ML19256G373
| ML19256G373 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/12/1979 |
| From: | Ferguson R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Randy Hall BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7912310188 | |
| Download: ML19256G373 (6) | |
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DEC 121979 Mr. Robert Hall Brookhaven National Laboratory Long Island, New York 11973
Dear Mr. Hall:
This letter initiates a new generic task to develop a staff position which establishes the characteristics of water shields that protect sensitive electrical equipment from water damage by the operation of fixed fire suppression systems or fire hose or by breaks in piping.
This task is designated as 2 H Water Shields.
For your assistance in initiating this task, we are enclosing a first draft of a brief position, and an outline for a more complete position.
The final position should state the acceptance criteria you have used or will use in evaluating such shields in the operating plants.
I have also enclosed an excerpt from a memorandum to Comissioner Bradford from H. Denton dated September 26, 1979 which indicates that this task should be completed by March 1980. Note also that this excerpt indicates that task 2 A In-situ Test Methods and 2 F Flame Retardants, should be completed by April 1980 and February 1980, respectively.
Sincerely, j
n pW "w
RobertE[erguson,SectionLeader Plant Syt. ems Branch Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosures:
As stated cc 3/ enclosures:
G. Lainas V. Panciera E. Sylvester R. Cerbone W. Kato 1656 217 7912810
ENCLOSURE 1 DRAFT STAFF POSITION ON WATER SHIELDS Staff Concern In some plant areas, redundant electrical equipment important to safety may be disabled by water from automatic or manual fire suppres3fon systems. The water may come from leakage from the suppression systems, inadvertant operation of the fixed systems or deliberate operations of a suppression system during a fire.
Where redundant equipment is not adequately separated; water being used to extinguish a fire in one division of equipment could disable redundant equipment required for safe shutdown, which is not directly involved in the fire.
Staff Position Where redundant safe shutdown related equipment could be disabled by the application of water from fire suppression systems, such equipment should be protected against water damage. This protection may consist of portable or fixed water shields, or waterproofing.
Portable Shields Portable snields should be provided where it is impractical to use fixed shields because of operational restrictions.
Portable shields should be made from material of non-combustible or low combustible construction, which are easily deployed by fire fighters.
Materials may include canvas materials; rubber coated canvas, canvas treated with a waterproofing preparation, or polyethelene.
Polyethelene sheeting should not be used in areas where hot dropping insulation or other material can burn a hole in or ignite the shield.
Portable shields should be kept in a centrally located easily accessible location.
They should be deployed by fire fighters prior to an attempt to extinguish with hose streams where the deflection of water from surrranding surfaces could cause damage to redundant safe shutdown equipment.
These shields should be so placed as to intercept water, and to continue to allow for required ventilation of the equipment p rotected.
Fixed Water Shields Fixed water shields should be used in areas containing fixed water suppression systems and where the shields will not restrict operations.
Fixed shields may be constructed of sheet metal, or other non-combustible material.
I6SI6 218
2-Fixed shields should be placed so as to intercept the falling water, and configured so as not to restrict the ventilation requirements of the equipment protected. These shields should be effective in preventing direct or indirect water impingement type damage from the fixed suppression systems that would normally be used for the area.
They should be designed to remain functional following an SSE.
Waterproofing Methods Where the water comes from fixed or manual systems in another fire area, e.g., from the floor above; one of the following methods shall be provided:
Openings where differential thermal expansion is of no concern should be sealed with a sealant that maintains water-tight characteristics between the parent material of the opening and the sealants.
Sheet metal, canvas, or rubber lined canvas troughs should be provided on the underside of openings where thermal expansion dictates the use of a flexible membrane between the two sides of the opening, i.e., the expansion joints between two overhead floor slabs. The troughs should be routed to direct any water to the plant drainage system.
1656 219
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BNL AREAS OF INVESTIGATI6N STAFF POSITION - CN WATER SHIELDS OUTLINE I.
Types of Shields A.
Fixed
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When used B.
Portable 1.
When used II. Materials of Construction A.
Conditions of Use B.
Conditions of Storage III. Criteria for Evaluation A.
Test Standard - Methods B.
Material Compatibility C.
Hazard Evaluation of New Design IV. Waterproofing Techniques A.
Sealants - Criteria B.
