ML19256F903
| ML19256F903 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07106206 |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1979 |
| From: | Zeff D BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | Macdonald C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17249A972 | List: |
| References | |
| 14799, NUDOCS 7912270051 | |
| Download: ML19256F903 (11) | |
Text
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~ Babcock &Wilcox RECE!VED Power Generation croup P.O. Box 800 Lynchburg. Va. 24505 77 Of 25
.U j !C $5 Telephone: (804) 384-5111 November 21, 1979 0 3. '!'
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.dCTION Ap p!!::st....................
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Fir. C. E. blacDonald, Chief
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Transportation Branch i;,, ; c.._.
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Division of Fuel Cycle 6 Flaterial Safety
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United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission em.;. w m j.
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Washington, D. C.
20555
REFERENCES:
(1) SN51-1168 (2) Certificate of rempliance, USA /6206/AF, Babcock 6 Wilcox, "b!odel B", DNket 71-6206 (3) BSW Applica+. ions Dated 1/16/70, As Supplemented 3/3/70, 11/25/74 end 3/21/79 Gentlemen:
This letter is written in regard to Reference 2 above concerning the Certificate of Compliance for the b!odel B fresh fuel shipping container which will expire on January 31, 1980.
We are requesting that the current certifi-cate be reissued for another 5 year period prior to the expiration date. The attachment to this letter is a consolidated application combining all submittals and supplements (Reference 3 above) with all duplicated and superceded material omitted as requested by bir. Odegaarten of your staff.
There have been no changes affecting container design or application other than those previously approved by the NRC, and no other changes are requested at this time.
Any future changes that are significant in relation to container design or application will be submitted for NRC approval prior to first use.
We appreciate your consideration in this matter. Should you wish to discuss this material in more detail, or if questions should arise, please do not hesitate to contact me at (804) 384-5111, Extension 5211 or J. P. Watters at (804) 384-5111, Extension 5966.
4{
Sincerely, BABCOC:' 6 WILCOX C0h!PANY C05BIERCIAL NUCLEAR FUEL PLA.T N
[b D.bN# h D +
W. Zeff, blanager Health-Safety and Licensing DW::com 147S9
, Attachments g6/
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The Babcock & Wilcox Company / Established 1867 g gig 2'7
IODEL B FRESH FLEL SHIPPING CD.7TAINER Buf-GFP PACKkGEIDUSA/6206/AFDOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: SHIPPING SAFETY NMLYSIS 1.0 This section provides the demonstration of the safety of shipping container design, construction, and contents as required by USNRC regulations 10 CFR 71.
1.1 Package Description (71.22) 1.1.1 Gross weight loaded with two fuel assemblies will be 7300 lbs.
maximum.
1.1.2 Model B.
1.1.3 The shipping container is constructed primarily of carbon steel as described in the drawings listed in Exhibit A.
1.1. 3.1 The minimum.020" thick zircaloy or minimum.016" thick stainless steel cladding of the fuel rods is i
considered the containment vessel. The loaded fuel rods are then arranged in a rigid configuration with a 8.6" x 8.6" maximum cross section and having a volume of water (i.e., void) to U0 ratio of not more 2
than 2.0.
1.1.3.2 Two (2) 3/16 inch thick full length boronated stain-less steel plates containing at least 1.5% by weight natural Boron are located between the two (2) fuel assemblies as non-fissile neutron absorbers.
1.1.3.3 The shell of the container is a cylindrical structure constructed of 0.089 inch thick carbon steel sheet with end domes of 0.125 inch thick carbon steel.
Additional items to stiffen the outer shell have been included on the shell to provide support to its basic structure.
These items are as follows:
' A series of two (2) 90 angles which are rolled and welded circumferentially to the shell.
- The parting flanges on both the upper and lower sections of the container shell.
1642 246 DATE 11-21-79 REVISION NO, O
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fDDEL B FESH FUEL SHIPPING C0iffAIER B&l-GFP PACKAGE ID USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: SHIPPING SAFEIY ATMLYSIS 1.1 Package Description (71.22) (continued)
'The base structure of the container consists pri-marily of two (2) full length angles welded to the lower half of the container shell.
1.1. 3. 4 Pressure relief and filler valves, lifting and tie-down devices, humidity indicators and accelerometer viewing ports are as shown on the referenced drawings.
