ML19257D398
| ML19257D398 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1980 |
| From: | GILBERT/COMMONWEALTH, INC. (FORMERLY GILBERT ASSOCIAT |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19257D397 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002040311 | |
| Download: ML19257D398 (34) | |
Text
REVISION 5 FIRE PROTECTION EVALUATION VIRGIL C. SDNER NUCLEAR STATION Due to the increasing size of the fire protection evaluation a new binder is being provided for your use.
Please inscrt the existing Fire Protection Evaluation into the new binder, along with this revision.
Pages listed in the " Remove" column should be deleted. Pages listed in the
" Insert" column should be inserted. All insert pages include the words
" Revision 5 2/1/80".
Remove Insert 4.5-17 4.5-17 4.5-18 4.5-18 4.5-37 4.5-37 4.7-16 4.7-16 Q1-1 Ql-1 Q1-2 Ql-3 Ql-4 Ql-5 Ql-6 Q1-7 Q1-8 Ql-9 Ql-10 Ql-11 Ql-12 Q1-13 Q1-14 Ql-15 Q1-16 Q1-17 Ql-18 Ql-19 Ql-20 Ql-21 1864 326 so c c o.i o3 Il Remove psert Ql-22 Q1-23 Q2-1 Q2-1 Q2-2 Q2-3 Q2-4 Q13-1 Q13-1 Q20-1 Q20-1
'1864 327
e.
Operate instrumentation, such as indicators, required for safe plant shutdown.
f.
Manually actuate ESF systems from the control room.
g.
Automatically actuate the ESF sy>,tems.
There are no specific fire hazards or concentrations of combustibles within the relay room.
Cables and instruments are confined within steel cabinets, the interior of which is painted with fire retardant paint.
The total fire resistance rating of the barriers between cabinets is approximately 40 minutes.
Ionization detectors are provided above the safety related relay cabinets for early warning.
5 Inadvertent operation of the low pressure CO system would have no 2
adverse effect upon electrical instrumentation and relays located in the relay room.
Combustibles within the relay room consist of the following:
Wiring and components within instrument and relay cabinets, a.
75,440,000 Btu.
b.
Cable insulation, 8,410,000 Btu.
Total room Btu content is 83,850,000 Btu.
Total room fire loading is 2
31,400 Btu /ft e64 328 G.itert /Commonwesc 4.5-17 Revision 5 2/1/80
4.5.7.3 Conclusion The objective for this room is to prevent spreading of fire from equipment in one safety related channel to redundant equipment in another safety related channel.
This objective is achieved by enclosure of instrumentation, cables and wiring in separate steel cabinets and through spe.cial separation of redundant cables.
Fire loading of this fire area requires 30 minute rated fire barriers and the cabinets are rated for approximately 40 minutes.
A CO system is 2
provided in the room to extinguish any fire and ionization detectors are provided in the room and above the safety related relay cabinets 5
for early warning.
4.5.8 Computer Room, Fire Area CB-7, Elevation 436'-0" 4.5.8.1 Descripti<>n The cor.puter room (room 36-10), shown on Drawing E-023-018, is locat.ed in the north central portion of the control building at elevation 436'-0".
It is bounded on the north by the intermediate chase, northeast; on the east and south by the relay room; and on the west by the future computer room.
This room houses the main plant computer and associated auxiliary equipment.
Walls enclosing this room are of steel framing and drywall which provides a three hour rated fire barrier. The floor and ceiling are constructed of reinforced concrete over three hour fireproofed steel form deck and framing.
Both floor and ceiling provide three hour rated fire barriers. Doorways between this room and adjacent fire 10C4 529 Geert / Commonwealth 4.5-18 Revision 5 2/1/80
the stair towers where Class B fire doors are provided.
Other wall penetrations are sealed.
Ventilation ducts which penetrate fire carriers are equipped with fire dampers.
Floor and ceiling penetrations are sealed.
Heating, ventilating and air conditioning for the control room and cable spreading area below are provided by a separate control room ventilation system.
This system consists of two 100 percent capacity air handling units, redundant duct work, two 100 percent capacity emergency filter systems, dampers, and instrumentation and control devices.
Additional ventilation system details are presented in the FSAR, Section 9.4.
Safe shutdown equipment located within this fire area consists of the following:
a.
Main control board instrumentation, b.
Nuclear instrumentation system consoles.
c.
HVAC control board.
Fire detection equipment for this fire area consists of the following:
a.
Heat and ionization detectors in the HVAC ducts.
b.
Ionization detectors inside the main control board and HVAC 5
control boards.
2(4 330 Gibert / Commonwealth 4.5-37 Revis on 5 2/1/80
Safe shutdown equipment located within this zone is as follows:
a.
Service water pumps A, B and C.
5 Fire suppression equipment for this zone consists of fire extinguishers as shown by Drawing E-023-023.
4.7.7.2 Analysis Service water pumps and related auxiliaries are redundant.
Any one service water pump and related auxiliaries provide the required cooling water flow during safe shutdown operations. The service water pumps are separated from each other by a distance of approximately eight feet. Additionally, 18 inch thick concrete shield walls are provided between adjacent pumps.
Channel B cable trays in this zone are separated from trays for channel A by a floor slab.
Cables for channel C are embedded in the floor slab.
A specific hazard exists in the event of failure of the traveling screen mechanism lubricating oil system.
