ML19261A725
| ML19261A725 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/20/1978 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-1587, NUDOCS 7902080038 | |
| Download: ML19261A725 (50) | |
Text
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ISSUE DATE: 11/20/78 P
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HINVTES OF THE ACRS R CTI7TYIES SUBCOMMITTEE HEETING WASHINGTON, DC g_ /$ N7 OCTOBER 4, 1978 pna 7/,/n The ACRS Subccamittee on Regulatory Activities met in Room 1046, 1717 H St.,
NW, Washington, DC on October 4, 1978, to discuss several regulatory guides, revisions to appendices to the Code of Federal Regulations, and other matters relevant to reactor licensing activities. The notice of the meeting appeared in the Federal Register on September 19, 1978 and September 28, 1978 (Attach-m at A). A list of attendees at the Subcommittee meeting is attached (Attach-ment B). A list of documents provided to the Subconnittee for this meeting is provided (Attachment C). A written statement and a request to make an oral statement had been received from Ederer Inc. prior to the meeting (Attachment 0) concerning Regulatory Guide 1.104. The entire meeting was open to members of the public except for the showing of a short company pro-prietary movie by Ederer, Inc. concerning specific design features of I
I their nuclear cranes.
MEETING WITH THE NRC STAFF 1.0 Subcommittee Chairman's Opening Remarks Dr. Siess, Subcommittee Chairman, introduced the members of the Sub-committee and discussed the order of business for the day, ile pointed out that the meeting was being conducted in accordance with the pro-visions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Government in the Sunshine Act and that Mr. Gary Quittschreiber was the Designated Federal Employee for the meeting. He noted that representatives of Ederer Inc. had provided a written statement concerning Regulatory Guide 1.104 and had requested time during the meeting to make an oral statement.
Dr. Siess passed the following items on to the NRC Staff for appro-priate action: 7790208003F *
(1) Letter from Mr. Bender to Mr. Fraley containing questions regarding the Draft Lightning Protection Regulatory Guide, dated September 29, 1978 (See Attachment E);
(2) Letter from Mr. Burton o Mr. Bender concerning inspection of fiberglass ecoling water supply and return lines at Tennessee Valley Authority's Hartsville and Phipps Bend Projects, dated September 29, 1978 (See Attachment F)..
Reg. Act. 10/4/78 2.0 New NRC Procedure for Handling Regulatory Guides Mr. Morrison. HRC Staff, discussed.a new procedure in which the Regulatory Requirenents Review Committee (RRRC) will not review changed Regulatory Positions in Regulatory Guides or Standard Review Plans until after they have been circulated for public connent. This will allow the RRRC. havs
- Se benefit of public comments and the NRC Staff's proposed resolution to the public comments prior to deciding on any changed position.
Mr. Morrison noted that the proposed procedure does have an impact on the existing method of issuance since tney are proposing to send the Regulatory Guides and their associated value impact assessments out for public comment in a rougher form than in the past, probably double spaced, to encourage more people to cannent.
Hr. Morrison noted that they were still requesting input from the ACRS Regulatory Activities Subcommittee before they send the pro-posed guides out for public cunment.
Members of the Subcommittee suggested that some editing of the pro-posed guides be performed before sending out for public conment.
It was the consensus of the Subcommittee that it was desirable for the ACRS Regulatory Activities Subcommittee to continue to look at pre-comment guides. Dr. Siess noted that the Subcommittee would have to remember that the guides are going out in rougher form and that it should mainly look at the guides from the point of view of con-tent, not wording 4ad editing.
Mr. Bender noted that the NRC Staff may be trying to resolve NRC Staff differences of opinion by seeing what the industry can live with.
It was the opinion of Mr. Bender that the NRC Staff should have nn objective view about what can be afforded in the name of safety and what needs to be specified. He fel'. that the NRC Staff should be looking to industry to ask questions with regard to guides instead of askina industry to provide answers.
. Reg. Act. 10/4/78 It was the opinion of Dr. Stess that the Regulatory Activities Sub-comittee could be a lot more help to the NRC Staff at the precoment stage than at the post-coment stage; therefore, the Subcomittee will continue to perfom its review before the guides are sent out for public coment.
3.0 Regulatory Guide 1.28, Revision 2, " Quality Assurance Program Requi rements Design & Construction."
Mr. Beckhan., NRC Staff, noted that Regulatory Guide 1.28 was published initially in 1972 as Safety Guide 28 endorsing ANSI N45.2. The standard was revised in 1977 and Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.28, endorsing the revised standard, was published in March of 1978 for coment. Public coments were received 'from nine individuals.
Dr. Siess pointed out an editorial error in the Regulatory position.
There were no other coments concerning the Guide.
The Subcomittee members agreed that Regulatory Guide 1.28. Revision 2 be recomended to the ACRS for concurrence in the Regulatory Position.
4.0 Revision to Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50, " Fracture Toughness Requirenents" Mr. Gamble NRC Staff, discussed the proposed change to Appendix G which replaces the requirements for toughness in bolting materials and materials for pumps and valves with presently-existing ASME Code requirenents.
Dr. Siess noted that Ors. Bush (ACRS consultant) and Shewmon (ACRS member) both reviewed the proposed revision and agreed with the changes (See Attactraent G).
Reg. Act. 10/4/78 The Subcomittec manbers agreed that the revised Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 be recommended to the ACRS for concurrence.
5.0 Revision to Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50, " Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program Requirements" Mr. Gamble NRC Staff, discussed the proposed change to Appendix H to relax the requirements for limiting neutron fluence lead factor time to three, and to make it as low as practical r! thin the physical constraints of the reactor vessel internal design.
Dr. Siess pointed out that the proposed change could conceivably allow someone to put the capsule outside the vessel since the change does not require the fluence lead factor to be one or greater. Mr. Gamble indicated this as an error and that they had not intended to eliminate the lower limit and would add it back into the Guide.
Mr. Gamble noted that they are also recomending that the Regulation be changed to eliminate the restriction against welding surveillance c psule attachments to the vessel wall, provided they are in accord-ance with the ASME Code.
Dr. Siess requested a revised copy of Appendix H reflecting the lower limit of fluence. The Subcomittee members agreed that the revised Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50 be recommended to the ACRS for concurrence.
6.0 Regulatory Guide 1.104, Revision 1, " Overhead Crane Handling Systems i
for Nuclear Power Plants" 6.1 Discussion With NRC Staff Mr. Porse NRC Staff, provided a brief background on the Guide noting that it was reviewed by the ACRS Subcomittee on January 8,1975 and sent out for public comments. The NRC Staff received about 500 pages of public coments. These coments were resolved by August 1977 and a public meeting was held on March 20, 1978 to discuss the revised Draft 1.
Following that public meeting, Draft 2 was written which is the copy presently available for review.
Reg. Act. 10/4/78 Dr. Stess noted that he had reviewed all of the infomation sent to the Subcommittee on this Guide and found it difficult to under-stand. He noted that Regulatory Guide 1.13, for spent fuel storage facility designs, requires that cranes capable of carrying heavy loads should be prevented, by design rather than by inter'ocks, from moving in the vicinity of the pool, should be single-failure-proof, or the fuel pool should be designed to withstand the impact of the heaviest load without leakage uncovering the fuel. 5. Siess noted that this Guide was apparently written to define the re-quirements for the spent fuel pool single-failure-proof crane as well as to define the requirements for a single-failure-proof crane inside containment. He noted that new plants are being designed so that heavy loads cannot be dropped over the fuel pool such that a single-failure-proof crane would not be required in the fuel pool area; therefore, this Guide would apply only to the polar crane inside containment for all new plants. Dr. Siess noted his concern on backfit plants that there was no clear-cut policy as to whether alternatives to single failure-proof cranes would be acceptable in this Guide as they are in Regulatory Guide 1.13.
DP. Siess noted that the Guide's definition of a critical load is open-ended for " unacceptable release of radioactivity." The NRC Staff members present were unable to address Dr. Siess's questions in this area.
In response to a question from Dr. Siess concerning why the NRC Staff does not wilt to issue this Guide until after the ASME crane specti-
cation code is issued. Hr. Porse said it would be two or three years before the code is issued. Mr. Jagodzinski, ASME Comittee Chaiman on Cranes, indicated that it was intended that the code would meet the intent of the Guide. He noted that they needed guidance on the definitions of a critical load and the consequences of dropping a load.
Reg. Act. 10/4/78 Mr.. Bender indicated he needed ciore information on how this Guide muld apply to backfit plants before he would agree to ACRS concurrence.
Dr. Anderson noted that it was not the intent of this Guide to define a critical load. It was his understanding that the determination as to whether a single-failure-proof crane as needed would be made during the licensing process.
The Subcomittee members requested that the NRC Staff provide defint-tions of the three kinds of loads. Mr. Porse agreed that the existing wording was misleading. Dr. Anderson said they would define the various loads for Witch the crane is to be considered and will relate them to one another.
During a page-by-page review, the Subcommittee members recomended numerous editorial changes to clarify the intent of the Guide, which the NRC Staff agreed to incorporate.
6.2 Public Statement from Ederer, Inc.
Mr. Bill Clark, Chief Engineer of Ederer, Inc., noted that they have been in the lifting equipment business in Seattle, Washington, since 1901 and have been designing and manufacturing cranes 'or nuclear facilities since 1951.
Mr. Clark indicated that, owing to an outgrowth of a detailed analysis of the loading imposed by two-blocking, (See Attachment D) they have found that additional two-blocking protection can be readily provided.
He found it necessary to come formrd at this time since they found that the NRC Staff was going to relax the Guide more than necessary in the area of two-blocking protection. Clark stated that tw limit switches may be sufficient to prevent two-blocking but he saw no evidence that demonstrates they mald prevent all two-blocking, since experience shows a single limit switch has not previously been adequate. He stated that their analysis shows that it is
eg. Act. 10/4/78 possible to design a single-failure-proof crane with the inherent ability to withstand two-blocking and that it would be irresponsible not to use this feature. He noted that even if the NRC Staff does not require Ederer to provide this independent safety feature, all future Ederer cranes for nuclear safety related lifts will have the follor iag:
(1) Two independent lioit switches; (2) Dual diverse protection to prevent the ca'cies from being crushed or cut in the event of tw alocking; (3) An overload protection device that senses overload caused by two blocking; and (4) Capability of withstanding a slow-speed two blocking test to verify the above features.
Mr. Clark proposed wording changes to paragraphs C.3.j and C.4.b of the Guide (See Attachment H) reflecting his previous comments.
He added that the results of their analysis support the general crane industry concern about the required load hangup test which could result in serious overstressing of the crane structure if the overload protection system fails. Since the crane structure would not t e affected by a slow-speed two blocking test he strongly recommended the deletion of the presently proposed Guide require-ments for a load hangup test in favor of the original slow-speed two blocking test.
