ML19259B246

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IE Insp Rept 70-1151/78-17 on 781211-781213.No Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Organization,Operations,Nuclear Critical Safety & Noncompliance Item Followup
ML19259B246
Person / Time
Site: Westinghouse
Issue date: 12/22/1978
From: Coryell G, Potter J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML19259B244 List:
References
70-1151-78-17, NUDOCS 7901180093
Download: ML19259B246 (4)


Text

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Report No.:

70-1151/78-17 Docket No.:

70-1151 License No.: SNM-1107 Licensee: Westingbouse Electric Corporation Nuclear Fuel Division Drawer R Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Facility Name: Columbia Nuclear Fuel Plant Inspection at: Columbia, South Carolina Inspection conducted: December 11-13, 1978 Inspectors:

G. P. Coryell Reviewed by:

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-[4J.P.Retter, Chief Date Fuel Facilities and Materials Safety Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch Inspection Summary Inspection Conducted on December 11-13, 1978 (Report No. 70-1151/78-17)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of organization, opentions, nuclear criticality safety and followup on an item of noncompliance.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in :he four areas inspected.

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RII Rpt. No. 70-1151/78-17 I-1

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DETAILS I Prepared by:

.-.,G G. P. /oryef1 A uel Facilities Inspector Date Fuel FaciliMes and Materials Safety Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch Dates of Inspection: December 11-13, 1978 Reviewed by:

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/2/> 2/74 J,-J.P.Pfter, Chief Date 9

L Fuel FaM1ities and Materials Safety Section Fuel Facility and Materials Safety Branch 1.

Persons Contacted M. D'Amore, Plant Manager

  • W. Hartnett, Materials Manager
  • R. Drescher, Chemical Manufacturing Manager
  • W. Goodwin, Regulatory Compliance Manager
  • C. Sanders, Radiological and Environmental Engineering Manager H. King, Nuclear Criticality Engineer R. Moe, Chemical Development Engineer L. Coco, Radiological and Environmental Engineer L. Bouknight, Process Engineer D. Logan, Supervisor, Conversion Area G. Lowder, Supervisor, Construction and Repairs R. Dereani, Supervisor, Pellets and Rods J. Rosier, Jr., Supervisor, Maintenance and Construction The inspector interviewed six operators and technicians.
  • Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings Noncompliance (Closed) Noncompliante (78-12-01): Feilure to comply with posted SNM unit spacing requirements. Verification made that SNM sub-crit spacing corrected and that area personnel reinstructed at work place meetings.

(paragraph 4b).

3.

Organization a.

The facility organizational structure has been revised by addition of a Process Development Department. This department includes the Mechanical Development Section transferred from the Mechanical

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9 RII Rpt. No. 70-1151/78-17 I-2 Manufacturing Department; the Chemical Development Section from the Chemical Manufacturing Department and the Q.C. Development Section.

Mr. W. H. Britton has been appointed manager of the new department.

b.

The inspector was informed that one additional Radiological and Environmental Engineer has been hired and is scheduled to join the staff of the Regulatory Compliance Section in January 1979.

4.

Nuclear Criticality Safety The inspector examined several r.uclear criticality safety analysis a.

covering proposed or completed equipment installations. Confirmation was made that the criticality control parameters and criteria used in the analysis were authorized by license conditions. Review of analysis was performed by a second qualified individual.

Each review package included an up-to-date floor plan of the SNM process and fixed storage areas showing the spacing requirements imposed to control neutron interaction as required by license condition No. 37.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

b.

During a tour of the plant the inspector observed that SNM was processed and stored in conformance with the posted isolation and interaction criteria. Verification was made that SNM subcrits in the scrap recovery hoods met isclation criteria. Discussions with operations personnel confirmed that additional training had been provided, at work place meetings, regarding nuclear safety criteria and conformance with posted instructions.

The inspector had no further questions in this area.

Additional items examined during the inspection included review of c.

the criticality alarm system operational tests and calibration; performance of the inspection and analysis of boron raschig rings and verification that the SNM inventory was less than the license 235 limit of 50,000 kgs of U No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

5.

Operations a.

Verification was made duririg tours of the operating areas, that procedures were available and criticality limit signs posted at work stations and storage areas. The inspector checked operations logbooks and discussed procedural requirements and criticality control limits with several operators and technicians. No items of noncompliance or deviations were noted.

b.

Plant expansion construction activity and some line modification and maintenance work was in progress during the inspection period.

Operating and construction area general housekeeping was good and no industrial safety or hazard conditions were observed.

T.II Rpt. No. 70-1151/78-17 I-3 c.

The inspector reviewed calibration records for the W detectors in 6

the vaporization system.

Calibration procedures were discussed with licensee representatives. The inspector was informed that no difficulties had been experienced in caintaining the detectors.

The inspector had no further questions.

6.

Non-Routine Event a.

A momentary UF release to an operations area occurred at 11:40 p.m.

6 on December 11, 1978. The release was from the top of a hydrolysis column where a " PVC water line broke. The licensee, per procedure, evacuated the Chemical Manufacturing Area for about thirty minutes, the time required to obtain and count area and special hi-vol air samples. Special air sample results showed airborne concentrations of uranium to be about 50% of MPC.

b.

There was no detectable loss of SNM; preliminary bioassay results indicate no personnel overexposures.

The line was retui..ed to operation following repair of the water line.

The licensee is performing an engineering review and evaluation of c.

the vaporization - hydrolysis equipment and procedures. Preliminar, findings show that the pressure buildup in the hydrolysis column did trip the automatic shutoff valves on the UF feed line and 6

water line. However the T, feed line control valve bypass was partially open and the e uEtor line for heel removal from one cylinder was in service.

UF fl w fr m these sources, combined 6

with partial plugging of the column vent system retained pressure on the hydrolysis column until the cylinder block valves were manually closed.

d.

The licensees evaluation and corrective measures taken to preclude recurrence will be reviewed on a subsequent inspection.

7.

Exit Interview The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection. The scope and findings of the inspection were summarized.

Detailed discussion covered corrective actions on a previously identified item of noncompliance and review of preliminary findings relating to the nonroutine event.