However, the distance from any traveling screen to the redundant service water pump and the unsealed manhole cover to the associated piping pit room and the location of shield walls provide adequate protection.
Combustibles within this zone are as follows:
a.
Lubricating oil, 450,000 Btu.
k?Nk b
CJbert /Commomwea@
4.7-16 Revision 5 2/1/80
VIRGIL C. SGMER, UNIT 1 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE PROTECTION QUESTIONS POST SITE REVIEW Ql. You state in your Fire Hazards Analysis how various safety related cable trays, conduit and equipment are separated by distance from its redundant counterpart, and the criteria that were used to establish barriers between these redundant trains.
In order to provide a defense-in-depth design, so that a fire will not prevent the performance of necessary safe plant shut-down functions, a detailed fire hazards analysis should be conducted for each plant area.
It is essential that the analysis include the effects of postulated fire involving permanent and/or transient combustibles (e:cposure fires) on systems, circuit cable trays or equipment required for safe plant cold shutdown.
The fire hazards analysis should identify all the redundant mechanical and electrical systems and component necessary for safe cold shutdown which are separated only by distance (no fire barriers and with redundant trains 20 ft. or less from each other).
Redundant trains within 20 ft. of each other, as a minimum, will be required to be protected by a half hour fire rated barrier as well as area automatic sprinklers. This does not mean that in some instances such as the auxiliary feedwater system redundant trains separated by more than 20 ft. will not require additional protection.
The fire hazards analysis need to demonstrate that, assuming failure of the primary suppression system, a fire on installed or transient combustibles will not result in the loss of capability to achieve safe cold shutdovn.
Where this ccnnot be demonstrated, an alternate means of assuming safe plant shutdown (cold shutdown) should be provided.
Demonstrate:
(1)
Safe shutdown from the main control room where a fire disables any safe shutdown equipment including conduit / cable trays controlled from remote locations.
(2)
Safe shutdown from remote locations when the main control room is uninhibited due to a fire or when fire disables safe shutdown equipment of the relay room, cable chase areas, or the cable spreading areas.
Remote location need only be provided for the essential instrumentation, controls and equipment necessary to bring the plant to a hot standby condition.
Fire damage to systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown should be limited so that repairs can be made and cold shutdown conditions achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Attached (enclosure 1) are our guidelines for alternate shutdown systems.
1P/el 432 Ql-1 Revision 5 2/1/80
Rl.
To demonstrate the safe shutdown capabilities required in subitems (1) and (2) above, functions necessary to achieve hot shutdown and within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> proceed to cold shutdown, have been identified and are listed in attachment I.
Additionally the locations and methods of manual control to be used in the event of a fire in the control room, relay room, or cable spreading rooms are listed in attachment I.
Three separate analyses of the safe shutdown capabilities were performed:
(1) Equipment separation (2)
Circuit separation in general plant areas (3) Control and instrumentation requirements for a fire in the control room, relay room or either of the two spreading rooms.
The analyses are further described in the following paragrapPs.
Where these analyses identified problems, additional fire barriers, fire suppression equipment or additional instrumentation and controls are baing provided as necessary, 1.
EQUIP 5ENT SEPARATION:
Areas outside the Control Building where redundant safe shutdown equipment is not in a separate fire area are as follows:
Equipment Location Separation Residual Heat Removal Auxiliary Building In separate rooms, 3' Pump El 374' concrete wall, entrance Section 4.2.2 curbs RHR - Spray Pump Room Auxiliary Building Spatial (50') plus 3' Cooling Units El. 385' concrete wall Section 4.2.2 Dwg. 002 Charging Pumps Auxiliary Building In separate rooms, 3' El 388' concrete wall, entrance Section 4.2.3 curbs
)b h
5 Ql-2 Revision 5 2/1/80
EQUIPME'iT SEPARATION (Cont'd)
Equipment Location Separation Charging Pump Room Auxiliary Building Spatial (9' and 14')
Cooling Units El. 400' Section 4.2.5 Residual Heat Removal Auxiliary Building 2' concrete wall Heat Exchanger El. 412' Section 4.2.6 Boric Acid Transfer Auxiliary Building Spatial (10') 2' Pumps El. 452' concrete wall Section 4.2.7 Boric Acid Tanks Auxiliary Building Spatial (6')
El. 463 Section 4.2.10 Reactor Building Reactor Building Spatial, opposite Cooling Units El. 514 wall of reactor Section 4.1.5 building Component Cooling Intermediate Bldg.
Spatial (17' and 40')
Water Pumps El. 412' Section 4.4.7 Component Cooling Intermediate Bldg.
Spatial (33')
Water Heat Exchanger El. 412 Section 4.4.7 Service Water Booster Intermediate Bldg.
Spatial (30')
Pumps El. 412' Section 4.4.7 Emergency Feedwater Intermediate Bldg.
Motor driven pumps -
Pumps El. 412 spatial (19'), turbine -
Section 4.4.7 driven pump, protected by 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> wall
)
bh )
k Q1-3 Revision 5 2/1/80
EQUIPMENT SEPARATION (Cont'd)
Equipment Location Separation HVAC Equipment Water Intermediate Building Spatial (7') l' Chiller Pumps El. 412' concrete wall Section 4.4.3 Emergency Feedwater Intermediate Building Spatial (20')
Pump Room Cooling Units El. 423'-6" Section 4.4.7 Service Water Pumps Service Water Pumphouse Spatial (8")
Section 4.4.7 18" concrete barrier Dwg. 023 walls Service Water Pumphouse Service Water Pumphouse Spatial (7')
Supply Fans Section 4.7.5 A fire hazard evaluation of each of the above areas concluded that a fire affecting one piece of safe shutdown equipment would not affect its redundant equipment.
