ML19256D177
| ML19256D177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 10/25/1967 |
| From: | Ross D US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Boyd R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910170676 | |
| Download: ML19256D177 (9) | |
Text
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007 2 5 567 Roser S. Boyd, Asse Dir, RF, taL Taxu
- Charia c. Laos, Chief, RFB-3, DRL Deswood F. Ross, RFB-3,IMtL SEconD tzcanICAL NEETInc UITH M m oPoLITAu-EDISON COMPANY, (DOCIET X). 50-289)
A meeting was held as October 17-18, 1967 with the Metropolitan Edison Company, their suppliers, and their comeultants to discuss he 2 (Volume 4) relating to the Three Mila Island Station. A list of attmarimas is shows ce Table I.
The meeting started with a discussion om hydrology, more particularly the projected water elevations for the design flood. Meyer of USGS and McLemore of CAI were the principais.
TABLE I LIST OF AITIEDEIS MET-ED 1EITIEG October 17-18, 1967 B&W Gilbert Associates Met-Ed J. M. Catchia
- 1. H. McLemore G. F. Biernan F. R. Thomassee W. B. Shields R. E. Beidig W. B. Beisel C. B. Bitting G. Charnoff (Shaw-Pittman)
R. F. Ryan D. A. Codfrey J. G. Miller R. M. Douglass D. K. Cromeberger W. W. Love (Fiekmed-Love)
J. H. Ereps J. E. 3ehen Emith Woodard (Pickard-Iowe)
D. M. Collings W. H. Traffas D. W. Howard D. E. Thoren D. A. Mitti Caussitants taL M. F. Sankovich I. Cornet E. L. Natarfis1d
- 1. E. Wascher D. F. Ross G. S. White E
- 3. Crimes F. C. Beller Eric Meyer P. S. Check E. H. Baltz
- 5. Pawlicki N. H. Davison R. A. Birkel C. C. Long g
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OCT 2 5 567 Meyer's point was that a pool may back up, from the das and up, during the design flood and cause higher water levels. Some doubt is in his mind about the possibility that the narrow section of river (by powerhouse) may act as a control and back water up.
A conclusion reached was: McLemore will furnish his computer program and input data (informally) so that Meyer can independently check.
We asked what the minimum flow rate was for intaka supply. McLenore said 100-200 cfm (this assumes loss of York Haven Dam). We asked if there were any dans upstream for possible site inundation--and were assured there were none.
Containment We brewsht up the question of long-term surveillance of grouted tendons.
Inspection areas includa loss of prestress and corrosion. Croneberger (GAI) discussed long-term surveillance. He thinks crack observation is good and displacement measurements are the best for detection of loss of prestress.
The facility operator must be able to measure 0.07-0.10 inch variation over an 80-foot dimension to detect one-third loss of prestress. Croneberger said a combination of tape and theodolitas will be used to survey dimensional changes. Our concern is that some meaningful parameter must be postulated to serve as a limit on loss of prestress. We stated that greased tendons have been found acceptable before and that the surveillance features are quite attractive. Met-Ed requested time to confer with GAI prior to making any final decision.
professor Cornet discussed his opinions on grouted vs greased tendons.
He asserts that several ( ~ 3) inches of concrete around steel should serve
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as protective cover for steel. He used city of Los Angeles as reference data for both reinforced aad prestressed piles, some data that only 1-5/8-inch concrete was adequcts over a 25-year life. He offered the (unsolicited) comment that dimensional measurements aren't very outstanding criteria for detection of loss of prestress.
We asked Professor Cornet wbst was the merit of grout inside the conduit, since the greater reliance was on enternal protection, and since some wires touch the conduit. We asked him about possible hydrogen anbrittlement of tendons. He said no significant atomic hydrogen was formed, and hydrogen embrittlement does not occur if the environment is basic. He will send (informally) a reference. We asked if there was any related experience with similar structures and external cracks. The answer was "no."
We asked CAI whers external cracking might occur under normal or emer-sen g loads. Croneberger answered: Near the to,, of the well--used criteria 6 vf'c (or about 300 psi)--loods from thermal stress. There will be 1007.
visual auspeccaan of cae outer waii.
curing the pressure test. l In conclusion.
