ML19257D206
| ML19257D206 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1980 |
| From: | Zahler R METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8002010526 | |
| Download: ML19257D206 (18) | |
Text
sy January 22, 1980 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-289
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(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
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Station, Unit No. 1)
)
LICENSEE'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS On January 2, 1980, Licensee filed a response to the detailed emergency planning contentions submitted by UCS, Mr.
Sholly, ANGRY and Newberry.
Subsequent to that filing, Li-censee has received additional emergency planning submittals from ECNP (filing dated January 7, 1980), Mr. Sholly (filing dated January 7, 1980), Newberry (filing dated January 11, 1980),
UCS (filing dated January 14, 1980), and Mrs. Aamodt (filing dated January 15, 1980).
Licensee's response to the filings by ECNP and Mr. Sholly follows.
A further response addressing the filings of Newberry, UCS and Mrs. Aamodt will be submitted prior to Friday, January 25, 1980.
Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power On January 7, 1980, ECNP filed its detailed emergency planning contention.
A request by ECNP for an extension of time within which to make that filing was denied by the Licens-ing Board in its January 8, 1980 Memorandum and Order Ruling on Intervenors' Requests for Extentions of Time to File Revised ag% 220 8002 otoS M p
. Emergency Planning Contentions.
The Board there indicated that any emergency planning contentions filed by ECNP would be con-sidered as a late filing under the standards of 10 C.F.R.
S 2. 714 (a) (1) (Memorandum and Order at 4).1/
Since entry of the Licensing Board order, ECNP has not sought to submit any information that addresses the criteria of section 2.714 (a) (1).
Certainly there can be no claim by ECNP that there was good cause for its failure to file on time.
Licensee's review of ECNP's filing fails to disclose any material that could not havE been submitted by December 19, 1979.
As noted below, one entire section of the ECNP filing (i.e.,
the 21 assumptions set forth at pages 4-6) was transmitted to the Commission in connec-tion with another matter as early as December 1, 1979; the delay in submitting that information in this proceeding is totally un-explained by ECNP.
As to the other four criteria set forth in section 2.714 (a) (1), it is ECNP's obligation to come forward with relevant information.
Having failed even to attempt to make such a showing, there is no basis for accepting the late filed contentions by ECNP.
If the Licensing Board should nonetheless decide to accept the ECNP filing, in whole or in part, Licensee offers the following comments.
There are three preliminary observations that Licensee draws from the ECNP filing.
First, ECNP's objec-tion is not so much with Licensee's updated Emergency Plan,
-1/
Notwithstanding Licensee's failure to object to ECNP's re-quested extension of time, the Board entered this ruling in the interests of preserving orderly procedure.
1855 221
3-but rather is with the entire concept of emergency planning.
Licensee doubts whether any emergency plan would satisry ECMP's basic opposition to nuclear power.
Nowhere in its filing does ECNP identify any objective criteria by which to measure the adequacy of Licensee's Plan.
As a result, there are numerous objections, statements and comments raising issues that are wholly irrelevant to emergency planning or setting forth principles of faith not directly translatable into emergency planning criteria.
The criteria for judging the adequacy of Licensee's plan are specified in 10 C.F.R.
S 50. 34 (b) (6) (v) and Appendix E thereto.
While Licensee fully recognizes that Appendix E is undergoing substantial change, and is willing to have the adequacy of its Emergency Plan evaluated against the proposed revisions to Appendix E, Licensee believes that it would be error to judge its Plan against the implicit criterion of ECNP that no emergency plan can be found adequate.
Second, ECN. has chosen to evaluate the Emergency Plan in a vacuum without zegard to the substantial volume of other material contained in the TMI-l Restart Report.
As a result, many ECNP contentions fault the Emergency Plan for failing to include tangentially relevant information that is found else-where.
This approach elevates the Emergency Plan to the status of a super-licensing document that must be wholly self-contained.
So long as that information which bears directly on emergency preparedness is addressed in the Plan there is no need -- and, indeed, it would be undesirable -- to incorporate reams of less relevant information.
1855 222
. Third, as drafted, the ECNP emergency planning conten-tion is almost unmanageable.
Rather than identify in a simple fashion discretely numbered contentions, ECNP has submitted a jumble that combines together in a haphazard manner contentions, bases, observations, and some irrelevant commentary.
