ML19256E527
| ML19256E527 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/22/1979 |
| From: | Pollard R Chesapeake Energy Alliance |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911070571 | |
| Download: ML19256E527 (15) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORT COMMISSION BEFORE TEE ATOMIC SAFETT AND LICENSING BOARD e
In the Matter of
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'#cu ;, 2 Petitioner, Chesapeake Energ-- Alliance, :nc. ?CEA), hereby files its anended cententions concerning the poscible re-start of 5:1-1 nuclear reactor. The amended contentions sub=itted below reflect changes fran CEA's draft contentions as a result of CEA's greater awareness of the suitable form of contentiens following CEA's Cetober 16 meeting with counsel fren liRC and licensee, and incorporate changes discussed at that neeting.
CEA's amended contentions supercede entirely
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a The Occ=ission's Order and Notice of Hearing of August 9,1979, notes that the subjects to be considered at the hea t g shall include:
(1) Whether the 'short term acticns ' recernended... are necessa:7 and sufficient to provide reasonable ascurance that the (TMI-1) facilit7 can be operated uithout endanpring the health and safet7 of the public, (2) Whether the 'leng term actions
- recommended... are necessary and sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the facili:7 can be operated Ecr the 1cng term without endangering the health and safety of the public,
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_a The followd"; contentions are submitted concerning the sufficiency of the reco=nended actionsinv lving the re-start of CC-1 :
o (1) CSA contends that the Atomic Safety and Licencing Board's (ASL3) action in permitting the re-start of 3C-1 wculd constitute a 7.jor Federal action significantly affecting the hu=an environment, and that, therefore, an Environnental I= pact Statenen (IIS) is required pursuant to the provisicns of the :Tation:12avircrentc1 Protection Act (li2PA) (h2 U.S.C. !h332(2)(c)). CEA contends that the scope of the ZIS should not be li.ited to ps7chological distress of the issues, but shculd also evaluate factors such as the i= pact re-start on businses decisions to re-locate to, or r e in in, the SE area, the availability of alternative means to =eet the energy needs suuplied by TIC-1, and the i= pact of a decision to permit re-start of DE-1 on the overall climate of licensing and constrnction perit decisions" involving nuclear power plants.
on the need for an IIS, CIA notes In support of this contention.
that the AEL3, in its Memorandum and Crder on :'otiens to Modif7 (October io, 1979) achnewledges that the Federal action in this proceeding nay well be different, in degree at least, from natters such as the location of a jail or garages (each of which required an IIS), with thb ' clear i=plicaticn that this proceeding involves a more major Federal action (p.3).
The fact of the 3/28/79 accident, and of the indisputable neras between EC-1 and SII-2 involving the identical design of reactor, the sane licensee, and the identical enU.$onment (ph7sical/ciological and socia' ), na2e it clear that t7 no stretch of the inasinaticn can the decision
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to re-start 52-1 be considered as a routine re-start decision (as the licensee night be e=pected to contend). The Council on Environnental cuality guidelines, 40 C.'3.R.
31500, applicable to a" federal agencies for the purposes of i=plenenting the 3IS provisions of HEPA, and specif4cally adopted in the.iRC regulations, note that "Significantly, as used in U271, recnires condideration of both centent 2nd intensit. " 40 C.F.R. 31508.27.
- 7ery clearly, the context of E 2-1 re-start can not be separated from the 3/28/70 accident at 02-2.
Furthermore, in evaluating -/ e:her the AS13 decision to pernit re-start of SII-1 "signi"icantly affects the environnent", the overall context of clinate surrem d*
3 the nuclear industry and related licensing and construction decisions tne potential incact of must not be overlooked, as must ecually not be overlooked /the ASLb's decision in this proceeding on that c74rnte. The recent exs=ple of VEIC0f a decisien-to convert North anna Units 3 f.: 4 to coal-burni g rather than nuclear powered plants, and the severe financial difficulties experienced in the construction of the Seabrook, U.H.
reactor are but two of nany possible ena=ples of the uncertaint7 surrounding the $uclear industry. It would be a denial of realit7 were the ASL3 cr licensee to contend that the decision in this proceeding will not have a significant affect on the development of the nuclear industry, and hence on, all those aspects of the 07 environnent that stand to be impacted / or alternatively, to be spared the i= pact of, the future development of the nuclear industry.
