ML19259C490

Summarizes Responses to IE Bulletin 79-06B.Operating Manuals Are Being Scrutinized.Operational Personnel Are Being Trained.Radioactive Gases & Liquids Transfer Lines Are Interlocked W/Containment Isolation &/Or Radiation Signals

ML19259C490
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs, Palisades, Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	05/08/1979
From:	Tam P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
FOIA-79-98 ACRS-SM-0113, ACRS-SM-113, IEB-79-06B, IEB-79-6B, NUDOCS 7906220186
Download: ML19259C490 (8)

Text

-

EI

-.,u, e.

iP V

n. _....

J 7

1C[5$h-d(G

~

DR 4n,7 i.ruy 8, 1979 i

,; \\ rg [p

~

4 ACRS t'enber s SU4 tJrl O? PEGrONSES TO IE BULLETIt! 79-0GB (CmBUSTION E! git SERI!G RFACTORS) 3.

R' view the descr iption of circtnstances described in dnclosur e 1 of IC Bulletin 79-05 and tha preliminar y cht enclogy of the D1I-2 3/28/79 accidc.nt included in Enclosut e I to IE Dulletin 79-0%.

'Ihis r eview should be directed towed under stan?ing:

a.

(1) the extrcne reriousness and consequences of the sinultanc-aus blocking of both auxiliar y feedwter ti ains at the 'Ihr ca tiile Islcnd Unit 2 plant and other actions taken during; the car ly phaces of the accident; (2) the appar ent operational er ors v.hich led to the eventual cor e dcame; (3) that the fotential exists, under certain accidynt or tt ancient conditions, to have a ' pater level in thq p. ecsurizer simultaneously with the eactor venael n:>t ' ull of water; and (4) the f

4 necessity to systemtically adalyza plant conditions and parameters and take approp: late cotrcctive action.

i b.

Cperational personnel should ha instructed to:

(1) not ovet:ide antomatic action of cryineer ed safety features l

unless continued 0,mr ation of engineet ed safety features

,(.

will tesult in unsafe plant conditions (see Section 6a.);

i and (2) n3t nake op2 rational decisions based solely on a single plant [araacter indication when one or more con-

's t

firmator y in:lications at e available.

All licenced oper ator s and plant nanagcaent and supervirors c.

with oper ational a ccp..nsibilitics shall par ticip3te in this

}.

~

icview and such far t.iciiution Qall be doctraented in plant ecordu.

j Renpance Resp)nm to this iten is quite unifoin. All licensees indicated that j

they have been fo)Jo.zinj tir? D1I-2 incident ver y clorely, and have been br icfed by the fluC Staff (usually the Pr inci ol t

not

[

cach p,lant).

4 t

7 9 0 6220/g orrier.

6

.u - o-1 11 ATt h

• -).'

• u7~~c"~u~-"a=

mc nua t sia <s-m 1.:c's em

s

.,.L f: ;,

s :..,

1 tcrG Member n

.. May 8, 1979 mgf. &

.t.,

,d

'\\\\\\

Opar ating r.anuals are beinj closely scr utinized for insti ty;tions th3t might lerl to conditions desca ibed in a. and b. above. All licenseen have indicated that all per sonnel with oper ational tecponsibilities ar e being tr ained according to c.

2.

Daview the actiona icquit ed by your clur ating pr ocedures for copiry I

with transients and accidents, with par ticular attention to:

a.

Racognition of the possibility of formir,3 voids in the pr imr y coolant rystc~i Ic't ge enough to cmpt onise the cor e cooling capability, ccpecially natur al cit culation capability.

b.

Oper ation action t equired to pr event the formation of such

~

voids.

~

c.

Opet ator action equit ed to cnhance cor e coolinj in the event such voic's at e formed.

(e.g.

uaote venting)

Regr;nse

%er c was little or tu discussion on 2.a by all the licencces.

All indicated that energerry oper ation pr ocedut es have been or are being t eviewd f t cn tha standpoint of p; evention of void formation.

Other than this review, only one licensee (Pa]isades) has prepared to nahe available ratur ation curven to the opc1 ator s, and to considct pr oviding ec.ntintr;us monitor irg of subcooling conlitions or annuncic-tion of approach to Satur ation conlitions.

3.

Review the contairaent isolation initiation design and p:ocedurcs, and pr epare and implenent all changes necessar y to petnit contain-ix nt inolation whether mnual or automatic, of all linen khose isolation does not dejiade needed cafety featur es or cooling calubility, upon automtic initiation of safety injection.