6.3 Ederer Proprietary Movie (Closed Session)
Representatives of Ederer, Inc., showed a 5-10 minute company pro-prietary movie showing specific design features of their cranes that would prevent damage to them during two blocking events.
eg. Act. 10/4/78 7.0 Draft Regulatory Guide 1.35, Draft 1, Revision 3, " Inservice Inspection of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containments" Mr. Hans Ashar, NRC Staff, noted the following major changes in the latest revision. He noted:
(1) The discussion portion has been expanded to clarify the intent of some of the Regulatory Positions.
(2) The liftoff test w1s modified so that for two simi-lar containments at a site, the' liftoff test is per-formed on each during alternate inspections.
(3) The sample-size criterion was changed from arbitrary numbers to a percent of population of tendons, with limits on the minimum and maximum number of tendons to be selected for inspection.
(4) Detensioning provisions for tendons during liftoff i
testing is relaxed from detensioning of all selected tendons to that of only one tendon in a group.
The Subcommittee members had no problems with the NRC Staff's recommended changes. During a lengthy page-by-page review of 3
the Revision, the Subcommittee members recommended numerous 3
editorial changes.
l The Subcommittee members recommended that draft Regulatory Guide l
1.35, Draft 1, Revision 3 be issued for public comment.
8.0 Draft Regulatory Guide 1.35.1, Draft 1, " Determination of Prestressing Forces for Inspection of Prestressed Concrete Containments" Dr. Siess noted that the proposed methods in Regulatory Guide 1.35.1 were reasonably clear. He noted that the essence of the Guide was con-tained in the statement "In short, the intent of any adopted procedure' should be to track the individual prestressing forces as precisely as possible with the current state of the art predicting these forces so that when a tendon is selected randomly during an inspection, its measured values can be compared with its prescribed band of tolerance."
During a page-by-page review of the Guide, the Subcommittee members recommended numerous editorial changes.
Reg. Act. 10/4/78 The. Subcommittee members recommended that Draft Regulatory Guide 1.35.1, Draft 1, be issued for public comment.
9.0 Regulatory Guide 1.134. Revision 1, " Medical Evaluation of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses" Dr. Hoeller noted that he questioned the NRC Staff at the September meeting as to how a utility would determine that a chysician, psy-chfatrist, or psychologist was qualified to examine a reactor operator with respect to mental capabilities and mental health. The NRC Staff brought Dr. Thomas J. Doyle, Assistant Vice-President and Chief Medical Officer of Consolidated Edison, to the meett:.g to dis-cuss Dr. Hoe 11er's concerns.
Dr. Doyle noted the follovdng significant points in response to Dr. Hoe 11er's questions:
(1) Physicians must reregister to remain licensed to practice in the states. Reregistration'is dependent upon continuing medical education. All physicians employed by utilities are members of the American Occupational Medical Association which provides annual meetings, ccientific discussions, and post-graduate courses These post-graduate courses frequently incit training in radiation safety guidelines for -
.upational positions involved in nuclear facilities.
(2) The Edison Electric Institute, the trade organi-zation for the utilities, has an Occupational Safety and Health Committee 41th medical con-sultants. This Committee provides an exchange of information and training for the physicians.
Part of the training is now conducted at ORNL where tt physicians are given background train-ing to dle nuclear safety radiation protection treatment of exposed and contaminated employees.
P.eg. Act. 10/4/78 (3) Consolidated Edison has a Nuclear Facility Safety Commit-tee and a Radiation Safety Subcomittee.
It is part of the Medical Directors' responsibility to be involved with the decision making process of these groups and to be kept informed. physicians not involved in these groups are given the opportunity to participate in training drills where they are given the opportunity to learn the responsibilities of the various employees.
(4) Examining physicians follow a fomat set up by the Medical Director. The fomat is based largely on the ANSI Standard. The ability to best assess someone's mental competence and ability to respond in an emergency comes from the individual's supervisor; therefore, it is important that the supervisor complete the answer on the form developed from the ANSI Standard. The physician would nomally discuss this first with the individual and, if the physician is not satisfied that he has a ready under-standing, he would refer.the case to a psychiatrist or psychologist for further professional testing. Dr. Doyle noted that he has reviewed this procedure with other utili-ties physicians and they follow the same practice.
(5) The utilities physicians spend a good deal of time in the plant. It is the responsibility of the utility physician to get to know his people and their needs on the job.
Dr. Hoeller indicated that he was satisfied with the answers provit Ld to his questions concerning this Guide. The Subcommittee members agreed that Regulatory Guide 1.134. Revision 1 be recomended to the ACRS for concurrence in the Regulatory Position.
10.0 Draft Regulatory Guide 1.XXX, Oraft 1, " Nuclear Analysis and Design
_ of Concrete Radiation Shielding for Nuclear Power Plants" Hr. Morrison noted that there was a difference of opinion between the Office of Inspection and Enforcement and the Office of Standards Development as to the usefulness of the Standard and the Regulatory Guide which endorses the Standard. He noted that it was the feeling of Standards that the prime customer and user of this Standard and Guide was the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and that they requested the Guide and saw value in it. Mr. Henderson, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, said that their concern was that the
Reg. Act. 10/4/78 HRC. Staff has limited resources and this Guide describes many different techniques, any of which may be used, and there is no specific guidance in the document about which should be used under certain conditions. Henderson said it did them no good and he did not see that it would do NRR any good. He believes that with the limited staff time available, that effort could better be spent on documents more explicitly addressing regu-latory requirements rather than documents which are essentially tutorial.
It was noted that this Guide had not been to the RRRC at the time of this meeting and that they may decide to cancel it.
The Subcommittee discussed the procedures the NRC Staff has available to enoorse Standards without writing regulatory guides.
It was noted that they can be endorsed by regulations, regulatory guides, or the Standard Review Plan.
It was noted that an advantage of the regulatory guide process is that it gets wider review within the NRC and from the public than does the Standard Review Plan.
The Subcommittee recommended that the NRC Staff look at this sort of Guide to determine its usefulness but that the ACRS not get involved in such an investigation. The Subcommittee recommended that Draft Regulatory Guide 1.XXX, Draft I be sent to the RRRC and then issued for public comment if the RRRC decides that it is necessary.
Reg. Act. 10/4/78 11.0 Draft Regulatory Guide 1.XXX. Draft 1, " Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor yessel Welds During Inservice Inspection" 7
The Subcomittee and NRC Staff discussed each of the coments provided by Dr. Bush (Attachment G). Dr. Bush's major coment was the time lag in adopting the Amendment to 10 CFR 50.55a and his objection to endorsing the Addendum to ASHE XI without first approving the Amendment to 10 CFR 50.55a. Dr. Anderson noted that the Amendment to 10 CFR 50.55a in question has been concurred in by all of the NRC Office Directors and was going to the Commission for approval.
The NRC Staff discussed each of Dr. Bush's coments and agreed to incorporate editorial changes into the Guide as necessary.
The only significant change was to eliminate the need to perform fracture mechanics evaluations on those areas that could not be inspected.
The Subcomittee recommended that Draft Regulatory Guide 1.XXX.
Draft 1 be issued for public coment but that it not be made effective until after the Amer.dment to 10 CFR 50.55a is issued endorsing the updated addendum to ASME XI.
12.0 Future Agenda The November 1,1978 Regulatory Activities Subcomittee Meeting was cancelled owing to the small number of regulatory guides to be ready for the meeting and the difficulty of getting Subcomittee members to attend.
The next Regulatory Activities Subcomittee Meeting is scheduled ',e December 6,1978.
Items to be covered at that meeting will include revisions to Regulatory Guide 1.8 and 1.104 as well as any other new items that may come up in the next month.
{
The meeting was adjourned at 2:20 p.m.
No executive sessions were held.
l t
NOTE:
For additional details, a complete transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H St., NW, Washington, DC 20555 or from Ace-Federal Reports, Inc.,
444 North Capitol St., NW, Washington, DC.
I l
MOTICES the partJes of record at the addreas stated in paragraph 3.
puis of scientific and technological ac-4204p
~
' tivities, and for reje.ted studies. Most Authority to close meettne nts determina.
awards are expected to be in the alon was made by the Director. NaF. pur.
o e
$25.000 to $50.000 range.
suant to provisions of scetton totot of the Signed at Washington, D.C., on Sep-Proposals received after February 2 Federal Advisory Committee Act.
Lember 14,1978.
1 9, are not 1 y to be considend E RarcCA WmRt.tR hhm r funding until the 1980 fiscal year.
ComrailleeXanageme.nt hentamof h.
r Coordinator, 4FR Doc. 78-36264 FDed 9-1&-78; 8.45 am)
,,nt, u
ogr r
aly E arzwszz 14,1978.
als of Science Resources, NSF 78-47 or (FR Doc. 78-28348 F1)ed S-18-78; 3.,t3 am) contact the folloMng individuals in Di-(7537-01]
~ (vision of Science Resources Studies National Sc!cnce Foundation,1800 C NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THEM ho
[7590-01]
E
. 20 ARTS AND THE HUMANITIES j
NUCLEAR ltEGULATORY e
phone 202-634-4625; personnel-COMMI5510N,
6 1m an utpu Amar com oN aEACmt SAM Vt$UAt Amis ADyrsoaY PANit BuzzeUI, telephone 202-634-4682.
oms, susCOM ON RIWmtY
"**"*8 This is a revision of notJce No. 7555-
"C""E3 Pursuant to section 10(a)(2) of the 01, which appeared in tha FrotRAL Pederal Advisory CommRtee Act (Pub. Rscism of.Apr0 26,1978. Respon-m enn, L 92-463), notice is hereby given that dents to that notice will recejve this The ACRS Subcommittee on Regu-program announcement with no fur.
latory ActMtles will hold an open a meeting of the Visual Arts Advisory ther request.
Panel to the National Council on the meeting on October 4.1978, in Room Arts wiu be held on October 12,1978 E REFECCA WUrKI.ER 1046,1717 H Street NW., Washington, from 9.3s a.m. to 5 p.m. at the Univer.'
CommiffecManagem$tt alty
- U "I *"3 of Fcnnsylva::ta, University
' Coordinatof*
published in the FEDERAL Ractsm on Museum, Mosaic GaDery, 33rd and BertMaza 14,1978.
August 15,1978 (43 FR 36152).
Spruce Streets Philade}phia, Pa.; and October 13-14.1978 from 9:30 a.m. to IFR Doc. 78-26347 Filed 9-13-78,4:45 am3 In accordance with the procedures 5 p.m. at the University of Pennsylva.
outlined in the FEDERAt. RscistzR on October 31, 1977 (56972), oral or sTit-nit, Benjamin Frankun Roam, Hous- [7555-01]
ten statements may be presented by ton Hau, 34th and Spruce Streets, members of the public, recortfings will Philadelphia, Pa.