Troughs - Criteria V.
Training A.
Use of Portable Shields B.
Techniques 1656 220
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Cox.issioner Bradford The NRC Fire Protection Research Review Group met on July 12, 1979 with repre-sentatives from Sendia Laboratories and Brookhaven National Laboratory to start An NRC Test Coordinatir
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planning the test of the Rancho Seco Pakeup Pumo Roo..
Co :-ittee consisting of representatives fro-NRR, RES and SD was established to expedite decision c.aling. Action'iters and other assign ents were r,ade at this time.
On August 21, 1979, the Fire Protection Research Review Group and the Test Coordination Comittee met with representatives fron Sandia, Brookhaven and Underwriters Laboratories (UL) to r.ake initial plans and decisions regarding It pre:aration testing, neasurenent require.ents, fire brigade actions, etc.
was agreed that IE should assess the actual status of the Rancho Seco Makeup A site visit to Rancho Pump Roon so that a representative mockup can be -wde.
Seco was planned fer the week of Septeter 17, 1979.
Af ter that Sandia and L'L personnel would prepare cost and schedule estic.ates.
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Subsequently on August 31, 1979, the licensee for Ranbho Seco infcmed us that the redundant high pressure injection pu.? cables in the Fakeup Pump Room would be rerouted to outside the room. As a result, the adequacy of separation in this plant area is no longer a concern. The Rancho Seco Makeup Pump Room configuration will be deleted fro-the test prograr and work will begin en the next plant configuration on the program schedule:
the Arkansas 1 Auxiliary Suilding Corridor. Drawings of the Arkansas 1 Auxiliary Building Corridor and other background infomation will be provided to the Test Coordination Comittec and a site visit will be scheduled before the end of Deee.ber 1979.
You will be notified when the schedule is set and, as you requested, we will in-fem you of any slippage of that schedule.
Item 2 Please provide a list of the open ite~s that are comen to several plants des-cribed in the third paragraph. What is the present schedule for developing the acceptabce for those items?
Answer _
The oren items that are com:n to seve-al plants for Mich accertable criteria are bein; developed ar.d our sched;1e for their de el:: e-is listed as foll:<;
1.
Safe Shutdc.cn Ca: ability Plant areas have been identified in *".ich the s.aff d:es n:t have ade: ate
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ass;. ? :e t".at a prstA tted fi e we d n:: di a;e 5:t' red..da - divisi:.-
Lice sees have not ade ;a.ei icer.ti<ied -ke syste s O f s h r.d ><. sy s te.s.
a.d cc :cnents rec; ired fcr safe shJtd:c. and treir lo:ati:- in s;ecific r
fire 1 as, er tava n:t dermestrated
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656 P00RORGNAL
ese Co nissioner Bradford f I-l 2.
&e Brigade Size and Traininc
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sta is the minimum size of fire brigades and training requirenents Th.tse criteria have been develcped and are being sent to licensees ande i
in addition, the Office of Stan:'ards Developnent is initiating a rule-l mLing procedure.
3.
sssociated Non-Safety Circuits Establishes the separation and isolation m 2 ire ents to provide additional l
assurance that fire darage to non-safety el ctrical circuits would not pro-pagate to safety circuits. Estimated to be completed in hovember 1979.
l 4
Reacter Coolant Pu o 011 Collection System The lubricating oil syster.s for reactor coolant pumps are a potential source of fires.
Acceptance criteria are ueing developed to judge the l
adequacy of and provide design requirements for oil collection systems intended to prevent such an occurrence.
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be com;1eted in December 1979.
These criteria are estinated to i
g,p 5.
_ Fire Retardants l
Establishes the need, location, qualification requirenents, and quality assurance for fire retardants, (e.g., coatings. tray covers, ceramic blankets).
Estir.ated to be completed in February 1950.
Oh 6.
Water Shields Establishes the characteristics of water shields which protect sensitive electrical equipment from water damage by the operation of fixed fire '
suppress'an systems or by breaks in piping. Estimated to be em:pleted in March '1980.
pg 7.
In-Situ Testing of Smoke Detection Systems N
Establishes the in-situ tests and other verification rethod:
f used to veri-Estir,ated to be completed in April 1950.i that installed s cke detect:rs P00R ORGin
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