E!'MLnsp Res!unces to this item var les fr om plant to plant. We following table nu..aat izes imot tant aspacts of thoce esponses:

.I.nol.ation Initia. tion I.ines to b.e._I_n.olated

.Co.~.r.m_n_t Plant 2281 085 3

j e R1 mTur-Tit canta!T3 iT

c:e

e. h

>en oi valves

.... rul y.9.t.. hl.0h..t.a.'.l l ti.on,.,. incl.c tim..lC1'..mc.U.

?.i orr.ca r (0!i i vill inalat-ntt..

blecd off lir.o

.m a =

• 1

....?

. p., )..

p a t. b.

.....o.....

..u.,

..............f.,...

,i a - n, -,,7 y

N

~,

e

)

ACRS Meaber s Tby 8,1979 a

I

.1 Plant Isolation Initiation Lines to l>3 Isolated Coment Ik:Vics under-Calvett High contairnent (4.25 psig) 8 Cliffs initiates CIS and SIAS.

way to change ituto.matic iso-At SIAS, opat ator iso-lation at L_AS lates strap rmp, con-foi a nire.bei tainacnt pur ge, etc.

of lines Pt.

CIAS genciated by high All lines except tlnso Calhoun contaitrent [1 ensure for transient raitigation or lou ptescutiner ptensure (or rcana lly)

A Atkansas CIAS generated by high Suop drain inc1tded Nuclear contaircent p:cssure One -

(10.4 psig) SI'.S gener-Unit. 2 ated by CIAS or lou TCS pt essus e lilll. stone SIAS initates CIAS All penett ation 2

not needal for LSF oparation f

St. Lucie 14 lines m uld not Perfoamin]

txt isolated by SIAS, evaluation of but strnp pnp line chawjes to is rot incitded automatic iso-lation. Q.n -

iently oper ator

'p bDUld IUID OlO

,o

,m; O

!_'i j i.

'f

' h !il a CIS up;n i eceip t

~

'i C 2281 086 of sus 4.

For facilities fot kbich the am:llian y feed. rater systesa is rnt automatically initiated, pr epar e and implcuent. irxnediately pr oce-dures s.hich a cquit e the stationinj of rn Irxlividual (with rn other accign xi concut i mt duties and in dir ect an:1 contintuus canunic.r-tion uith the contr ol teom) to p: cenptly initiate a_lapnte auxiliar y fe Jate t-~

w nTriitETTU Ta~ 11E>I:2~~tTar/.7ntT; GI~T,0CT

..@ntn..tbe..bo um ommaumma..o

...M)1ch..caa..bd.liait.e.l..ly..d,$..a?. tion.

. ia >

sune.~ e oms >

'/f w.s. = e v e-a e a av easariae.,c a s s i o e s u. in IPC LORM 318 (9-7<O NHOi 02 4 7

,r..

)

c we w

t.CO >,

h: May 8, 1979 1

b.* [

St. 1u:10 Ibt autoratic. ll ate r in D3 nufficient for 13 ninuter.. Idequate time for nanual opu at. ion by a dcsignc.ted oret at or. 01: i ently evaluatinj need foi cua., mat.ic AD! actuation.

f til): i en' 2 Not automatic. t itor in fG fut 15 ninutes of coolinj vithout feed. tbt planoitrj to inJify M','! to at.ltcriatic initiation.

I,1 h n':~a 1.'tal ar Autom1 tic, pit t of IX'CS.

Danigned for TW.1 Dae - U.iit 2 of 14: ench Technical Po.nition I6S 10-1.

~

Pt. C. 1 h';t'n Scni-automatically acttated, but his stationed an opetat.or an :c7 tuted.

Calves t Cli1E; tbt automatic.

I.n opetatot van in tratmally in chat ge of t enctivity contr ol r, hall be im"diately availaSle an the de signated individtnl. Cutiently,,

evaluating feasibility of change to automatic initiation.

Pal 1:. ?.a

!bt autu1atic. EUs car) pt ovide 16 rainuten of

\\

heat imoval vithout atuillas y feed. O?ct ator lb. 2 vill initiat e MW mantially.

Feels that the intent of Iten 04 has been net.

5.

l'on your facilities, p: efat e and inpluacnt immediately pr ocedur es t.hich:

a.

