ML19259B458
| ML19259B458 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1979 |
| From: | Gossick L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Ichord R HOUSE OF REP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19259B459 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7902130208 | |
| Download: ML19259B458 (3) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES yV f ' *g NUCLEAR REGULATORY ( OMMISSION g.J g
WASHINGTON, D. C. 0555 9
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FEB 89 The Honorable Richard H. Ichord United States House of Representatives Washington, D. C.
20515
Dear Congressman Ichord:
This is in response to your December 19, 1978 referral to the Department of Energy of a letter from Mr. David Haenke.
The Department of Energy hat. forwarded Mr. Haenke's letter to us.
In his letter, Mr. Haenke expresses concerns iegarding the Callaway plant and nuclear power plants in general.
In the enclosed copy of its Final Environmental Statement for the Callaway Plantt, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimated the cost at about
$1.9 billion (1982 dollars).
Any one of a variety of eventualities like unanticipated delays during construction, rate of inflation, or design changes could result in the actual cost being higher.
This capital cost represents about 16 mills per kilowatt hour of the electricity that will be generated by the Callaway units over thirty years, which is less than about 20% of the cost of delivered electric power.
Cost projections are based on an assumed economic lifetime of 30 year.;.
This means that in about 30 years a variety of circumstances may make it economically attractive for the utility to substitute newer generating capacity for Callaway.
Such circumstances might include technological innovation and increased operating and maintenance costs for Callaway.
It is likely that the Callaway plant will actually operate longer than thirty years.
Retired generating units (either fossil or nuclear) would eventually be demolished and removed.
In the case of nuclear generating units demolition and removal is complicated both by the fact that some parts of the plant become radioactive during its operating life and by the presence on site of radioactive materials which were necessary for plant operation.
Two recent, independent, detailed engineering studies of demolition and removal estimate the cost to be about $40 million per generating unit (1978 dollars).
That amounts to a cost of about 0.2 mills per kilowatt hour of electricity.
Since dismantling and removal of generating units is one aspect of power generation, its cost will be borne by the users '
the power.
The method of payment is controlled by the State government rather than the Federal government.
Radioactive wastes are classified as low-level, high-level, and transuranic.
Low-level wastes will be disposed of at land burial facilities so that there will be no significant radioactive releases to the environment.
High-level and transuranic wastes will be buried at a Federal Repository 790213 M ot 2072 265 A
The Honorable Richard H. Ichord 2
so that there will be little likelihood of any significant releases to the biosphere.
After about 4,000 years, nuclear wastes are less radioactive than the original ore.
After 500,000 years the level d radioactivity would be so low that even if the waste were to be dug up there is virtually no chance that exposure could result in either chrolic or latent fatalities.
Postulated nuclear power plant accidents include a wide spectrem in terms of severity and probability of consequences.
These postulated accidents are considered design basis accidents, which means that the plant is designed to reduce the likelit ood and/or consequences of such accidents so that there is little risk to public health and safety.
Occurrences beyond the design basis accidents involve sequences of successive failures more severe than those required to be considered in the design bases of protection systems and engineering safety features.
Their consequences could be severe.
However, the likelihood of their occurrence is judged so small that their risk is extremely low; i.e.,
it is extremely unlikely that such an event will occur during the operating lifetime of the plant.
Defense in depth (multiple physical barriers),
quality assurance for design, manufacture and operation, continued surveillance and testing, and conservative design are all applied to provide and maintain a high degree of assurance that potential accidents of this type will not represent a significant risk to public health and safety.
As indicated above, the likelihood of accidents exceeding the design basis accidents is very small.
I.n the unlikely occurrence of such an accident, extent of contami'1ation could range from very local to some tens of miles, depending on the nature of the accident and other considera-tions.
However, even if such an accident were to occur, it is highly improbable that there would be contamination beyond a radius of fifty miles that would be significant enough to warrant any special protection measures.
The incident in 1966 at the Fermi 1 plant near Detroit occurred during power ascension.
A high activity signal on the monitors indicated to the operators that something was wrong.
They isolated the containment building, reduced power, and then shutdown the reactor.
There was no significant release of radioactivity to the environment nor was there any difficulty encountered in shutting down the plant and maintaining it in a safe shutefown condition.
A two year period was needed to determine what had gone wrong, remove the fuel assemblies, redesign them to prevent a recurrence, and finally to verify that no damage had occurred to the reactor.
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? "ano::: l e F:na rd 5. ict ud 3
The fire which occurred on March 22, 1975, at the Bro n's Ferry nuclear power plant was significant because it rendered certain safety features of the plant inoperable.
However, actions could be and were taken by plart personnel to shutdown and safely maintain both units 1 and 2.
j There was at all times sufficient water available to cool the core and,
because of redundancy and flexibility in design, there were alternate teans for mair,taining a safe shutdown condition even though the fire caused a loss of capability for automatic actuation of the emergency copiing <quipment.
I hope the above responds to Mr. Haenke's questions.
Sincerely, 1Sion.4)Y.4,Ed'a L
gunw us C%nnM Enclosure s :
1.
I;UREG-75/ 011 2.
L tr to Horcrable Richard H.
Ichord fm John M. Deutch dtd 1/11/79 3.
Ltr to Congressional Liaison, DOE, fm Richard H. Ichord dtd 12/19/78 4.
Ltr to Rep. Richard Ichord fm David Haenke dtd 12/18/78 s
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