ML19256D154
| ML19256D154 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1967 |
| From: | Ippolito T US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Long C US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910170649 | |
| Download: ML19256D154 (3) | |
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C. C. Leag, Chief AUG 181967 asseter Projects Branch f3 TRED:
V. A. Heers, Chief, I&FTB, DRL T. A. Ippolice Iactrumentaties and Feuer Techselegf Branch, DEL METROPOLITAN EDISW, THEIE MILE ISLAND STATIN, UNIT #13 QUESTINS RELATING TO INSTEDENTATIN, CGffEOLS, AND POWERg DoGIT #50-289 I&PTE DEL TAI - 25 129 Flasse ime1=Ja the following questicas among these in preparatism for transmittal to the appliaant 1.
Does the desip of your protecties system samflict is any way with the propened IIII Standard for Emslaar Fever Plant Pretseties l.
Systems? If se, plears stata reasema justifying year posities.
2.
(a) Please list all alastrical osapements (embling facladsd) 1=*=*ad withim===*=i-e skene operatian during the desip basis seeia==e (De&) is required for the proper fumatisming of the enginessed==E=*y featszes.
(b) Througimet what ties latervals mest each esmpensat operate?
(c) Miss toets will be perforund to ensure that these eeupements cas, is fast, withstand the pestalated accident envire====t and perfens as seguired?
3.
The " trip" bus feeding the red relsene asammiamo cannet, in our judpost, be disabled by any singla fault. Resever, immensch as see saa postulata several "first fanit=" (a.s.. the commeeties of the peettive side of a d.a. sosres to the bus) whose existenes cannot be detected daring r== rima *a=*i=3, the bus is therefore vulnerable to t;.a adverse effects of the first detectable fanit. Thus, the desip does set eenfers to the single fat f are criteries. Accordingly, please discuss any changes you any aske to remove this vulnerability.
4.
The protesties system is required, onder some cireamstaneos, to take acties is reopease to **=1 ant, ;
-iter operaties. Is there esffirimat margia in the protectica syntam desip to allow for single fai1=ves within the semiters which give rise to falso indiameism of pump operme4==?
5.
Identify the seuroes of pesar tea (a) Cails of trip circait hvaamre in reactor protecties syntam.
tu n a a,4 =.1-e a 7
-14 1446 273 7910170(f9 y
?00RORGNM C. G. Lang M G 1 8 US7 6
Esplaim the pury, ee of separate dual logie chanaals for reactor building spray pumps and valves.
7.
Discuss the significance of the alarm function of the incora instrumsntation system. What are the sensequences of its failura?
8 Discuss your critaria for the desip of those sub-systems which scatrol the operaties of lead-shedding and loseceanecting circuit breakers under DBA renditions.
9.
To what extent are your engineered saf2ty feature systsas vulnerabic to an accidental reversal of a three-phase voltage supply? What precautions will be tamen to prevent each an ocaarresee?
10 Please describe the proposed 250/125 vde system. In additten, please provide answess to the fellowing
, (a) What is, the sapasity of eseh battery and battery sharter?
(b) What are the emergmasy loads in each d.e. bus section?
(e) Will each battery be capabla of carrying full emergency lead?
(d) Rat toets are to be perferend en the batteries and what are the test fagmencies?
- 11. (a) hat is the rating of' each diesel generator unit?
(b) Assuming a failed generator, what margin does this represent in terus of power requirements for miniana engineered safety feature speratisat
- 12. 'Masess the independemos of the diesel generater units with respect tes (a) Physiaal separatise (b) Starting systems (c) Lebricatism systems (d) Fuel supplies, feel pumpe (e) Cooling systems (f) Control oipals (3) Fire protection
- 13. dsausdag atstal less of estemaal peser estacident with a design basis accident, pisase perform a failure analysis to show that no single failuss saa prevent the actuatica of sufficient engineered safety feature devices. Postulated failarse should include, but not meesssarily be limited tos (a) skert eiresit (b) Open cirsait 9
rauma assoai semerateri i
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?00R ORML C. G. Lang AUG 131957 (d) Failed engineered safety feature devios (e) Malfumationing airaait breaker (lead-shedding er naammeting)
(f) Loss of one battery (3) Faultad undarveltags maatter (at emergency bas) 14 Discuss why it is set necessary for radistian moeiterins system to provide isolaties er interleek functism in the plant and gas discharge lines.
15 Describe the system which automatically drains wastes to the waste batch tank when they are sufficiently acaematratad? What means are used to dotaraine esseostration of wastest What are the cassequemees ed failure of the metsmatia systaat 16 Flaase provide justifiaation for your assumptica that gases are se3mased at a law sentrol reta in the event of a vaste gre tank laak sham the tank pressure saa he as high as 100 pet.
- 17. Provida Radiattaa Manitertag System schaustice which indicate loestian, equipeast type, peser seurees, and interleek functions, if asy. The saheesties should show the relatimaship of the area, ute and gas disposal, ventilaties, and site monitoring systees. These
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should be massepamied by adeguate descriptism. Also, if possible, the radiaties moeiterias equipasst sharesteristice such as range, sensitivity, type of senser, senser energy dePenesses, sampling sate, malthrsties, ets., sheeld be gives.
- 18. Discuss how the DBA dose saleslatione relate to the radistica semitering system design.
- 19. Disease what astiana ass initiated spas reasipt of a high radiatica afa m 20 Diasass the reason for met monitoring er filtiering the turbine ballMa3 exhaost.
- 21. Describe the operatiam of the sentrol reasi hosting and ventilation systems darias sermal mad emergemey opersticas.
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