It is thus very difficult for Licensee to draft a concise response to the ECNP filing.
Nonetheless, to the extent Licensee can identify discrete ECNP contentions, specific comments follow.
Page 3, underlying assumptions (a) through (c) --
Licensee objects to consideration of these matters since they are wholly unrelated to the criteria for judging emergency plans set forth in Appendix E or any proposed revision to Appendix E.
Moreover, the listed assumptions are mere argument in support of ECNP's views and are not properly part of a contention.
Page 3, deficiencies (a) through (d) -- Licensee objects to these alleged deficiencies.
The first deficiency asserts that " live drills, including evacuation" must be carried out.
The basis for Licensee's objection is as stated in re-sponse to Newberry Township Contention No. 3(B), subpart 21 (see Licensee's Response to Emergency Planning Contentions, filed January 2, 1980 at 11-12).
The last three deficiencies speak in terms of very broad and vague " guarantees" wholly un-related to the Appendix E criteria and again constitute argu-ment that does not belong in a contention.
-2/ In fact, the Board would in Licensee's view be fully justi-fied in rejecting all of ECNP's emergency planninc;8552I'Ts conteqt on grounds of improper form.
. Pages 4-6, assumptions (1) through (21) -- Licensee notes initially that all of the listed assumptions are totally general in nature without any specific consideration or applica-tion to Licensee's Emergency Plan.
ECNP has made absolutely no attempt to specify the nature of its claims or to provide any basis in fact to support those claims (e.g.,
evacuation will be unsuccessful dua to a lack of cars, buses, etc.)
- Indeed, ECNP in a December 1, 1979 letter to the Commission commenting on the draf t emergency action levels specified in NUREG-0610 listed each of the 21 assumptions set forth in this filing as assumptions also made in the NUREG document.
Moreover,.nany of the assumptions listed by ECNP raise issues unrelated to the scope of this proceeding (e.g.,
sabotage) or covered in material outside the Emergency Plan (e.g.,
reactor operator training and control room design).
As to the balance of the assumptions, virtually all constitute argument which ECNP may choose to advance in support of its position at the close of the hearings on the basis of the evidentiary record compiled.
These assumptions, however, are not factual matters and do not lend themselves to adjudication.
Pages 7-13, deficiencies (1) through (38) -- Specific comments to each listed deficiency follow.
~3/ Attached as Exhibit A hereto is a copy of the ECNP letter reproduced in the December 31, 1979 edition of Nuclear Hazards.
Also included in Exhibit A is a table correlating ECNP's number-ing in its January 7 filing with the number used in its December 1 letter.
As is apparent in almost every instance identical or very similar language was used by ECNP.
i855 224
. 1.
Objection.
There is no requirement that the Emergency Plan include an " array of accidents from which the public is to be protected."
2.
Objection.
Licensee sees no significance to the fact that counties have prepared contingency plans for 5, 10 and 20 mile evacuations.
3.
Objection.
Licensee's obligation is to dissem-inate accurate information in a timely manner.
Whether the populace believes the information disseminated is wholly speculative and no basis for the speculation is provided by ECNP.
4.
No objection.
5.
Objection.
The contention is vague and without basis.
Appendix E requires Licensee to have in place an ap-propriate program for maintaining emergency preparedness.
The contention does not directly challenge the adequacy of that program, but merely asserts that no amount of training will be effective.
This conclusion is unsupported.
6.
Obj ection.
The categorization of FSAR postu-lated accidents into the various emergency classifications was done in response to a specific NRC Staff request.
Other more severe accidents would be categorized either as Site Emergen-cies or General Emergencies.
The absence of such other more severe accidents is wholly irrelevant to the adequacy of the Emergency Plan.
7.
No objection to the extent this contention is limited to a claim that the proposed dissemination of informa-tion during an Alert is inadequate.
1855 225
. 8.
Objection.
This statement constitutes legal argument by ECNP and is not a contention capable of litigation in an evidentiary hearing.
9.
No objection with respect to that part of the contention relating to valid alarms.
As to the rest, there is no need to include in an Emergency Plan the basis for the action levels chosen by Licensee.
10.
No objection.
11.
No objection, although Licensee notes that the adequacy of its radioactive gas monitoring devices is addressed elsewhere in the TMI-l Restart Report.
12.
Objection.
