ML19256D343

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Summary of 680229 Meeting W/Util,Gilbert Associates,Inc,B&W, Pickard,Lowe & Associates,Shaw,Pittman,Potts & Trowbridge & Univ of MD Re Review of Further Info Required Supporting Analysis of Aircraft Crash Effects
ML19256D343
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/04/1968
From: Grimes B
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To: Boyd R
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
References
NUDOCS 7910170847
Download: ML19256D343 (3)


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T. Engelhardt 511 F. Brannigan, Oper. Saf:ty Roger S. Boyd, Asst Dir, Reactor Projects, ERL 4

THRU Charles G. Long, Chief RPB 3, ERL Brian K. Grimes, Reactor Project Branch No. 3 Origfdf SW.cd bj Division of Reactor Licensing Chtes G. L:q MEETING WITH METROPOLITAN EDISON ON AIRPORT PROIIMITY TO THE TEREE MILE ISLAND STATION - DOCIET 50-259 On February 29, 1968, C. Long and B. Grimes met with repreaantatives of Metropolitan Edison (see attendance list) to discuss further information required in support cf the analysis of aircraft crash effects at the proposed Three Mile Island plant. Mr. Roddis had teen previously notified of defi-ciencies in Amendment 8 by a telephone call from Dr. Morris on February 27, 1968. Also present at the meeting were T. Engelhardt, OGC; J. Proctor, Naval Ordnance Laboratory; and F. Brannigan, Operational Safety.

Fire Effects The applicant stated that provisions against crash fire effects will be implemented by limiting the number of openings in vital structures and pro-viding a labyrinth entrance design and fire shutters on ventilation openings.

' The control room ventilation can be either complete recirculation or have intake from diverse points and be operated either manually or by smoke and heat monitors. Mr. Brannigan noted that the control roco would have to be habitable for a period of time sufficient to extinguish external fires, and that the withdrawal of air by external fires must be considered as well as entrance of smoke. Mr. Brannigan cited studies of bocbing raids on Hamburg, Germany in which residents in bomb shelters suffocated because of external fires sucking oxygen frca the shelters. The applicant stated that this is taken into consideration by diverse ventilation intakes and self-contained, long-term (several cours) breathing apparatus available to the operators.

When asked about blast effects the applicant stated, and Mr. Brannigan agreed,

.that no fuel explo_sion would occur either in the fuel tanks or in the open air, and that no s'ignificant overpressures would be generated by burning fuel.

It was noted that all vital structures are designed for an internal pressure of 3 psi (tornado considerations) and that the buildings could withstand at least this pressure externally. Mr. Brannigan stated, however, that the fuel must be kept free closed spaces in which an explosion could be caused by a small amount of fuel. The applicant stated that this will be given special attention in the design. In the upper, nonvital, floors of e.ne auxiliary 1454 323 a

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2-MAR 4 1968 Roger S. Boyd building an explosion should be vented through the corrugated walls, but this has not yet been analyzed in detail. Special design will be required in nonvital areas which have equipment which communicates to vital areas to assure exclusion of fuel.

Storage areas for hydrogen en-site are outside the turbine building, and all compressed gas cylinders will be physically secured to prevent missile generation frm thi.; sou ce.

Large Missile Impact Mr. Croneburger made a presentation en the results of the 300,000 lb miasile impact calculation. An aircraft at 200 knots was assumed to hit downward at tha apex of the d m e.

A maximum displace =ent of about 1 inch at 0.16 seconds was calculated. On the basis of checks of the code with static loads, it was estimated that the upper limit calculations presented for the smaller missiles in Amendment 8 were perhaps a factor of 10 conservative (which would lead to deflections of only 0.1 inch). Mr. Proctor said he agreed that this was about right and recomended recalculation of the smaller missiles with the new code. The applicant said this would be done but it may not be possible before the ACRS meeting.

When asked how big a load the contaiment could take, Mr. Cronebureer said that the load could be increased at least 50. on the same impact area and still remain in the elastic range. Since a larger plane would have a larger impact area, since a reserve of energy absorption would be available in the plastic range, and since the contaim ert was assumed to be a concrete shell and reinforcing and prestressing tendons were not taken into account, Hr. Cronaburger thought that a much larger lead could be tolerated without collapse. (After the meeting we asked Mr. Proctor if he thought the contain-ment could take twice the load postulated and he stated that it was his opinion that it could although he would be reluctant to flatly state this in public.) We suggested to the applicant that any work that could be done in the area of higher loads would be profitable.

When asked about other structures, Mr. Croneburger said that the centaiment design was probably limiting and that additional wall thickness could be easily specified for the ccaventional buildings if necessary. We also asked that a qualitative discussion of Icad distribution be suboitted which would consider the effect of small high density missiles (engines) impinging at appropriate distances fra the main fuselage.

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1454 (24 The applicant was reluctant to consider a break of both steam lines since this might give problems in starting the turbine driven emergency feed pumps if the steam generators emptied before the gate valves (1 minute closure time) could close. ' The applicant agreed to provide two electrical, half-co acity. emergency m-a in =Adie4r4 en -= = * = =- A - t u =, 7m M peri 4 assurance that steam pressure couldj be restored af ter the blowdown.

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. clos *ing check v alves were also mentioned by the applicant as an alternative, but we stated t2at the reason for the gata valves had been to provide an additional leakage barrier in view of population density considerations and questioned the leakage properties of the check valves.)

We asked what information had been obtained on distribution of debris after a crash, and the apt.ucant stated that only qualitative information was avail-able to date but that ecre detailed infor=ation was being obtained. We noted that thic was important in the separability of on-site and off-site power sources which are not protected against impact. The diesels are protected against tornado missiles by about 1 foot of concrete and would have a capa-bility to withstand debris. The diesels and transformers are located about 250 feet apart and are separated by the turbine building, which is a sub-stantial building up to the operating floor. Even if all AC power were lost, the plant could survive for several hours with only the batteries (which are protected).

The applicant will submit the follcwing confirmatory information before the ACRS meeting:

1.

More detail on how the fire prob' tem will be coped with 2.

Charts presented at the meeting on the large missile impact 3.

A discussion of impact distribution and the superi: posed impact of the four engines 4.

An indication that other buildings will take the large missile 5.

An analysis of the blowdown of both steam generators (0.57. subcritical with one stuck rod) 6.

Replacement of one of the steam driven emergency pumps by two 1/2 capa:ity electrical pumps.

Metropolitan Edison Representatives in attendance:

Metropolitan Edison Babcock & Wilce::

L. H. Ro 413 GFU R. Wascher C. F. 31erman R. E. Neidig Gilbert Associates J. G. Miller D. Croneburger C. Bitting Consultants D. Godfrey

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