1.1. 3. 5 Heat dissipation not applicable.
1.1.4 Coolants not applicable.
1.2 Package Contents l.2.1 Radioactive contents are U0 sintered pellets.030 inch to 2
.060 inch in diameter, enriched to a maximum of 4.05% in the U-235 isotope. Maximum activity will be 1.27 curfes per assembly, or 2.54 curies for the container.
1.2.2 Each assembly may contain up to 18.8 kg U-235 fissile constitu-ents, or 37.6 kg U-235 for the container of two assemblies.
1.2.3 UO sintered pellets as described in 1.2.1.
2 1.2.4 Not applicable in that nuclear safety analysis presumes optimum conditions.
1.2.5 Maximum weight of the contents will be 3360 lbs.
1.2.6 Decay heat not applicable.
2.0 General Standards For All Packaging (71.31) 2.1 There will be no significant chemical, galvanic or other reaction among the container components, or between the container and the fuel assemblies. The shipping container is made primarily of car-bon steel and the exposed material of the fuel assemblies is primarily zircaloy and stainless steel.
Packing media may include polethylene and fibre pane'ls outside the fuel regions.
2.2 The self-contained closure hardware must be deliberately unfastened.
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lDDEL B FRESH FUEL SHIPPIfra C0fffAlfER BFil-OFP PACKAGE ID USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 GECTION: SHIPPING SAFEIY RMLYSIS 2.0 General Standards For All Packaging (71.31) (continued) 2.3 Lifting Devices 2.3.1 There are eight (8) lifting eyes on the lid of the container, four of which (two on opposite sides of each end) are used to lift the loaded container.
This was shown by lifting the loaded container free of the floor by each of its lifting eyes and holding to illustrate no yielding in the lifting eye. The system of four lifting eyes consequently is capable of support-ing three times the weight of the loaded container without generating stress in excess of the yield strength.
2.3.2 Covered by 2.3.1 above.
2.3.3 There are no other structural parts of the package which could conceivably be used to lift the package.
Further assurance of the use of only designated ' lift points is provided by adequate identification of the proper lift points on the container, and the fact that the container will be part of a Fissile Class III Shipment.
As such the containers shall be transported with a vehicle for the sole use of Babcock & Wilcox.
The controls imposed by B&W for loading and unloading the containers will assure that only the designated system of lifting devices is used, and that only one loaded container is lifted at a time.
2.3.4 Failure of the lifting devices under load will not impair the containment or shielding, properties of the package.
Such failure if it occurred would only damage a portion of the con-tainer cover which is not considered as shielding and is not part of the structural members retaining the assemblies in the container.
2.3.4.1 Tie-down devices There is no system of tie-down devices which is a structural part of the container.
The container is secured to the vehicle by binder chains passed over 1642 248 DATE 11-21-79 REVISION No.
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TDDEL B FESH REL SHIPPIf5 C0!!TAlfER BW-CffP PACKAGEIDUSA/6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION:
SillPPIf1G SAFEiY #@ LYSIS 2.0 General Standards For All Packaging (71.31) (continued) 2.3.4.1 Tie-down devices (cont'd) the container and fastened to the truck bed.
In addition the containers will be chocked on the truck bed.
2.3.4.2 Since this container will be part of a Fissile Class III Shipment, it will be transported by an exclusive use vehicle, with specific restriction in the special arrangements providing for sole use by the Babcock and Wilcox Company (B&W).
B&tl will supervise the loading of the vehicle to assure that the containers are tied down as described abcVe.
This administrative control by B&tl is adequate to assure that no structural part of the container is used as a tie down device.
2.3.4.3 There is no tie down device which is a structural part of the container.
- 3. 0 Criticality Standards for Fissi12 !!aterial Packages (71.33) 3.1 The damaged container nuclear safety analysis demonstrates that an array of damaged containers is subcritical under varying conditions of moderation and full reflection.
- onsequently one container is likewise subcritical under the crite.-ia of this paragraph.
3.2 Not applicable; there will be no liquid contents during normal transport.
- 3. 3 Not applicable; there will be no liquid contents during normal transport.
4.0 Standards for Normal Conditions of Transport (70.35) 4.1 A prototype container was tested under normal conditions of transport and found acceptable.