Most of ECNP's statement is argument rather than a contention.
The claim that the public is not adequately informed is overly broad and without basis in fact.
13.
No objection.
14.
No contention numbered 14.
15.
Objection.
The contention is without adequate specificity or a basis in fact.
16.
Objection.
No basis is provided for the claim that the Offsite Emergency Support Organization is in-competent.
Any reference to an entirely different group that existed at a different time is not relevant.
17.
Objection.
ECNP specifies no basis for this claim which is more properly addressed to occupational exposures and information provided to workers.
Such material is not relevant to Licensee's Emergency Plan and is therefore 1855 226
. not included 18.
Objection.
The material objected to by ECNP was added in response to a request by the NRC staff.
On the basis of this information, ECNP incorrectly asserts that assessment actions are based on assumptions consistent with TID-14844.
While elapsed time to reach specific dose vs.
distance graphs are included, the Plan nowhere indicates that assessment actions are based on such graphs.
Rather, the material is included to provide guidance should an accident similar to that postulated in TID-14844 occur.
Thus, the contention is without adequate basis since it depends on a clear misreading of the Emergency Plan.
19.
Objection.
The increased training of reactor operators in accident analysis is addressed elsewhere in the TMI-l Restart Report; there is no need nor any require-ment to discuss such matters in the Emergency Plan.
20.
No objection.
21.
Objection.
The contention lacks any specificity of what precisely is inadequate with the proposed
" drills and exercises" or what ECNP would propose to add in order 'o maintain emergency preparedness.
22.
Objection.
ECNP identifies no reason why a single spokesperson cannot provide " prompt, complete, and consistent dissemination of information."
23.
Objection.
There is no need nor any requirement for the Emergency Plan to discuss the scenarios that might lead to a Class 9 accident.
1855 227 24.
Objection.
No basis is pro 7ided for this con-tention.
The "Information Plan" describes the process by which Licensee will disseminate information to the public.
ECNP does not identify specific problems with Licensee's proposal other than to state it is inadequate.
25.
Objection.
ECNP's statement is not a contention.
26.
No objection.
27.
Objection.
The contention is overly vague and without any basis in fact.
28.
No objection.
29.
Objection.
ECNP provides no basis for this claim.
30.
No objection, but this contention is encompassed by number 20 above.
31.
Objection.
ECNP's statement is not a contention.
32.
Objection.
The contention totally lacks any specificity and is without a basis in fact.
33.
No objection.
34.
Objection.
Neither this contention, nor the referenced Contention No. 3 (renumbered by the Board as Con-tention No. 13), provides any basis for ECNP's challenge to Regulatory Guide 1.109.
35.
Objection.
ECNP's statement is not a contention.
Furthermore, Licensee sees no inconsistency between the designa-tion of separate spokespersons at the State and County levels.
36.
Objection.
ECNP's statement is legal argument and not a contention; it provides no basis for an evidentiary hearing.
37.
Objection for the reasons stated in response to number 32 above.
1855 z28 38.
No objection.
Steven C.
Sholly On January 7, 1980, Mr. Sholly filed a response to Licensee's January 2, 1980 filing.
While Licensee would not normally reply to such a filing, further definition given by Mr. Sholly to some of his contentions has caused Licensee to revise the position initially taken in its January 2 submittal.
Contention No. 8(C) -- As explained by Mr. Sholly, Licensee no longer objects to this contention.
Contention No. 8(D) -- Licensee continues to object to this contention.
Class 9 accident considerations have been taken into account by Licensee since the 10-mile EPZ is based on certain Class 9 accident scenarios.
Had Class 9 accidents been ignored, the emergency planning zone proposed by Licensee would have been significantly smaller than the 10-mile radius i.e., it would have been confined to something approximating the low population zone ("LPZ").
Thus, if Mr. Sholly accepts the 10-mile LPZ as an appropriate planning guide -- as he apparently does -- then there is no need for a further con-sideration of Class 9 accidents in the Emergency Plan.
More-over, NUREG-0610 clearly postulates certain Class 9 accidents as events which would give rise to a General Emergency.
Having also adopted the classification scheme proposed in NUREG-0610, Licensee is somewhat at a loss to understand Mr. Sholly's claim that Class 9 accidents have been ignored for emergency planning purposes.
