ML19256D250
| ML19256D250 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1967 |
| From: | Ippolito T, Danielle Sullivan US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Long C US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910170762 | |
| Download: ML19256D250 (8) | |
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Lecenber 20, 1547 O. G. EnI, Ch12f Ecacter Project Branch ;;3 Eivicien cf Reacter I.icensirc TH2":
- 7. A. : bore, Chief, Isz3, 23L D. F. Sullivan T. A. Ippolito, I?J23 TERIE MILE ISIND (IC2 ED. ) U2IT fl, TRA3SICTTAL CF,SATI A'!AI1 SIS DccKET i 50-269 I3JT3:D3L:EFS& TAI - RF-930 The Safety Analysis relat136 to Instrunentatics, Centrol and Fever is attached a=d herevith transcitted for inclusion in the report to the ACRS for consideration at its Jnmm f ceeting.
A cc:
S. Invine V. Moore
- 3. Gri::es T. Ippolito
?00R BRIGINAL iA50 095 y91 011 0 A
I"C'.'".'Cl.TICH, CCT_2C L, A"? F C'.'"3 PD0110aalRL se.,
The reactor protectica and control systens for the Tnree Mile Island station are escentially identical to those proposed for the Cconee station.
Wita one nicor exceptics, the systens which initiate engineered safety feature action are also identical. FC - these reascus, the respective safety analyses presented to the Cot:r.:ittee in our (Occcea) Report p2, dated June 16, 1966, re:::nin valid, and are not repeated herein.
Accordingly, the scope of the report is limited *w:
(a) the EmerEency Power sys+4m (b) the Badf ation )bnitoring system, and (c) new infor:aation rtilated to the Beactor Protection and Control syste=s which h as been develo;ed during the course of this review.
E G Gr rt POWD1 SYSTEM:
At this writing we understand that a redesign of the Energency Fover The three 2000 kv diesel system is to be acco=plished by the applicant.
generators vill be replaced by two 2650 kv diesel generators. The split-bus concept vill be retnf ned, and the leads, tota'7 ' s S MO kv, vill be divided betveen the tvo busses. The generators vill not be synchronined. Cne change vill be =ade in the circuits which deliver off-site rever to the station; specifically, the deletion of Engineered Eafegua:f_s Trar.cforrcr
$10 The staff agnes with the applicant's position that the redundant startup transfer::nrs ($1A and E13) obviato any reTc. ire:nent for a thirl 1450 0 %
P00R ORGINAL Incening ;cwr vill se provided by three 230 %v lina:; tyc fr:n Middletcyn Junction, and one frcn Jac2cca. As si:cvn in yicura v-C cf the PSAR, the right-of-my of the Jack::n lina 10 distinct fren t'_nt shared by the ':iddletova lines. T2e three lines te..:inato as tc.2 ;i;a in a conventional breaker-and-a-half anr.ngenent as shown in Fic.re c-1.
This pernits flexibility in cross-corr.ectirg; the three linas to t2 tic; startup transforners, and in isolatin6 inults.
Tse station d.c. Cycten, essentially tvo independent 250/125 volt sourcer, vill re-Mn unchant cl.
We expect to receive, vithin a few days, infer =atica vhic?. v1 2 az::plify and docu:nent the details of the proposed redesic. Tre 23.-lier.
has been requested to include t. failure analysis to verify that the ec-visions of criterica 39 and his evn criteria (Q 9.6, and c.13, Supple-ment $1) are satisfied. We vill Le prepared to discues the natter orally at the January eeting.
RADIATIO:1 ?CERI"G STS'"ZM Tbc Radiatien Mcnitoring systen for this pinnt consists of 0.cae subsystens, Area Garna &nitoring, Ataccrheric mnitoring ced !ic.c.i.1 Monitoring. The area monitors consist Of those instrunent c?r--213 vc.i.:..
indicate general levels of radicactivity at selected 1ccatien: in the 7 r*,
1 and serve to linit accees to tbc affected crea. The etnespheric and lir..
conitors concist of these inst: ment channels which neasure radiccc:i.:. 3 levels within specific plant processes c d autecatically initinta ec.mn:172 action or indicate that corrective actica shculd be tahen rrrcC.
f 1450 097 Tho Pt.:licticn bbnitoring systen has been evalunted ti n respect to the follovir.c:
1.
Ec,ector types ard sensitivitics 2
Instr.rdnt ani detector rances 3
Detector locations 4.
Alan:s, inlicators and mcorders 5.
Calibration ani test 6.
Process isolate or interloc2s 7.
Pover sources In order to ect:plete our evaluation of the above ite=s, the applienst vas requested to provide sche:natic diagrams snowing equipmnt types, power sources, ani isolation and/or interlock functions. He was alco asked to list detector locations, sensitivities; sai rances, ar2 to stav that the ran6es 2N1ste to the desi5n basis ani other accident The responses are contained in Supple:nent $1 (Q.10.1 thru 10.8) releaces.
and Supple:aent f3 (Q.18.7).
Our analysis of the FaM ation >bnitoring systen re~.als the followinc:
1.
The detectors selected for each location have sufficient ranges and sensitivities and together with thetr respective instrumnt channels vill provide readincs within rance during a D3A.
1450 098
j 2
The detectors vill be located in cl00: proxinity to t'c.2 points of releases or areas of :rst pro':aale equi; nnt failure.
3.
All inctrunents vill provida indicaticn of radiation level cnl vicual and auiible alarns. Inlicatice and/cr alar:n:
cr2 provided at the detector locations if thcce areas are e.nectai to be nanned. All inlications and nin s are providei in t..a centrol roca. Tne radiation ala=s vill be of the seal-in tre that are reset canually to clear the alcrn.
