ML19257C347
| ML19257C347 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 01/14/1980 |
| From: | Baxter T, Charnoff G SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8001280471 | |
| Download: ML19257C347 (24) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
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S?.CRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
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Docket No. 50-312
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(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
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Station)
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LICENSEE'S BRIEF ON REFERRED RULING EXCLUDING CONTENTIONS ON EMERGENCY PLANNING Gerald Charnoff Thomas A. Baxter Lex K.
Larson SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 January 14, 1980 Counsel for Licensee iBi9 068 8001980*EI
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Introduction...................................
1 Argument 2
I.
THE DELEGATED AUTHORITY OF THE LICENSING BOARD DOES NOT INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE OF OFF-SITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE 2
II.
IN ANY EVENT, THE LICENSING BOARD PROPERLY DECLINED TO ENTERTAIN EMERGENCY PLAN ISSUES BASED ON THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THAT SUBJECT 11 Conclusion.....................................
17 1819 069
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES:
Metropolitan Edison Co. et al. (Three Mlle Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1),
NRC Docket No. 50-289, Order, August 9, 1979...................................
10 Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1974)..........
2,11,14,17 RULEMAKING:
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Proposed Rule, Emergency Planning,44 Fed.
Reg. 75167 (December 19, 1979)........
9,11,13,14,15,16 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Advance Netice of Proposed Rulemaking, 44 Fec. Reg. 41483 (July 17, 1979)...................
9,11 1819 070
January 14, 1980 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
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SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
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Docket No. 50-312
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(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
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Station)
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LICENSEE'S BRIEF ON REFERRED RULING EXCLUDING CONTENTIONS ON EMERGENCY PLANNING Introduction On December 14, 1979 the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board reaffirmed its earlier ruling that emergency planning issues will not be considered in this proceeding, and referred its ruling to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board.-1/
In accepting review, the Appeal Board gave the parties an opportunity to file additional briefs;-2/this brief is filed in response to that opportunity.
When briefing this subject below, Licensee took the position that issues concerning off-site emergency response were not within the authority delegated to the Licensing Board to 1/
Referral of a Licensing Board Ruling to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, December 14, 1979.
2/
Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board, Order Accepting Referral, December 19, 1979, at 2.
That Order provided for the filing of briefs by January 7, 1979; a request to extend this date to January 14, 1979 for all parties was granted by the Appeal Board on December 26, 1979.
1819 071
. consider.-3/ In the December 14 ruling, a majority of the Licensing Board rejected this position but excluded consideration of such issues on a different ground -- namely, the Commission's announced intention to engage in rulemaking on that subject.-4/ The Chairman, in a separate opinion, agreed with Licensee's view.-5/
For the reasons given below, the Appeal Board should uphold the Licensing Board's action excluding emergency planning issues, preferably on the ground that the Licensing Board has not been delegated authority to consider such issues.
- However, if it is persuaded that such delegated authority did exist, the Appeal Board should reach the question of applicability of the Douglas Point doctrine and affirm on the basis articulated by the majority below.
Argument I.
THE DELEGATED AUTHORITY OF THE LICENSING BOARD DOES NOT INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE OF OFF-SITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE.
This proceeding has its origin in the Commission's Order of May 7, 1979 which, in the aftermath of the accident 3/
Brief of Sacramento Municipal Utility District on the Scope of the Board's Jurisdiction, August 24, 1979; Licensee's Answer to Motion of the California Energy Commission for Reconsideration or, in the Alternative, for Certification to the Commission November 8, 1979.
4/
Referral, note 1 supra, Separate Opinion of Dr. Cole and Mr. Shon.
5/
Referral, note 1 supra, Separate Opinion of Elizabeth S.
Bowers.
1819 072
. at Three Mile Island, required certain modifications to plant and procedures to enhance the capability of the facility to respond safely to feedwater transients.
Certain of these modifications were required to be accomplished before opera-tion of Rancho Seco could be resumed -- for example, measures to upgrade the timeliness a-d reliability of Auxiliary Feed-water System performance, and implementation of operating procedures for initiating and controlling auxiliary feedwater independent of Integrated Control System control;-6/other long-term modifications were required.