In further support of this contention, CEA submits that the context of alternative =eand of provid*"g for the energ7 needs that nigh; be and supplied b7 SC-1, including but not linited to the develop;ent awareness of solar, biccass, insulation, and conservation alternatives to nuclear power, has chr ged dramatically since the original IIS jnn3 09b
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was prepared for EG-1 win 1973, hence undernining the validity of that II3 in respect to its censideration of alte" natives.
CIA submits that the use of alte ative means such as solar and conservation methods to meet the energy needs that might otherwise be met by Z C-1 would also b.<e sig=ifican econcmic and social impact, primarily b7 way of the jobs that vould thereby be created in the licensee t s service area, ani that such econceic and social inpact is cognisable under NE?A provisions.
(see, for exa:mle, McDowell v schlesine er, b.0h. P.Supp.221, on the courtIc f**d"
- of the impact on a '.ccal econc=7 constitut'*C r ignificant effects 1 for consideration under NEPA).
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notes here that the availability of alternative means for meeting energy needs tL.c =ight otherwise be =et b7 DII-1 tends to rebut argunents propoun'ded by licensee in its Answer to Cce.issients Order a d Notice of Hearing Dated August 9,1979,(p.3), and that n
further an active policy on the behC f of licensee to pronote solar and conservation methods in its service area could serve as a model to be followed by other utilities, and hva an overall effect of recucing the need for i= port of foreia,n cil. CIA will also submit further argt:=ents in support of this contentien at the special Pre-Eearing Conference, based on a review of the original DII-1 ZIS, documenting wa:s M which that IIS is no longer adaquate.
(2) CIA contends that the energenc7 preparations considered in the Ccenissionrs August 9 Order and Notice of Hearing are inadequate in that they do not provide for:
(a) evacuation pla"m**g and exercises for the area wd thin the one hundred (100) mile radius that can be threatened by
- ediate fatalities fran radiation emnnting frem a core =eltdown and 1 qri3 096
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breach of containnent at 52-1.
CEA contends that such trior to a re-start of TMI-1 preparations are necess'ary/in light of the estimates of the 1965 revised edition of msz 740 of the potential danage frca such an accident, and of the poscibilit7 that such an accident night occur at 22-1.
- n support of this contentien, C21. s' bnits that there cs an i=inent possibility of such an accident at CC-2 dur4 3 the 3/2S/79 accident, and that the nemis between DII-1 and DII-2 is sufficiently strong due to their identical design, and cc=cn licensee, and that the URC and licensee have failed to denenstrate that they have censidered eve r possible sequence of events that could lead to en accident as severe or more serious than the 3/28/79 DC-2 accident.
(b) the provision of adequate energency nedical facilities equipped to handle large nunbers of radioactively contaminnted casv4. ties fren an accident at TMI-1 on a scale up to that noted in (a) above.
CEA contends that the prevision of such facilities is necessary prior to a re-start of TMI-1 given tLe above stated ne==s between 22-1 and the 3/26/79 22-2 accident, and given the absence of such madical facilities in Baltimore, the closest najer netropolitan area to TMI-1 and a natur21 location to which casualties fron such an accident wculd be transported, as well as in other ad.jacent areas. C2A centends that the receipt and treatnent of such r dioactive17 conta=inated casualties at a a
hospital that is not equipped to isolate and decentam mate then d
would have a naf or adverse _npact on other patients and on critically needed nedical equipnent.