Contention No. 8(Q) -- Licensee continues to object i855 229
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to this contention.
It is simply inadequate for Mr. Sholly to state that the material contained at section 4.8.0 of the Emer-gency Plan is vague and lacks specificity without identifying any material that he asserts is inadequate.
Contention No. 8 (S) -- Licensee no longer objects to this contention.
Contention No. 8 (T) -- Licenssee finds Mr. Sholly's further explanation of the contention unconvincing and still is of the view that the matter is too undefined to be litigated.
Contention No. 8 (Z) -- Licensee still objects to this contention.
As explained by Mr. Sholly it appears that this contention does not have the requisite nexus to the TMI-2 accident to come within the scope of this proceeding.
Whatever the shortcomings of Licensee's emergency response may have been during the accident, nothing Licensee is aware of suggests that an alleged inability to control the Susquehanna River was in-volved.
As to Mr. Sholly's comments with respect to the Emergency Plan Implementing Document and the detailed implementing procedures, Licensee wishes to make clear that access to the above-referenced documents has not been " denied" to Mr. Sholly.
The undersigned counsel has informed Mr. Sholly on various occasions that the documents have not yet been completed.
When the documents are drafted they will, of course, be placed in Licensee's Discovery Reading Room.
This should take place 1855 230 within the next month or two.
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE h
By:
Robert Zahler' Dated:
January 22, 1980 1855 231
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EXHIBIT A D
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1 q ENV18%auaENTAL coALstiope ON NUCLEAA POvvf R b
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- e. a m==.a.-.m s c-A.am swsmme an unusual twent and Alert categories); and o,c,,,er 1, i,7s (b) tnere may not be enougn time for meneers of the punlic to Carry Out meir necessary comest1C functions, such as secretary of the Casetssion IJ.1. 'a Clear segulatory Countssion (l) CSlIetting necessary documents. suCn as eteds, v
mesnington. 0.C. 20155 tasurance poltctes. be"th certificates, one se on.
Attenttu: Docasting and Seevice tranca (2) turning off gas oil, electric 1ty, and closing
- ear nr. secretary:
.tnoows locatng navsa.
mfg *0610 spells out. In principle. a sectes of
- action levels" to 'toorove (3), gathering all non-school fastly memoers (off energency creoareeness' around nuclear posee plants. The need for teoreved emergency shoortng, etc.),
prepareeness around nuclear poner plants es amely demonstrated during the ascent Class g accioent at Three at te Island. MuttG-0610 is based on a nanoer af assusettons (c) no consideretton has been given to the care of fare animals
.Mct are Ret f aclueed in the test. The assence of these assenctions and the necessary enere meses afgnt be espected to evacuatal discussion accompanytag then maats energenCy pleaning an esercise 15 breaucrat1C oa snuf fli ng.
- he ene result util be the creatton of an 11tustoa of safety of colossa) per (d) no consteeration has been given to me time rowered ta proportteas waien -ti) instead be an arrogant self eelusion and say less to tratesy.
encuate the affected institutionalised individuals (hospitals.
Selow I list a nunoer of crittcal assumotions voon mica this aneqency plan esperuns
. petsens. etc.):
upon fer its succ*ss.
1.
Instrumentation taists is every operating nuclear powee plaat to (e)_ little-er ne constoeretion has been gina to the method of evecuation of instemals eithout carss '
give the slant personnel accurate. unamatguous taformation so that the reactor 09erstars can (f] no Consideration has been givet ta ut availability of gastlinel a) enett and respond f atalligently and carrectly, and (g) no cornsioeettien has been given to the amount of cash on hand b) accurately and in a timely manner infore plant management and all emer of ficials of current plant conettions.
the evacbees may have for their een support for am unapown length of ttee.
2.
Utflity management can be t.usted to transmit accurate inforestion l y.
If greers are given for the meneers of tne public to close windows and in a t2 eely fasaton to the potentially af fected pualic.
er11ers a sistake.
stay inocers, conettions at the plant will not snange so as ta state these-3.
Control roam operators are properly trained $4 that mey will know how te correctly react. and is a timely f annion. In the next accident.
- 18., If there.it a reactor core meltdown, and me conta1 meet enes' not rueturei early is the acc16ent, then all is well and there will be ne need fon'..
4 All control rooms are designed for snaimas efficiency and with further cancern.
,w mintaan poss16111ttes of confusion and ameiguity in the event of an-
~. i emergency.