This meeting wt SusCohta !Ttt Fot TNs trvirw of be permitted only during those por.
public on a space a!! be open to the NUCLEAR SCENCE tions of the meeting when a transcript vailable basis. The is being kept, and questions may be topic for discussion will be polley; w ug asked only by members of the Bub-guidelines; question and answer period committee, its consultants, and stafL with the public.
In accordance with the Federal Advi-Further information with reference nory Committee Act, as amended. Pub Persons desiring to make t.ral state-to this meeting can be obtained from L 92-463, the National Science Foun-.
ments should notify the Designated Mr. John H. Clark. Advisory Commit-dation announces the foDowing meet-Federal Employee as far in advance as ing*
tee Management Officer. National En-practicable so that appropriate ar.
rangements can be made to allow the dorment for the Arts. Washington, ADvisoar com roa Pmes Sm.
necessary time during the meeting for D.C. 20506, or call 202-634-6070.
smTrs ros tus Ramw or Noctzaa Sci.
such statements.
sucz.
Jon H. CtARK, The agenda for subject meeting Dirrefor, Offlee of Cbuncil and Date and time October 5-7,1F78;1 a.m.to 5 shah be as foDon Panel Operations. Nahonal p.m. each day.
Endotomenf for the Arts.
Place: Rooms 340 and 341. Nations) ScienceWrwssa hra 41978 hundation.1800 0 Statet NW., Washing
- TFR Doc.7&-2625i Piled 9-18-78; 8.45 am) ton D.C.20550.
Type of meeting Closed.
SCERTING WT2.t. COMMENCE af s:45 a.3L Contact person Dr. Laura P. Bautz, Senior The Subcommittee w1U hear presen-
[7555-01]
Staff Associate. Division of Physics. Room taQns from the NRC staff and will 141 Nauona) Science hundation. Wash *ha d discussions with this group pertl-NATIONAL SCIENCE TOUNDATIONIngton, D.C. 20550, telephone 4176.
302-632-neat to the following:
OttECTORATI POR SCitNTIFIC, TECHNOLOGl. Purpose of eubmnunfttee: Tb prmide pro. (1) Regulatory Oulde 1.134 Revtston 1 CA1, AND INTIRNAfloNAL AMAlts gram oversight concerning NSF support "Mec caJ Evaluation of Personn,el Requiring for researth to nuclear science.
Operator ucenses."
Presrom for the Anefrels of Sc6ence Rescueces.
Agenda
- To review NSP Nuclear Science (2) Regulatory Oulde 1.28. Revtston 2 Poetennel Fensms, impects, end Overvts Section documertation as part of the pro.
" Quality Assurance Program Requirements gram oversight f anction.
(Design & Constructiont" Summary: The National Science Reason for closint-The meetfor s111 deal Regulatory Guide 1.104, Revision 1 (3)
Ibundation annouAces its ongoing with a redew of crants and dec!! nations in" Overhead Crane Handling Systems for Nu-program for the analysis of science re.
which the subcomatttee will review mate-clear Poser Planta?
Personnel, funding, impacts, rials containing the.'smes of applJeant in-(43 Rettsions to Appendkrs to 10 CFR aources:
Part 50:
and outputs. Awards wt41 be for in-sututions and prtnetpal investiratars and privileged information trora the files per.
- e. Appendix 0, Tracture Toughness Re.
depth analyses and integtstion of data qutrementa?
talning to the prop sala The meettna w!!I on segentific and technical pers.ennel*
also include a review of the peer review
.b. Append:x H *Remeter Vessel Survett, the funding of aclentific and techno-documentation pertatning to applicanta.
lance Program Requirements?
logical activilles, for development of These matters are sithin exemptions til (5) Dran Herulatory Ovide 1.35. Draft 1 3ev messures of the lppacts and out-and (6) of 6 UAC. 652v(c). Covernment inRevision 3.
- Inservice Inspection of Un-the Sunshine Act.
trouted 7tnoons an Prestressed concrete' Containmenta?
motAt aroism, vot. :, no. n -7velnAr, samuers w, ura
.AT C MENT A
42050 NOTICES 8> Draft neruistory cuide 1. s.1, Draft September 15,1978. the meeting time, Information in connection with the 1.-Determination of Prntrustna rocees for now reading ~8:30 a.m.", should read, antitrust rettew of this app!! cation can Inspection of Prestresaed Concrete Contatn-
"9.00 a.m.**,
be obtained by writing to the U.S. Nu-it raft nesulatory Oulde 1.XXX. Draft c ar Regdatory Conunission, Wash-
- 3. Nucicar Analists and Design of Concrete Inston, D.C. 20555, Attention; Anti.
Hadiation Shielding for Nuc! car Pomer
[7590-01]
trust and Indemnity Group. Office of Plants Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
a (8) Draft Regulatory Oulde 1.XXX. Draft 1.
Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Vessel (Docket Nos. 5G-443-A and 50-444-Al Any person who mishes to have his Welds Durtng Inservica inspection **
views on the antitrust matters with re-Other matters which may be of a Pusuc SttVICE CO. OF NEW HAW 5mtt, IT spect to the Massachusetts Municipal predecisional nature relevant to reac.
AL, SEABROOK SfADON, MTS I AND 2 Wholesale Electric Co., Vermont Elec.
tric Cooperative, Inc., Matne Pub!!c tor operation of licensing methitles may be discussed following this sea.
Nome of ReMyt of Additlenel Ane6tevst biter.
Servlee Co.. Taunton Municipal Light-Ing
. slon.
- h fia*
f*' 54 4ska of vices *a Plant Commission, and Bangor Persons tilshing to submit written Aa**" M*"*
Hydro-Electric Co. presented to the Attorney General for consideration statements regarding Regulatory Guides 1.134, Revision 1; 1.28. Revision Pub!!c Servlee Co.. of New Hamp. should submit such views to the U.S.
2; and 1.104, Revision 1 may do so by shire, pursuan; ' section 103 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commiss!on on or before November 5,1978.
ote ubco ttee at e
- d. filed on sy
,1978 in a on Dated at Dethesda, Md., this 21st of the meeting.
H'., wever, to insure requested by the Attorney General for day of August 1978.
that adequate time is available for full Antitrust Review as required by 10 consideration of these comments at CFR Part 50. Appendix I. This infor-For the Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission.
the meeting, it is desirable to send a mati n adds Itassachusetts Municipal read!!y reproducible copy of the com-Wholesale Eles tric Co., Vermont Elec.
SmrN A. VARcA, ments as far in advance of the meeting Eric Cooperatise, Inc., Maine Public Chief. Light Wafer Reactors as practical to Mr. Gary R. Quittsch-oervlee Co., Tat.nton Municipal L!aht-Branch No. d. Dirision c/ Prof-reiber ( ACRS). the Designated Federal g
ect Management cf IFR Doc. 78-24769 Filed 9-18-18; 8:45 aml Employee for the meeting. In care of gydro t ic o
po Ibe ACRS. Nuclear Regulatory Commis.
owners of the Se vrook Station, units sion, Washing 1cn, D.C. 20555, or tele-1 and 2*
copy them to the Designated Federal The Information wo filed by Pub!!c [7555-02]
Employee, 202-634-3319, as far in ad-Service Co. of New Hampshire, the OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND vance of the meeting as practical.
United nluminating Co.,
Central Such comments shall be based upon -Maine Power Co., Central Vermont TECHNOLOGY POLICY documents on file and available for Pub!!c Service Corp.c the Connecticut public inspection at the NRC Public L!sht & Power Co., Fitchburg Oss &
NTERGOVIENMtNTat, SCINCE, ENGINitt-Document Room.1717 H Street NW"'
Electric L!sht Co., Montaup Electric.
ING, AND ftCHNOLOGY ADV!50RY PANit Washington, D.C. 20555.
Co., New Bedford Oas & Edison Light Meettas Further information regarding Co., New England Power Co., Vertnont toples to be discussed, whether the Electric Power Co Inc-, Massachu-In accordance with the Federal Adv!-
meeting has been canceled or resche-setts Munleipal Wholesale Electric sory Committee Act, Pub. I.92-463 the Office of Science and Technology duled, the Chairman's ruling on re-D V
Polley announces the fol.lowirut meet-EM c e lee r
tatements a d t t me al te ton Municipal Lighting Plant Commis-- ID8' therefor can be obtained by a prepaid sion Bangor H=dro Electric Co.. and telephone call to the Designated Fed.
town of Hudson. Mass., Light & Power Intracomn4tww. Scirwet. Enctwrramo, AND TECHNOLocv ADvisoar Pantu HUMAN eral Employee, Mr. Gary R. Quittsch-Department in connection with their arsooners Tasx roacs relber, telephone 202 4 34-3267, be-application for construction permits tween 8:15 a.m. and 5 p.m. e.d.t.
and operating Ilcenses for the Sea-Date: October 8. H78.
Dated: September 14.1978.
brook Station, Units 1 and 2. The site Place: New Executive Office Budding. 726 for this plant is located in Rocking-Jackson Place NW room 3104, Washing.
ton. D.C.
Jo C
ham County, N.H.
Type of meeting open.
Advisory C' H bmm ec, The original antritrust portion of C 7ne,P,' E $
t s tr, o
Managemenf O//icer.
the application was submitted on July n
p e,,
t IFR Doc T8-26279 Filed 8-18-78; 8.45 aml 9,1973, and Notice of Receipt of Applj-othee of the President, telephone: 202-395-4596. Anyone who plans to attend cation for Construction Permits and Facility Llcenses and AvailabilJty of abou3d contact Mr. Blair by October 4 1978.
[1505-01]
Applicant's Environmental Report; Purpose of the panet:'Ite Interrevernmen-Time for Submission of Views on Anti, tal Science. Engineering. and Technology NUCLEAR REGULATORY trust Matters, was published in the Advisory Panel sas estab!!shed to identtir COMMI5510N FrnrnAt Rectstra on August 9* 1973 State. regional. and local somnment (38 FR 21522). The notice of hearing problems which research and technology
- ADV150tY COMMITitt ON REACTOR SAft-was published in the PrDERAt. RectstrR may assist in resoking or amellorsung GUARDS. $U8COMMilift ON AMPROVID on August 9.1973 (38 FR 21519).
and to help develop pohcies to transfer re-search and developrnent findings.
r SAf TTY $Ysitas Copies of the above stated docu. Minutes of the meeung-Executive minutes M*das ments are available for public inspec-of the meeting sul be avanable from Mr.
tlon at the Commission's Public Docu. Tfnuve senda: (1) overview of selected Cbrreeffon ment Room, 1717 H Street NW.,
Washington, D.C. 20555. and at the Department ?f Labor R & D programs of In FR Doc-78-26073 appearing on page 41316 in the issue for Friday, Exeter Public Library, Front Street, concern to Stae and local sovernrnents; Exeter, N.H.