4 Each instranent v4'l be calibrated and tested ;criodically ani after maintenance using radicactive test ccurce.
5.
All instruments vill receive power tzum the vital instru ent buses themby assurin6 their avialability under accident coniitions.
6.
Eich radiation signals vill be used to au*xnaticclly chat off disebar; es from the liquid and gaceous vaste dicycal sy: tans.
T'.:ese sic:als vill also shut dovn the au: ciliary, Pael.nrainc cai reactor building ventilatien systens.
7 The ecoling vater syste=3 vhich re-cre heat fr::n ;ctentially radioactive sources vill be ::enitored to detect accidental releases. 'Inece systens are the inte::niiate ecclinc loc;,
the nuclear services closed cooling loop and the srent fac1 1450 099
_5 coc11cc icop. A ::eniter is also providei in tLe plant effluent line fut prior to diccharte into the river.
We believe the radiation ::enitoring syste= proposed for the 7.1ree Mile Island station is acceptable.
E4 DFC2'.CICH a) Enriceered Scfety Featurec-As stated earlier, the initiatin6 circuits are, with one exception, identical to those at Ceccee. At Three !ile Island two ceparate sets of bistables respectively actuate the reactor biliMing spray pu:::;s and the associated valves.
(At Oconee, one set of bistables accc=plisbec both actions). In response to our inquiry (Q 9.6, Supple:ent pl) the applicant stated that the separate logic per=1ts testin6 the reactor buildin6 spray system vitbcut actually sprayinc vater by starting the pumps with the valves closed, a::d o;cning the valves with the pu=ps shut off.
We a6ree that this constitutes a design improve::ent, b) Qualification Testint-The applicant was asked to list all electrical eccponents (cabling included) located within contai:=ent vbece operation is requind for the proper functienin6 of the engineered safety features. He was al:o asked to describe the qualification tests which vill be perfor::rd to i450 100
P00R ORSINAL
+
ensure that these cor:;orents can vithstand the acciicnt environnent and ope mte as required. The res;cnces are contained in Supple:rnt 91 (Q 9.2) ncJ Supple:xnt 53 (Q 13.1).
The applicant stated that, of the several cc=penents vitz.in contain=nt, only the emergency cooling fans mst operate for an extended perica after the accident. The fan :notors vill be desi;;ned so that vindings =1 bearing surfaces are protected against the accident anbient. !i:tcr hcucinc: vi2 be desi6ned to withstand 60 psi, ani vill be provided with an air-tc-vetor heat excWr to be supplied from the sa:n source as its acccq= yin; ventilating cooling coil. The vinding inculation vill have been de:rnstrated to withstand an acemented dose greater than tbo expected lifeti:r and IDCA dosages. Bearin6s vill be of a seal tyg which vill withstani the IDCA pressure pulse ani vill be cooled along with the : noter internal air.
If, after the design is conpleted, the applicant detemines that an enviren-mntal test confir=ation of bearing design is required, he vill prepcca that a suitable test be performd.
We agree that providing a local, controlled environ:mnt for the inn mtors constitutes a valid desi6n approach. We believe, to.ever, that at least coe such fan ::otor system and mpresentative sa=ples of cabling, valve operators and other vital apparatus within centairrent sh:tC.i ^:e tested under si=1taneous conditions of pressure, te=peratu.m and hunidity.
We vill centinue to ptL7ue this : natter vith the applicant.
1450 101
300R OR GINAL
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c) Physical Eer.aration of Protection Systen CMnnels TM applicant was acked to di::cu s ni: criteri relatis; to Le physical seption of *he instcnol instn:aent a::d locic channela vnich initiate c:2 rcency and cafety feature ncti:n (Q 10.',, Eupplerent j3).
In reply, the applicant has stated that:
(1) 'a'ithin t1:e protection system physical isolaticn vill be provided to M nfmise the likelihood of a sincie event within or outside of a system cabinet or equi;:str.t houcir<
fm:2 inicirin6 the opemtion of acre than one protcetica channel and its associated instn::::ents. There vill be four instru: ment cabinets, each bcusing the equi;=nnt (s.Wers, relays, test equip:nent, etc. ) of one logic channel.
(2) Phfnical icolation of mdurx! ant sensors vill be achic.M throuch phy::1 cal separatien.
(3) P.eduMnnt protection syste:2 relays are packaced in relay cculec and these in turn am divided between the protection systes cabinets.
(4) The cabling both into and avay from the protection sys*2:a cabinets, vill be carried in closed retal trays or iron conduit.
The cables will be assigned to separate corduits based upon separating inHvidual channel signals and electrical functions.
1450 102
.e We acree with the applicant's criteria Si. le Seran ~:uc d) r T.:o applicant was asked to consider =etheds of imp _,d.x the m
reliability of the scran buc. In r2 ply to Our question ?.3 (P.cf.
Suppicent yl), tM applicant diccu :cd three possible apprcaches:
- 1) splitting the clutcMs betvcen coveral bus:cc;
- 2) nMing an auto::ntic ru::down s/ctes;
- 3) installing an ausc=atic shunt sviten which vac.a effset t.S2 effects of a:rf live short circuits at the ous.
We have subsequently been infor.md that (2) and (3) vill be The runback function is not intcoded as a incorporated into the design.
backup to the scrsm function, but as a mans of driving a stuck red The bus shunt svitch vill becem a part of the (or rods) into the core.
protection systen and =ust be designed accoriincly.
We believe the applicant's pmpccal constitutas an acceptable desia.
i 1450 103
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