occurred in March 1978 (Initial Decison Slip Op.
- p. 56). Because of an extended shutdown of Trojan from March 1978 duetodesigndeficienciesintheControlBuilqing(theStaffisofthe view that official notice, pursuant to 10 CFR 5 2.743(i), may be taken of the fact that Trojan was shutdown for an extended period from March 1978 and that, on December 22, 1973, pursuant to a Partial Initial Decision issued by an Atcaic Safety and Licensing Board, Portland General Electric Co. (Trojan fluclear Plant, LBP,
flRC (Dec. 21, 1973), startup and operation of the facility in its as-built condition was authorized), the second refueling, scheduled for the Spring of 1979, may be delayed.
5_1/ Initial Decision Slip Op., p. 56.
M/ The possibility that the second refueling (the point at which full case discharge capability will be lost) might be delayed (see footnote
Althouch the draft GEIS was issued in early 1978, the final GEIS has not been issued.
The Commission did not indicate that individual licensing actions should be deferred if the GEIS is about to be issued but, instead, indicated that a determination as to deferral should be based on a weighing and balancing of the five factors.
. not dictate that full utilization of the nodified SFP be deferred as proposed by Oregon.53/
2.
Conulative Iroacts Were Adecuately Considered and the Five Factors In the GEIS Notice Were Adequately Applied, Weianed and Balanced Oregon aruges that the Staff failed to thoroughly consider " cumulative" impacts of the Trojan SFP modification as required by the third factor in the GEIS tiotice.
' Cumulative" impacts as refered to by Oregon in this regard are apparently impacts experienced throughout the nation, as a result of similar SFP licensing actions, which would not otherwise be experienced absent such licensing actions. E l This is a unique and novel definition of cumulative impacts but it is the wrong one.
As indicated in the Prairie Island SFP proceedina:
The Commission has not expressly said how wide the staff must search for any impacts that may be cumulative.
It is clear, how-ever, that no "overall program of action" involving capacity El Oregon argues, in essence, that full utilization of the modified SFP should be deferred so as to avoid a fait accomoli. Oregon does not explain, however, how the objective of avoiding fait accoroli.
could be accomplished by authorizing the SFP modifications on the one hand but prohibiting full use of the modified SFP on the other as it proposes. lforeover, while a substantial number of SFP modifications have been authorized at operating reactors, there is no showing that such authorization for Trojan would bring about the fait accompli. The Commission established no numerical dividing line beyond which individual SFP amendments cannot be authorized and the Trojan SFP amendment should not be prohibited based on the fortuitous circumstance that such amend-ment was not issued until af ter a number of similar amendnents had been issued for other facilities.
El Oregon Brief, p. 16.
. expansion of spent-fuel pools is underway.
That being so, it takes, no sense to say that the Commission intended the search for cumulative irpacts to be conducted on a national basis as thounh an overall oroaran was in existence.
The Court in Hanly v. Kleindienst 471 F. 2d ETT2nd Cir.1972),
articulated the vic./ that a proposed action should be evaluated for fiEPA purposes in the light of at least two relevant factors, one of which is "...(2) the absolute quantitative adverse environnental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area" (emphasis supplied), 471 F.2d 823, at 830.
i'e think that what was intended by the Cornission's flotice in this regard is nothing other than the search for cumulative impacts conducted in the area of each facility.
Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island fluclear Generatina Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-77-51, 6 flRC 265, 272 (1977), aff'd in part, ALAB-455, 7 i!RC 41 (1978).
Cumulative impacts then, as that tern is used by the Commission in the GEIS flotice, refers to impacts in the NEPA sense, i.e. effects that are
" synergistic" or wor' King together and interrelated.
See, e.a. Klepoe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 409-412 (1976), where the Supreme Court clearly equates "cunulative" impacts with " synergistic" and interrelated regional impacts. Curulative impacts in this sense were not considered in detail in the Staff's Environmental Impact Appraisal (EIA) for the Trojan b See also Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, 541 F.2d 1292,1306-07 (8th Cir. 1976) (emphasizing ccabined effects of federal actions in a particular area); NRDC v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 87-89 (2d Cir. 1975) (cunulative impacts are those affecting a parti olar area); Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813, 824-25 (5th Cir. 1975) (regional effects working in combination);
Wisconsin Electric Power Co. (Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 2),
ALAB-137, 6 AEC 491, 495 (1973) (interaction or " contact" between federal actions and their effects).
. E/ ut were addressed in Staff testimony.
As found by the Licensing b
SFP Board based on the uncontroverted evidence E! the environmental impacts of such nodifications at other plants around the country are so localized and inconsequential that there are no cumulative impacts.
In view of this, it is clear that cumulative impacts and the third factor of the GEIS flotice were properly and adequately considered and Oregoo's asser-tion to the contrary finds no support in either the facts or the law.
Finally, Oregon asserts that the Staff did not weigh and balance the five factors of the GEIS flotice. The apparent basis for this contention in Oregon's assertion that the Staff relied in some instances, on inforna-tion from the licensee.El While it is true that the Staff relied on the Licensee with regard to information on the potential effects of deferral oftheSFPauthorization,El the Staff did review such information, evaluated it for reasonableness, and generally confirmed such information Staff Exh. 1B, p. 25.
The simple reason for this is that there were no cumulative impacts to be discussed.