(2) overvlew of sected information dis-semination prosram in the Departrnent FIDERAt IIGl$ttA, 'VOL 43, NO. It2dUt1 DAY, EEPTIMSER 19,1978 e
~
9
MOTICE$
[y337 01) t on Regulatory Activilles published I NATIONAL FOUNDATION ON THE September 19.1978 (43 FR d2049), has Dated: September 25.1978.
ARTS AND HUMANITIES been arnended to read as follows:
g (3) Regulatory guide 1.104. rettsion Ad sory Com tice mus C Aovisoef PANR
,"g p Afa na9ement O//scer.
g g
p may IFTt Doc. 78-27282 nicd 9-27-78. 8 tS aml ps. ele,,t s w wo, necessary for the subcommittee to Pursuant to section 10(ax2) of the hold a closed session for Lne purpose of exploring matters involving propri.
[7390-01]
2-463 as e ed ice is hereby thenithat a meeting of the y suide N'
I have d' termined, in acrordance Music Advisory Panel (Jan Section) to e
the National Council on the Arts will with subsection 10(d) of Pub 1. 92-8 be held on October 16.1978. from 9 463. that, should such a sessio'n be re.
quired. lt is pecessary to elose that ses.
O tobe'r 18 9 m.
- 30
.m from 9.30 a.m. 5:30 p.m October 19
([U S C.
cx f) 2 1978, from 9 a.rn.-5:30 p.m In Room Dated September 25.1978.
Puttic tity)CE titCTRIC a GAS CO.
1422. Columbia Plaza Building. 2401 E Street Northwest. Washington D.C.
' JOHN C. Hort.r The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Com.
20506.
Adt isory Committ'ee mission (the Commission) has rd A portion of this meeting will. be Afanagement O//ieer.
viewed the proposed amendments re.
open to the public on October 18.1978 (FTt Doc. 78-27278 Mied 9-27-78. 8 tS amllating to the construction permits for from 9 a.m.-12.30 p.m.. The topic of discussion will be policy and gulde.
the Hope Creek Generating Station, Unit
[7 g Nos.1 and 2 (CPPR-120 and lines.
The remaining sessions of this rneet CPPR-121), located in Salem County.
ing on October 16.1978, from 9 a.m.*
A0Visoef COMMfifff ON RfActot N.J., issued to the Public Service Elee.
t 5.30 p m.: October 17,1978, from 9 SAMOUARD5 tric & Gas Co. The amendments would authorize the use of an extended aer.
a.m.-5:30 p.m.: October 18.1978 from m a'tas R* M atton sewage treatment system in.
12.30 p.m.-5:30 p.m.: and October 19 stead of septic tanks and a temporary l
1978. from 9 a.m.-5:30 p.m. are for the Regarding the previous Protart.
septic field.
purpose of panel review discussion. Racistra notice (43 FR 42314 dated The Commission's Division of Site Sept.20,1978), for the meeting of the Safety and Environmental An a 1e o s for i a e al is ane Advisory Committet on Reactor Safe-under the National Foundation on the guards to be held on October 5,7.1978.
has prepared an environmentalimpact Arta and the Humanities Act of 1965 In Washington. D.C.. cauMatton of appratsal for the amendments, and as amended including discussion ofin. the fast flux test facility has oeen can. has concluded that an environmental formation given in confidence to the celed and the notJce is revised as fol-impact statement for this particular agency by grant applicants. In accord. los s.
action is not,marranted. This conclu.
ance with the determination of the slon is based on the fact that there chairman published in the FEDERAt.
TNUnsDAY. Oerost: 5.1978 will be no significant environmental Rscistra March 17, 1977, these ses-8 $,'c,o m7h [r an $
3 Impacts attributable to the proposed sions will be closed to the public pur-ty act! n. and any impacts that might m n; auant to subsections tc) (4), (6) and 9 reports of its Subcomtnittee on Regula, occur will be less than those predicted (b) of section 552b of title 5 United Lory Acunties and proposed redstons to and o scribed in the final environmen NRC Regulatory Guides.
St.ates Code.
tal statement for the Hope Creek Gen-Further information 'with reference
. Onoara 8.1978 erating Station Unit Nos. I and 2. pub-to this meeting can be obtained from
- 7,,**,,I# 30 ','"i'"h f 11shed in February 1974.
Mr. John H. Clark. Advisory Commit-The environmental Impact appraisal r, y,
. It e tee Management Offleer. National En.
mittee sin hear preuntations and hold-is avaJable for pubile inspection at the domTnent for the Arts. Washington, ducussions alth AcRs consultants. septe.
Commluon's Public Document Room, D.C. 20506, or call 202-634 9070.
sentauses of the NRC 8taff, the nuclear 1717 H Steet NW Washington D.C and utility industry. and the Department and at the Salem Free Library,112 of Energy rega rding proposed reactor JoNw H. Ctanx Director, O// ice of Counctf and safety research programs related to ad.
West Broadway. Salem. N.J. A copy Punef Operations. Naffortal vanced reactor destrna, rudioacthe waste may be obtained upon request ad-Endotcmenf for fAe Arts.
management and disposal. and emergency dressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regula-core cooling systema as well as the poor. tory Commission. Washington, D.C.
(71t Doc.18-27248 Fued 9 24-78. 8.45 atol itles for the arwmpilshment of these and other reactor safety research work. Por.
20555. Attention: Director. Division of tions of this session s!Il be closed if neces. Site Safety and Environmental Analy.
[7390 0)]
_l sis.
stry to discuss proprietary information re.
tated to tbese mattera.
Dated at Bethesda. Md this 20th NUCLEAR REGULATORY Saro***v. Ocroars 7.1s7s day of September 1978 COMMISSION s.30 a.m. to 2-30 pm.irsecutiee session ADVnORY COMMfrTit ON ttACTOR SAft-topent The Committee wiu dtscuss its po- [
e Mear WNaNQw GUARDS. SUSCOMMITTit ON ttGULATORYatuon and proposed future action regard.
Ron at.o L. Bat 2.ano, ACTIVITE5 ing matters discussed during this miettna.
Chic /, Entironmenfo! Profeefs The Committee aill dhruss the quallhea.
Ateeting; Aseendment to Agende tion of candidates proposed for appoint.
BrGnch J. DiDision of Site ment to the ACRS. This session will be Sa/efy and Ent7(rortrnenfal I
The agenda for the October 4,1978 closed to protect infortnation the release A naly*(s.
inecting.of the ACRS Eubcommittee of shlen would represent kn unmarranted IFR Doc. 78 27280 M!cd 9-27-72. 8.45 aml t
invasion of personal privacy.
c
~
MDttAt RIGl5TER. YOt. 43,000. Ist-Dfut30AY. SIPitMSit e
- 28. 1978 l
ATTENDAf E LIST ACRS REGULATORY ACTIVITIES SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING WASHINGTON, DC OCTOBER 4, 1978
_==.
ACRS NRC STAFF C. Siess, Chairman R. Gamble D. Moeller*
D. Beckham W. Kerr*
J. Milhoan' M. Bender
- S. Richardson W. Mathis D. Sullivan G. Quittschreiber, Designated Federal Employee E. Hill S. Duraiswamy, ACRS Staff
- W. Anderson L. Porse
- Part Time T. Stickley, Consultant P. Zorich, Consultant C. Tan BECHTEL POWER CORP.
A. Gluckmann H. Ashar B. Montgomery R. Kirkwood H. Filacchione P. McKee J. Mutzbert G. Arndt D. Mehta F. Clemenson N. Tuholski M. Fleishman R. Emch T. Murphy BABC0CK & WILC0X J. Norberg W. Morrison R. Borsum
- 0. Henderson W. Hazelton T. Doyle, Consultant SARGENT & LUNDY A. Eberhardt EDERER, INC.
C. Clark HARNISCHFEGER CORP.
- a. Johnson R. Oram E. Jagodzinski R. Holloran, Consultant GENERAL ELECTRIC GILBERT COMMONWEALTH N. Shirley V. Williams E. Hottenstein S. Kleimola SCIENTIFIC APPLICATIONS INSTITUTE J. Penland ATTACHMENT B
. 0AK RIDGE NATIONAL LABS.
+..
R. McClung K. Klindt SANDIA LAB.
G. Varnago J. Gieske 0FFSHORE POWER SYSTEMS R. Touchton OTHER W. Rhine, NEMA M. Meltzer, Ate Federal DEPAP,TMENT OF ENERGY J. Carson, Sr.
W. Maybee
DOCUMENTS PROVIDED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THIS MEETING 1.
Regulatory Guide 1.134 Revision 1, " Medical Evaluation of Personnel Requiring Operator Licenses."
w.
~
2.
Regulatory Guide 1.28, Revision 2. " Quality Assurance Program Require-ments (Design & Construction)."
3.
Regulatory Guide 1.104, Revision 1, " Overhead Crane Handling Systems for Nuclear Power Plants."
4.
Revisions to Appendices to 10 CFR, Part 50:
a.
Appendix G, " Fracture Toughness Requirements."
b.
Appendix H, " Reactor Vessel Surveillance Program Requirements."
5.
Draft Regulatory Guide 1.35, Draft 1, Revision 3, " Inservice Inspection of Ungrouted Tendons in Prestressed Concrete Containments."
6.
Draft Regulatory Guide 1.35.1, Draft 1, "Deterinination of Prestressing Forces for Inspection of Prestressed Concrete Conicinment:."
7.
Draft Regulatory Guide 1.XXX, Draft 1, " Nuclear Analysis and Design of Concrete Radiation Shielding for Nuclear Power Plants."
8.
Draft Regulatory Guide 1.XXX, Draft 1, " Ultrasonic Testing of Reactor Vessel Welds During Inservice Inspection."
9.
Written statement from Ederer, Inc., dated September 25, 1978 concerning Regulatory Guide 1.104, Revision 1, " Overhead Crane Handling Systems for Nuclear Power Plants."
ATTACHMENT C
n
.Ng P. o. Box 24708, SE ATTLE, WA 98124 2931 F mST AVE. S., SE ATTLE, WA 98134. 206 4224 421 SUB.ilDIAR Y OF FORMAC INTERNA TIONAL, INC.
DESIGNERS AND MANUFACTUREhS OF CRANES AND HEAVY MACHINERY SINCE 1901 ur,;9
!:n:-
- .?