Also, an opportunity was provided for persons to request a hearing with respect to that Order.
The Licensing Board's authority in this proceeding derives from the Commission's Order of June 21, 1979, in which it specified three issues for hearing, as follows:
"1.
Whether the actions required by sub-paragraphs (a) through (e) of Section IV of the
[May 7] Order are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facility will respond safely to feedwater transients, pending completion of the long-term modifica-tions set forth in Section II.
A contention challenging the correctness of the NRC staff's conclusion that the actions described in sub-paragraphs (a) through (e) have been completed satisfactorily will be considered to be within the scope of the hearing.
However, the filing of such a contention shall not of itself stay operation of the plant.
2.
Whether the licensee should be required to accomplish, as promptly as practicable, the long-term modifications set forth in Section II of the Order.
6/
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Order, May 7, 1979.
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. 3.
Whether these long-term modifications are sufficient to provide continued reasonable assurance that the facility will respond safely to feedwater transients." 7/
These issues have nothing to do with off-site emergency response, and no party has contended otherwise below.
- Rather, the argument has been that the three issues were not limiting and that other issues could be raised so long as they are "related to the Commission's May 7 Order."
This appears to have been the Licensing Board majority's posture when it re-jected Licensee's position and ruled, without further elabora-tion, that "there is a reasonable nexus between emergency planning / response and occurrence of feedwater transients."-8/
It is instructive at this point to examine the language of the emergency planning contention of California Energy Commission
(" CEC") which was rejected by the Board.
That contention states:
"Whether notwithstanding measures taken and contemplated to deal with feedwater transient problems, the facility should be required to re-vise emergency planning procedures so that, in the event of future problems, persons in the immediate reactor area and in the facility's reasonable impact area will not be exposed to danger.
This issue will require analysis of whether the facility's current emergency plans and the state and local plans associated therewith are adequate, or whether changes should be re-quired within a definite timeframe or before the facility is permitted to operate further."
(Emphasis added, footnote omitted.) 9/
7/
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Order, June 21, 1979, at 2.
8/
Separate Opinion, note 4 supra, at 4.
9/
Item 4 at page 11 of Revised Statement of Issues of Concern to the California Energy Commission, August 1979 (undated).
1819 074
9 CEC proceeded to elaborate by stating that this contention would also require inquiry into whether accident notification procedures are adequate and whether the scope of accidents addressed by the emergency plans is adequate. --10/
Licensee respectfully submits that this contention departs drastically from the scope of this proceeding as articulated by the Commission in its orders of May 7 and June 21, 1979.
As discussed more fully below, those orders have solely to do with assuring that the facility will respond 11/
safely to feedwater transients.
This may include considera-
-~
tion of the Licensee's organization and personnel as it relates to that assurance. --12/If the Licensing Board finds that the modifications directed by the Commission are not sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facility will respond safely to feedwater transients, then, in the words of the 10/
Id.
11/
The underlined portion of the contention quoted above highlights the fact that CEC's contention has nothing to do with such assurance.
12/
Our position is also consistent with the Board's articu-Tation of the scope of the proceeding:
"In this proceeding, it will be appropriate to investigate questions concerning the propagation of a response throughout the Rancho Seco system, where ' system' includes the physical facilities as well as the organization and personnel which operate them."
Order Ruling on Scope and Contentions, October 5, 1979, at 3.
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Commission, " appropriate cction can be taken at that time."--
The Commission, however, has not authorized the Licensing Board, as a general proposition, to investigate questions which do not relate uniquely to the features of the B&W design which led to issuance of the May 7 Order.
Accordingly, the subject of general measures to protect the public from the consequences of a broad range of accidents is not part of the Board's dele-gated responsibility.--14/
We grant for present purposes that it was not the Commission's intention to limit the possible scope of the hearing strictly to the three issues stated in its June 21, 1979 Order.
We base this on a portion of the transcript of the Commission's public meeting of July 11, 1979 in which it discussed possible modifications to the June 21 Order.
During that meeting, Chairman Hendrie noted, with apparent approval, that the Licensing Board had stated in an order of July 3, 1979--15/
that further issues could be specified "as long as they are related to the action taken by the Commission in its May 7, 1979 Order."--16/It seems. fair to conclude that the other Commissioners concurred in Chairman 13/
Order, note 7 supra, at 3.