(c) the provision of adequate energency neasures to prevent the possibility of du= ping of highly radioactive water into the Susquehnmr, and fro:a there into the Chesapeake Ba7, in
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the event of an accident at CC-1 such as described in (a) crior to the restart of SG-1 above.
CSA contends that such provisien is necessary/given the above stated nems between CC-1 and the 3/2c/79 T"I-2 accident, and given the inestinable value of the Chesapeake Bay, including,but in no wa7 linited to,its ecenc=ic valle of approninately 31CC nillion per 7 ear for the :".a 7 and 1
sec*cci industr cu-tained b-- the 327, and given the irreversible ham that could bef all the Ba7 were significant quantities of highly radicactive water to be d. r ed into the Susquehanna River, the principal tributary of the Ea7, as the re ult of a TIC-1 gecident such as described in (a) above.
CD. centends that among the necessary provisiens to protect water quality but would not be 1* 4 ted to would be/the constructi 7n of substantian 7 greater shielded auxiliary storage tanks at the n'I facility.
(d) the provisior' of adequate energenc7 neasures to protect livestock within a fift7 nile radius of IE.
CZ;. contends that such provisions, including, but not l' 4 ted to the preparation cf evacuation contingency plans for livestock and the provision of adequate education to farners in the above sthted area for the optinal protection and managenent of livestock in the even of an accident as in (a) above, are necessary given the above stated ne=s but teen CC-1 and ths 3/29/7c accident and given the prevalence of dair7 farning in the EC area and its inportance in the local econeny, and given the inadequate preparation,for the protection of livesteck,that becane evident dur45 and after the 3/26/79 S'.I-2 accident.
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(') CEA contends that the tshort term actions: are inadequate in that the7 fail to specify the entent to which offsite monitoring is to be upgraded prior to re-scart of ZI-1, and hence no basis is provided for asce & W ng the adequac7 of the monitoring te be described by the Commission.
CZA contends that the establich=ent of specifications for offsite nonitcring by the Connissica, or tha sub-issien of plans for upgr ding monitoring b7 the licensee a
is necessary 's necessary for CEA to determine or assess the adequacy of such scnitoring.
CI.1 centends that the offsite menitoring must provide for conplets assessment of the entent pattern and densit7 of dispersal of radiation, and rast also provude for fally adecuate monitoring of discharges into the Susquehanna.:.iver fand for adequately
=cnitoring the dispersal of such discharges, and enat the nonitoring devices cast have the capabilit' of alpha, beta, and gan=a radiation
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directly, rather than only providing for the inference of levels of 31pha and gn==a radiation from the o'oserved levels of beta radiation. C21 contends that that the above stated provisiens are necessr7 so that complete and accurate informatien en relea::ed a
radiation is available in the event of an accident at TMI-1 involv?.ng significant release of radiation into the enviren.ent, and that the absence of such information during the 3 /2c/79 ".'E-2 accident denied the public'_nferra'ia;r. essentia' to ascertr.1-ing the risk c
to which it was enposed.
(b.) CEA contends that there exists conflict of interest in the present arrangenent where'c7 licensee is responsible for =cnitoring offsite radiation, in that the public is not guar mteed independent and i= partial seasurement and reporting cf released radi,tien.