September 25, 1978 wt e
Mr. Raymond F. Fraley
'; ' Ig.b 4
Executive Director, ACRS U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Draf t 2, Revision 1, Proposed Regulatory Guide 1.104,
" Overhead Crane IIandling Systems for Nuclear Power Plants"
Dear Mr. Fraley:
The purpose of this letter is to provide the ACRS, and NRC Staff, Ederer's commenM on Draft 2, Revision 1, of proposed Regulatory Guide 1.104. Among other changes, the proposed revision of the Guide relaxes the regulatory positions of Revision 0, which requir-ed the mechanical and structural components of the hoisting !.ystem to have the strength necessary to resist failure if a two blocking or load hangup occurs during hoisting. The requirements for testing to verify the crane's ability to withstand a low speed two blocking and load hangup are also relaxed by the revision.
Specifically, regulatory position C.3.j is being revised to allow a two blocking preven-tion system, based upon duallimit switches, to be used in lieu of providing sufficient strength to withstand a two blocking. A load cell or a moter-current-sensing device would be allowed in lieu of providing sufficient strength to withstand a load hangup.
When Revision 0 of the Guide was first issued, Ederer agreed with the conclusion of the other nuclear crane manufacturers that it was not practical to build a crane that could safely withstand "two blocking" or " lead hangup" accidents.
Since then detailed analyses of the stresses in crane cables during two blocking and load hangup have been made. A summary of these analyses is provided in section 1 of Attachment A. These analyses indicate to Ederer that conventional cranes have more ability to safely withstand two blockings than previously assumed-providing the cables are not cut or crushed by the lower block when it contacts the upper block. By more than doubling the normally specified wire rope factor of safety, the Regulatory Guide assures that the wire rope of any Regulatory Guide 1.104 crane will not be the weak link during a two blocking-provided it is not cut or crushed.
Section 2 of Attachment A indicates to Ederer that, with the specified factor of safety, the wire rope strength is sufficient to withstand the stresses of a high speed two blocking. Even a high speed two blocking with the full breakdown torque of the motor applied will not load the cables beyond their yield strength, although the hoist machinery may not be able to withstand such an extreme incident. An indirect confirmation of the analytical methods of section 1 of Attachment A was provided by re-evaluation of a slow speed two blocking incident of an industrial crane. This re-evaluation revealed that, contrary to assumptions made following the incident, the cable was cut by the sheaves and that undamaged the cables would probably have not failed.
Ederer is incorporating two independent limit switches in all nuclear safety related cranes, to reduce the likelihood of two blockings following malfunction of a single limit switch. However, Ederer considers that the cables still need to be protected from damage FA<Lmd D
Mr. Raymond F. Fraley Executive Director, ACRS 8
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission September 25,1978 Page 2 by a two blocking, since malfunctions of other equipment may keep limit switches from preventing a two blocking. For example, a Commonwealth Edison letter to the NRC dated April 17,1978 (NRC Docket Nos. 50-454/455 and 50-456/457) describes a two block-ing that resulted when a control system failure defeated the limit switch. Use of two limit switches does not appear to completely eliminate the potential for such two blockings.
For example, provisions must be made for either automatically or manually overriding the limit switches so that the hook can backed out of the limits following the periodic tests of them.
The consequences of this type of two blocking incident can be reduced further by designing the overload protective device, specified by regulatory position C.3.j, so that it also serves as an overload backup to the two limit switches. Such an overload protective device should not be overriden.
Section 3 of Attachment A contains an analysis of the cable and machinery loading following the low speed two blocking test required by regulatory position C.4.b of Revision 0 of the Guide. These results indicate to Ederer that:
Depending upon the selection of the hoist drive and control systems, there may o
be sufficient time for a load hangup protective device, incorporated in the reeving, to actuate and de-energize the motor-limiting the load imposed on the hoist ma-chinery by a two blocking; This capability can be safely verified by performing the original slow speed two o
blocking test of regulatory position C.4.b; Conventional dual reeved Regulatory Guide 1.104 cranes are capable of withstanding o
this test without damage, even if the overload protective device fails to operate; A separate load hangup test is not required, since the specified low speed two blocking o
test represents the worst case load hangup; and An actualload hangup test should not be performed on a conventional crane, since o
excessive stresses could be placed on the crane structure if the load hangup protective device fails to operate properly during even a low speed load hangup test.
Therefore, Ederer recommends that the following changes be made in the proposed revisions of regulatory positions C.3.j and C.4.b:
C.3.j
"...the main power supply. In addition the reeving system should be designed such that the cables will not be cut or crushed in the event two blockings are not prevented. Furthermore, the protective... sensing devices. The protec-tive control system for load hangup should deenergize the motor in the event that the two independent travel limit devices fail to do so."
C.4.b-Delete the proposed revisions to the second paragraph. Replace the last two sentences of the existing regulatory position with "or load hangup."
Mr. Raymond F. Fraley Executive Director, ACRS EiENER U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission a ncompen ass e September 25,1978 Page 3 In designing one of the first crancs installed in general compliance with Revision 0 of the Guide, Ederer discovered the new approach to single failure proof crane hoist design that is now embodied in Ederer's lioist's Integrated P_rotective System (IllPS).
lilPS is a part of Ederer's new extra-S_afety And Monitoring (X-SAM) Crane design.
With lilPS, any X-SAM Crane satisfies all of the controversial "two blocking" and " load hangup" requirements of Revision 0 of Regulatory Guide 1.104. lilPS is incorporated in the Ederer replacement trolley for the LOFT Containment Building Polar Crane, which was recently successfully tested and installed.
Ederer submitted the Safety System Final Design Review Document for the LOFT trolley to the NRC on March 18,1978.Section VII of this document contains a detailed comparison of the two blocking and load hangup protection potential of conventional dual reeved cranes with that provided by the lilPS incorporated in the LOFT trolley.
Ederer's analysis and testing has verified that !!IPS actually protects the cables, as well as the hoist's machinery and structure, during any two blocking or load hangup incident.
In addition, IIIPS absorbs the kinetic energy of the high speed rotating machinery in the event of a load hangup, providing X-SAM erancs complete protection from such incidents.
The hoist machinery, reeving and crane structure of X-SAM crancs are protected from overload, even if the load hangup protective device fails to stop the motor.
Ederer requests the opportunity to summarize Ge recommendations of this ~etter for the ACRS Subcommittee on Regulatory Activities when the Subcommittee considers Regulato y Guide 1.104. The opportunity to present, at that time, a short proprietary film of the new LOFT trolley two blocking is also requested. Ederer is prepared to provide the ACRS, and the NRC Staff, access to proprietary design details of X-SAM Cranes with IIIPS, although Ederer is not suggesting that the extra safety of X-SAM erancs be a regulatory requirement.
Sincerely, Ederer Incorporated
/
C. W. Clark, Jr.
Chief Engineer
Attachment:
A.
Analysis of Cable and Machinery Loadings Following Two Blockings or Load llangups of Cranes Copy to:
Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:, Docketing and Service Branch
R. W. HOLLORAN & ASSOCIATES Nuclear Engineers and Scientists suite 30s 909 Northeast 43rd Street Seatt.e. Washington 98105 (206) 634 0090 ANALYSIS OF CABLE AND MACHINERY LOADINGS FOLLOWING TWO BLOCKINGS OF CRANES R. W. Holloran C. A. Rusch R. E. Morton M. N. McDermott September 1978
NOTICE This report was prepared by R. W. Holloran & Associates (RWH), as on account of work sponsored by Ederer incorporated (Ederer). Neither Ederer, RWH, or any person acting on behalf of either: (a) makes any worronty or representation, express or implied, with respect to the occuracy, completeness, or usefulness of the information contained in this repori, or that the use of any information, opporatus, method, or process disclosed in this report may not infringe privately owned rights; or (b) assumes any liabilities with respect to the use of, or for domoges resulting from the use of, any information, opporatus, method, or process disclosed in this report.
1.
Description of Analysis of Cable and Machinery Loading Following Two Blocking The rope stresses that occur following two blocking of a conven-tional overhead crane can be approximated by a simple model.
The following discussion describes the model used and presents an ana-lytic solution for the stress in the lead line, and the hoist machin-ery, as a function of time following the two blocking.
This analysis can be extended to represent the stresses in the lead line and the hoist machinery / girder structure following a load hangup, by accounting for the additional cable extended.
A single drive train and hoist drum crane is analyzed.
This analysis can also be extended to dual drive train cranes by the appropriate adjustment to the effective moment of inertia.
Cranes with multiple hoist drums can be analyzed with the same approach used herein.
Figure 1-1 A drum of radius R carrying n w
ropes, turns to lift the load (Fig-g ure 1-1).
The tensions F in each
[
lead line are assumed equal.
An effective moment of inertia L
I is used for the drum such that the rotational kinetic energy E of the drum, gear train and P
motor is given by E=fIw (1.1) 2 where w is the angular velocity of the drum at rated speed.
The wire rope is assumed to be fully elastic and is characterized by a spring constant k.
The spring constant is obtained fror.1 the expression k=
(1.2) 1-1
where y is the elastic modulus of the wire rope, A is the metallic cross sectional area, and L is the effective length of one of the wire ropes.
The effective length is obtained from the expression i
(1.3)
L=
i=1 K -I I
where 1 is the length of rope between the (i+1)th and (i)th sheave, K is the ratio of stress in the rope unwinding from a sheave to the stress in the rope winding onto the sheave, and p is the numoer of parts of line in a single rope. Use of an effective length corrects for the effects of the sheaves on rope stresses.
Sheave effects are also included through the use of the lead line factor in calculating P, the stress in the lead line that results from a given load.
The inertial effects of the sheaves are neglected and the system is assumed to be undamped.
For n identical ropes on the drum and a time varying torque T(t) applied by the motor to the drum the dynamical equation that gives the angle 9 through which the drum rotates following two blocking, with 9 = 0 at t = 0, is d
2 I
= T(t) - knR 9 - nRP (1.4) dt Before a solution can be obtained, it is necessary to know the motor torque as a function of time.
The case considered here is one in which the angular velocity of the drum remains constant until a limit-ing torque is reached, whereupon the torque remains constant at its limiting value.
This situation is encountered in crane systems that are designed to hoist at constant speed, i.e., DC systems.
Suitable conservative assumptions can be made to approximate AC crane drive systems in the same manner.
The solution divides naturally into two parts.
The first part applies to the time during which the angular velocity is constant.