14/
Since this hearing is purely discretionary, the Commission Is free to establish a limited scope, as it has done.
15/
Order for Filing of Amended and Supplemental Requests For and Notice of Prehearing Conference, July 3, 1979, at 3, n.3.
16/
Transcript, NRC Public Meeting: Discussions of Modifications to the Rancho Seco Order, July 11, 1979, at 5-6.
Note that for this transcript the Commission waived its usual rule forbidding citation.
Id. at 12-13.
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. Hendrie's view.
The Commissioners were concerned that the Licensing Board feel free to consider issues of management competence and control, if raised; because of the quoted lan-guage they concluded that it was unnecessary to amend their
-17/
June 21 Order to accomplish this. ~
The question then is whether the issue of off-site emergency planning is likewise "related" to the Commission's May 7 Order.
This is a question of the Commission's intent, and the transcript of the Commission's July 12 meeting does not enlighten us.--18/ Rather, we must examine the terms of the May 7 Order, together with the circumstances surrounding its issuance.
That Order is but one of a range of actions which have been taken by the Commission with respect to reactor licensees as a consequence of the Three Mile Island experience.
For example, all holders of facility operating licenses have been instructed to take a number of immediate actions to assure that human errors which occurred during the TMI-2 accident and contributed to its severity would not be repeated at other reactors.
The intensity of Commission action has depended on how closely a given class of reactors resembles TMI-2 in design.
17/
Id. at 7-12.
18/
The Commission's allowance of management competence and control as an issue in Rancho Seco does not imply that emer-gency plan issues should be treated similarly.
Management competence has an obvious bearing on whether the short-and long-term modifications will be effectively impiemented and whether the operating organization will be capable of safely responding to feedwater transients.
See Transcript, note 16 supra, at 4.
1819 077 Orders much like the May 7 Order were issued to all licensees of operating reactors designed by Babcock & Wilcox
("B&W").
The reason for this type of action is set forth at the outset of the May 7 Order:
"In the course of its evaluation to date of the accident at the Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 facility, which utilizes a B&W designed PWR, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff has ascertained that B&W designed reactors appear to be unusually sensitive to certain off-normal transient conditions originating in the secondary system.
The features of the B&W design that contribute to this sensitivity are:
(1) design of the steam generators to operate with relatively small liquid volumes in the secondary side; (2) the lack of direct initiation of reactor trip upon the occurrence of off-normal conditions in the feedwater system; (3) reliance on an integrated control system (ICS) to automatically regulate feedwater flow; (4) actuation before reactor trip of a pilot-operated relief valve on the primary system pressurizer (which, if the valve sticks open, can aggravate the event); and (5) a low steam generator elevation (relative to the reactor vessel) which provides a smaller driving head for natural circulation.
Because of these features, B&W designed reactors place more reliance on the reliability and per-formance characteristics of the auxiliary feed-water system, the integrated control system, and the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) performance to recover from frequent anticipated transients, such as loss of offsite power and loss of normal feedwater, than do other PWR designs.
This, in turn, places a large burden on the plant operators in the event of off-normal system behavior during such anticipated transients." 19/ (Emphasis added.)
The B&W operating reactors were singled out for consideration of issues associated with their particular design 19/
Order, note 6 supra, at 1-2.
1819 078 features.
Those issues and management competence to cope with those unique design features are ripe for consideration in the course of this hearing.
There is nothing unique to B&W reactors about issues of off-site emergency planning.
Effective emergency plans must be in effect at any site and must deal with the measures to protect the public from the consequences of acciden*s regardless of the initiating event (whether a feedwater transient or otherwise).
They are not uniquely related to any particular design feature of a B&W-designed reactor.
The Commission recognized the generic nature of the emergency planning issue when it recently initiated a compre-hensive rulemaking, discussed more fully in Part II below, for the purpose of upgrading its emergency plan requirements. --20/
21/
The Commission's Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,-
issued not long after the June 21 Order in this proceeding, made it clear that a central purpose of the rulemaking will be to deal with questions raised by the accident at Three Mile Island about the adequacy of radiological response plans.
of the range of actions taken in response to the Three Mile Island accident, that rulemaking is the forum chosen by the Commission to con-sider whether new emergency planning measures are called for.