El Initial Decision, Slip Op. pp, 53, 55.
El The only other basis for Oregon's clain in this regard appears to be that thc Staff failed to use the words " weigh and balance" in the EIA.
El Use of information provided by an applicant or licensee is not per se unacceptable.
Sierra Club v. Lynn 502 F.2d 43, 50 (5th Cir. 1974).
.., as it relied upon to a substantial degree.S/ In addition, the Staff conducted a fairly extensive independent evaluation of alternatives available if the SFP modification were deferred.S/ The Staff did take a "hard look" despite Oregon's assertion to the contrary. S/
Moreover, the absence of an explicit, detailed weighing and balancing of the five factors is due to the fact that the Staff found, based on ite evaluation, that each factor weighed in favor of issuing the Trojan SFP amendment.S/ That being the case, there simply was nothing to weigh and balance. There is no evidence in the record indicating that this situa-tion is not still operable.
S/ See, e.g. Testimony of Clark fo!1owing Tr. 5692, pp. 8-10.
61 /
'his evaluation is summarized in the EIA (Staff Exh. 18) at pp.
3-20, and in the t 2stinony of Clark following Tr. 5692.
S/ Oregon's reliance on Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim !!uclear Generating Station, Unit 1), dLAS-479, / WC 74 (1978) is misplaced.
That case set forth the required independent Staff evaluation of alternative sites necessary fo a construc"f on permit for a power reactor, in-diciting that, for that stage c' licensing, the single most important environmentally-related task fc ' the Staff is the alternate site evaluaticn. The cf rcumstances are far different for the instant licensing action end, in the Staff's view, the requirement to take a "hard look" is more than satisfied by the Staff's action here.
S/ The adequacy of tle Staff's findings on each of the factors is dis-cussed in the f1RC Staff's Brief In Opposition to Exceptions of Intervenor Susan 91. Garrett, January 13, 1979, at pp. 26-28.
In the interest of brevity, that discussion vill not be repeated here.
. 3.
Conclusien liith Regard to Deferral Pending Issuance of the GEIS While Oregon's proposal with regard to deferral of full utilization of the modified SFP may be superficially attractive, it is not required by the applicable law or the facts.
As a practical matter, adoption of Oregon's proposal would needlessly extend an already unnecessarily pro-tracted proceeding without attendant benefits, commensurate or otherwise.
III.
C0f'CLUSIO!!
Based on the foregoing, Oregon's appeal, in its totality, is without merit and should be rejected.
The relief requested by Oregon the imposi-tion of technical specifications or license conditions and deferral of authorization for full utilization of the modified SFP pending issuance of the GEIS should be denied in toto and the Licensing Board's decision affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
/
- ? ',,Y 7 Joseph R. Gray Counsel for f1RC Staff Dated at Bethesda, ftaryland this 29th day of January, 1979
UNITED STATES OF /,:.1 ERICA NUCLEAR RI:.GULATORY CO..I'.1ISSION BEFORE TliE ATO.,IC SAFETY Ai!D LICENSI.':G APPEAL BOARD In the.'. tatter of
)
)
PORTLAND GE.;ERAL ELECTRIC
)
Docket No. 50-344 CO:, IPA.sY, ET AL.
) (Proposed Amendment to Facilitf
) Operating License NPF-1 to Permit (Trojan Nuclear Plant)
)
Storage Pool ?.iodification)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certif,f that copies of "NRC STAFF'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO EXCEPTIONS OF INTERVENOR STATE OF OREGON" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 29tn day of January,1979:
Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman
- Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq.*
Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safetf and Licensing Appeal Panel U.S. IIuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. Frederick P. Cowan, '!cmber Dr. John 11. buck
- Apt. B-125 Atomic Safety and Licensing 6125 N. Verde Trail Appeal Euard Boca Raton, Florida 33433 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555
'.i r Frederick J. Shon, '. ember
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Boaru Dr. W. Reed Johnson
- U.S..' uclear Regulatory Ccmmissiot.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, D. C. 20555 Appeal Boarc' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmmission Susa, ? !. Garrett Washington, D. C. 20555 7325 S.E. Steele Street Portland, Oregon 97206 Mr. David B. McCoy 34S Ilussey Lane Ms. Sharon S. cKeel Grants Pass, Oregon 97526 P. O. Box 37S6 Pertland, Oregon 9720S
I
'- Warren IIastin;p, Esq.
Atomic Safety anr1 Licensing Coun;el for Pertland General Luard Panel #
Electric Company U.S..':uclear Regulatory Commissien 121 S.W. Salmon Street Washington, D. C. 20555 Portland, Oregon 97204 Atomic Safety and Licensing Richard I.I. Sandvik, Esq.
Appeal Panel (5)+
Counsel for Oregon Energy Facility U.S. !!uclear Regulatory Commissien Siting aunsel and Oregon Washington, D. C. 20555 Department of Energy 500 Pacific Building Docketing and Service Section (3)*
520 S.W. Yamhill Cffice a: the Secret ry Portland, Oregon 972C4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 John J. iiaugh, Esq.
O'Connell, Goyak & IIaugh, P.C.
555 henjamin Franldin Plaza One Southwest Columbia Portland, Oregon 97258 l
//
I 6;/'.'-(//4
'i. l.,' l i
! ?,..
Stuart A. Treby-Assistant Chief IIcaring Counsel ese