ML19256F303
| ML19256F303 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/09/1979 |
| From: | Book H, Cooley W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256F301 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-QA-99900005 99900005-79-11, NUDOCS 7912180467 | |
| Download: ML19256F303 (15) | |
Text
U. S. IlUCLEAR REGULATORY COB'MISSI0il 0FFICE OF INSPECTI0tl AtlD ErlFORCEMErlT REGI0tl V Report flo. 99990005/79-11 State of CA 99990005 0017-59 na Docket flo.
Licease flo.
Safeguards Group Licensee:
General Electric Company Vallecitos fluclear Center P. O. Box 460, Pleasanton, California 94566 Vallecitos fluclear Center Facility flame:
Vallecitos Nuclear Center, Pleasanton, California Inspection at:
March 14 - September 6, 1979 Inspection Conducted:
Inspectors:
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bb TNf
/
W. J. Cooley, E6el Faj:llities Inspector Dath' Signed Other Participating ff Personnel:
F. William Brown III, Health Physicist, State Date Signed of California, Division of Industrial Safety Byron M. Stone, Department of Transportation, Date Signed Sacramento, California Ross R. Chappell, Jr., U.S. NRC, Transportation Date Signed Branch, NRC HQ Date Signed Approved By:
2
//!9[77 H. E. Book, Chief," Fuel Facility and D/te6igned Materials Safety Branch Summary:
Inspection on March 14-September 6,1979 (Report No. 99990005/79-11)
Areas Inspected:
The Vallecitos Nuclear Center packages and transfers approximately 3000 containers of xenon-133 gas each year to consignees for use in medical diagnosis.
The primary container of xenon-133 gas, a pyrex glass ampule, was found to be leaking in gas shipments on March 9, 1979(oneleakingcontainer), August 24, 1979 (one leaking container),
ud August 31, 1979 (three leaking containers). The purpose of this inspection was to determine the cause of that leakage; to estimate possible whole body exposure do to that leakage; and to determine the shipper's actions to preclude additional leaking shipments.
1608 351 1609 028 7 912180 M
General Electric Company Report tio. 99990005/79-11 Summary:
(Cont.)
Results: This inspection indicated the leaking xenon-133 was caused both by inadequate packaging (one case) and by inadequate workmanship on the part of the Vf(C (three cases). The ViiC has improved the energy absorbent qualities of the Specificiation 7A packaging and has taken administrative steps to insure qualified workmanship at the gas seal-off operaticn for xenon-133 ampule loading.
Possible exposures to the public at the California terminus of these shipmen's was most probably less than 10 mr to individual common carrier emplo.ees.
ilo items of nontcapliance with flRC requirements were identified within the scope of this inspection.
/
1608 352 1609 029
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a.
General Electric Vallecitos Nuclear Center
- R. W. Darmitzel, Manager, Radiation Processing Operation
- R. E. Butler, Manager, Radioactive Products and Services T. C. Hall, Engineer, Radioactive Products and Services
- L. A. Hanson, Manager, Isotope Product, Fuel Recovery and Irradiation D. W. France, Manager, Customer Services J. E. Morissey, Acting Manager, Marketing J. H. Cherb, Manager, Quality Assurance
- G. E. Cunningham, Senior Licensing Engineer J. Zidak, Packaging Engineer b.
Federal Express P. D. Getske, Manager, Restricted Articles Administration M. Castillo, City Manager, Federal Express J. Straus, Van Driver, Federal Express J. Quiroga, Hazardous Material Specialist, Federal Express L. Roshell, Truck Driver, Federal Express Dr. R. A. Parker, Radiation Physicist, Consultant to Federal Express
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Introduction The Vallecitos fluclear Center (VilC) packages and transfers approximately 3000 containers of xenon-133 gas each year to consignees for use in medical diagnosis.
The primary container of xenon-133 gas, a pyrex glass ampule, was found to be leaking in gas shipments on March 9, 1979 (one leaking container), August 24, 1979 (one leaking container),
and August 31,1979 (three leaking containers).
Characteristic of a leaking glass ampule is a rise in the radiation rate at the surface of the shipping container from less than 1.0 mr/hr to approximately 200 mr/hr.