ThematerialsofthecontainersandcontentsaresuchtS I
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FDDEL B FESH FUEL SHIPPIm QiffAINER Bel-GFP PACKAGEIDUSA/6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: SHIPPING SAFETY #MLYSIS 4.0 Standards for Normal Conditions of Transport (76.35) (continued) 4.1 Continued effectiveness can not be substantially effected by either temperature extreme of 130 F, or -40 F.
Pressure relief valves will maintain the container shell pressure differential to. less than 4.5 psi.
Water spray test is not applicable because the container shell and structural components are steel.
The free drop tests performed resulted in no significant damage to the container or contents.
The corner drop test is not required by virtue of the materials of construction.
The penetration test was not performed in that it is not credible that the test could puncture the container shell and result in the release of radioactive material.
The compression test performed was limited to demonstrating that two fully loaded containers' could be-stacked on top of one container.
This test is adequate to assure safety in that the shipments will be made by exclusive use vehicle as Fissile Class III, and B&W administra-tive controls will limit the stacking height.
In view of the above testing and assessment, it is concluded that:
4.1.1 There will be no release of radioactive material from the containment vessel.
4.1.2 The effectiveness of the packaging will not be substantially reduced.
4.1.3 There will be no mixture of gases or vapors in the package which 'could through any credible increase of pressure or explosion, significantly reduce the effectiveness of the package.
J'642 250 IMTE 11-21-79 REVISION No.
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FDDEL B FESH FUEL SHIPPIf5 C0ff!NfER Ml-CIFP PACKAGE ID USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: SillPPING SACEIY #MLYSIS 4.0 Standards for Normal Conditions of Transport (70.35)(continued) 4.1.4 & 4.1. 5 Not applicable in that coolants are not involved.
4.2 The design and construction of the container and contents is such that under normal conditions of transport:
4.2.1 The package will be subcritical, see 71.33 (3.1).
4.2.2 The geometric form of the contents were not substantially altered by normal transport conditions.
4.2.3 Not required in that nuclear safety analysis presumes in -
leakage of water.
4.2.4 There will be no substantial reduction of the effectiveness of the packaging including:
4.2.4.1 Reduction by more than 5 percent in the total effective volume of the packaging on which nuclear safety is assessed; 4.2.4.2 Reduction by more than 5 percent in the effective spacing on which nuclear safety is assessed, between the center of the containment vessel and the outer surface of the packaging; or 4.2.4.3 Occurrence of any aperture in the outer surface of the packaging large enough to permit the entry of a 4-inch cube.
5.0 Standards for Hypothetical Accident Conditions F.or A Single Package (71.36) 5.1 The effects of a hypothetical accident on a loaded container have been assessed as follows:
Free Drop - a prototype container loaded with two dummy fuel a,ssemblies was drop tested.
Results werr. acceptable.
Puncture - although this test is not essential in that nuclear safety analysis presumes the container to be flooded, the test h'as performed.
Results were acceptable.
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,mm IDDFL B FRESH FUEL SHIPPIIE C0ilTAlfiER MI-CIFP PACKAGE ID USA /6206/AF DOCKET 71-5206 SECTION: SHIPPING SAFEW AM.YSIS 5.0 Standards for Hypothetical Accident Conditions For A Single Package (71.36)
(Continued) 5.1 Continued Thermal - all materials of the container and contents significant to safety are such that they can withstand 1475 F for 30
. minutes.
Water Immersion - this test is not necessary since nuclear safety analysis presume's the container to be flooded.
The nuclear safety analysis of an array of damaged shipping containers presented in Section 6.0 shows the array to be subcritical.
Conse-quently a single container from the array is subcritical.
6.0 Specific Standards For A Fissile Class III Shipment (71.40) 6.1 The undamaged shipment shall be subcritical with an identical ship-ment in contact with it and with the two shipments closely reflected on all sides by water.
Undamaged shipping containers present a minimum of twenty-four inches separative distance between assemblies in adjacent containers.
Since an infinite array of damaged containers with only seven to eighteen inche,s separation distance is subcritical, the undamaged containers with their additional spacing are likewise subcritical.