The Commission did not intend duplicative consideration of those questions to take place in the Rancho Seco hearing.
20/
44 Fed. Reg. 75167 (December 19, 1979).
21/
44 Fed. Reg. 41483 (July 17, 1979).
9 079 Additional support for the Licensee's position is provided by the Connission's 1.ugust 9,1979 Order initiating a hearing in the Three Mile Island Unit 1 proceeding.--22/
Although the two orders served similar purposes, the TMI-l Order, in contrast to Rancho Seco, explicitly set forth issues of emergency preparedness to be considered in that proceeding.--23/
Moreover, in the TMI-l Order the Commission stated:
"In addition to the items identified for the other B&W reactors, the unique circumstances at TMI require that additional safety concerns identified by the NRC staff be resolved prior to restart.
These concerns result from (1) potential interaction between Unit 1 and the damaged Unit 2 and (4) recognized deficiencies in emergency plans and station operating procedures." 24/
This language makes it clear that the omission of the subjects of emergency preparedness and evacuation plans from the Rancho Seco Order was deliberate.
Finally, we agree with the point made by the Licensing Board Chairman that considering the Commission action enlarging the issues in Rancho Seco to in-clude management competence, similar action on the off-site emergency plan issue would have been expected if the Com-25/
mission had intended that issue to be covered.
22/
Metropolitan Edison Co. et al. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1), NRC Docket No. 50-289, Order, August 9, 1979.
23/
Id. at 6.
These isnues will not be repeated here as tEey are reproduced in " Referral of a Licensing Board Ruling to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board," December 14, 1979, at 11.
24/
Id. at 4.
25/
Separate Opinion, note 5 supra, at 12.
1819 080 II.
IN ANY EVENT, THE LICENSING BOARD PROPERLY DECLINED TO ENTERTAIN EMERGENCY PLAN ISSUES BASED ON THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THAT SUBJECT.
If the Appeal Board does not agree with Licensee's Point I above, it then becomes appropriate to consider whether the Licensing Board's action should be affirmed on the basis of its present rationale.
The majority ruled that emergency plan issues are barred by application of the Douglas Point-~26/
doctrine, because of the Commission's actions relative to rulemaking on that subject.
The Licensing Board originally excluded the various contentions on emergency planning based on what was then the 27/
prospect of rulemaking.-~ That prospect has now materialized with the publication, on December 19, 1979, of a proposed rule which, when made effective, would make sweeping changes in the Commission's requirements governing emergency planning.--28/
The broad scope of the rulemaking confirms and strengthens the logic of applying the Douglas Point precedent in this instance.
We agree with the majority that the "real value of the Douglas Point teaching is in the avoidance of unnecessary 26/
Potomac Electric Power Co. (Douglas Point Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-218, 8 AEC 79 (1974).
27/
Order Riling on Scope and Contentions, October 5, 1979, at 2-4.
tee Li:ensing Board had before it the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, published on July 17, 1979.
28/
44 Fed. Reg. 75167 (December 19, 1979).
1819 081
. 29/
duplication."~~
The rulemaking notice permits us to assess its scope and determine more clearly the extent to which con-sideration of the contentions on emergency planning put forward in this proceeding would result in such duplication or otherwise contravene Commission policy.
We refer the Appeal Board to CEC's contention reproduced at page 4 supra.
A close examination shows that that contention is in fact generic, despite CEC's protests to the contrary.
No concern is offered which is in any way unique to the Rancho Seco facility.
Prompted by the TMI-2 experience, CEC's issue simply amounts to whether, despite measures to compensate for the unique design features of B&W reactors, new emergency plan requirements having no relationship to those unique design features should be imposed.
Very simply, this is what the recent proposed rulemaking proceeding is all about.
The supplementary information published along with the proposed rule states:
"The proposed rule is predicated on the Commission's considered judgment in the after-math of the accident at Three Mile Island that safe siting and design-engineered features alone do not optimize protection of the public health and safety.
Before the accident it was thought that adequate siting in accordance with existing staff guidance coupled with the defense-in-depth approach to design would be the primary public protection.
