ML19256D676

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Input to Safety Evaluation of Spent Fuel Pool Mod.Mod Acceptable
ML19256D676
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 09/26/1977
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML19256D675 List:
References
NUDOCS 7910220593
Download: ML19256D676 (3)


Text

ENCLOSUP.E 1 THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1 SPENT FUEL PCOL MODIFICATION - SER 1.0 Introduction By letter dated Fecruary 3,1977, Metrocoli' tan Edison Comcany, 'M pro-posed to change the spent fuel pool (SFp) storage design for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 1 (TMI-1) from the design wnich was reviewed and approved in the operating license review and described in tne FSAR.

The proposed change consists of reolacing the existing spent fuel storage racks, which have a total capacity of 430 fuel assemblies, with new rack

aodules which have reduced center-to-center spacings. The proposed change was requested by MEC based on its projections of the non-availability of offsite spent fuel storage or reprocessing facilities. The proposed change would allow for the storage of 752 fuel assemblies.

We reviewed the letters dated February 3, 1977 and May 24, 1977 from MEC which provided information on the proposed modification of the SFP. Our review addressed the following major considerations:

fuel handling, occupa-tional radiation exposure, and radioactive waste treatment.

2.0 Evaluation 2.1 Fueljandline The NRC staff has underway a generic review of load handling operations in the vicinity of spent fuel pools to detcrmine the likelihood of a heavy load impacting fuel in the pool and, if necessary, the radiological con-sequences of sucn an event. 'Because TMI-l will be required to pronibit the movement of loads in excess of 3000 pounds over fuel assemblies in the SFP, we have concluded that the likelihood of a heavy load handling accident is sufficiently small that the acceptability of the proposed modification is not affected, and that no additional restrictions on load handling operatiens in the vicinity of the SFP are necessary while our re-view is underway. Additionally, no shielded cask movement will be per-mitted on the refueling deck prior to the completion of the cask drop analysis review.

The consequences of fuel handling acci' dents are not changed from those presented in the SER.

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.. 2.2 *0ccucational Radiation Excosure We have estimated the increment in onsite occupational dose resulting from the proposed increase in stored fuel assemblies en the basis of information supplied by the licensee and by utili:ing realistic assumptions for occu-pancy times and for dose rates in the spent fuel area from radionuclide con-centrations in the SFP water. The spent fuel assemblies themselves con-tribute a negli'gib~le amount to dose rates in the pool area because of the depth of water shielding the fuel. The occupational radiation exposure resulting from the proposed action represents a negligible burden. Based on present and projected operations in the spent fuel pool area, we esti-mate that the proposed modification will add less than one percent to the total annual occupational radiation exposure burden at this facility. The small increase in radiation exposure will not affect the licensee's ability to maintain individual occupational doses to as icw as is reasonably achievable and within the limits of 10 CFR 20. Thus, we conclude that storing addi-tional fuel in the SFP will not result in any significant increase in doses received by occupational workers.

2.3 Radioactive Waste Treatment The station contains waste treatment systems designed to collect and pro-cess the gaseous, liquid and solid wastes that might contain radioactive materi al. The waste treatment systems are evaluated in the Safety Evalua-tion Report (SER) dated July 1973 for the station. There will be no change i'n the waste treatment systems described in Section 11.0 of the SER and no change in the conclusions of the evaluation of these systems in Section 11.0 of the SER because of the proposed modification.

4.0 Sumary Cur evaluation suppor.2 the conclusion that the propcsed modification to the SFP at TMI-l is acceptable because:

(1) The increase in occupational radiation exposure to individuals due to the storage of additional fuel in the SFP would be negligible.

(2) The installation and use of tne new fuel racks dces not alter the consequences of the design basis accident for the SFP, i.e., the rupture of a fuel assembly and subsequent release of the assembly's radioactive inventory.

(3) No shielded cask movement will be ::ermitted en the refueling deck prior to the ccmpletion of the cask drop analysis review and no movement of leads in excess of 30C0 pounds will be allcwed over fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool.

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5.0 Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:

(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activ-ities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the healtri and safety of the public.

Dated:

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