That rise in surface radiation level results from diffusion of xenon-133 out of its lead shielding container but into the volume of an hermetically sealed metal can in which it is shipped.
One leaking glass ampule from each of the Marc?. 9 and August 31 shipments was returned to the VilC for examination.
Those exam-inations indicated a pyrex glass vial had broken as a result of inadequate packaging (March 9 shipment) and the glass vial had cracked due to poor workmanship in the glae, seal-off o;'eration at the VilC ampule loading manifold (August 31 Wipment).
1608 353 1609 030 Shipments of xenon-133 gas are made in a tested and qualified Department of Transportation Specification 7A package. As a result of observations of the March 9 shipment packaging, the licensee has made improvements in the Specification 7A package primarily by the addition of energy absorbing dunnage. The licensee is continuing improvement of that packaging.
The improved package has been qualified as a Specification 7A package.
Possible exposures to members of the public at the California terminus of the shipments was estimated to be less than 10 mr.
Those estimates are supported by film badge results for carrier employees involved in the March 9 and August 24 shipments.
3.
Shipment of Xenon-133 on March 9,1979 On March 9,1979 the VflC made a routine shipment of xenon-133 gas consisting of 29 individual packages.
One of those packages was consigned to the Rush / Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois. Upon arrival at the hospital the shipping container indicated a surface reading of 500 mrem /he and a level of 10 mrem /hr at one meter.
Details of the matter are presented in the flRC Preliminary flotification PN-III-79-25, dated March 12, 1979.
General Electric VriC shipping papers associated with this particular container indicate a maximum surface radiation of one mrem /hr and a transport index of 0.5 on the date of shipment.
The total activity shipped was listed as 1.6 curies. The shipment was made in a certified Department of Transportation Specification 7A container, a diagram of which is attached to this report as Annex A.
The delivery of gas including the leaking cor.tainer was made by Federal Express.
Feuaral Express picked up the packages at the VtiC by truck on March 9,1979. The shipment was transferred to the San Francisco airport where it was placed aboard Federal Express flight 172.
Flight 172 proceeded nonstop to Memphis, Tennessee.
The shipment was transferred at Memphis to Federal Express flight MEM275.
Flight MEM275 proceeded nonstop to Chicago.
The delivery w at. Luke's Medical Center was made by Federal Express truck.
Air transportation was by cargo air. The names of Federal Express employees involved in various points in the itinera"y are available in the Region V file. Nine Federal Express employees were potentially exposed.
Six of those employees (the crews of flights 172 and MEM275) were wearing badges. The badge results indicated no ex-posure in excess of 10 mr.
The use of xenon at the ViiC is under the jurisdiction of the State of California Department of Health, the State acting in agreement with NRC.
On March 14, 1979, a Region V inspector accompanied by a representative of the State of California, Division of Industrial Safety visited the VNC.
The State of California was acting as the lead agency on the subject matter and the NRC representative 1609 031 accompanied in order to gather any available information which might be of assistance to NRC, IE, Region III personnel.
The above information was gathered at that time. Additional information available on the subject in the Region V files includes the Depart-ment of Transportation Specification 7A test certification, appropriate shipping papers, and radiation survey records made at the VNC.
The State of California and NRC Region V are in agreement with the Region III analysis expressed in PN-III-79-25 that it is likely the inner glass vial leaked the gas into the hermetically sealed metal can.
The gas thus lost a major portion of its lead shielding and presented the high radiation readings at the surface of the 7A container.
The leakage could have been caused by an imperfect glass ampule seal creating a slow leak or by some form of damaging accident to the package en route.
The package includes absorbent material (cotton balls) which are placed above and below the glass vial to prevent its contacting the internal surfaces of the lead shield (Annex A).
It is possible that an error was made in the original packaging at the VNC. During the visit of March 14, 1979, at the Valiecitos Nuclear Center, the possibility that the con-tainer had been damaged onsite was explored.
It appeared that the package was not damaged at the VNC site although the only evidence available was the radiation survey record appearing on the licensee's shipping papers. The above information regarding the March 9, 1979 shipment was furnished to Region III by Region V by memorandum dated May 15, 1979, subject " Damaged Shipment of Xenon-133 from the Vallecitos Nuclear Center-General Electric Company, License No.
SNM-960, Docket No.70-754." No further action was taken at that time.