Emergency planning was con-ceived as a secondary but additional measure to be exercised in the unlikely event that an acci-dent would happen.
The Commission's perspective was severely altered by the unexpected sequence of events that occurred at Three Mile Island.
~~29/
Referral, note 1 supra, at 7.
\\819 082
. The accident showed clearly that the protection provided by siting and engineered safety features must be bolstered by the ability to take pro-tective measures during the course of an accident."30/
Further reading shows that the rulemaking proceeding will consider fundamental changes throughout the structure of the Commission's emergency plan regulations, including requirements of NRC concurrence in state and local government emergency response plans, adoption of newly defined and ex-panded zones governing protective action for the public, and substantial changes to the required content of emergency plans. --31/
To illustrate further, CEC states that consideration of its issue will involve "... whether changes should be re-quired within a definite timeframe or before the facility is permitted to operate further."
This precise issue is addressed in the proposed rule which, for nuclear power reactors already licensed to operate, would require NRC concurrence in state and local emergency response plans within 180 days after the effective date of the rule or by January 1, 1981, whichever is sooner.
The notice considers two alternative schemes, one of which would automatically require nuclear power plant shut-down in the absence of concurrence after that date.
Clearly the Licensing Board has no business dealing with questions like this.
30/
44 Fed. Reg. 75167, 75169 (December 19, 1979).
31/
Id. at 75170-74.
1819 083
. We have quoted CEC's only contention on the subject of off-site emergency response.
The contentions of other 32/
parties on that subject, which were also rejected,-
present much the same problem.
A good example is Contention 18 of Intervenors Gary Hursh and Richard Castro, which reads as follows:
"SMUD, the licensee, has not extended the capability to take appropriate emergency acticns for the population around the plant site for a distance of ten miles and therefore Rancho Seco is unsafe..." 33/
Again, the proposed rulemaking vill explicitly consider the use by Federal, State and local officials of expanded areas called Emergency Planning Zones, one of which would be an area about 10 miles in radius from the reactor within which appro-priate accion can be taken to protect the population against 34/
thc. effects
<<f plume exposure.-
The contentions in question are quite general and in many cases it is difficult to tell whether they amount to any more than a request for the establishment of new require-ments.
To this extent, we concur with the conclusion of the Licensing Board majority that the Commission intended 32/
Contentions of Petitioners Gary Hursh and Richard Castro, AEgust 17, 1979, items 11-14, 17-19, 23 (pp.3-5); Friends of the Earth, Revised Contentions for Prehearing Conference, August 1, 1T19, item III(b).
These were rejected on the ground of the Douglas Point precedent in the Order Ruling on Scope and Contentions, October 9, 1979.
33/
Contentions of Hursh and Castro, note 32 supra, at 4.
34/
44 Fed. Reg. 75167, at 75172.
i819 084 development of new requirements to take place in the course of rulemaking, and for implementation of those requirements with respect to specific state and local plans and specific sites to follow thereafter.
The Commission in its rulemaking effort has set in motion a comprehensive response to the need for improvements in emergency planning arising from the TMI-2 experience.
Recognizing the time required to make such fundamental changes, it has proposed, for reactors already licensed to operate, an implementation period of 180 days after effective date or January 1, 1981 (whichever is sooner) before action will be taken with respect to the license.
The Commission has further determined that operation for the periods prior to the implementation of concurred-in plans "does not con-stitute an unacceptable risk to the public health and safety."--35/
Under these circumstances an attempt by the Licensing Board to implement new emergency plan requirements would not only be duplicative -- it would contravene the whole approach to this problem taken by the Commission.
We have great diffi-culty seeing how the Licensing Board could require implementation of new requirements which are only in a formative stage, espe-cially where the Commission has approved continued operation
_3_5/
44 Fed. Reg. at 75169.
i819 083 in their absence.
At best, any such review would have to be duplicated when those requirements are finalized.--36/
On this point it is instructive to examine how the Commission plans to deal with emergency plan issues arising in initial license and construction permit proceedings prior to completion of the rulemaking.
It stated in the r"lemaking notice:
" Prior to the conclusion of this rule-making proceeding, the Commission will give special attention to emergency planning matters, including the need for concurred-in plans, on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the modified adjudicatory procedures of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix B.