Each piece of redundant safe shutdown equipment is separated from a fire protection viewpoint by at least 20 feet, or a suitable fire barrier, with the exception of the following:
Charging Pump Room Cooling Units have a spatial separation of 9' a-between Units B&C, 14' between Units A&C and more than 20 feet between Units A&B.
Cooling units A&B will be encased with three inches of 8 lb./cf Kaowool blanket insulation applied in accordance with accepted procedures, b.
Component Cooling Water Pumps have a spatial separation of 17' between pumps B&C, and 40' between pumps A&B.
These pumps contain only a small quantity of lubricating oil (two gallons) per pu=p and the floor
)b(h Q1-4 Revision 5 2/1/80
around these pumps is sloped so that any leakage would drain away from the pumps, fire loading in this area is low.
The A pump is separated from the other pumps by more than 20 feet.
A radiant shield wall will be installed to separate B&C Component Cooling Water Pumps and all pumps will be protected by automatic sprinklers.
c.
HVAC Equipment Water Chiller Pumps have a spatial separation of 7 feet. The three chilled water pumps will be separated from each other by radiant shield walls and will be protected by automatic sprinklers.
d.
Service Water Pumps have a spatial separation of 8 feet.
Concrete barrier walls 18 inches thick separate adjacent pumps.
Fire loading in this area is low.
Drains are provided between each pump. A fire involving transient or permanent combustibles adjacent to any pump will not damage redundant pumps. However, an automatic preaction sprinkler system will.be installed in this area for defense-in-depth.
Service Water Pumphouse Supply Fans have a spatial separation of e.
7 feet. The fire hazard e -luation, Section 4.7.5, describes this fire area and concludes tham additional separation is not required.
However, an automatic preaction sprinkler system will be installed in this area for defense-in-depth.
f.
Boric Acid Tanks have a spatial separation of 6 feet. A fire in this area would not affect either tank as they are filled with water.
g.
The Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater Pumps are not redundant to each other, but are redundant to the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump. However, an automatic preaction sprinkler system will be installed in this area for defense-in-depth in addition to the existing 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> rated fire wall.
1C'4 336 Q1-5 Revision 5 2/1/80
2.
CIRCUIT SEPARATION IN GENERAL PLANT AREAS:
The raceways for redundant circuits outside the control room, relay room and the two cable spreading rooms were marked by color codes on the raceway drawings. Where the separation betv.'an raceway of opposite channels containing circuits required for safe shutdown was less than the recommended 20', the area was circled and a case number assigned.
A detailed analysis was made for each case to determine if redundant function would be lost in the event of a fire.
The analysis included listing the circuits involved, the function of the circuits, and what functions would be lost if the cables were destroyed.
If it wac determined that required mutually redundant functions could be list, the following options were considered to provide the necessary protection.
Isolation of redundant channels by barrier on the raceway of one a.
of the channels consisting of three laycrs of one inch thick, 8 lbs/cf Knowool insulation.
This has been demonstrcted to provide a 1 1/2 hour rated fire barrier in " Fire Protection Cable Tray Fire Test" by Melvin S. Abrams, Construction Technology Laboratories, June 1979. Where this type of barrier is being used, the ampacity of power circuits has been analyzed and additional cable added to the circuit where necessary.
b.
Separation of redundant circuits by a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated barrier.
e.
Assuring that temporary circuitry or manual actuation can be initiated in sufficient time to meet safe shutdown commitments.
A total of 64 cases were identified and reviewed.
From these cases a total of 23 specific actions were identified to provide required protection.
Twenty of these involved option 1 for the use of the Koawool barriers, 2 cases require the addition of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated walls and one case is based on the use of temporary circuitry.
Two examples of cases from t.his analysis are provided on the following pages.
O 10'4 337 01-6 Revision 5 2/1/80
In addition it was determined that a fire in the vicinity of the "A" train service water booster pump could alco be a hazard to "B" train circuits associated with reactor building cooling. As a result the area is being provided with a preaction sprinkler system and with a one inch M-board barrier above the pump and below the cable trays in an area within 10 feet of the pump.
The plant was also revieued to determine if any plant fire areas exist with local areas of moderate or high conbustible loadings which could also contain circuits for redundant functions separated by greater than 20 feet.
No such areas, other than the two cable spreading rooms were found.
EXAMPLE I Raceway Circuits Function Tray 1034 CCM38C Power to Component Cooling Pump 1C (Transfer Switch to Pump)
Conduit CCM44B CCM44B "B" Control to Speed and Transfer Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pu=p 1C Conduit XX-3115B CCM26B "B" Control to Speed and Transfer Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pump 1C Conduit VUL34B VUL34B Power to Chilled Water Pump B Conduit CCM34A CCM34A "A" Control to Speed and Transfer Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pump 1C Conduit XX-3117A CCM32A "A" Control to Speed and Transfer Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pump 1C Conduit XX-3116A CCM16A "A" Control to Speed and Transfer Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pum IC 1059 338 Ql-7 Revision 5 2/1/80
EXAMPLE I (Cont'd)
Raceway Circuits Function Conduit CCE21A CCE21A "A" DC Power to Speed and Transfer Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pump 1C Tray 1027 CCM11A Power to Speed Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pump 1A CCM12A Power from Speed Switch to Component Cooling CCM17A Pump 1A CCM33A "A" Power to Speed and Transfer Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pump 1C Conduit CCM15A CCM15A Control to Speed Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pump 1A Conduit CCEllA CCEllA DC Power to Speed Switch Feeding Component Cooling Power lA Conduit XX-3113A CCE12A Control to Speed Switch Feeding Component Cooling Pump 1A Effects of a Fire Without Protection - Loss of component cooling pumps lA and IC.