Part 1
=0andh=wg 1-2
Equation (1.4) reduces to 2
T(t) = knR 9 + nRP (1.5) or, in terms of F F=
kR9 + P (1.6)
Since the angular velocity is constant 9=wt (1.7) g and F = kRw t + P (1.8) g If T is the motor torque required to lift the design rated load, d
and "a" is the ratio of the limiting torque to the torque required to lift the design rated load, equation (1.5) yields the drum angle 9 1
at which the torque becomes constant, aTd - nRP 91=
2 (I'9) knR From (1.7) the drum angle reaches 91 at a time t1 9
aT t d - nRP 2
(1.10) 1 "o
knR,9 Part 2 For angles 9 greater than or equal to 9 and times t greater than 1
or equal to t, (1.4) becomes y
2 2
aT d 0, knR d
nRP 2
dt I
I I
(I*11) 1-3
which can be written in terms of a natural frequency f 2
8 d9,f9, d _ nRP 2
(1.12) 2 1
I dt where f = (knR )1/2 (1.13) d9 The solution obtained for the conditions 9 = 9, and g=wg at 1
t=t is y
w aTd - nRP 0=jSinf(t-t)+
(l*l4) y 2
knR The lead line tension is therefore, F = kR9 + P kRw aT Sin f(t - t ) +
(*
=
f y
nR Sumary The stress in the lead lines is F = kRw t + P 0$t5ty (1.8) g kRw aTd Sin f(t - t ) +
t>t (1.15)
=
i nR y
f where 2
f = (knR )1/2 (1.13) and 9
aT t d - nRP (1.10) 1 w
2 o
knR wg 1-4
2.
Cable and Machinery Loading Following a High Speed Two Blocking Figure 2-1 illustrates the cable loading in a typical dual reeved, dual drive train, 50 Ton capacity hoist following a two blocking at rated speed.
The equations, derived in accordance with section 1, were evaluated using a FORTRAN IV program and the figure was generated by a CALCOMP Plotter. The scale for cable loading is on the right hand side of these figures.
This scale has been normalized based upon an assumed wire rope breaking strength sufficient to provide a 11.5 to 1 inertial and static factor of safety with 4 parts in each of two cables.
The 11.5 to 1 factor of safety was selected to provide a 10 to 1 factor of safety, with a 15% margin for degradation, in accordance with Regula-tory Guide 1.104.
The scale for machinery loading is on the left hand side of these figures.
It has been normalized such that the machinery loading is 1 when a design rated load is being hoisted.
Figure 2-1 illustrates the loading following a two blocking at the rated speed following a control systei failure.
For this calculation it has been assumed that the maximum toique that can be applied by the drive motor is 3 times the torque required to hoist the design rated load.
The following data was used in generating these figures:
k =.57 x
= 222,000 ft-lb 2
R = 1.58 ft
.163 radian /sec (1150 RPM motor speed) w =
g a = 3.0 (worst case control system malfunction)
P = 14,552 lb Td = 45,900 ft-lb 2-1
L = 25.7 ft n=2 p=4 K = 1.04 I
2E where:
W' w =.163 radians /sec (1150 RPM motor spead)
E = 3,804 ft-lb 2-2
11.50.-
- 1.00 WORST CONV REON CRANE TWO BLOCKING Figure 2-1 10.35 Page 2-2 90 o:o 9.-20 80 A
E o
8.05
.70 e
E m
o"
.60 h
6 90 5
a-H Q1
.50 E
e 5.75 a
C
'I w
w E
4.60 40 I
m z
h w
E zO 3.45 30 o
ma 5
5 z
2.30 h
.20 E
E 1.15 10 3
5z 5
0 I
I I
I O
E 3.50 3.10 2.70 2.30 1 90 1.50 1 10 70
.30 10
.50 TIME RFTER INCIDENT (SEC)
s 3.
Analysis of the Low Speed Two Blocking Test Specified By Revision 0 of Regulatory Guide 1.104 Figure 3-1 illustrates the cable and machinery loading following a two blocking that occurs with no load on the hook and at slow speed.
The crane design input parameters are the same as those listed in section 2.
The operating parameters are based upon the slow speed two blocking test required by Revision 0 of Regulatory Guide 1.104 (20% of rated hoisting speed).
The parameters changed from those listed in Section 2 are:
.0326 radians per second (230 RPM motor speed) w =
g a = 1.70 P = 822 lb (No load except weight of lower block) r 3-1
11.50 1.00 REG OUIDE REV 0 TWO BLOCKING TEST Figure 3-1
~~
10.35 Page 3-2 90 am 9.20
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.50 TIME AFTER INCIDENT (SEC)
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September 29, 1978 Mr. R. F. Fraley Advisory Committec on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cortnission Washirston, D.C. 20555 rear Ray:
Attacned is a list of questions which I believe six>uld be answered before the ACRS establishes a position on the Lightning Protection Reg Guide.
It would be helpful if the staff would provide a written response to these questions when it brires the guide to the sab-corrraittee for a second review.
Sincerely, M. Bender cc:
C. P. Siess Members of Reg. Guide Subcommittee Jeremiah J. Ray retyped da 10/2/78 ATTACHMENT E
8 Questions Concerning the Adequacy of the Reg Guide on Lightning Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Is there agreement cn lightning strike frequency and intensity as 1.
a function of the strike target area, the site location, ard the atmospheric properties? If so, what is the basis?
Is the availability of suitable lightning arrestors established?
2.
Is it based on synchronizing the capacity of two or mre units or Is there will the capacity be available from a single arrestor?
any use experience with the proposed installations and if not, what engineering verification should be required?
Does the value impact statem nt supporting the acceptability of the 3.
guide consider the following:
he reliability of arrestors as a function of size, maintenance a.
ard testing frequency, and replacemnt policy or other perform-ance considerations.
%e need and status of development work associated with estabish-b.
ing performance capability to satisfy the guide's requirements.
Se effect on plant availability of maintenance and test require-c.
ments for large capacity lightning arrestors, i.e., if there is difficulty with a lightning arrestor, what will be the regulatory policy concerning operation when it is not functional, and Capital investment in newly developed arrestors and the effect d.
on energy cost to the consumer.
the probability considerations associated with a range of lightn-Hava 4.
ing strikes been taken into account in establishirg arrestor capacity, and is there a parametric evaluation of these capacities using NASH-1400 rise analysis methodology to determine how the relationship between lightning frequency and damage consequences as a function of intensity would influence the need for a specific arrest capability?
Does the staff have documntary information frcrn lightning arrestor 5.
manufacturers to establish that appropriate industrial capability exists to meet the requirements of the guide?
r
h--y, Fiberglass Engineering And Field Service / inc.
I:~
1SG Laurel Avenuo Fairhopo. Alabama 3G532 t,tC;.i. LJ py(ISORY CC71WTEE G:n 205 928-5417 g,.n.3 sr.nr/Jt;;3 E5.
- O b ' d E '?'
September 29, 1978 n :...y_ V;A J2; 'S 5
...r-Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, Northwest Washington, D.C.
20555 Attn:
Mr. Myer Bender Chairman, Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safeguards
Dear Mr. Bender:
You were re'forenced to me through Senator Jim Sassor's (Tennessee) office in Washington.
'I had originally contacted him with reference to a problem concerning the fiberglass cooling water supply and return lines at Tennessee Valley Authority's Hartsville and Phipps Bend projects.
The problem is not with the material itself, but rather the degree of proficiency, or lack of it, in which the pipe is to be inspected.
I am an independent consultant specializing in fiberglass pipe.
As the previous Engineering Manager of the company which supplied the fiberglass pipe to the Hartsville plant, I have become very
~
familiar with the operations as well as the people at T.V.A.
I do not believe that T.V. A. has the personnel qualified to conduct a professional analysis of the pipe.
As a result I submitted a proposal to T.V.A. offering my services for among other things the purpose of progressively inspecting the pipe under load.
My proposal was rejected on the basis that T.V.A. felt their personnel were qualified to conduct the inspection.
Fiberglass pipe (reinforced thermosetting resin pipe) is a non-homogenious material made primarily of continuous fiberglass filaments and impregnated resin.
During manufacturing, the continuous filaments are wound onto a form (steel mandrel) at a constant angle measured at either side of a line perpendicular to the pipe's longitudinal axis.
In other words, the finished product resembles a woven structure.
If the helix angle is anything but forty-five degrees, which all large diameter pipe is, different physical values exist in different directions.
For example, the 6 FSI in the circumferential modulus of elasticity may be 3 x 10 0 PSI in the axial direction.
Although direction and 1 5 x 10 ra t a ntoo r h
a constant design strain is.usually used (.00171n/in) the resultant stress is quite dependent upon the particular mass of an area and the helix angle of the filaments.
With this in mind, particular areas of interest are the bell shoulders and the external rib fillets.
Obviously the ribs are of interest during flexure, however, realistically one must rely on the test data as it is impossible to examine external ribs af ter backfilling.
- However, a little known area worthy of much consideration is that where the reaction of axial stresses due to axial flexure around the ribs is present.
Aside from any further technical discussion, my purpose here has been to simply scratch the surface to enlighten you to the infinite number of interactions present when the final product is deflected under load.
The crux of the problem is that T.V.A. simply does not have the expertise to fully examine and inspect the pipe under load.
I'm afraid their conception of inspection is to watch for cracks or crasing in the liner.
Liner is simply a resin rich layer used to protect the structural portion from contamination.
An experienced eye can loop beyond the liner and detect a stress matrix in areas approaching the ultimate strain.
This obviously is simply a preliminary indicator of a trouble spot resulting from a flaw in the material.
It is interesting to note that as the engineers in Knoxville are becoming more familiar with the intricacies of fiberglass pipe design, they are the ones who agree that having someone in the field thoroughly familiar with the product would be invaluable.
However some of the field personnel have objected rather loudly to my presence, hence my proposal was rejected.
Unfortunately all my proposals to T.V.A. have resulted in a major difference of opinion.
Acide from claiming competence versus incompetence, I think the question now boils down,-to the degree in which T.V.A. wants to assure themselves the pipe is acceptable to encounter all design loads.
As once representing the manufacturer, I am aware of the importance of T.V. A. not having to totally rely on his input.
I certainly do not mean to discredit anyone, I am simply aware that manufacturing variances do occur and some things do not show up until the pipe is stressed.
I very strongly believe that it should not be left to the manufacturer to inspect and accept the pipe.
Whv should the fiberglass cooling water sunply and return lines not undergo the same decree of quality insnection as do the other items made of more familiar materials?
The fact that the manufacturer has a two week field support obligation at Hartsville and a one week obligation at Phipps Bend really has no bearing on the issue at hand.
Prior to writing you expressing my concern of T.V. A. 's lack of technical expertise to properly inspect the fiberglass pipe at the Hartsville and Phipps Bend plants, I directed a somewhat similar
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- omm 8
e
. emen.e-en.,.
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letter to T.V.A.'s office in Washington.
This, unfortunately, turned out to be a mistake ~on my behalf as my correspondence was simply forwarded to Knoxville where, incidently,'I received my first rejection.
The unfortunate aspect is that now should anyone such as you bring this matter to T.V. A. 's attention, the reply in all probability will be that the matter has already been looked into.
I have since received a second rejection from Knoxville based on my letter to T.V.A.'s Washington office.
I certainly hope you will agree with me that someone thoroughly familiar with the product should assist T.V.A.
in inspection the fiberglass pipe at the Hartsville and Phipps Bend plants.
In order to properly analyze the structure, a visual time reference study should be conducted.
Only one day a week at each site is required.
