ML19259D653
| ML19259D653 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/04/1979 |
| From: | Sholly S AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910250352 | |
| Download: ML19259D653 (17) | |
Text
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U UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Q/
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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In the Matter of
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Doc No 0-289 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANi s
(Three Mlle Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1)
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LIST OF DPAFT CONTESTIONS FILED BY STEVEN C. SHOLLY Pursuant to the Board's Memorandum dated 18 September 1979, draft contenttons in the above-captioned proceedtnc are hereby submitted.
These draft contentions supercede those submitted in the original and amended intervention peti.ttons dated 20 August 1979 and 4 September 1979.
Through-out these draft contentions, the following deftnttlons apply a.
"the plant" and "Untt 1" refer to Unit No. 1 of the Three Mlle Island Nuclear Station; b.
" Unit 2" refers to Unit No. 2 of the Three Mlle Island Nuclear Station; c.
" Licensee" and " Met Ed" refer to the Metropolitan Edison Company; d.
"NEPA" refers to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969; e.
"FES" refers to the Final Environmental Statement related to the operation of Three Mlle Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 (NURED-0552);
f.
"I & E investigatton" refers to the Office of Inspection and Enforcement investigation of the Unit 2 accident on 28 March 1979 (STPE-0600); and g.
"NRC" refers to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
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. Draft contentions are set forth as follows:
DRAFT C0bTESTION # 1 It is contended that Unit l's reactor contatnment isolation system does not provide sufficient assurance that the plant can meet NRC requirements in 10 CFR Part 20, Paragraphs 105 and 106.
It is further contended that this lack of assurance poses a real and substantial threat to public health and safety and that the NRC should, pursuant to authority to require backfitting in 10 CFR Part 50, Paragraph 109, require backfitting of the Unit I containment isolation system to provide for automatic isolation upon high-pressure injection inttlation, reactor trip, or high radiation signal.
It is further contended that this backfitting must be performed prior to restart in order to adequately protect the public health and safety.
The basis for this contention comes from the similarity between Unit 1 and Unit 2 and the I & E investigation of the Unit 2 accident.
The failure of the Unit 2 containment to isolate upon initiation of high-pressure injection led to a large off-stte release of radioactive xenon and krypton which produced an average annual release rate of about eleven times greater than is permitted in 10 CFR 20.106 (NUREG-0600).
This release resulted in an average radiation level of 30 millirems per hour on Kohr and S. Shelley Islands on 29 March 1979, in excess of permitted limits in 10 CFR 20.105.
1211.96.4
. DPJ.N CONTENTION # 2 It is contended that the plant's design containc features which make the plant unusually sensitive to certain off-normal transient conditions and that as a result there is a lack of reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated withcut endangering the health and safety of the pubile.
It is further contended that all actions required of the Licensee by the NRC which relate to the sensitivity of the plant to off-normal transient conditions must be completed prior to restart in order to provide reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated without endangering the public health and safety.
The basis for this contention comes from the NRC's Or. der and Notice of Hearing dated 9 August 1979 which cites five features of the plant which contribute to the unusual sensitivity of the plant to of f-normal transient conditions.
The NRC cited these five features as the reason for its lack of reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated without endangering the public health and safety.
Petitioner concurs with the NRC that the short-term actions should be completed prior to restart, but disagrees with the NRC on the need for completion of long-term actions
- 1, #2, and #3 prior to restart.
Petitioner believes that completion of these items prict to restart is necessary to provide the reasonable assurance required to permit restart
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, and so contends.
DRAFT CONTENTION # 3 It is contended that the Licensee's analys ts of loss-of-cooling accidents (LOCA's) is incomplete and that oper-ational procedures used by the Licensee to define operator actions with respect to LOCA's are defective.
It is further contended that without complete analysis of LOCA's there is a lack of reasonable assurance that the plant can be operated without endangering the pubite health and safety.
It is therefore contended that LOCA analysis and operational procedures used to define operator actions with respect to LOCA's must be completed prior to restart in order to protect the pubite health and safety.
The basis of this contention comes from a statement in the' NRC's Order and Notice of Hearing dated 9 August 1979 which states as a short-term action that the Licensee shall take the following action:
"(c)
Complete analyses for potential small breaks and implement operating instructions to define operator action."