If pump 1B is out for maintenance, then component cooling function is lost.
Conclusion - Provide barriers of Koawool to protect tray 1034 and conduits CCM44B and XX-3115B, from fire.
EXAMPLE II Raceway Conduit Function VUL34B VUL34B Power to HVAC System Chilled Water Pump 1B VUL52C VUL52C Power to HVAC System Chilled W:.ts: Pump 1C 10G4 539 Ql-8 Revision 5 2/1/80
EXAMPLE II (Cent'd)
Raceway Conduit Function VUL31A VUL31A Power to HVAC System Chilled Water Pump 1A VUL41A VUL41A "A" Power to Transfer Switch Feeding HVAC System Chilled Water Pump IC VUL43A/XX3158A VUL43A "A" Control to Transfer Switch Feeding HVAC System Chilled Water Pump IC Effects of a Fire Without Protection - Loss of HVAC system chilled water pumps lA, 13 and IC.
Conclusion - Provide barriers of Koawool to protect conduits VUL52C and VUL34B from fire.
3.
CONTROL REQUIRDIENTS:
The original fire hazards study concludes that fire in the different fire areas of the control building will not result in the loss of redundant equipment, instrumentation, or cables. A more detailed study has been undertaken to demonstrate that the minimum controls required for cold shutdown will remain intact when any one of the fire areas within the control building is lost due to a fire.
Since the fire areas are bound by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated fire barriers, it is concluded that a fire will not occur in two fire areas of the control building si=ultaneously. The control room and the control room cable spreading room were combined into one fire area, and the relay room and the relay room cable sprcading room were combined into one fire area for the purposes of the analysis.
Even though all four rooms are separated by 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated floors, less of a cable apreading room means loss of function of the associated contrcl room or relay room.
The two fire areas 1064 340 Ql-9 Revision 5 2/1/80
for this study have separate HVAC systems, and a fire in one will not affect the other.
Two case studies are being completed for each cf the functions required for safe shutdown as identified in attachment I.
In the first case, for each function the loss of offsite power is assumed concurrent with a fire in the relay room or its associated spreading room.
In the second case, for each function the loss of offsite power is assumed concurrent with a fire in the control room or its associated spreading room.
These studies address the availability of alternate control switches and automatic controls, the routing of cables, the urgency of operation for the function, and alternate manual methods of operation.
With the fire in the relay room, or its associated spreading room, the controls are reviewed to ensure that functions required i= mediately after the loss of offsite power can be achieved from the main control room, and that subsequently required actions can be achieved from the control room evacuation panel (CREP) or local controls. Where the function can be delayed by at least 30 minutes, the use of jumpers has been considered acceptable.
With the fire in the control room, or its associated spreading room, the controls are reviewed to ensure that functions required immediately after the loss of offsite power can be achieved by automatic controls, such as the engineered safety functions loading sequencer (ESFLS), and that subsequently required actions can be achieved from the CREP or local controls. Where the function can be delayed by at least 30 minutes, the use of jumpers has been considered acceptable.
In each case the adequacy of local instrumentation and instrumentation on the CREP is being reviewed to ensure that adequate information will be available to the operators, lbbh Q1-10 Revision 5 2/1/80
Where adequate controls or instrumentation are not presently available, action is being taken to implement the necessary changes.
These changes include the re-routing of cables, the relocation of controls, and the addition of automatic controls to supplement the functions of the ESFLS.
For example, when considering the function of providing service water with a fire in the relay room or its associated spreading room, the MCB and CREP controls for the train A service water pump breaker could be lost since these circuits are routed through the spreading rooms. However, the train B circuits for the train B and C pump breakers are not routed this way and the MCB and CREP manual controls remain operable.
In another case, when considering the function of providing service water with a fire in the control room or its associated spreading room, with the present design, the ability to trip and re-start both trains of service water pumps could be lost since the required circuits are connected in series with MCB switches.
The breakers for these pumps can be operated from the CREP; however, sufficient time may not be available for an operator to reach the CRIP and activate these pumps, which provide cooling to the diesel generators before the diesels overheat.
Therefore action is being taken to provide for automatic opening of the existing connection of the fire service system to the diesel generator coolers in the event of over-temperature in the diesel generator cooling system.
The diesel driven fire pump will start automatically and has adequate capacity to cool the diesel generators and provide the required fire service.
Subsequently, the operator can manually activate the service water pumps and isolate the fire service system.
In another pair of cases, a fire in the relay room, the main control room, or either spreading room, the control circuits used to close the accumulator isolation valves need not be closed until the operators proceed to cold shutdown, which can be up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after the postulated fire.
The use of jumpers at motor control centers to operate the valves was considered acceptable.
2 Ql-11 Revision 5 2/1/80
These case studies will have reviewed the required functions and tha actions required to ensure the availability of adequate controls. With the implementation of the required actions, adequate controls and instrumentations will be available in the event of a fire.