Ig. There will be no sanotage at any nuclear poser plants.
5.
The retc will transmit information openly and accurately ane in a
- 20. The inadecuacies of emergency response at all Tenis curing the 312 timely manner ta tne outlic througnout tne esorgency.
accisent can and will be prmated from recurring at the nant accident.
4.
The Stata will transett information r-oenly and a*curately and is a 21.- Accurate predictions can be maee concerning the pro 6ab111ty of occurrence "
timely manner to the public througneut the emergency.
an( tenooral distribution of reactor accieents.
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F.
no political pressure v111 be applied to encoursge say involved The accioent at 312 demonstrated conc 1ssteely that the confidence la organization ta town-s. lay the severity of the accisent.,,,- =....
y planning and eserveacy preoareeness empressed during the licensing preseedings for 12 were fauneationless. In tne mese of tnat accteent, the PMsteent apoeinted 4.
The memoers of the affected or potentially affected public de not have either tne right to or the need for accurste and timely a Comission to stuey various aspecu of tne 3!.2 accident. With the casslation of information enroughout en emergency at a nuclear power plant.
the investigation by that Comission and the puelication of its final recort. unich
- 5 accomoanled by about 30 staff reports a far eifferent view of emergercy prepareeness is peesenta4.
ha t er es s f rad oa 1e I
) ha Fros just a cursory readi of some of the reports of the Presideat's Consission already taaen place during an accident.
en the Acct 8ent at Three atte 1 and. It is evtsent that. of the assumottons I have enuserated, nweers 1 througn 7,11 and 13. aid not survive the 31-2 accisent.
I'J. Members of the affected or potentially affected public have neither -
Information abant the conettien of the reactor came out late and ws generally inaccurata the need nor the rignt to be able to take actions on thete own ta on March 28. 1979. (Cannare, for instance. $eovence of (vents, given in the Report of prevent unmented encosures to radiation at levels which the ARC and the Test Group on health P%ysics. pages 6-14. with the Publicilaformation Chronology, other severamental egencies dose to be acceptable. (as ta p(3-0610 of the Report of the Public's Ught to Information Task Force, pages 28 32). The I
and WitG-4396).
pu6ile =es alle.ed to knee that as acctdent *haopened.* but was sented accast to
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accurate taformation by all institstions watch had, or had access te. accurate
- 11. Renners of the affected pubits do not need to be told that the male.
teformation.
just1fication for tneir being orsered to stay indoors during se,
nyngg.0610 not only dcas not offer or mandate any correction of these serious sporgency may well be that they ceaaet De evacuated, deficiencies. It renews and actually increases reliance on institutions wnich failed so badly a t TM.I Mning in f4)p!G-0610 re=edies these fettines. or even acknowledges li. Both Sta te and lesal officsaka arovas every nusleer vuwer pleas art.
their esistence. Quita the contrary. It offers utilities broad distretion in the
. capable of evacuating all wne meet evacuating and reeutrements of nottf tcation of the public. to the entent that the health and safety of the publ1C may be seriously comprantsee by the punitc's not being informed of an (a) there will be enough cars. buses. etc. for everyonet.
accideer ta progress.
(b) roads will not be jausted te the stelling pointf
' of nuclear utt11 ties.are to be given little crsdibility unsee normal circumstances.
1
, The pue)1C has Itarned ever the years that the pious, self-serving announcerents (c) there will be no gas shortages and The TM.2 accident apoly demonstrated that the Control race personnel of Metrooolitan
-Edison < lid not unserstand the acct 6ent as it.took place; Furthermore, most of the (d) all necessary volunteer energency personnel will be *
' were directed anclustwely t:n.ard protecting the " image' of Metropolitan Edison. Factual pualic pronouncements _of the sanagement officials in the first weet or so of the accident available for duty.
infomation ses not deemed morthy of release to the putile try Petropolitan Edison's
- 13. The effdte radiation levels prior to the put11c announcement of an ananagerent. MEG-0410 does not remedy tats deploraele situatton. Nothing in thts aper 9ency and radiation levels and esposures prior ta and surin0 report even remotely hints at the need for the release of accurate and factual evacuation as desertbed in NUREG-0610 constituta acceptaale levels of taformation by the ut111 ties.
li espesures to the effected meneers of the pult c even though There are a numeee of deeper and very ominous imetications contained in nuttG-C610.