Identify thoce plant indications (such as valve diccharge pipinj tc p2: atus e, valve rositior, indication, or valve dit.ch.! g" i elief tank t~1 pen atut c or pr occut e inlication) s.hich plc ut o; ci tot :. nay utilize to deter mine that pr en-uit imi l a'..u t oiet ated iclief valve (n) are open, any]

b.

Dit tet. the plant opri ator n to nanually clone the pwer op2:atel r eliet block valve (s) t.Sen t eactor coalant nystem p.:: ;ut e in i edoeni to belu./ the et tr> int. fo surnal auto atic clwut e of t he town op r at.ed t elief valve (s) an3 th" valve (n) r emain nttx:k olen.

2281 087 or e.c. w sur..m. n so u s F h7411IXf 4 314 (9-76) NM JJ M41 8

v... e. v e m e= =e. = v em e s e= =

e ec e i s e t e - e. e - e s e

,..-m..

.C'1

.. y

'Y.j -

.j '

ICiti Menbets triy 8, 1979

?SGE22 a

(IUIV uned only when PCS tenirt atut e is less Palisades a.

than 300 F). Position inlication, discharge tempet atur o qiench tank con'litions etc.

b.

'Ibe alatn r estr>nse procoJure dir ects oper ator to take action.

a.

(no information)

Calvett Cliffs b.

OcrrJe of plant ancigency procefut e par formed.

Ibsition indication, discharge tenperatur e, quench ft. Calhoun a.

tank corditions.

b.

alt rent oper ating pr ocelot es alt exly contain such -'

dir ection.

'.\\ -

!Jo P0ilV.

At hansa3 Nucleat O)e -

Unit 2 Dischan ge temper ature, quench tank con 11tions, etc..

Millstone 2 a.

b.

Dnet gency pt ocedut e i evised as i equasted.

n.

Position inlication, discharge tenpet atur e, quench St. Lucie tank corditions.

b.

Procedur e being reviewed for necessary changes.

s 6.

Th2vicu the action dit ected by the op2r ating pr ocedur es and training insti trtions to casut e that:

Opet alot s do mt ovet :ide automatic Pctions of engincet ed a.

tafety Icatui es, unless continued op t ation of engineet ed rafety featut es vill t ecult in unmfe plant conditions. Foi example, i f continued oper at ion of enjincet el safety featut es muld tht eaten cactot vem.el inte3:ity then the llPI should le recut c.! (an noted in b(2) below).

emc= >

evaaa==9-D A T a )*

s'co.... -...~...

.-r.~. --..e.

re.c soun 3:a o.m rmu4 one

.. s. c. 1 228T 088

~

!)

(

t.QC Membern

-G-thy 8, 1979

~

I*

ntly, or ar e r eviced to, specify b.

0;er.dn3 pt r m m c'.'tt injection (HPI) syste:a has been thr.t if the b :h

.e: m : c-aut c tr ically. - ;.u.tel !

.a of lu.i ist essut e condition, it nr.t r cuin in c; et ation tutil eithar:

(1)

Dath IU.: p nmut t injection (LPI) Emps at e in g

opas rtio a s ei t'Ic.In; for 20 r inutes or longer; at a rat" tich u m10 acsur e ntable plant bcMvior; or (2) Tna HPI :.nra hr b, -n in opn ation for 20' ninutes, and cli.l..>t and c al leg tc. par atut es at e at least 50 dtgt(. - balev th : natui ation temparature for the exicti10 T3 pt e: /m o.

If 50 &gt con subcc<> ling cannot l' _ r.;inta inc i af ter !DI cutoff, the UPI chall tea scocti.ated.

'an c!cgt ee of cubcooling bayand 50 de] cas l' ml the Jcajth of tina I!?I in in operation chall in limited 12/ cM pressut e/tcmpet 6tur e considera-tionc for tb ver,al integ t ity.

Orricting pic:cI"res cut rcatly, or are r evised to, specify that in c.

the event of ::?I ini;iation with reactor coolent prps (RCP) opera-tinJ, at least one ICP cMll remain oper atire as long as the grap(s) in p:oviding for ccd fleu.

d.

Op2 ator n :n e previded aidItional infornation cnd incts o:tions to rnt rely u:en l'<. usuri;mr level inlication alone, but to also e::ctnine p: ersm izer pr c: nut e cad other plcnt par cruter in:iications in evalu-cting plant canditions, e.g., water inventory in the reactor primary cystt.a.

~.