1864 343 Q1-12 Revision 5 2/1/80
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Page I of ?:
ATTAClElENT I VIRCll. C. Steett:k Col.D SillrtlK)WN kEHOVE kCS IIEAT l.OCAT10N Fl!NCTION EytllPHENT #
SEP.
OF CONa'kol.
HENAkKS 1.
Ope rate Emergency t ee.1 water Syst e on St as t /St op Hotor Driven Pimips XPP-21A-EF A
Swi t t ligea s (XSWIDA) & NCB
.s.
.O XPP-21B-EF 11 Swit tligear (XSWIDU) & HCh 1
I.. Stast/Stop Tuil>ine Driven Pump XST-21-EF
- Open/rlose steam supply V.stve to t u a lsine IFV-2010-HS A/B CHEP & HCB
- Contaal Speed XST-23-EF 3
CREP & HCB t'. N.3dulate Flow Control Valves ItV-3531-EF 11 CHEP & HCB flandwheel provided lur local, manual (untrol 16V-3541-EF B
ChEP & NtB llandwheel provided f or lot.s!, manual (untrol m
IFV-3554-EF h
CHEP & hcl!
llandwheel provided for local, manual suntrol
- g 16V-1536-EF A
CREP & NCh Il4ndwheel provided fus lot.s!, manu.nl suntsol
^
CREP & HCh llandwheel psuvided f or local, manual rout sul A
IIV-1556-EF A
CHEP & HCB flandwhcci psovided f or tou t, m.snual cout s ol j
el. Open/Close Ser vis e W.st er Supply XVG100lA-EF A
HCC (XNCIDA2X) & NCh llandwhcci provided for local, manual control to Emergency feedwater System XVG100lli-FF B
tlCC (XHCIDil2X) & HCli Handwheel provided for lou l, me.ual control for long team Coulang XVG1002-EF h
HCC (XHCIDB2X) & HCll Hanilwlcel provided for local, m nu.nl tuntsul XVG1008-EF A
HCC (XHCIDA2X) & tiCH llandwheel psovided fus local, manu.si sontsol XVG1011A-EF A
HCC (XMCIDA2X) & HCR ll.sntwheel provided for local, manu.sl contaal R
XVG101/B-EF H
HCC (XHCIDB2X) & HCB llanlwheel psuvided for local, manual contaol
" 2.
Open.ste Steam Dump System 0
Open/Close Nain Steam Power IPV-2000-ils XA/XB 1.oul & HCli llandwla ci provided lor lot.nl, m.anual auntrol
.a.
v, kelaci Valves I PV-2010 -iri XA/Xh 1.ut.sl & HCH Handwheel psovided for luu l, manu.nl tuntrol
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iPV-2020-HS XA/XB 1.uul & NCli llandwheel provided for local, m.enual (untrol C
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Page 2 ot 9 ATTACllHENT I VIRGIL. C.
Sllt!HEit COID SiluTl)OWN HEHOVE RCS l! EAT 4.0 CATION FUNCTION EQlllPttFNT #
SEP.
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HEtlARKS 1.
I n.li ca t i on a.
Steam Cruerator 1.cvel 1.1 -4 / ?ll I (1S01..)
CREP I.1 -48 ?ll 11 (ISOL.)
OkEP LI-49711 lif ( 1 S01.. ) CREP 1.1 -411 A I (ISOL.)
- 1. oral EF Pump Stations
.o LI-487A II ( I SOI.. )
local EF Pump Station
~
LI-497A Ill (ISOI..) (Later) 1 LI-415 II (1S01..)
HCR
Ill (ISOL.) HC11 LI-495 II (ISol.)
HCR I.I-496 III (lSul.. ) ilCil la. Steam Generator Pressuse PI-474A II (ISOL.)
CHEP PI-485A til (ISOL.) CREP PI-496A IV (ISol.. )
CHEP PI-414 11 (1801..)
tlCB PI-415 til (ISOL.) HCB PI-484 11 (ISOL.)
HCR PI-48')
111 (ISul.. ) HCB PI-494 11 (IS01..)
HCll l'l - 495 III (lSul..) HCit c.
Condensate Storage Tank I.evel Li-3611 tt 11 CEEP y
1.1 - 36 3 t A 11 NCh k
it. Reactor Coolant Syst em II.it l ey.
TE-4I3 8 (ISol.. )
CHEP Indicator to lac added to CSDF g
Temperature
'IE-423 1 (ISOL.)
Cwp ludicator to lie adJed to CSDF TE-4'l l I (IS01..)
CH El-In.lis ator t o lie ailde.1 t o CSDF m
TI-411 1 (ISul.)
HCh t*
TI-421 1 (Isol.)
HCh m
{
CO o
- N L.r4 b
N
Part: 1 of
'l ATTAclD1LNr i VIRGII. C. Sut ttF M Cold SiluTDoWN KEtiOVE RCS IIEAT
!.OCATION
!I.I@.!T [@ _. __. _ ___ _
[ g !,HENT #
_JP.
_ __ 0F CONTHOL k};HAkKS c.
kractor Coolant System Cold I.cg TE-410 IV (IS01..)
ci:EP lu.licator to be aslJeil to CSI)F Temperature TE-420 IV (IS01..)
onrP Indicator to be adJcJ to CSDF 1E-430 IV (ISol.. ) okte lu.lis atur to be added to CSDt 71-410 IV (ISOL.)