CIA urther.. contends that given the present reputation of licensee--
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[h b fS O UI b [0. 2 . hI &\\db 8 a reputation established in substantial part b7 licenseeis withholding or falsification of critical information gfrcm both the public and the Co-4 ssion at th '4-e of the 3/28/79 accident at 2II-2--that the piblic has sufficient reasen to cuestion the validit7 or credibilit7 of * 'cr~.ation on observa,d radiation offsite in the ab::ence of a r.cnitoring agency independent of licensee, and that tne public has an indisputable right to im'ormation that is both accurate and perceived to be accyrata e (5) c2A centends that the short tern actien: are inadequa:e in that they do not include provisions for den 7 g re-start of 22-1 until 1 the radioactive 17 contaminated water from 22-2 is fully decontaninated and disposed of in a =anner that provides for no possible interference from that contaninated water with storage space that might be required in the event of a TI-1 accident (as in 2(a) above), and that also providers for no possibla accident in the decentnmdratien and disposal of the 2C-2 radioactive water that =ight 4-,act on the operation and emergenc7 provisions of CC-1. CEA contends that thare is sufficient controversy over the potential effectiveness of EPICOR-II (see for enample Dr. Louis Kosamekts response to NURzo 0591, the Environnental Assessneut of IPIcoR-II), and over the possibilit7 of an accident involving EPICCR-II, that the possibilit7 cf such an accident tappening and impacting Z1I-1 can not be disnessed. CIA further contends that the enistence of present civil litigation concerning the decontnm# ation and disposal of the 22-2 radicactive water brought b7 the City of Lancaster, PA, and by the Susquehnena Valle7 Alliance, and the prospect of further such litigation that na7 involve the State of Maryland and/cr Earford and Cecil Counties in Maryland opposing the disposal of water into the Susquehanna River creates the Idecont
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9 J .] _a distinct possibility of substantial dela7 in the disposal of the CH-2 water such that it remains an encumbrance on the st6 rage facilities of EC that it may interfere with energency storage facilities that may be needed in the event of an accident at CE-1. Cr. *urther. contends that, absent an Environnental 1::essnent 2:atenent 71snned or an _~_3 conc 3=ing tic / treat ent and disposal of the water presentl7 in.he 5!I-2 containnent building, it restns to be detar ' ed if such treatment will be safe and adequate, and :(nether such treatment and subsecuent disposal will not be delayed in such a way that it interferes with the provision of adequa:e en:rgenc7 water storage space for EC-1. (6) CEA contends that. under no circunstances shculd EE-1 be permitted to re-start while C2-2 continues to fleale f contaninated water. CZ1 contends that as 1cr4 as 22-2 continuas to genertate surplus radioactive water'that EH-2 continues to pose the th: at of retuming to an active emergency status, posing potenti m 7 severe conflict with th opertaion of 32-1. (7) C3A centends that, absent specificasions b7 the Cc= ission, or pl ns prepared by the licensee, there is inadequate infor.ation to deter.ine whether radiation =cnitoring provisions cill be adqquate to discrimate between effluents of EC-1 and OE-2. CEA centends that such specifications or plans nast be made available to intervenors so that the plans or specifications can be evaluated tc determine if they are adeglate to discri:s sate between effluents of SE-1 and ZC-(S) The history of licensee'n P" gement of SC-2 ashcws clear evidence of tne inadequacy of licensee t s management car:abilit7 (see, for Contenbien ik of era:;:ple, instances cited by Steven 3cholly in/his Final Contentions) CD. contands that licensee has not shown cny clear and convincing evidence of an7 significant ch mges in its nanagenent practicG8s 3nn