(a) such levels of aspewee es not take teto account the-however. 'Flest. there is the impitcation given that, with a new set of energency veristility of humans of all ages to the effects of p.lanntag guidelines. fran wnich will supposedly flow dotatted and comelea local radiation; or emergency plans. progress will have been made toward insering the wortability of emergency plans in an emergency. Such is not the case. as the teldentiary record (b) the increased average sensl. 'ity of children to radiettoni er in the TMI.2 licensing proceeding vividly demonstrates. Metropolitan Edison, local.
State. and ifRC Officials all testified (under oath) to the total worsasility of the (c) the greatly increased everage sensitivity Sf the developing then esisting epeegency plans. But unen put ta test ta en accident that unfolded fetus to radiation.
s l arly, they all failed miserably. NUs(G-0610 does nothing-othee than convey the 14 (vacuattan planning and pre 9eredness can be Itaited to some artttrary sistance f rae a nuc' ear reactor.
But that trick was tried before at the TMI.2 proceedings. There. the ' image' of preparooness was created to cover inettitude. taaotlity and inconcetence. se as
- 15. The nest serious acetdent will occur only after all-emergency planni"9 to Itc NUREG-0610 retnfortes the comitment of the NRC ta tne image of preoar, ease TM!.2. ems, as tooosed to the achievenent of a position of de-castraele preoireaess.
and all sporgency preparsticas have been complete.
Is. tvecuation. le the event of another nuclear accieent. can be counted Secondly, any utility however technoleically west. incompetent or cettvious on as a general procedure to reduce (but not et teinate) elevat*d to canoor. will continue to be allowed to coerata eneclear oower plants. The perfect esposures even though record estan11shed by the AEC ans continued ey the mRC of scenting every operettng license requested strongly suggests that theet are.no sinimal reoutrunents whatsoever (a) ansch time will have already been wasted prior to alerting for a utility in these areas. The TMI.2 accident l> ears out this teoression, and th,e public to the accident (ne notification of the N6lic notagng gn gag,.0610 altars this impression.
(continued on Page 81
(Continued frorn Page.7)
Third. NUREG-0610, implies that generic safety problems need n'ot ever be solved, since the image of the ability to protect the public is given therein. Thus..
accidents will go ahead ar3 happen. If this is the case, then again NUREG-0610 is just a licensing document whose purpose is to buy time so as to increase dependence The descent of NUREG-0610 on nuclear power (at the expense of all safer. options).
into the classification of a " licensing document" relates.to its image-conveying properties. These properties are for the purpose of providing a paper frame. work around which utilities and the NRC Staff can imolv the ability to protect the public in the event of'an accident.- The result is the satisfaction of licensing requirements, but the denonstrability of safety remains sadly' distant.
The -result is..that the; image of..' emergency preparedness is a necessary device' ~
to cover the habit of the'.NRC. of shunting unresolved reactor safety problems'off
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into a regulatory limbo where 'the problems are not solved. (See, in general', " Report-of the Office of. Chief Cour.sel' on'the :Hucle'ar Regulatory Comission" to' the' Pr2sident's Commission, and,' in particular, Part IV of that re,) ort.). -fiowever, the chronic '
.non-resolution of safety problems is not ~ allowed to retard.the design, construction.
and even operation of more nuclear power plants.. Rather, the problems are removed from public scrutiny. Simultaneously, utilities are relieved of the potntially severe public relations problems related to building and operacing reacto s with large
~
numbers of unresolved safety problems. The extra escape route: of public accountability is afforded 'by the creation of the illusion of emergency preparedness. It.then becomes absolutely necessary that emergency plans never be put to a realistic test, even though their failure is a certair.ty, as at TMI-2. -
Last, the implication, or, more properly, the conclusion, seems inescapable that, in the collective minds of the NRC, the' public is expendable. Were this con-clusion invalid, the NRC would long ago have shed the cloak, of protection it offers the rYuclear industry..The NRC would long ago have aggressively solved outstanding safety problems at the expense of granting more reactor licenses. Further evidence for 1;his truly disturbing conclusion is seen in the unnecessarily high levels of -
offsite exposures which the NRC will allow utilities to' inflict on the unknowing public. There is no justification whatsoever for these high levels, especiallytwhen radiation standards tnemselves are under such strong attacks from outside the - _
traditional radiation biology comunity. A number of assumptions which I feel fonn a -
background for NUREG-0610 address this subject. The NRC has the duty to discuss candidly all of these assumptions.a _
.The bluster, ' flurry of cliches, ' tiresome denials, and " business as usual" attitudes of,the NRC are due for a change. The NRC can begin by discarding NUREG-0610 The NRC should then fact the realization that nuclear accidents are and NUREG-0396.