HCh T1-420 IV (ISOL.)
HCh c
1.
kr.st t o Coolant Systra tiow tT-414 I (ISOL.)
CRt:P Ind a t.s t or t o be aJJed t o CSDF
~
tT-424 I (ISOL.)
cul P Inds.. tor to be added to CSDF 1
FT-414 I (ISOL.)
cNt r ludicatos to lee added to CSDF
'J 61-414 I (ISOL.)
MCh F1-415 II (1S01..)
MCh 11-424 I (1S01..)
HCh FI-425 11 (1S01..)
HCh F1-4 34 1 (Isoi.. )
HCli F1-435 ll (ISOL.)
HCh g.
ke.sttor Coolant System Pressure l'T-402 IV (ISOL.)
a M t.P ludicator to lie added t o CSDI PT-401 1 (ISOL.)
OkFP Ind a t atos t o be ad.leil to CSI)F l'l -402 IV (Isol.)
HCh PI-401 1 ( 1501.. )
HCh 4.
Ope s.s t o s kilk System Start /Stop kilH Pumps XPP-ilA-kit A
Swittbgear (XSWIDAI) & HCil a.
X Pl - ll ti-kil B
Swittbgear (XSWil)lil) & HCit y
li. Open/Close kilR Sus t ion Valves XVGH / u l A-kil A
HCC (ANCIDA2X) & HCh trom Hea.tos Coolint System XVC810 lls-kil A
HCC (XHCIDA2Y) & HCil XVL8 /02 A-kil is HCC (XftCIDH2Y) & NCh j
XVGH / ulb-kil 11 NCC (Xt1CIDli2Y) & HCh v.
tJ
(
e-b
[:=
- =
CO
O Page 4 e>I 9 ATTAClittENT I VIRGIL. C.
Stil1HEH Col.8) SituTIM;WN l(EDtlCE HCS IHESSURE I.00AT10N FUNCTION FylllPflLNT #
SEP.
OF CONThof.
REMAkkS I.
Vent Pressurizer to Pressurizer Relict Tank 4.
Open/Close Pscssurizer Power PCV-445A A
cxEr & HCil Contsol to lie added to CSDF Operated Helief Valve PCV-444tl B
okEr & HCil Control to lie added to CSDF
.O 2.
N.sintaiss P:essurizer Paessure St ar t /Stop Paessurizer liat kup CRollP I XA CREP & HCh 4.
CD lic.s t e r s Gliour 2 XB CHEP & tlCil 1.
Isolate Accumulators a.
Resture Power to Valves XVG8808A-Si A
flCC (XtlCIDA2X) & hcl!
Jumper Required XVG8808B-SI HCC (XHCIDB2Y) & tlCli Jumper itequiacd XVG8808C-SI A
HCC (XttCIDA2X) & ilCB Jumpe Required 11 C4use V.alves XVG8808A-SI A
HCC (XttCll)A2hs & HCll XVG880811-S i B
HCC (XtlCIDil2Y) % HCB XVG8808C-SI A
tlCC (XHCIDA2X) & t!Cl!
4.
ludiratson a
Pressurizer Pressume ludicator PI-444A 4
CREP u
PI-455 I (IS01..)
hcl 1 PI-456 II (IS01..)
tlCli "o'
Is. Picssurizer I.evel in.licator 1.1-45911 i (ISOL.)
Cl(EP 1.1-459C 1 (ISol..)
Im al EF Pump Statson 8.1-459A i (ISol.. )
HCB iO 1.1-460 11 ( 1801.. )
HCit
?
O b
h u
N.-
W
Page 5 of 9 ATTACllMENT t vikCII. C.
Stierttk COlb SituTix)WN BORATE I.OCATION FifNCTION byllitttENT #
SEP.
Of CONTROL.
REMAkXS 1.
Charging System Stant/Stop Ch.srging Pumps XPP-41A-CS A
Switthgear & HCil (XSWIDA) 4.
Xi'P-43b-CS B
Swit(hgear & HCB (XSWIDH)
XPP-43C-CS A/Il Switchge.ar & HCh (XSWlDA/XSWIDB) h.
Open/Close Boric Acid T. ink XVG8304-CS is CHEP (XHCIDB2Y) & ttCB p
I.ine V.alves to Charging Pumps
)
XVD8331-CS 1.ut a l H anual llandwheel Operated e
XVI)8129-CS 1.ot a l Hanual I!.sudwhcci Operated XVD8 32 'lA-CS 1.oc a l Manu.sl Handwheel Operate.l XVD812111-CS Local Manual HanJwheel Operated c.
Open/Cluse RWST Lane to if Vi l5 h-CS A
ttCC (XHCIDA2Y) & HCli Ch.siging Pumpa I.CVil5D-CS B
HCC (XttCIDit2Y) & tlCB d.
Start /Stop lioric Acid XPP-13A-CS XA HCC fXNCIDA2Y) 6 NCB Tiansler Pumps XPP-13B-CS Xll OktP (XHCIDh2Y) 6 NCli e.
Ch.erging Flow Contial V tve FCV-122-CS 2
CREP & HCll 2.
I.etdown Systra (il Reynised) a.
Emcagency 1.ctJown
{
- Ecattur Vessel llead Vent 6 V.alves A/is HCh to Picssusteer Relac! Tank i
on b.
Noimal 1.ctdown u.