This statement clearly implies that LOCA analysis for the plant is incomplete.
This lack of completeness in LOCA analysts leaves open the possibility that a thus-far overlooked LOCA event could occur, thus posing a great risk to public health and safety.
Lack of complete LJCA analysts leads to deftciencies in operational procedures which must be corrected to provide reasonable assurance that the plant
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-.. -.. can be operated without endangering the public health and safety.
DRAFT CONTESTION # 4 It is contended that the Licensee's emergency plan for the plant is defective and does not provide sufficient protection of the public health and safety.
It is contended further that the emergency action capability of the Licensee must be upgraded to include persons living within twenty miles of the plant in order to adequately protect the public health and safety.
It is further contended that the emergency plan and emergency action capability for the plant must be upgraded prior to restart in order to provide reasonable assurance that the public health and safety will be protected in the event of an off-site release of radiodctivity from the plant.
The basis for this contention comes from a variety of sources.
A recent NRC report on the evacuatton of persons following the 28 March 1979 Unit 2 accident stated that approximately 144,000 persons evacuated from the area around the plant.
It is clear that some of these evacuees came from outside the ten-mile radius recommended by the NRC staff.
The EES on page V-27 lists the average annual dose for persons living from ten to twenty miles from the plant as 0.0023 millirems : this works out to 0.67 man-rem per year based on the population of 484,900 in the ten to twenty mile 1211 167
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, radius of the plant.
A Department of Energy report quoted in the Evening News (Harrisburg, PA) on 6 April 1979 cited an exposure for persons within ten to twenty miles of the plant for the first eight days of the accident at Unit 2 of an average dose of 0.45 millirems.
This works out to a total man-rem dose in eight days of over 218,000 man-rem.
This is far in excess of the annual dose to the population within fifty miles of the plant (1,868,000) of about 31 man-rem ciced on page V-29 of the FES.
It is therefore clear that the populat'.nn aithin ten to twenty miles of the plant is in significant risk in accident conditions and should therefore be includei in emergency action planning capability.
Since it is beyond.tua capability of the Licensee or the NRC to predict with certainty when the emergency action capability of the Licensee may be needed, Petitioner contends that the upgrading of the olant's emergency plan must occur prior to restart to ensure adequrte protection of the public health and safety.
DRAFT CONTEST 10N # 5 It is contended that the Licensee's environmental radiation monitoring program contains an insufficient number of monitoring sites and an 7.nadequate distribution of radiation monitering sites within twenty miles of the plant to provide sufficient protection of the public health and safety.
It is contended further that an unwarranted i211 068
4 reliance by the Licensee on the use of thermoluminescent dosimeters as radiation monitoring devices seriously underestimates radiation doses to the public within twenty miles of the plant.
It is contended that the Licensee does not possess adequate additional portable radiation monitors and does not maintain them properly to adequately assess radiation doses in the event cf an accidental off-site release of radioactivity.
It is contended that the environmental radiation monitoring program of the Licensee must be upgraded prior to restart in order to adequately protect the public health and safety.
The basis for this contention comes frou documents in the local Public Document Room.
It is clear from the Licer.c ce's descriptions of its. environmental radiation monitoring program that there are a very limited number of monitoring stations outside a five-mile radius of the plant and that these few stations are not distributed evenly throughout the compass directions from the station and at a variety of distances from the station.
It is a fact that thermoluminescent dosimeters do not record beta radiation exposure and therefore are likely to lead to serious underestimation of radiation exposures, especially in accident conditions when a large portion of the dose is due to beta radiation.
The lack of complete exposure information makes decisions by public 1211 069
. Samu..
- officials difficult with respect for the need for protective actions.
Therefore, it is contended that the Licensee's radiation monttoring program must be upgraded.
The I & E investigatton cited examples of Ltcensee radiation monitoring equipment being in non-usable order when the 28 March 1979 accident occurred, and also cited a specific incident in which eight environmental air monitors had not been calibrated since 1974.
It is clear that the Ltcensee has _not exercise proper administrative controls over the radiation monitoring program and therefore it is contended that the Ltcensee must upgraded prior to restart.
DPAFT CONTESTION # 6 It is contended that untti a method for decontaminating and restoring Unit 2 has received NRC approval and the environmental impact of that method and the impact of that method on Unit l's waste handling and storage capacity has been evaluated, to proceed with restart would place an unnecessary risk on the public health and safety.