On August 29, 1979 Region V was informed by Region I that a ship-ment of xenon-133 gas from the VNC exhibited a high radiation rate at the surface of the container when received on August 25, 1979.
The container was identified as one which had been shipped on August 24, 1979 to Elfreth Alley Apothacary, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
The high surface radiation levels indicated a xenon-133 leak from the pyrex ampule holding the gas in the shipping container.
On August 30, 1979 representatives of Region V and the State of California visited the VNC.
The purpose of that visit was to provide Region I with assistance regarding the August 24 shipment and also to witness the opening of the shipping container used in the March 9 shipment. That container had been returned, unopened, to the VNC for disassembly on August 30, 1979.
Observations made during the disassembly of the March 9 shipment container were that all labelina required by the NRC and DOT were correct.
Shipping papers including radiation surveys of the outer container were properly recorded.
Copies of those labels and records along with black and white polaroid photographs taken during the disassembly are available from the Region V files, j
The outer cardboard box used in that shipment appeared essentially undamaged.
There was, perhaps, a dent on one corner of that box.
(All references to components of the Specification 7A shipping con-tainer may be keyed to those components as diagramed in Annex A of this report.) All components of the shipping container were returned in their proper position by the consignee.
The inner tin can had not been opened by the consignee and appeared to be essentially undamaged. There was evidence that the bottom of that can had been impacted by vertical vibration of the inner lead shield. Those impacted marks may be described as " pressure marks," not as dents.
The tin can was then punctured and fitted with a pressure tight fixture permitting leak testing of the can.
One to one and one-half psi pressure test was performed using nitrogen gas.
The tin can was found to leak (one 3 millimeter size bubble per second in a water bath) at the top of the vertical scider seam of the can.
That leak was caused by an imperfection in the solder seam during manufacture of the can.
The can was then opened at the top and it was observed that the lead shield had deformed the "H" shaped inner cardboard spacer so that the sacer was no longer effective either as a centralizing element for the lead shield or as an energy absorber. The condition of the deformed "H" shaped cardboard spacer was then recreated at the Vallecitos laboratory using a dummy setup.
It was possible to cause that deformation by merely shaking (cocktail wise) the assembled dummy Specification 7A container.
The lead shield was then removed from the tin can.
The lid of the shield remained taped to the lead cylinder and the shield appeared essentially undamaged with the possibility of a minor dent at its base.
The contents of the shield were then removed and were found to include in the proper sequence:
cotton wading, the pyrex-glas ampule (broken), and additional cotton wading at the base of the lead shield.
The break in the glass ampule was a clean circum-ferential break (see Annex A) at precisely the location of the arrowhead indd.cating " glass ampule" in the Annex A diagram.
Careful examination at the removal of the shield contents revealed that the cotton wading at both the botton and the top of the shield had been applied so that the glass ampule was not centered within the lead shield.
Both the lower stem and a point in the surface of the gas-containing volume of the ampule were in contact with the inner surface of the shield.
The loss of the energy absorbing function of the cotton balls and the "H" shaped centralizing cardboard is sufficient to explain the break in the glass ampule as a result of the normal conditions of transport.
Examination of the pyrex glass ampule parts indicated 1609 033 that radiation damage (discoloration) to the ampule bulb was very much greater than that to the ampule stem tending to indicate that the gas had been held in the bulb portion of the ampule for a considerably greater length of time than it had existed in the lead shield.
The VNC made a review of customer (consignee) complaints over the period 1972 through 1979(8/30/79). That review indicated a total of 22 complaints. Review of those 22 complaints revealed that 18 cot.u ce positively attributed to broken glass ampules.
That failure rate is approximately one for each thousand shipping con-tainers delivered.
The radiation level history of the March 9, 1979 shipping container was determined from VilC telephone call records.
In a telephone call made on March 15 a consignee reported that radiation readings upon arrival at the Rush / Presbyterian Hospital were 480 mrem /hr at the sides of the box; 530 mrem /hr at the top of the box; and 520 mrem /hr at the bottom of the box (all surface readings). The surface reading at the tin can was reported by the consignee as 730 mrem /hr during the day of March 12.
By March 15 the surface reading at the can had stablized to about 950-1000 mrem /hr.