I also hope you feel I am best qualified to conduct the inspection as I am the only independent consultant in this country with extensive'large diameter fiberglass pipe design experience.
As pointed out in the enclosures, the cost to T.V.A.
is approximately equal to the weekly wages of a couple of conmon laborers.
1 I have included copies of all pertinent past correspondence.
Note that I originally offered T.V.A. a variety of services.
I am only interested in the inspection as I feel this is most important.
Also my original correspondence did not include the Phipps Eend project.
This is because at that time the pipe at that plant was not being installed and was not ready for inspection.
I certainly appreciate your reading all this correspondence and considering my proposal.
Regardless of yout decision toward utilizing my professional services, an expert in the field of fiberglass would be very beneficial to all concerged.
My dee est and sincerest appreciation, lhf Ken Burton
~
President Enclosures KB/akb cci Mr. James Yore, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
- I i%
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e Fiberglass Engineering And Field Service / inc.
Fairhopo, Alabama 3G532
,f 15G Laurel Avenuo 205 028 5417 September 11, 1978 Senator Jim Sassor Federal Office Building 701 Broadway Ave.
Nashville, Tennessee 37203
Dear Senator Sascor:
I am writing to you in hopes that with your support a very serious problem may be rectified.
The area of concern lies with two of Tennessee Valley Authority's nuclear power plant projects -- Hartsville and Phipps Bend.
I am an independent consultant specializing in fiberglass pipe.
While I was the engineering manager of Wolf Ridge Plastics in Mobile, Alabama, we were awarded a contract to supply several thousand feet of 66 and 132 inch diameter fiberglass pipe to the Hartsville project for the purpose of conveying cooling water to and from the reactor buildings.
Likewise a'campetitor was awarded a similar contract to supply pipe for the Phipps Bend project.
Since, I have formed my own consulting business.
I have tried without success to convince T.V. A. that they should have someone representing them who.is thoroughly familiar with the product to perform a professional examination of the pipe during the backfill sequence.
I can speak with authority with reference to the Hartsville project when stating that in theory the combined operating loads imposed on the pipe should not cause a stress-yielding situation.
In reality, no one has ever attempted to install fiberglass pipe of this diameter as deep as will be. buried at the two sites.
I Fiberglass pipe (continuous filament reinforced thermosetting resin pipe) is a very scientific product.
Unfortunately the word
" pipe" conotates a cylindrical object of the simplest form.
It is such a specialised product that there are only about half a dozen engineers in this country capable of totally designing the product.
The reasoning behind this is that filament wound pipe
s Page 2
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develops different stress modes in different directions which are highly dependent upon the mass density of a particular area.
Those of us who have developed the product, of which we are very few in number, combined a high level of theory with many unhappy results of various buried systems and developed a method of design.
My point is that I believe it imperative that someone representing T.V.A. perform a time study of the pipe during its installation.
It takes a highly trained eye to detect the formation of a stress matrix.
One must understand the directional qualities of the matrix and what design parameters they affect.
As a result of T.V.A. not having anyone familiar with the product (very few engineering firms do) they have relied totally on input from manufacturers.
Each contract has a provision for one week of field assistance from the manufacturer, however none has been requested.
Although here we are comparing apples to oranges as I am not concerned with manufacturer's input assuring the installatipn team that this or that scratch is acceptable.
Please keep in mind that we are talking about maintaining the operating status of a nuclear power plant, not to mention safety and adverse publicity, designed on a forty year life; not of concerning ourselves with the manufacturer's one year product liability warranty.
The rejection of my proposal to T.V.A. was in the form of a letter stating they felt their field personnel were competent enough to handle any problems.
In all respect to T.V.A.,
nothing could be farther from the truth.
Anyone can take diametric measurements, however, not one of T.V.A.'s engineers, much less.-the field personnel, could even describe a stre'us matrix.
At this time engineers in Knoxville possess only a general knowledge of the product.
This is very understandable considering the material.
Very few people do.
My major concern lies in the fact that the pipe supplied to the Phipps Bend project has much less material than that of the Hartsvills job.
This significantly reduces the stiffness factor of the pipe.
The reason for this is that during the time T.V.A. was accepting proposals for the Phipps Bend project, Armco Steel was considering buying CorBan Industries.
CorBan very much desired a large backlog to entice Armco.
Obviously to cut cost, every method was employed to reduce material.
W
Page 3 9
e I have included copies of my correspondence to T.V.A.
I hope you will read these as they will more fully explain the situation.
I realize all this correspondence is quite lengthy, however, I feel that I had not projected a clear image with past correspondence.
I am only trying to insure that T.V.A. maintain the same level of quality control with fiberglass pipe as they do with all other materials.
Please remember, we are talking about the lifeline to the nuclear reactors.
Please note in my proposal of July 3, 1978, I offered services for several items.
My only major item of concern is that of inspection.
As I pointed out in the enclosure, only a couple of days a week is required and the cost is minimal.
I hope you will realize the urger.cy of this matter as T.V.A.
is now installing pipe past the confines of the reactor buildings.
I have cent similar letters to my local congressman, Jack Edwards, and to the T.V.A.
headquarters in Washington, D.C.
To da te I have not received a definite reply.
In writing to you I hope that you will help me reach my goal, namely spending one day in each plant to assist T.V.A.
in obtaining a trouble free cooling water supply system thus maintaining a safe plant environment and eliminating extremely costly shut downs.
I feel I am best qualified to perform the examination as I am the only independent consultant with extensive fiberglass pipe design experience.
Thank you very much for your time and consideration.
Sincerely, s
Ken Burton KB/akb Enclosures 6
S(
1 Fiberglass Engineering And Field Service / inc.
156 Laurof Avenuo Fairhopo, Alabama 36532 205 928-5417 July 3, 1978 Mr. Domer Tennessee Valley Authorities W9D224 Commercial Reality Management Building 400 Commerce Avenue Knoxville, Tennessee 37902
Dear Mr. Domer:
As a result pf my involvement with Wolf Ridge Plastics and T.V. A.,
I have been very involved with the fiberglass supply and return lines at the Hartsville plant.
During my visits to the job site I was extremely impressed with the degree of control exhibited both to materials and installation.
In my many years of visiting various job sites, I have yet to witness a more comprehensive quality assurance prog. ram than that of T.V. A. 's.
My concern lies with the fact that there exists only a minor form of quality assurance directed toward the fiberglass pipe.
This is obviously understandable.as fiberglass pipe is a new product to T.V. A.
To date the field personnel have had to rely solely on Knoxville for any information regarding the prod'uct.
The engineers in Knoxville likewise are forced to seek the advice of the manufacturer.
I certainly don'.t mean to belittle anyone.
Conversly, the learning curve exhibited by the T.V.A.
employees has been rather phenomenal.
I would also like to emphasize I believe Wolf Ridge Plastics submitted a sound design and offered substantial advice when called upon.
However, one must realize that regardless how sincere an individual is, his first responsibility is to hiu employer.
My whole point is that I believe T.V.A. should have someone thoroughly knowledgeable with filament wound pipe,.large diameter fiberglass pipe design, and a familiarization with the overall project to represent them.
It is a rather elementary task to simply examine the pipe in the holding area for surface damage.
It is an entirely different matter to inspect the pipe during installation with a trained eye watching for stress diagrams to develop within the matrix.
S 8
/;14bt
. One of the major advantages of filament wor.nd pipe is that an experienced individual can literally see high stress areas within the pipe.
As the filaments tend to stretch or separate along a resin line, a visual profile is developed along a high' stress area.
Please don't confuse this with surface cracks or cracing.
They are totally different items.
It is very important to watch critical spots such as high mass areas (bell shoulders and rib fillets) and rib and pipe interaction.
Very often a flexible conduit such as filament wound pipe will creep in two directions as a result of a single directional reaction such as circumfrential deflection.
This is very normal and the pipe is designed to take this factor into account.
- However, should failure occur, it is usually in this mode.
What I have been attempting to do is to make you aware of the fact that should any troubles arise concerning the pipe, corrective action can be taken if discovered early enough.
I would like to propose that T.V.A.
retain my services for approximately two days a week to inspect the pipe during installation.
During this inspection period I would conduct time intervaJ studies of specific loactions on all buried pieces of pipe.
At the same time I would hope to work closely with your quality. assurance. people in the field for the purpose of instructing them on what areas and items to concentrate their attentions.
Should any questionable areas arise, I would call T.V.A.'s attention to it.
They, in turn, could either consult the manufacturer or take the initiative to recommend a remedy depending upon the degree of responsibility T.V.A. wanted.to assume.
In my past experience T.V. A. has been careful to keep the burden of responsibility on the manufacturer.
There is certainly nothing wrong with this approach and need not be altered simply because T.V.A. retained the services of a professional within the fiberglass industry to aid'you in your quality assurance program.
I am aware that CorBan/Armco is required by contract to supply a field technician for a period of two weeks to assist in field installation.
I cannot see where this would interfere with.my proposal as they are two separate job descriptions.
I certainly hope the two will not be confused.
Another important area in which I believe my services would be extremely beneficial is that of aiding in writing specifications for upcoming proposals in which fiberglass pipe is considered.
J e
M T.V.A. could have protected themselves much more effectively by placing certain restrictions and still. alleviate itself from assuming design responsibility.
Alco, many of the cohtract specifications were contradictory to each other causing a great deal of confusion between the manufacturer, engineers, and quality control incpectora.
This idea of aiding in writing of specifications is obviously another matter, however, I did want to bring it to your attention.
As I mentioned earlier, I believe my services would benefit T.V. A. both immediately and' in the future.
I would think that a time lapse study would be invaluable especially as no one has ever buried fiberglass pipe as deep ac is planned at Hartsville.
Should T.V. A. decide to retain my services, my fee is $225 00 per day plus expences.
Aside from the technical services this firm offers, we also supply fiberglass techniciano experienced in the art of fiberglass lay-up.
I would like to make our services available for the work which may be required on the six joints at Hartsville that were disrupted due to flotation.
Also our services would be available for all fabrication work to be done at the Phipps Bend project in which CorBan did not include field fabrication in their proposal.
It is extremely important that only experienced fabricators be utilized for this type of lay-up.
Even suppliers of fiberglass products use only experienced personnel for projects of this magnitude.
To avoid any confucion in my current status, I am presently being retained by the h'olf Ridge Corporation to close a few outstanding matters.
One of those items is the repair of the steel bells at the job site.
Being totally independent and considering the type of services I would be rendering, there would be ab'colu tely no conflict of interest either ethically or legally.
In closing, I would like to state that I have been very impressed with the effectiveness with which T.V. A.
has dealt with this contract.
I have personally enjoyed working with all the T.V.A.
personnel.