It is further contended that until the Licensee can provide reason-able assurance that it can safely operate Unit I while decontaminating and restoring Cnit 2, restart of Unit 1 must be postponed as posing a risk to public health and safety.
The basis for this contention comes from the NRC's Order and Notice of Hearing dated 9 August 1979 wherein the NRC states as a short-term action that the Ltcensee i211 070
. must take prior to restart the following:
"The Licensee shall demonstrate that decontamination and/or restoration operations at TMI-2 will not affect the safe operations at TMI-1."
The Petitioner agress with this requirement and contends that it is necessary to provide reasonable assurance that operating the plant will not endanger the public health and safety.
DRAFT CONEENIION # 7 It is contended that the production of explosive gases in the reactor core following an LOCA poses an unacceptable risk to the pubite health and safety and that untti a safe and reliable means of eliminating explosive gases from the containment la installed at Unit 1, the protection of public health and safety mandates the denial of restart.
The basis for this contention comes from the similarity of Unit 1 and Unit 2 and the results of the 28 March 1979 accident at Unit 2.
According to the I & E investigation, a 28 psig pressure spike in the containment after the accident started was caused by the burn of hydrogen within the containment.
According to newspaper accounts of the accident, there was great concern over the possible existence of a hydrogen bubble in the reactor and explosive mixes of hydrogen and oxygen present in the containment which could 1211 071
- have exploded and resulted in the destruction of the reactor core and the containment with the subsequent catastrophic release of radiation into the environment.
In addition, the cause of the 28 psig pressure spike was not known and the existence of the spike was not reported to the NRC until two days after its occurrence.
These concerns and the lack of awareness of the situation place emphasis on the need for an automatic system to deal with the production of explosive gases in the containment.
DRAFT CONTEST 10N # 8 It it contended that regardless of the substance of the NRC's final order in this proceeding, such a decision will constitute a major Federal action which will significantly affect the quality of the human environment, and that as a result, the decision of the NRC falls under the requirements of Section 102 of NEPA.
It is contended that the required environmental impact statement must be prepared before the SRC's final order can take ef fect.
It is also contended that numerous sections of the original FES for the plant have been rendered invalid by the 28 March 1979 accident at Unit 2 and must be addressed in the new environmental impact statement.
It is also contended that the psychological implications of restart must be addressed within the NEPA review process.
The basis for this contention comes from the text of 1211 072
3 NEPA and the FES.
The following sections of the FES have been rendered invalid as a result of the Unit 2 accident and must be reworked in a NEPA reviews a.
Section III, D, 2, which deals with radioactive wastes; b.
Section II, C, which deals with regional demography and land use c.
Section V, dealing with the environmental impact of plant operations; d.
Section VI, dealing with the environmental impacts of postulated accidents, including Class 9 accidents such as Unit 2's accident; e.
Section X, dealing with the need for power; and f.
Section XI, which deals with the cost-benefit ratio.
The inadequacies of the original FES and the unprecedented nature of these proceedings clearly mandate the preparation cf. a Section 102 environmental impact statement.
' Evaluation of the psychological implications of restart falls within the issues to be considered as part of the NEPA review process.
Paragraph B of Section 102 of NEPA requires all federal agencies (i.e., the NRC) to develop methods and procedures to insure the evaluation in decision-making of " presently unquantified environmental amenities and values", along with economic and technical considerations.
The psychological implications of a proposed major Federal action fall under this requirement tecause the absence of artificially created distress can te considered to be an environmental amenity or value.
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300RORGNAL Another feature of NEPA which mandates the consideration of psychological implications of major federal actions is Paragraph b of Section 101 of NEPA which states that it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the Nation may:
"(2) assure for all Americans safe. healthful, productive, and esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, riah.t:.2 health apud safety,,gr other undesirable and unintended consecuencess (5) achieve a balance between pcpulation and resource use which will permit high standards d living and a wide sharing g life's amenities."
The underlined portions of Paragraph b of Section 101 of NEPS imply the inclusion of psychological implications of major proposed Federal actions in the NEPA review process.
Psychological distress is a " risk to health and safety" and represents an " undesirable and unintended consequence" as defined in NEPA.