nut fun, and are to be evoided. If they cannot b'e avcided, altogether, their probability must be avoided completely. No group of Arnericans should ever again be subjected to-the terror that.was so much a part of,the TMI-2 accident.' ~
The achievement of the laudable goal of reactor safet,y is a wdcthy one, if it is even.pgssible. However, it wi'l never be achieved if attempts to delude the public' into a f alse feeling of security, as NUREG-0610 does, continue in a never-ending stream from' the NRC. It is time for the NRC to makh safety a primary comrittment, prior to the licensing of any more reactors. If this cannot be done, then those operating must be shut down imediately.,
4 s.
I hope these coments will be Mlpful.
Chauncey.Kepford
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1856 233
ECNP Filing of ECNP ' tter of January 7, 1980 Decep :r 1, 1979 Designated Assumptions Designated Assumptions 1
21 2
20 3
19 4
14 5
15 6
1 7
3 8
4 9
2 10 5
11 6
12 7
13 8
14
?
15 10 16 16 17 13 18 12 19 11 20 17 21 18 1855 234
January 22, 1980 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-289
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(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
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Station, Unit No. 1)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of " Licensee's Supple-mental Response to Emergency Planning Contentions", were served upon those persons on the attached Service List by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of January, 1980.
/l sd_
7j 1 Robert E.
ahle'r Dated: January 22, 1980 1855 235
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
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METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear
)
Station, Unit No. 1)
)
SERVICE LIST Ivan W. Smith, Esquire John A. Ievin, Escuire Chairman Assistant Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Pennsylvania Public Utility Ccmn'n Board Panel Post Office Box 3265 U.S. Nuclear Pegulatory Ccmnission Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Washington, D;C.
20555 Karin W. Carter, Esquire Dr. Walter H. Jordan Assistant Attorney C<meral Atomic Safety and Licensing 505 Executive House Board Panel Post Office Box 2357 881 West Cuter Drive Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 John E. Minnich Dr. Linda W. Little Chairman, Dauphin County Board Atomic Safety and Licensing of Ccmnissioners Board Panel Dauphin County Cour+Jruce 5000 Hennitage Drive Frcnt and Market Streets Paleigh, North Carolina 27612 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17101 James R. Tourtellotte, Esquire Walter W. Cohen, Escuire Office of de Executive legal Director Consumer Advocate U. S. Nuclear Pegulatory Ccmnission Office of Consumer Advocate Washington. D.C.
20555 14th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, Permsylvania 17127 Docketing and Service Secta n Office of the Secretary U. S. Nuclear Pegulatory Cannission Washington, D.C.
20555 1855 236 Jordan D. Cu:vungham, Esquire Karin P. Sheldon, Esquire Attorney for Newberry 'Itwnship Attorney for People Against Nuclear T.M.I. Steering Ca mittee Energy 2320 North Second Street Sheldon, Harmon & Weiss Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 1725 Eye Street, N.W.,
Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20006 Theodore A. Adler, Esquire Widoff Peager Sellowitz & Adler Robert Q. Pollard Post Offi Box 1547 Chesapeake Energy Alliance Hart d urg, Pennsylvania 17105 609 Montpelier Street Balt1rore, Maryland 21218 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Attorney for the Union of Concerned Chauncey Kepford Scientists Judith H. Johnsrud Sheldon, Harmon & Weiss Environmental Coalition on Nuclear 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Power Washington, D.C.
20006 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Steven C. Sholly 304 South Market Street Parvin I. Iewis Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania 17055 6504 Bradford Terrace Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19149 Gail Bradford Holly S. Keck Marjorie M. Aamodt Iegislation Chairman R. D. 5 Anti-Nuclear Group Pepresenting York Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 245 West Philadelphia Street York, Pennsylvania 17404 1855 237