ML19257B534

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Submits Info Re Loop Seals in Pressurizer Surge Line as Requested of E Case,Ofc of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ML19257B534
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 07/26/1979
From: Rehm T
NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To: Helfman S
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 8001160802
Download: ML19257B534 (2)


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July 26, 1979 l_

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d SM ID;IN Mr. Stan Helfman President's Comission on T!!I 2100 M Street,,f' W., Suite 714 Washington, D. C.

Dear Stan:

Attached is the informatior, you requested frora Edson Case, Deputy Director, Office of fluclear Reactor Regulation, y-Sincerely, jf Thomas A. Rehm Assistant to EDO Endosure Background info to 1/10/78 re Loop Seals in Pressurizer Surge Line E.KevinCornell/liRC-Tiil[

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Background Information to January 10, 1978 f;ote to RSB -- Loop Seals in Pressurizer Eurge Line The potential ef fect of loop seals (i.e., a manometer effect) in a pressurizer surge lir e on pressurizer level indications was considered by fir. S. Israel (RSB) back in 1977 as a generic technical matter rather than during the review of any specific plants; however, he did recognize that the loop seal configuration appears to be unique to B&W The nature of the concern for the loop seal deals with plant designs.

behavior as a mano$eter where level changes would be associated with differences y in pressure between the primary system and the pressurizer.

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In some transient situations where voids would be formed in the primary This

. system, the pressu{izer may not be the hottest point in the system.

Since the could lead to the manometer effect in the pressurizer.

pressurizer is where the instru:;hion is installed to measure system coolant The level, this situa'i, yon could lead to misleading level information.

y operator relies.on level indication for the control of makeup flow to the plant system.

Operating experience.available at the time that the memorandum was prepared did not reveal any situa n for which the operator could not effect safe plant shutdown; consequently, actions to pursue this matter further at the time were not taken.

This has remained generally true up to i

The experience of the Tlil 2 accident, makes it apparent that greater now.

emphasis in the review must be given to this matter.

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