N&l th e the-surveO W e 1pestpras--as--postulated--by--Met-M-wee-mot anequate for grouted tdadons.
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.I 3-OCT 2 51967
'I We had same questions about the coismic analysis--Mat-Ed answer 3.2.2-b
- 1 (page 3.21 of Voluna 4). Dr. Newsark had questions about load combir.ations
- 5' in the piping designs i.e., pressure loads, seismic, dead, temperature as related to yield stretsth. Also, we noted some deficiancy in answer 3.2.5--
what differential action is forecast or allowable? Croneberger asserted that
> r the turbias foundation (or pedestal) is about 5 or 6 feet above rock, on very dense sand and gravel. This would give support to main stesa line. However, feedwater train is on a different foundation. GAI says some feedwater compo-nants are Class I structures. We wanted more detail on exactly what systems and camponents are located on what foundation. Items include condensate storage tank, emergency feedwater pumps, interconnected piping. GAI stated 1
that specific calculations on pipe vibration east avait final design. We stated that different foundations give rise to different seismic responses.
GAI said 'sasically the auxiliary building and reactor building would be on e
rock--all others on soil.
We noted difficulty interpreting the answer to question 7.2.
It appeared that the frequencias were added instead of the responses. game rephrasing is indicated. We asked if the polar creae would be amehared when not in use.
GAI said this was answered om page 3.2 2.
We wanted to know if trolley and bridge were both loeked when mot in use. GAI said it was.
We asked if the prestess anchor was to be inspectable. GAI said that the amebor was to be grouted.over. We said that inspection may be required.
We asked whether the turbine missile analysis considered the worst case.
T1ma Met-Ed answer was not particularly responsive. GAI will ask the turbine vendor (GI) for 1%rther information.
We expressed concern over turbine missile protection for feedwater
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train components, and stated our need for more information on shielding and distance factors. Apparently the two emergency feedvater pumps and the associated piping will be located 50 feet or better apart, so that missile effects are lessened.
A separate and concurrent meeting was held on the Met-Ed draft of answers to pressure-vessel thermal shock. gene of Se results are:
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1.
We are basically satisfied with the analytical treatment but would lika some more information on brittle failure--both the Fellini diagrse method and for fractura mechanics.
2.
Certain detailed requests were mode: 1.o., reports, curves. We stat:id we would like the. formation soon, in 2-3 weeks. It was sarawived whether BW could formalise the submittal in time for 4
thc December ACES meeting.
OFFfCE >
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Rwm ABC 318(R.v.943) umemwCMam
-4 OCT 2 51967 We notified the applicant that there seems to be scoe general need for experimental infor:aation on ther:nal shock to thick slabs. Until these data are available the thermal shock problae cannot be considered fully analyzed. We stated that other reactor manufacturers are also being actified.
N response of the system to combined seismic--1DCA loadings was discussed. 36M stated that additional information would be available in Jr.nuary 196f.. Final analysis would take 2 years--well after design and construction of the pressure vessel. We pointed out that three areas are:
1) loading combinations 2) stress limits and deformation limit for no loss of function 3) salculational method We reminded the applicant that no formal requirement presently exists for compliance for combined loadings. We also reminded the applicant that usually seismic loadings are much smaller than blowdown forces.
We discussed answer 4.3--DER correlations. !sch of a key referenca was noted. DugR's were lower using the new W-3 cold wall corrections.
We asked for the significance of the change in the DFB correlation. 34M stated that their bundle data agree with the Wastin6-aae bundle data in the referenced report. N reason that the W-3 correlation gives low IstB ratios for the 34M design was stated to be the use of a low mixing factor in the" worst casa" 34M calculations.
We asked for discussion on R&D items:
1.
Steam Generator Blowdown No specific results were presented. We need details before we can find that the R&D program has been successfully completed.
2.
Core Barrel check valve We stated our desire to know number and sizing information and redundancy critarina. B&W's present position is no redundancy in check valves. They are not in position to state how many valves, except that the number will be less than eight. Analysis is continuing, and results will not be available for several months. N sole basis for sising is emergency core cooling.
34N stated that no dynamic vibration tests are envisioned on these valves. We questioned the advisability of chis approach.