E
'O-Open/Close 1.rtdown 1. anes to l.CV459-CS XA CHEP h NCB Volume Cont e of Tank 1.CV460-CS XA Cl&P & HC11 h
^
PVi tt l 49 A-CS A
CHEP & HCli o
., 2.
I"VT8 8 49 tt-CS A
CRFP h HCh PVr8149C-CS A
CHLP & HCH XVT81's!-CS 11 LI.1 P & HC11 Cunt a ul t o lie added t o CSDF W
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m Revision 5 2/1/80 Ql-20 1
64 351
P.sge 1 ul 9 ATTAt:HMENT 1 VIRGIL. c. SuttMEtt C01.1) SIluTlusWN SUPP0kT SYSTLits 1.OCATION FilNCTION EQUIPttENT #
SFP.
OF CONTROI.
HEt1AkKS 1.
Service W. ster System St.ast/Stop Servise Water Pum.ps XPP-39A-SW A
CREP & HCB a.
XPP-398-SW CREP & HCB XPP-39C-SW A/B CREP & HCB C
b.
Start /Stop SW 11ooster Pumps XPP-45A-SW A
Switthgear (XSWIDAI) & HCil y
XPP-45B-SW B
Switchgear (XSWIDist) & HCB N*
c.
Start /Stop SW Tsaveling Screens XRS-2A-SW A
HCC (XHCIEAIX)
XkS-2ti-SW D
HCC (XHCIEBlX)
XkS-2C-SW C
ttCC (XtlCIECIX) d.
Open/Close Industrial XVil-1880A-SW A
HCC (XHCillA2X) & HCB ll.indwheel provided for loca contsol Cooling Water V.stves XVil-31108-SW B
HCC (XttCIDil2Y) & HCB ll.sudwheel provided for local rontsol t o k. B. Cooling Unit s XVG-3tllA-SW A
HCC (XHCIDA2X) & HCB llandwhcci provided for local control XVG-3111B-SW B
HCC (XtlCIDil2YJ & HCil llaudwheel psovided for local control XVG-lll2A-SW D
ttCC (XHCIDB2Y) & HCB llardwheel provided for local contsol XVG-311211-SW A
HCC (XflCIDA2Y) & ttCB llandwheel psovided for local aontrol O 'en/Close SW Valves Xvii-3106A-SW A
HCC (XtlCIDA2X) & tiCB Handwheel provided for total toutiol e-l to k. B. Cooling liails XVli 'llt. B-SW 11 ttCC (XHCIDil2Y) & hcl!
llandwhcci provided f or loc.sl aontrol XVG-310/A-SW A
HCC (XHCIDA2X) & ttCil llandwheel psovided for local contsul XVG-110711-SW 11 NCC (XtlCIDil2Y) & HCB liainthweet provided foi local control d
2.
Component Cooling W. ster System d
Start /Stop Component Couting XPP-IA-CC A
Swata gea & tlCB (XSWIDA)
_I g Wales Pump XPP-lit-CC 11 Swit chgrar & HCB (XSWIDB)
XPP-IC-CC A/li Switthge.sr & hcl 1 (XSWIDA/XSWIDll) es L.CL N3
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Q2.
It is our position that you comply with Section D.1.i of BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A in that the enclosure (walls, ceilings, and penetration seals) separating safety related equipment areas be 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated barriers.
Many fire zones barriers enclosing redundant equipment were not identified as being fire rated.
Indicate how you will comply with our position.
Revise your list to include all areas in which redundant safety related systems (cable, conduit, equipment, etc.) are located.
Identify the location and function of all such systems on your drawings.
a.
Verify that dampers installed in vertical or horizontal positions are listed for their respective installation (i.e. dampers listed ror horizontal installation or listed for vertical installation).
During our site visit we observed two 1-1/2-hour rated fire dampers installed in vertical penetration of floor / ceiling construction.
Ducts or openings in fire rated barriers should be provided with appropriate fire dampers. Modify your design accordingly.
b.
During our site visit we observed many fire door or door frame labels were not in place where credit for rated fire door has been utilized in your analysis and on the diagrams.
Verify that these doors are either labeled door / frames or that they qualify to be the equivalent.
R2.
The fire zone barrier enclosing redundant equipment which is not identified as being fire rated has been evaluated in question 1.
a.
Approved fire dampers have been purchased for both horizontal and vertical installation. Ducts or openings in fire rated barriers are provided with the appropriate fire dampers.
Vertical dampers are installed in walls, and horizontal dampers are installed in rated floor / ceiling assemblies.
Approved accordian-type fire dampers (2 -
1-1/2-hour UL fire resistant rating) are provided for floor / ceiling assemblies which are provided with a blade lock and stainless steel negator closure spring. Approved accordian-type fire dampers having 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> UL fire resistant ratin8 are provided in fire rated walls.
SCE&G QA program assures the proper installation of the fire dampers.
Horizontal fire dampers are provided in the control and intermediate buildings to separate floor areas containing safe shutdown equipment.
1M4 355 Q2-1 Revision 5 2/1/80
Automatic sprinkler protection is provided under the floor areas where the horizontal fire dampers are installed in moderate or high fire loaded (cable insulation) areas in the control building.
The fire loading in other areas of the control building where horizontal fire dampers are installed is low, 42,000 BTU /ft or less.
Ionization detectors are provided in the control room area which has the fire loading of 42,000 BTU /it The horizontal fire dampers installed in the intermediate building 2
are in areas having low fire loading, 52,400 BTU /ft or less.