u and that the burden of proof rightfully lies with the licensee, given the 3/28/79 accident, to present such clear and convincing ev1.denc e. CEA contends that licensee must first be required to demonstrate its capabilit7 to clean up the danage fren the acciden; of 3/26/79 before it is allowed to subject the inblic to the risk of ancther such accident. On contends further that licensee shculd shou cause as to uh7 its operati-g lice.ce should not be suspended as a result of its having allowed the 3/28/79 accident to have taken place. (?) CEA contends that licensee has inadequa:e financial rescurces te operate M -1 safe 17. In support of this contenti:n, C2*. submits that licensee has frequently raised publicly the spector of possible bankru ptc7 since the 3/28/79 accident, is faced with an estimated $hCO nillien cle n up cost for M -2 (a figure that, based on the a previous recotd of licensee in its contni ment of contract costs na7 well prove to be very substantially below the final clean up costs). CEA contends, however, that licensee's respense to the Connission concerning its financial status will be required before CEA will be able to make final deter =ination as to the adequacy of licensee:s financial resources, as will the outeene of tpconing KC hearings en whether M-1 should be ta'cen out of licensee r : rate base. CEA conteris that a critical aspect of licenseets financial capabiliry trut must be investigated is licensee a r ab" 4 t7 to withstand an accident at M-1 cc=mensurate with the 3/28/79 acciden: at T -2 (given the considerations elaborated in centention 2fa) above) and have adequate rescurces to cover C' the costs of cle n up, etc enarsting frc= such an accident. g ' " 3 102 4
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@g@@@D 11 ~ (10) In conaideration of the 81cng tern actionst.CI?. centends that they are inadequate in that they fail to c:ncider a n= ber of factors that are also necessary to ensure the health and safety of the public. CIA contends that the fell: wing factors :-ist be considered and evaluated for their impact on the health and safet7 of the public prior to the re-star of T:E-1: (a) "'he danger to the health and ca 'et-of th2 publi: fren spent fiel and other waste from EU-1, given that no long ter= safe storage hac 7et been developed, and tha: Table S-3 f~crnerly used by the Cemission in thi is no 1cnger erecognized a vali:1 in this regard. (b) The danger to the health and safet7 of the public frcn the release of Raden-222 frc= the uranium =ined cnd milled for C'.I-1, given the estinated 1,220,000 deaths erpected frc= radon emissioils per reactor year of operatien--a figure that has not been disputed b b:he Co=ission--and given the presentl7 7 undeter-"ed value for the inpact of..aden-222 in Cable S-3. (c) The da:Ijer to the health and safet7 of the public fren the possible loss or theft of enriched uranius destined for "".C-1, given the unacccunted-for 2h0 lbs of enriched ura-3 r. frem the Nuclear Fuel Services &.richment plant in Tehnessee, and given the read 7 availability of in*crnaticn con cerning the =eans of constr:cting a nuclear benb, and given furthernere the recent nature of the discovery of the missing uranium and the f act that such a possibi:.ity is not precently considered b7 the Connission in the granting of licenses. 3nn l
12 NhID L A _ b _ A.r$ 0 f_ U Mf a (11 ) CLi contends that the entent of infornation cencerning nuclear regalatir in ge s ral, and D E in particular, has becc=e so 4 ense that a state of infornation overload has been reched, so that it is a 'deconing h" 17 i=possible to absorb, digest, and understand all the pertinent infcT.atien, and at the sane time to place it in a proper perspective in relation to healrh and safety concerns and the probabilit-of the pc::ible ceqaence of event: that could lead to an accident as swricus or more so than the 3/25/79 accident. CZ1, centends that as a result of this, the regula c.7 proces: irself cas become unreliable and inadequate, 0.r.d indeed that the accident cf 3/28/79 1: in part 2ttri':utable :: the failure of the recalatory process. C21 centends that this breahde:m has re:ulted fren the increasing awareness that virtually every s7 sten (nechanical, electrical human, etc.) involved in the operation of a nuclear plant is at sone level critical to its safe operation. CIA further centends that the entent of regalation necessary for a nuclear reactob was not understood ewhen the N20, and before oit the AZC were established, and that tbh regalatory nechanisn conceived is not adecuate for its purpose. CEA contends that the re-start of SE-1 should be delayed pending a conplete revie:: cf the regalator7 prccess, inclu
- g consideration of the reconnendatiens in this regard of the ::enen7 Cenni Ccc=ission. In support of this contention, CIA su'-4 ts as an ensnple consideratien of all the documents that have been subritted to parties in this proceeding.