We pointed out the general inability of existing analytical methods to predict dynamic response. B4M intends to do some
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. OCT 2 51967 research on check valves in their 1/6-scale model. We askad if flow reactions could hold the valve open under full flow condi-tions. There was no ready answer. We asked why the hinge pin could not be located on the inside of the core barrel. B&W's answer was that the hinge pin was a zero-stress item and captive design made the hinge uninspectable. Analysis of loss of one valve was questioned. We wanted to know why increased core cool-ant outlet temperature would not serve as an indicator. On another problem, we asked (and were assured in the negative) whether the valve lid could be swept agaisr=t the bottom of the flow redistri-bution plate.
We asked the rationale behind in-core thermocouples. B W stated that insorporation of such thermocouples was in error sad was not a safety item as such. No fuel-elad thermocouples are envisioned.
We asked about the feasibility and desirability of electric-powered emergency feedvatar pumps. The turbine-powered emergency pumps (two) pump froma atmospheric up to 1000 pai. A small electric pump replenishes condes-sats from the river. !+pa stly each steam generator supplies one and only one amargency feeduster turbias; however the PSAR does not reflect this (in Chapter 10). This will be changed so that either sesam generator can feed either turbine.
The aest subject seasidered was effissey of the sodian thiosulfate sye-tems. We asked if any R&D programs were being considered. We stated that insufficient evidence exists to form a presise conclusion. Areas of uncer-tainty include radiation instability, sorrosion, condensats on drops, and
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effect os methyl iodide. Considerable discussion followed as to effective-mess of the system. Tests by BW show that adding sodium hydroxide (up to pH of 9) helps iodine reewval capacity. Radiation (108 rads) decreases pH, which is the motive for adding caustic. We asked about simultaneous irradi-ation and saidation tests ce sodium thiosulfate-boric acid tests. We stated the need for an R&D program by 3 2. We also stated that proven efficiency is required to comply with the Part 100 timits, and that reliance on a government-sponsored programs is inadequate. Industry programs should include:
1) mass transfer theory, 2) volume-to-spray density variations, 3) presrare, temperature, radiation effects, 4) sondensation effect on drop, 5) stability of the mixture, and 6) alternate proposals.
1446 325 OFFICE >
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Nbrm AEC=418 (Rev. 9-43) us. sowanuert penmns crvict : tsu.-ott +CS
. OCT 2 51967 We explained that the applicant must clearly identify the R&D program objectives and assume complete responsibility for supplying to DRL the results of the program. Completion of the program is not required for the construction permit het identification of the progras is required in dstail.
The next subject discussed was safe shutdown following loss of off-site power. B&W stated that the emergency feedwater pumps are started locally, and, for optistas results, should be started within 10 minutes. This answer may conflict with CDC No.11. The scheme for depressurisation used emer-gency feedwater down to 2500 F,135 or so psi and then Dit pissps. We were later informed that the emergency pissps may also be started from the control room.
We noted that neither neutros detection nor concentration of boric acid in solution is provided in poet accident conditions. Bei stated that post-accident sampling poses great difficulties, mostly from radioactivity.
Resistance to both neutron detection and chemistry sampling in the post-accident sendition was offered. We reserved final comment.
As additional area discussed was safe shutdown from witnout the coritrol room. MedEd firmly dissented, with the altaraste being continued control room assess. Difficulty in interpreting the word " access" is still being encountered 3 the applicant does not believe that CDC No. 11 requires asesideration of evacuation.
One final iten was heat transfer coefficients on the fan cooler for the R3 cooling. We asked for something more detailed to review, preferably a preliminary design. The applicant prefers to leave this to the relected subcontractor and may specify that a proof test under simulated accident conditions be run. We also reserved final cosment on this problem.
P003 ggt 1446 326 SURNAME >
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Form AEC-318 (Rev..-53) u.s.sovoumant rmMTN4 W1G 09m-021 429
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OCT 2 51967 CONTROL AND INSTRUMEYIATION )SETING october 18, 1967
)ST-ED We asked which schoss was to be used to combat the undetected appli-cation of positive DC voltage to the magnet power supply bus. Further information is indicated, particularly if credit is taken for a rod drive-down in lieu of a scram.
Another question related to the adequacy of the flow monitor as a backup to the pump moottor. We asked about the adequacy, taking single failures into account.