The consignee had wrapped the tin can in a plastic bag and subsequently took gas samples from the plastic bag.
Positive indications of approximately 50 to 60 microcuries in those 20 cc samples indicated that the xenon-133 was leaking from the can.
4.
Shipment of Xenon-133 on August 24, 1979 A shipment of 1.6 curies of xenon-133 was made to Elfreth Alley Apothecary, a branch of Nuclear Pharmacy, Incorporated on August 24, 1979.
Region V was informed by Region I on August 29, 1979 that that particular shipment indicated the xenon had leaked from the glass ampule and beyond the lead shielding in the Specification 7A container. That leakage was indicated by elevated radiation levels at the surface. The delivery was made by ground and air trans-portation by Federal Express from VNC to the San Francisco airport.
From the San Francisco airport the Federal Express carrier transferred the shipment to Memphis, Tennessee.
The shipment was transferred at Memphis to a Federal Express flight to Philadelphia where ground transportation to the consignee was furnished by the same carrier.
Radiation measurements made by the consignee upon arrival were reported as 50 mrem /hr at ten feet from the package in PN-NRC:1-146, dated August 28, 1979. NRC news release 1-79-122 issued on August 29, 1979 indicates a radiation level of 200 mrem /hr at a distance of three feet from the package.
Copies of shipping papers and radiation surveys for the August 24 shipment are available in the Region V files.
Survey records indicate 21 D0T Specification 7A packages were delivered to several common carriers and each measured less than 1 nrem/hr and were assigned a transport index of 0.5.
1609 034 The latest information available to Region V is that the August 24 shipment remains cnopened at the Elfreth Alley Apothecary.
The VNC has requested that it be returned to that laboratory for exam-ination.
No further information on the mode of leakage is available from Region V.
On September 5,1979 a representative of Region V and of the State of California met at the Federal Express warehouse facility located in South San Francisco near the San Francisco International Airport.
The purpose of that meeting was to attend a Federal Express management-employee meeting and to interview Federal Express employees who had handled the xenon-133 packages delivered by the VNC to Federal Express on August 24, 1979.
Federal Express employees had expressed concern to their management about possible radiation exposure and the purpose of the management-employee meeting was to reassure those employees.
Dr. Roy A. Parker, Consultant to Federal Express, made an informative presentation pointed towards the xenon-133 problem and answered numerous questions frca employees.
Robert E. Butler, representing the VNC, presented a detailed description of the 00T specification packaging for the xenon shipments along with the improvements which had been made to prevent recurrence of the gas leaks from the glass ampules.
(The VNC package improvement progrcm is discussed separately, below in this report.)
The Region V and State inspectors then interviewed three Federal Express employees who had been identified as those persons handling the xenon-133 packages between the Vallecitos Nuclear Center and the San Francisco airport. Those interviews included establishing estimates of times and distances.
Typical handling times for loading and unloading the pickup truck at the Vallecitos Nuclear Center were a total of ten minutes for 14 of the 21 packages handled by Federal Express.
The packages were placed in the rear of the pickup van about ten feet from the driver for the one hour trip to the San Francisco Federal Exoress warehouse.
At the ware-house the transfe-from the pickup van to a special hazardous material truck w, reinacted and found to be approximately two minutes. That transfer was performed by a second individual. A third individual required about two minutes to load the hazardous material truck; about five minutes unloading that truck into a hazardous material cargo bin; and approximately six minutes at ten feet to transport the material from the warehouse to the airport.
Assuming an average distance of about three feet from the package during all loading and unloading operations; a ten-foot distance from the package to the driver during transportation; and a radiation level of approximately 200 mrem /hr at three feet from the package, it appears that the maximum exposure of a single individual could not have exceeded about 50 mrem.
1609 035 However the three individuals who handled the VflC shipment were wearing film badges at the waist and those film badge results indicated a monthly exposure of less than 10 mrem (Landauer).
Pilots of the Federal Express aircraft involved in this shipment were also equipped with film badges which indicated ten mrem or less exposure for the same period of time.
5.
Shipment of Xenon-133 on August 31, 1979 On August 31, 1979, 52 shipping containers of xenon-133 gas were transferred from the VilC to several common carriers.
Three glass ampules of gas were found to be leaking upon arrival at the consignee.