Under that Appendix, no new license, construction permit, or limited work authorization may be issued without Com-mission consideration of issues such as this."
(Footnote omitted.) 37,/
(Emphasis added.)
Moreover, even after the rule is effective, concurred-in plans would normally be required prior to initial operating license issuance, rather than within the "180-day or January 1, 1981" period applicable to already operating reactors.
The Commission's decision to single out for special attention cases where imple-mentation of a new emergency plan is necessary for initial licensing, lends further support to our view that implementa-tion of new requirements for already operating reactors, such as Rancho Seco, is to occur in the normal course following completion of rulemaking.
36/
of course, after the new emergency plan requirements are established, CEC and other interested parties will have the opportunity to review Rancho Seco's plans in light of those requirements.
Further, we understand that the State of Cali-fornia's Office of Emergency Services will be holding hearings in the near future on changes to the State's emergency plan.
37/
44 Fed. Reg. at 75168.
. Conclusion The broad consideration of emergency planning is beyond the Li:ensing Board's delegated authority.
The Commission's orders initiating this proceeding define its scope to include whether there is assurance that the Rancho Seco facility will respond safely to feedwater transients.
They do not contemplate consideration of the issues which are not related to the unique design features of B&W reactors.
Both the Commission's May 7 Order in Rancho Seco and the pending rulemaking proceeding on emergency planning are among the range of actions, generic and otherwise, taken by the Commission in response to the TMI-2 accident.
It is only logical to assume that the Commission intended emer-gency plan issues to be addressed in the rulemaking, while matters deriving from the peculiarities of the B&W design are considered in proceedings such as the present one.
In any event, the Licensing Board's action is supportable under the Douglas Point, precedent, since its review of broad emergency planning issues would be duplicative of those reviews which will take place in, and as a consequence of, the pending rulemaking proceeding on this subject.
For these reasons, the action of the Licensing Board i819 087 excluding consideration of those issues from the pending proceeding should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted, SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE
. O h
G6ra7d Charnoff Thomas A.
Baxter Lex K.
Larson 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 331-4100 counsel for Licensee Dated:
January 14, 1980 1819 088
January 14, 1980 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
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Docket No. 50-312
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(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
)
Station)
)
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE The undersigned, being an attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before the Courts of the District of Columbia, hereby enters his appearance as counsel on behalf of Licensee Sacramento Municipal Utility District in proceedings related to the above-captioned matter, s,
lit. 4 i L u... -
.s, Gerald Charnoff SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 (202) 331-4100 1819 089
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD in the Matter of
)
)
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT
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Docket No. 50-312
)
(Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating
)
Station)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing " Licensee's Brief on Referred Ruling Excluding Contentions on Emergency Plan-ning" and " Notice of Appearance" of Gerald Charnoff were served this 14th day of January, 1980, by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, upon the following:
Richard S. Salz:ran, Esquire Dr. Richard F. Cole Chairman Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Frederick J. Shon Dr. John H. Buck Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atcmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cm mission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 David S. Kaplan, Esquire Mr. Thcmas S. Moore Secretary and General Counsel Atcmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Sacramento Municipal Utility District U.S. Nuclear Regulatcry Ccmnission P.O. Box 15830 Washington, D.C.
20555 Sacramento, California 95813 Fli n M th S. Bowers, Esquire Stephen H. Lewis, Esquire Chaiman Office of the Executive Irgal Director Atcmic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccmnission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccxrmission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 1819 090
s Gary Hursh, Esquire Suite 700 520 Capitol bull Sacranento, California 95814 Mr. Richard D. Castro 2231 K Street Sacramento, California 95816 James S. Reed, Esquire Michael H. Psy, Esquire Reed, Sannel & Fay 717 K Street, Suite 405 Sacramento, California 95814 Christopher Ellison, Esquire Dian Grueneich, Esquire California Energy Comission 1111 Howe Avenue Sacramento, California 95825 Herbert H. Brown, Esquire Iawrence Coe Ianpher, Esquire Hill, Christopher and Phillips, P.C.
1900 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ca mission Waslungton, D.C.
20555
/
Gerald Charnoff
///
1819 091