Each area is provided with ionization detectors for early warning of any fire condition.
b.
Approved fire doors and door frames have been purchased to protect areas as shown in the fire hazard evaluation. Mylar labels have been removed from some doors and door frames.
SCE&G QA program is presently verifying if the proper doors and door frames have been installed in their proper position.
If discrepancies are found, you will be advised and a mutually agreeable solution will be provided.
Letters for the Pressure Resistant Door Units and Bullet Resistant Doors are attached.
Fire doors which are required to be blast-resistant are as follows:
Auxiliary Building AB 304A Intermediate Building IB 103, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 202, 204, 210, 301, 305, 311, 315, 316 and 317 Control Building CB 102, 301, 302, 501 and 605 Fire door CB-517 is required to be bullet resistant.
1864 356 Q2-2 Revision 5 2/1/80
f-
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' Y. ('.SUMMEni
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g net,
- e. maro uitis CHICAGO GULLET P AOCF EQU!A. CC.
225o WESTEAN AVE.
I AAAK ACAEST, IL 60486 U SA o.unaust PH 312 /481-34cC p.ua m nt TLX ESS194 e
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July 10, 1979
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J Couth Carolina Electric and Gas Cc.
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I Caniel Construction Co., Agen*.
V1 n 'iU M
P.O. Ecx 66
. Jenkinsville, SC 29065 Re: Virgil Summer Nuclear Plant Your 7081-20508-01 CBP 78220A Ps3 FILE 2
Gentlepersons:
Enclosed please find (2) photocopies and (2) reproducibles each of the folicwing CBP sh:p drawings:
- 78220-2 (R-1: July 3, 1979)
- 78220-2A (July 3,1979)
(
These are sulnitted for apptwral. A set of reprcducibles is being sent to Gilbert Associates, Inc.
We note that en subject purchase order it is recuested the phrase "3 label const-ruction" he incorporated on drawings involved with dcor/ frame CB 517. Please rote that this statement muld be an asst =ption en our part.
Ecth the dcor and frane wre constructed of Shot-Tex #1221 steel.
This steel configuratien is utilized by CBP in the construction of our Underwriters Listed "A" label (3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) fire dcor units.
Fcwever, in : raking these, w utilize a different internal construction than was used in the mmufacture of CB 517.
Therefore, since a "B" label fire test has never been conducted on a unit similar in cen-struction to that of CB 517, we have no data to substantiate this assu:rption.
Very truly yours, CHICAGO ELUZr PROOF Fcnald L. Vance G((.gggr Drafting / Design ASSOC.. INC. W.O. No.
c:: Gilbert Associates, Inc.
dl,1779 44gi RLV/ amp 4u d 357 lv p.uk F-219 Q2-3 Revision 5 2/1/80
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a enzo SOUTH DORCHEsTER AVENUE
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C"'cAo, u. tin is sosza
.I h
.h h l {- h k h A DIVISION OF RYSDON PRODUCTS COMPANY
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au c oc sia 7 i. 7eo March 24, 1978 Gilbert Associatas Inc.
P.O. Box 1498 Reading, Pa.
19603 Re:
Pressure Resistant Door Units V.C. Summer Nuclear Station, Unit #1
~
South Carolina Electric & Gas Co.
Purchase Order #SN-10250-SR GAI Work Order No. 044461-000 Our Job No. 7505 CERTIFICATE OJ_
U.L. LABEL DOOR CONSTRUCTION We certify that the door units requiring Fire Rated U.L. Con-struction will be fabricated as close as possible following A
the Underwriters Laboratories procedure for 3 Hr. (A) Label requirements for our special purpose door units (File No.
R7643, Vol. I).
However, a physical label cannot be furnished due to job re-ERT w.o. No.
quirements!
4jj g,33, ass 00 t78 446}.
N y jg M -SONICBAR DIVISION RYS ON PRODUCTS COMPANY 1Rd
~
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J.C. Jarard,,
Engineerin
' anager SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS CO.
V.C. SUMMER NUCLEAR STATTON RECElV ED UNIT NO. 1-P.O. SN-10250-SR W.O. NO. 044461-000 Apg 7 m
SONICBAR JOB NO. 7505
- 1 IS7H AI AMOGATQ og.
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Q2-4 Revision 5 2/1/80
Q13. Page 5.0-37; Item F.2, page 5.0-41; Item 6, and page 5.0-43; Item 11 It is our position, as stated in " Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas,"
of BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A, Sections D.2, D.12, and D.13 that you provide smoke detection systems for the control room area, the control room ventilation system, and the new and spent fuel pool areas.
R13. Smoke detection systems are provided in ventilation systems serving the control room, the spent fuel pool area, and the new fuel storage area.
Smoke detectors are provided in the control room fer the main control 5
board and HVAC control board.
Smoke detectors wilt be provided for the control room area (control room, associated rooms and technical support center elev. 463'-0"), the new and spent fuel storage areas.
}
hhh Q13-1 Revision 5 2/1/80
Q20. Service Water Pumphouse 9
Describe the barrier, including its fire rating, that will be installed to separate the ventilation ducts from the electrical equipment areas similar to the way you described other barriers in your fire hazards analysis Section 4.7.2.1.
R20. Ventilation ductwork within the fire area is fireproofed by " boxing in" or by covering the duct.
Fireproofing material is applied for a 5
three-hour fire resistance rating.
e64 360 Q20-1 Revision 5 2/1/80