The consignees were St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Yakima, Washington; fluclear Pharmacy, Inc., Atlanta branch, Atlanta, Georgia; and fluclear Pharmacy, Inc., Birmingham branch, Birmingham, Alabama.
Levels reported by the consignees were greater than 100 mrem /hr at the surface of the package (Birmingham); 150 mrem /hr at the surface (Atlanta); and 300 mrem /hr at the surface (Yakima).
In each of these three cases the consignee opened the shipping container and discovered that the glass viai had not been broken but rather had cracked at the heat seal end.
Each reported that the vial had a slight depression (dimple) indicating the vial had been overheated during seal-off, the vial being under a partial vacuum at that time. The package shipped to Birmingham was returned to the Vf1C on September 5,1979 where the condition of the cracked vial was confirmed by the Vf4C and by representatives of f1RC Region V and the State of California.
The cracked glass ampuie was subsequently returned from Yakima and the condition confirmed at the Vfic by GE personnel.
The cracked glass ampule consigned to Atlanta was crushed by tr..t consignee to recover any xenon-133 available.
Photcgraphs of the cracked glass ampules retrieved from the August 31, 1979 shipment are available in the Region V files.
By telegram to the State of California authorities on September 4, 1979, the VflC volunteered to suspend all shipments of xenon-133.
The telegram was acknowledged on September 6,1979 by the State Department of Health Services. The voluntary suspension was to remain in effect pending review of packaging system modifications by the Department. On September 5, 1979 representatives of f4RC Region V and the State of California visited the VilC to determine what packaging improvements had been made.
A review of records by the Vallecitos fluclear Center showed that the technician filling the ampules for the August 31, 1979 shipment was a technician in training.
Prior to that time, he had been working under the direct supervision of the supervisor or a fully qualified technician.
On the date, August 31, 1979, he had neither 1609 036 available. The technician sealed off the glass ampules in at least three cases too near the xenon-133 containing volume of the ampule introducing strains and implosion dimples resulting in the observed cracks and subsequent xenon-133 leaks.
6.
Investigation by Vallecitos Nuclear Center / Package Improvements The VUC conducted an investigation to determine the reason for increased dose rate readings on the xenon-133 shipping containers which occurred in four separate instances following the week of August 19, 1979. The investigation included the observations of a broken ampule and three cracked ampules as described above in this report. As a result of those observations several package tests were performed as well as ampule flame seal experimentation.
Drop tests from 36 inches, 64 inches, and 161 inches were made of the lead shield using various shock absorbing material to protect the inner glass vial. As a result of those tests neophrene rubber was rejected due to three failures at 161 inches and styrofoam end supports for the ampule were adopted.
Ten completely assembled packages were then dropped from 31 feet using variations of the cotton ball / styrofoam ampule support.
Additional variations in-cluded filling the tin can with styrofoam " beads" and " bars" to prevent major dislocation of the shield in the can upon impact.
Two 31 foot drops were made using the configuration depicted in Annex A with the ampule in contact with the lead shield at both top and bottom (recraating the configuration of the March 9,1979 shipment).
No ampule breakage occurred in any of these tests.
It was planned at that time to continue with the use of styrofoam cups to support the angule and styrofoam inserts in the tin can.
Plans were to continue the search for an improved cardboard design or styrofoam inserts to reduce damage to the tin can from this type of 30 foot impact.
Photographs of the results of the 30 foot drop tests along with the variations in packaging are available in the Region V files.
Glass ampules were then tested by evacuating the bulb to less than 30 inches of mercury while pressurizing the break seal tube to about 22 psi. None of three randomly selected ampules failed in this test. Three randomly selected break seal ampules were pressurized throug& the break seal tube to greater than 400 psig while the bulb was at atmospheric pressure.
None of those ampules failed.
The laboratory then conducted a series of flame seal tests to determine the optimum distance of the tip of the flame seal to shoulder of the ampule bulb to prevent strains at the bulb shoulder as occurred in the August 31 shipments.
It was found that all ampules showed some strain in the flame seal. Ampules sealed at equalT!or greater than one-half inch flame seal length showed no strainT'in the bulb shoulder.
It was determined frr thase tests that the flame seal length should be equal to or greater than one-half inch and that the inner seal height for the ampule should be equal to a greater than one-quarter inch.