A "high standard of living and a wide sharin6 of life's amenities" requires the absence of psycho-logical distress due to major federal actions.
NEPA does not contain an exhaustive Itsting of specific impacts to be considered in the review process, but rather aims to include a wide variety of concerns.
This is clear from Paragraph A of Section 102 of NEPA which mandates the use of
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. "a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment."
The underlined reference to social sciences clearly points to psychological implications as psychology is a definite social science.
It is therefore contended that the psychological implications of restart must be included in the NEPA review proccss involving Unit 1.
DRAFT CONIESTION # 9 It is contended that the plant's computer system is inadequate to permit safe operation of the plant under all conditions.
It is contended further that the lack of real-time printout capability during accident conditions places,the public health and safety at severe risk, and that the computer system at the plant must be upgraded to provide real-time printout capability at all times in order to provide for the protection of the public health and safety.
The basis for this contention comes from the I & E investigation which cites numerous instances where lack of real-time data during the Unit 2 accident led to incorrect actions on the part of operators which caused the of f-site release of radioactivity, thus endangering pubite health and safety.
The similarity of Unit 1 and Unit 2
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. gives rise to this contention in this respect.
DRAFT CobTESTION # 10 It is contended that the Licensee has negligently, and in some cases willfully, violated NRC regulations and technical specifications for the plant, and that these violations placed the public health and safety at great risk.
It is further contended that until the Licensee demonstrates that it possesses the necessary financial, technical, quality assurance, maintenance, operations, and administrative resources to operate the plant in compliance with NRC regulations and plant technical specifications, restart must be denied.
The basis for this contention comes from the I '& E investigation and from NRC records of Licensee non-compilance and fines levied for such non-compliance.
In particular, the I & E investigation lists two groups of potential items of non-compliance resulting from the Unit 2 accident which evidence a serious lack of resources on the part of the Licensee in the operation of the plant within NRC regulations and technical specifications for the plant.
Some of these items of non-compliance relate directly to radiation releases to the of f-site environment and it is therefore contended that reasonable assurance that the Licensee can operate the plant within regulations is needed 1211 076
. to protect public health and safety.
DRAFT CONTESTION # 11 It is contended that the design of the Unit I control room is deficient from a human factor; engineering viewpoint and that this deficiency prevents plant operators from adequately protecting the public health and safety, especially during accident conditions when rapid operator action may be required to prevent off-site releases of radioactivity.
It is contended that until the control room has received a thorough human factors engineering review and necessary changes are made in the control room, there exists a substantial risk to public health and safety which mandates denial of restart.
The basis for this contention comes from the Final SafetyknalysisReportsforUnit 1 and Unit 2, photographs of the plant control room, and a study conducted by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI Report # NP309).
These documents show numerous instances in which control room design greatly influences the ability of plant operators to maintain control of the reactor.
In addition, the I & E investigation gives numerous examples of how control room design caused plant operators to misinterpret alarms, printouts, and plant sensor indicacors.
It is there -
fore contended that the design of the control room must be reviewed from a human factors engineering viewpoint to insure 1211 077
. the adequate protection of public health and safety.
Respectfully submitted, Steven C. Sholly, Petihner 304 South Market Street Mechanicsburg, PA 17055 (717) 766-1857 Dated: 4 October 1979 I
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9 300R ORi&
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR RB3ULATORY CCEMISSION In the Matter of Do e
N 50-289 MEIROPOLITAN EDISCN COMPANY (Three Mlle Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1)
)
CERIIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that coptes of " LIST OF DRAFT COSTENIICNS FILED BY STEVEN C. SHOLLY" dated 4 October 1979 have been served upon the f011owing by deposit in the United States mall, postage prepald, this 4th day of October, 1979:
Ivan W. Smith, Esquire George F. Trowbridge, Esquire Chairman Shaw, Pittman, Potts Atomic Safety and Licensing
& Trowbridge Board Panel 1800 M Street, N.W.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Washington, D.C.
20006 Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Dr. Walter H. Jordan 881 West Outer Drive M
Oak Ridge, TN 37830
/
Steven C. Sholly [
Dr. Linda W. Little "lEl 5000 Hermitage Drive Raleigh, NC 27616 Marcta E. Mulkey Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washtraton, D.C.
20555 Chlef Dockettng and Service Section Of fice of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 1211 079
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