6.2 The shipment must be subcritical if each package were subject to the hypothetical accident conditions.
Nuclear safety analysis has been performed for an infinite array of loaded shipping containers presumed damaged in excess of the actual damage experienced in testing and arranged in the most reactive configuration.
Maximum K f und eff considering various degrees of moderation was 0.93 at full moderation, generally reducing as degree of moderation was reduced.
For the purpose of this analysis, the container shell was considered to be crushed to the level of the internal structural members for its full length and entire periphery.
The containers were then envisioned 164-2 252 0
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FDDEL B FRESH FUB_ SHIPPIIS CD.'fTAlfER Bul-GFP PACKAGEIDUSA/6206/AF DOCKET 7.1-6206 SECTION: SHIPPIllG SEIY ARYSIS 6.0 Specific Standards For A Fissile Class III Shipment (71.40) (continued) 6.2 Continued to be in an array of top to top and bottom to bottom.
This arrangement provides for closer approach of assemblies than does the top to bottom arrangement normal to shipping configuration, and is considered to be the most. reactive. Separative distances were then determined allowing only for the spacing provided by the internal structurals and ignoring the contribution of such external structures as the skid frame, the sta:: king brackets and shell strengthening ribs.
The smallest separation distances considered credible under these conditions are seven inches between top to top layers, and eighteen inches between bottom to bottom layers. Minimum side to side separation between the nearest assemblies in sets is eight inches. The assemblies were presummed to be retained in desiga relationship with the boron-steel poison plates and steel strongback plates, and contained within the steel shell. The results of the hypothetical accident testing reported elsewhere show the extent of crushing postulated to be far in excess of that actually occurring in drop tests, thus making this analysis ultra-conservative.
The macroscopic cross sections re'presentative of fuel pin cells, control rod cells (w/o control rods), instrument cell, and water region were obtained from studies of fuel assembly storage criteria. With these cross sections available, a two-dimensional PDQ-07 model was developed representing 1/2 of a damaged shipping container, and using symmetry boundaries, an infinite array of containers was created. A buckling of 0.00007 was input for all cases to define the length of the assemblies.
K was determined both as a function of moderator density and
~
eff container dimensions.
First; keeping the given nominal dimensions, K
was determined for moderator densities from 100%, down.
The eff highest K f r these cases is 0.928 at 100% moderator density.
eff 1642 253 O
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10 DEL B FRESH FUEL SHIPPIf5 COWAlfER B&W-GFP PACKAGE ID USA /6205/AF DOCKER 71-6205 SECTION:
SHIPPING SAFETY N W.YSIS
- 6. 0 Specific Standards For A Fissile Class III Shipment (71.40)(continued) 6.2 Continued In the second set of runs, the moderator density was kept constant at 100% and the separation distances were decreased to 90% and 80%
of their original values.
These produced slightly higher Keff's with the highest K value being 0.942.
eff An additional zero axial buckling case was then run at nominal dimensions and 100% moderator to represent an infinite stack of containers of infinite length, K was 0.930.
eff The following conservatisms add a further factor to safety to the inherent safety of the system already demonstrated.
6.2.1 Credit has not been taken for the decreases in reactivity that results from other steel present; the "T" sections, the hold down bows, and strongback structural members.
6.2.2 The nominal separative distances are smaller than can reasonably be predicted considering the actual drop test damage, and also recognizing that external structural members do in fact remain in place and contribute to separation.
6.2.3 Practical considerations. such as transportation insurance, over the road weight limitations, and schedules will limit the quantity shipped.
6.2.4 No credit has been taken for the interaction shielding of water that would certainly exist between containers in an accident flooding situation.
This provides assurance that should an accident occur, recovery efforts would not result in a hazard due to loss of internal. shielding.
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lDDB. B FESil REL SilIPP!fS mffAIER Bdl-OFP PACKAGE ID USA /6206/Ac DOCKET 71-6206 SECTION: SillPPII!G SAFEIY NMLYSIS EXHIBIT A 110 DEL B - FRESH FUEL SHIPPIflG C0tiTAIflER DRAWIflG LIST B&W Drawing tio.
Title PE-52F Strongback Assembly & Details PE-53F Container Assembly & Components PE-54F Upper Weldment & Lower Heldment and Details
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1642 255 14733 DATE 11-21-79 REVISION No.
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