(12) CIA centends that the Cc ission and licensee have failed to denenstrate: that they have considered and ecaluated all possible sequences of events that could occur at SG-1, and that re-start of SC-1 should be denied until all such sequences have been censidered and evaluated to dete J.ne if they could lead to ,nn-- t
D an accident as serious as the 3/28/79 C'_T-2 accident. CEA contends that such consideration and evaluation is recessary given that the 3/28/79 accident resulted fren such a sequence of unan':icipated events, and given thatother sequences of events that have as 7et or more serious been unconsidered may have equally serions/ consequences. C -';. contends that consideration and evaluatien lof all such sequences is necass ry in ord6r that operators can be adequhta'.7 prepared for a such centingencies, and also te dete.ine if additional nodifications to the design of the reactor and/or of the centrols is necessary to prevent the adverse consequences of <Isuch sequances of sv hts. (13) CZA contends that there is a specific naed for the establic'r_ ent of training for operator that addresses the problen of a t=indsett that denies info =ation indicative of serious reactor prcblens. In support of this chntention, CD. subnits that such a nindset centributedtothegravityofthe3/29/79iccident, as reported in NU22G 0600, and that thd routine occurrence of abnomal transients will tend to ccnditien operaters to a nindset that underestinates the significance of (sequences of) abnornal transients. CZA contends that specific trai **g provisiens designed to addres s this t=indset t problen are necessary prier to the re-start of EC-1 in order to prevent the development or presence of such a mindset among C ~-1 operators fron contributing to a serious accident at IC-1. CIA reserves the right to formula;e further cententions in this matter in the light of informaticn not presently available to CIA, and to su' nit c further evidence in support of the above cententiens in the event the acceptabilit7 of the above cententions is challenged on the grounds of lack of sufficient evidence in support of the cententions. CIA also =c 4 *1catiens to the above con 7 en-iont.: a reserves the right to na'ce such nino !nn3 103
14 as are required to =eet specific needs concerning the exact appropriate for=at for fr-@ contentior5, provided that such modifications serve to =ake the above contentienc serve the intended pur ose of allowing the substan.tive issie:: raised b,7 CEA to be adeqyately considered bin this procacding. 02l. clains, inter alia, its previon inenperience in intervention proceedings as justification for C2A s reserving the 'N Yb l ' I a':cve : tared rights. pnTrHD i U _ d ;uL= M[ 2espectfull7 submit: f' -l / ./ / ' 'i / (/.s c-f(, i s" ./,.. a F' Robert Q, ?ollard, for CE2SAEEAEE EE2GT ALLI.u!C2, IIIC. , '"' 3 10 6 Cated this 22nd da7 of October,1979, ' ore, Ear 71end. a-
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA HUCLEAP. REGULATC.TZ CC12:ISSION 3EFORE THE ATOMIC SAFTEI A3D LICEITSIITG BOARD h kj b 6 Ta the Matter of .~_:22CICLI213 Z ISCU CC12rTZ rocket p 50-239 (2e-start) (Taree :'ile Island :'uclear ~ ?.eacter, Unit #1 ) e ':--9o -y:-n a 0 - -: oo' . n a o 0 :-.nnaan0 0 C22TIFIC1.?? CP m E CE I hereb7 certify that a copy of this MNO COUC!TICliS was served on the following this 22nd day of Cetober 1979 by deposit in the United Staces Mail, first class. 4 6 eee re \\ E::ecutive Legal Director /
- suc U,3. Nuclear Regulatory Ccenission l 0C.T2 51973 > :.2
'dashingten, DC 2c555 i \\g -,,.,., % e Ivan 'i, M th \\ g. S>ug" y Ato=ic Safety and Licensing Board g U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Oc=issicn 7 Washington, DC 20555 o;, ' W George F. Crowbridge, Esc. Shaw, Pittnan, ?ctts, and Trowbridge 1800 M street,liW
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-f ,O {V / -97 t/ s i / /,, s/(f 17"/7 * / ~. : 1 brW+ / V Robert Q. Follard, for CE2SA2?M EnZ?G'E AT.LIriCE, THC.}}