1609 037 The VilC determined to eliminate the need for absolute assurance of ampule integrity by making the lead shield gas tight prior to shipment. A series of three tests were performed using various types of vinyl tape, paraffin wax compound, and silicone rubber as sealing agents.
In those tests the silicone rubber seal proved most satisfactory 'nd is being further developed.
As a result of tLose tests th '
w ing changes were made in the shipping containe. which were..c l u-
' for the shipments made on August 31, 1979:
a.
Styrofoam suppori.s 6 the cardboard spacer in the tin can.
b.
Styrofoar., supports for the glass ampule at both top and bottom.
c.
White colored pressure sensitive tape (glove box tape) holding the lead shield lid to the body of the shield.
d.
Revision of the package schemetic.
e.
A warning notice identifying changes in the package.
The laboratory has also added an ampule leak check by pulling a vacuum of approximately 30 inches of mercury for three to five minutes after ampule loading in the shielced shipping container.
The withdrawn atmosphere is monitored for any xenon-133 release.
Only fully qualified technicians are presently allowed to perform the flame sealing of the ampules unless a qualified technician observer is in attendance at all times. The above description of tests and package evaluation was abstracted from a written pre-sentation sent to the State of California Department of Health, Radiological Health Fection on the morning of September 6,1979.
That evaluation was accompanied by a General Electric request that it be permitted to resume shipment of xenon-133 gas as a vital diagnostic medical isotope as soon as possible.
Copies of the GE communication with the State of California, in-cluding the details of its investigation and package testing described above, are available at the Region V files.
On September 6,1979 representatives of flRC, IMSS, HQ; fiRC, ISE Region V; State of California; and Department of Transportaion met with GE representatives at the Vf1C. The purpose of that meeting was to review all aspects of the xenon-133 problem and to determine the adequacy of the DOT Specification 7A packaging involved. The review included discussion of the package teu. and evaluations made by the laboratory, observations of glass ampule loading and package assembly and observation of the normal condition of transport tests required for the Specification 7A container.
The substance of the subjects reviewed has been presented above in this report.
1609 038 Also reviewed were the xenon-133 loading and shipping procedures used by the VflC as well as all pertinent shipping records and glass ampule vendor's specifications.
Copies of those documents are available in the Region V files.
The Specification 7A test observed by the group included a four foot drop on package edge; one foot drop on all corners of the package; and a 13 pound one and one-half inch diameter rod drop from 40 inches.
Four assembled packages incorporating the improved configurations inctding the use of a silicone rubber seal on the lead shield were used in these tests.
The 13 pound rod drop test was applied as a top impact on two of the packages and as a side impact on two additional packages.
One of those side impact specimens punctured under the rod drop test.
Upon disassembly it was observed that the two top impact specimens indicated deformation of the lead shield at its top.
The side impact specimens showed dented cans. A leak test performgd on the two top impact lead shields indicated slow leaks in a 190 F water bath, fio leaks under that test were observed in the side impact specimens. The top impact leaks were due to deformation of the lead shield causing leaks in the silicone rubber seals.
All glass ampules were intact and undamaged.
Conclusions of the Department of Transportation, flRC, and State of California representatives were that the unimproved package, when properly prepared, meets the DOT requirements for package integrity.
The group noted that xenon-133 leakage had occurred due to both mechanical damage during transport and human errors in preparing the ampule. They noted, however, that the varicus improvements in package preparation which had been tested substantially improved the performance of the package and reduced the potential for future occurrence of the problems.
The group further noted that additional work was being done to provide containment of the xenon within the lead shield even assuming the glass ampule to be broken.
That substantiating information was furnished to the Department of Health, Radiological Health Section, State of California and the State of California Department of Health Services permitted GE to resume shipments of xenon-133 on or about September 10, 1979.
7.
Management Interview The entire review and discussion with licensee management conducted on September 6,1979 is regarded as the summation of findings by fiRC with GE personnel in the xenon-133 aatter.
GE representatives present at that time included Messrs. Darmitzel, Butler, Hall, Cunningham, and others.
Attachment:
Annex A 1609 039
This package has several minor in-provements for safety purposes.
The void space inside the can is filled wi th Styrofcam beads.
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