Sincerely,
/
.hr Ken Burton President KB/akb a W
~
',
- ss Fiberglass Engineering And Field Serv, ice / inc.
f*
1SG Laurel Avenue
' i Faittopo, Abbarna 36532 2G5 928-5417 August 2, 1978 Tennessee Valley Authority Commercial Reality Management Building 400 Commerce Avenue Knoxville, Tennessee 37902 Attention:
Mr. Domer Gentlemen:
Approximately three weeks ago I submitted a proposal to T.V.A.
offering my services relative to the fiberglass pipe at the Hartsville job si'te.
To this date I have not received a reply
~
so I can only assume it is still under consideration or it has been rejected.
To reinforce my reasoning, and hopefully yours, I would like to relate an occurrence I was made aware of while I was at the job site representing Wolf Ridge Plastics.
While inspecting pipe at Plant B, I noticed that metal scaffolding with sharp edges is being used in the pipe.
This very easily can cyt the liner allowing water to enter the structural portion of the pipe wall.
Also most spiders are being used with no flat padded feet on the ends.
In some cases padding is not even used on the ends of the straight boards.
As a result of the concrete being poured at greater lifts than originally intended, a larger stress is realized by the pipe wall.
The flat end of a board does not represent sufficient area.
I did point this out to the proper individuals and was assured the matter would be rectified.
The last time I made a visit to the field I witnessed several metallic welding tools being dragged across the machined surface of one of the bells.
That action could have very easily insured a leaky joint.
My whole point is that if someone was there, the above mentioned items would never have happened.
I cannot understand from what I have seen at T.V. A. that for the cost equivalent to the weekly wages of a couple of common laborers, T.V.A. would not insure they would derive the full potential of the fiberglass pipe.
s Neither can I believe that personal pride would interfere with a matter of such importance.
Certainly T.V.A.
cannot expect to handle this by themselves if they have no one experienced in that area.
In all fairness to the field personnel, they are beginning to learn how to handle the pipe but they can't be expected to become experts over night.
As for the spiders in the pipe at Plant B, I suggest you mark each location so upon removal the damage will be more easily located.
After the pipe is encased, those areas will be very difficult to assess as no external light will be available.
Surface cracks will be easily recognized.
Have someone look for small separations of the continuous filaments.
These separations will run perpendicular to the strands and will be about one-eighth inch long.
They may or may not resemble a crack but should more often resemble a small hair.
Depending upon the depth of the separations, repair may be necessary.
I certainly hope T.V.A. is not obtaining a negative attitude toward fiberglass pipe.
It is truly an amazing product and savings will be realized if its strong points as well as its weak points are properly understood.
This point should be thoroughly understood upon commencement of installation at the Phipps Eend project as the pipe to be supplied is not identical to that of the Hartsville job.
Sincer ly,.m -
Y sp
- c..
Ken Burton
, President KB/akb I
L
6 TENNESSEE VALLEY A UTHO RITY KNOXVILLC. TENN CsGEC 37902 W11A9 Commercial Realty Management Building 400 Commerce Avenue September 8, 1978 Nk. Ken Burton, President Fiberglass Engineering and Field Service, Incorporated 156 Laurel Avenue Fairhope, Alabama 36532
Dear Mr. Burton:
SERVICE EROP0SALS FOR FIBERGLASS CONDUIT We have reviewed your July 3 and August 2, 1978, letters to Mr. Domer and his August 23 letter to you.
t We appreciate your concern as expressed in your August 21 letter to our Washington office that TVA should carefully monitor the installation process and fully examine the conduit during the backfill sequences. To this end we have instructed our field construction personnel at our Hartsville and Phipps Bend Nuclear Plants in specific pro-cedures to be followed in installing this conduit with particular attention to be given to circumferential deficction.
We are confident that with our present system of office engineers, field engineers, and inspectors complemented by the consulting service provided by contract, we can install the conduit and deal with any problems that may arise during installation.
Further, we are confident that the conduit, as installed, will ensure safe and dependabic service for
~
the life of the plants.
Again, we appreciate your interest in TVA and thank you for your proposals which will be considered should any need arise in the future for such services.
Very truly yours,
'Yh f '
W&
Roy H. Dunham Director of Engineering Design An Caual Opportunity Employer
@Ballelle Pauhc Northwest Laboratories a.r e. !h. I;.ia'. 3..r l Ric bl.enel, W.nhington W 151 3. e.m..- -en 946-2223 v. i... e <, m September 25, 1978 RECEIVED ABYISORY C0flMITTEE ON Mr. Sam Duraiswamy REACTOR Smt.gAIDS U.S. u a Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards SEP 2 9 $3U.'
m U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 AM
/"""F'?*^
pp 10 llil? 1 ? 3,4,5j 7:8 9 i
i 4 i
Dear Sam,
T Comments - Appendices G, H and R.
F.
1)
With regard to revisions in Appendix G the change is a'go'od one, resulting in no loss in safety.
2)
With regard to revisions in Appendix H the change is overdue, particularly in the light of the flux -
dependence of irradiation damage.
3)
Regulatory Guide (a)
Limited to RPV (b) (2) Calibration - Why cite Article 4,Section V when not approved in 10 CFR 50.55(a)?
This applies throughout the regulatory guide.
NRC cannot refuse to approve addenda of the codes on the one hand, then use the unapproved addenda to justify a regulatory guide.
This regulatory guide contains many statements concerning limitations in the UT procedures then recommends several specific actions.
So far as I can tell some of the proposed actions simply introduce more variables into a procedure containing too many already.
Page 12 - Stress corrosion in HAz in a RPV, Page 12 - You can't perform to 1977 until approvals in 10 CFR 50.
(1)
Instrument Performance Checks (a)
OK f
(
(b)
OK fl i ~dc.vgnigg h
(c)
OK (d)
OK
Mr. Sam Duraiswamy September 25, 1978 Page Two (2)
Calibration - OK (3)
I don't know how this will be done.
The near field detection in a major problem; however, the regulatory guide approach accomplishes nothing.
(4)
Beam Profile - OK (5)
Interface - I believe this is being met with 60*
70 inlet (6)
Sizing - No major problem (7)
Reporting -
b)
Will be difficult c)
Begins to be ridiculous I predict that most of the older plants where access problems prevent total UT coverage of welds will request clarification and/or relief flooding NRR with paper work.
f If one pursues the cited approach, it leads to the nearly through wall flaw in the plate or forging far from welds where ISI is not required.
I suggest the ACRS table this regulatory guide until NRC has revised 10 CFR 50, Part 50.55(a) re updating of acceptable addenda of ASME XI.
No requirements re quality of UT transducers is a marginally true statement which uses misdirection deliberately.
Depth sizing is a requirement in ASME XI.
Their costing is ridiculous.
If ISI is on the criteria path it is not the added costs per man that are important, it is the increased down time, then one talks in terms of hundreds of thousands of dollars per day.
I see the following problems:
(1)
From title this should be limited to reactor pressure vessel welds yet later terminology re stress corrosion, etc. is confusing.
To my knowledge they fail to return to the limitation re. RPV.
a%,
Mr. Sam Duraiswamy September 25, 1975 Page Three (2)
You should quiz them as to when they intend to update beyond Summer 1975 of ASME XI via 10 CFR 50.55(a).
(3)
Several of their calibration statements in the discussion don't get picked up definitively in the requirements.
(4)
The fracture mechanics section is completely open-ended.
I visualize the following variables as undefined all of which influence the answer.
(a) Assumed Flaw Location - near surface, far surface, embedded; ib) Load Cycles - types, amplitudes, number of cycles;
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(c) Flaw Size and' Dimensions - Semi-circular, round, elliptic, etc; (d) Assumptions re environment, flaw sizes, air, hot water, etc.;
(e) Material - safe ends, etc.;
(f) Crack Growth Assumptions, KIScc, I,
e c.;
(g) Will calculation be done at every ISI or once?
Needless to say I feel this section needs much more clarification.
Very trply yours,
)?
. - p neer H.
Bush peniorStaffConsultant SHB:kd
.h Proposed Changes to Regulatory Guide 1.104's Two Blocking & Load Hangup Requirements Notes:
1.
Changes proposed by the NRC Staff in Draf t 2, Revision I are underlined.
2.
Ederer's proposed deletions are indicated and proposed additions are in italics.
C.3.]
"The mechanical and structural components of the complete hoisting sys-tem should have the required strength to resist failure if the hoisting system should 'two block or if ' load hangup' 7 should occur during hoist-ing. The designer should provide means within the reeving system located on the head or on the load block combinations to absorb or control the kinetic energy of rotating machinery prior to the incident of two blocking or load hengup. As on alternative, the protective control system to prevent the hoisting system from two blocking should include, as a minimum two indepen-dent travel limit devices of different designs and act veted b_y separate mech-anical means. These devices should deenergize the hoist drive motor and the main power supply. In addition the reeving system should be designed such that the cables will not be cut or crushed in the event two blockings are not prevented. Furthermore, the protective control system for load honqup, a part of the overload protection in regulatory position C.3.h, should include load cell systems for direct or torsional strain or motor-current-sensing devices. The protective control system for load hangup should deenergize the motor in the event that the two independent travel limit devices fail to do so. The location of mechanical holding brakes and their controls should provide positive, reliable, and capable means to stop and hold the hoisting drum (s) for the conditions described in the design specification and regulatory positions I and 2. This should include capability to withstand the maximum torque of the driving motor if a malfunction occuTs and power to the driving motor cannot be shut off. The auxiliary hoist, if supplied, should be equipped with two independent travel limit switches to prevent two blocking.
'"Two blocking' is the act of continued hoisting in which the food block and head block assemblies are brought into physical contact, thereby preventing fur %er movement of the load block and creating shock loads to rope and reeving system."
7
" Load hangup' is the act in which the load block ' nd/or load is stopped during hoisting by entanglement with fixed objects, the by overloading the hoisting system."
C.4.b (Second paragraph)- "When equipped with-on. energy-sentr-olling-devios between-the 4eedond-heedblocksr the complete hoisting machinery should be allowed to "two block" during the hoisting test (lood block limit and safety devices are bypassed). This test, conducted at slow speed without load, should provide assurance of the integrity of the design, the equipment, the controls, and the overload prioection devices. The test should demonstrate that the maximum torque that can be developed by the driving system, including the inertia of the rotating parts at the ovetorque condition, will be obsorbed or controlled prior to two blocking or load hangup. The-sompletehokting-mOGhineF y-should-be 4 e sted f er obili4 y-to-sustein o feed hongup-eend' tie n-e by o 4 e st-M which-the 4 es d -block-ottochi ng -point s ore-seoored-to o-hed--
enehenor-exeessive-leed,-The-erone menOfooturer-rnoy-soggest-ether-test--
proc-edOFes-thGt-Will-ensOFe 4he-proper-IUna-tiesing Oi, pro 4Ec4iveOVeFlood-devices."
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