We taquired into the failure nature of the in-core instrumentation alare. A detailed question involved the possibility of exceeding DNB, as indicated by the in-core instrtamentation, and not being aware of the occur-rence. B&W acted that the out-of-core instruments are not adequate to e.tcet means esaillations.
We asked if loss of one diesel decreased emergency core sooling below 100% of required--and were assured that 2/3 of distal load provided 100%
of requirements. There is ao automatis cross-tie between emergency buses, sely manual erossover and synchronisation.
We inquired about sold weather, icing conditions, affecting external switchgear. Most E37 switchgear is inside buildiass. Diesels are also kept vers; if heating system fails, the diesel t' tarts and keeps itself warm.
Another question involved the likelihood and consequeness of 3-phase reversal, involving possible reversal of control rod drives. Concern was expressed about the aanbination of phase-reversal and undetected applica-tion of power to the magme* bus, giving rise to a ganged rod withdrawal.
41 We thought more attention should have been given to phase reversal regarding power to ESF pumps, valve operators, etc. B&W thought proper saintanence would deny such an occurrence.
game test program seed for 3-phase reversal detection was indicated, both for maintenance and for periodic tests. A need to examine plant performance with one diesel supplying reversed-phase power was expressed by us. Discrepancy in the description of the battery charges was noted.
Figure 8.1 ef the original PSAR should be revised; the answer to question 9.10 is correct.
OFTICE >
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DATED sbrtn ABC-als (R.v. 643) uena ymsmns crre w. eas
O PDDR ORGNAL Final specifications on the diesel is lacking. We wanted to know the margin available in diesel load--that is, how much over 2000 kw could the diesel supply. BtR thinks IM margin is nominally supplied. Also, B&W will specify 2000 kw as a continuous load rating. B&W might buy a diesel that is designed to deliver in the overload region, assuming that one of three does not start. We inquirs4 about diesel self-protection features, such as overcurrent, etc.
We brought up the problem of fire in the control room, while facility is in full operation. What activities could still transpire? Applicant answer is that breathing apparatus would be used. Also, applicant states that external air inlet location would avoid ingestion of smoke. We asked if the famility can be shut down from alternata locations, granting that the reactor has been scrammed. The sequence of events vau not readily available. However, it appeared that the plant possibly could take care of itself, staying at high pressure and extracting steam to drive the main feedwater pump turbines.
We aneutred why the ranges of atmospheric radiation monitors could not be fizee at tab time. B&W stated that they preferred to avait further advances in state of the art.
game desumentatise may be required in this line. Particular areas of soecern include matching instrueests to calculated dose levels.
We asked for a description of events following a radiation alarm in the vaceus pump exhaust. guch an alarm would be indicative of failed fuel and Isaky staan generator tubes.
We asked about physical layout (physical separation) of scras relays and associated wiring. B&W noted that in actual constructico physical separation is intended.
At the conclusion of the meeting we actified the applicant that we would send them a letter actifying our position on R&D progress, and other areas that came up during the meeting.
We asked them to esasider the consequences of not isolating a broken LPI or HPI line--whether boiloff could enhance production of radiolytic gas.
34W stated that smaller HPI lines (and more of thea) may be used. Of eencern west does the operator have to take corrective action?
We brought op the single operator action accident wherein the recircu-lation valve is opened prematurely sad admits RB pressure to suction mani-fold. We requested B&W to look at the problem.
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. OCT 2 51967 We also asked about minimum shutdown margin for the steam lice break with leaky stema seaerator tubes. More information was promised by B&W.
We asked, about question 6.2, whether the CF ran h should have been included.
Another question was tornado design for auxiliary building. No immediate answer available.
We noted that some formal questions on control and instrumentation.
They will be of general nature. Question areas will include adequacy of assurance that systems will operate as designed. Environmental testing is indicated for that portion of the system inside the RB.
Also, for seneral instrument design criteria, we expressed a desire to know how the criteria would be met.
.hnother observation is that the revised FSAR does not clearly state that the emergency diesels are split with no automatic cross-ties.
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pj t u D. F. Showbolt D. Thompson R. D. DeYoung J. F. Novell D. R. Maller C. C. Long C. Burley N. H. Davison S. S. Fawlicki R. L. Waterfield R. A. Birkel E. Kaial J. A. Murphy M. Dunenfield
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