Responne All chou 2d a willingnass to nake charges as requested.

7.

Revieu all cafety-related valve recitier.3, positioning r equir ements and lusitive conu ols to a::mu e that valves a cnain rositioned (open or cloc c.1) in a n.nnet to oncut e the pr opar opet ation of engineci ed nafety featutes. Alro r evD.i r elated pr ocedur es, such as those for mainten.nce, testira, pInnt and systen stat t-up, and nupe Vicoty per lodic (e.g. dai ty/rhif t checks) not veillance to casur e that such valveu in e t etut ned to their cet i ect tosi tions folle..'ing necennar y naniptletions c.nd er e maintaincd in their ptop2r positions during all openational mades.

2281 089 itentrinne oe r ri: s p-

..liCVieUd..d t t.fg;'.plek.d..Qt. tD.let Wy,L..

evaeaa w e >

DA1sW L.....~.- ~ -

.~<<~ -.c=>..n

...,=.

sac rcut sta cnn inas cus

~.. s,. 2 ~..

.+

.u-D.

l1 r.

-r 3

En3 n_nber s Pay 8,1979 4

8.

F.eview yout oret atirrj roles and pr ocelur es for all systens designed to trcnsfer totentially :adioactive ganes and liquids out of the pr imary cont.dawnt to r.usure that tndesit cd puiping, venting, or other reicacco of radioactive liquido anJ gases will rut occur ina0ver tently.

In rot ticular, encore that such an occurrence muld rut be caused Ly the t escttirrj of engincer cd safety featut es inatt umentation.

List all such systems and indicate:

a.

Lhethat interlocks exist to pt event tt ansfer t. hen high rcdiation inlication exists.

b.

thether'such systcms are isolated by the contairrnent

~

isolation signal.

c.

'Ihe basis on which continued oper ability of the above featur es is assured.

nesponso

\\:

tbst licensees caid that rr.dioactive gases and liquids tt ansfer lines at e intar lcckel s.ith contairc.ent isolation tnd/or high Iadiation signals. Datails are also pr ovided in r esponses to Item 3.

Most cited Tech. Spcas. and surveillance as the assurance of continued op:t d ility.

9.

rv2 view and tolify as necessar y your maintenance and test pr ocedut es to ensute that they require:

Verification, by test or inspection, of the ope; ability of a.

redunient safety-related systems prior to the i emoval of any safety-t elated system fr om service.

b.- Verification of the oper ability of all safety-t elated systems thcn they are r etur ned to retvice following taain-tenance or testing.

Explicit notification of involved teactor operational c.

personnel whenever a rafety-telated system is tcmoved fr o'n cn3 t etur ned to ser vice.

2281 090 rono as t equested.

s DATE M t u r. - u t. <,. m, _ m g

s a

m. e em,

x t

(, ~_.

.'l

. 1

/cRS Menbet s thy 8, 1979 2

10.

Revleu your pt oopt t epot tira pt ocedut es foi tac notifleation to assur e that lac is tratified t;ithin one inut of the time the icactor is not in a contr olloJ or egacted condition of oper at. ion.

nn ther, at that time on open continuaus communication channel chall be establi:,hed and naintained with lac.

y

Response

All have ev:caitted.

11.

Pcvicu operating rveles and procedures to deal with significant a nounts of hydrogen gas that may be generatcd during a tr ansient or other accident that v.ould either ieaain inside the pt inaty system or ba telcased to the contaituent.

[

Response

All the r espanses clain that pr oculur es exist to r enove hydrogen from different s cgions of the primary coolant system. '1hese incitrJe:

(1)

If ICP is opat ating, hyhogen can be stt ippad to pt essut izer vapar space cnd acleased thiotah ielief valvo.

(2) Throtyh Ictdo,ra system and stiipped in the voltre control tank.

(3)

In a major IKA, hydtcgen would vent with the stcan to the containnent.

\\

Propone changen, as iequit ed, to those technical sp cifications t.hich 12.

must be modified as a r esult of your implanentin] the above itcas.

~

Response

Some licensees did nat pr ovide t egenses to this Iten. fiele said they snuld sub iit later.

\\

'\\

Peter Tam Staff Enjineer cc: ACRS Tt chnical Staff 2281 091

u. veiess I. Citt on W. 1.1 M it,.1 o m e = *-

..C... tit ch:.t ' an.,.

W. St i atton p

munu s >-

..,....,. n.1....n, pais h

-. -