ML19256B781
| ML19256B781 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 08/01/1979 |
| From: | Goldfrank J, Ross M METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908290207 | |
| Download: ML19256B781 (33) | |
Text
118 i
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COMMISSION ON THE i
PRESIDENT'S ACCIDENT AT TIIREE MILE ISLAND I
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EDISON of METROPOLITAN CONTINUED DEPOSITION J. ROSS, held at Three Mile f.
COMPANY by MICHAEL Generating Station, Harrisburg, Island Nuclear 1979, com-day of August, on th e 1st 6
Pennsylvania, a
Stanley Rudbarg, before mencing at 9150 a.m.,
lic of the Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Pub i
of New York.
State 1.907 127
~
11EN.I AMIN IMPORTING SERVICE CERTIFIED SHOR TilAND REPORTERS FIVI', IIEEKM AN STILEIT10038 YOltK NEW YOltR,NEW
[212] 374-1138 7 9082 9 0'Ao J,
119 1
2 AP P EAR ANCE S :
3 METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY:
4 SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE, EcQS.
/~'
for Metropolitan Edison Company 5
Attorneys 1800 M Street, NW 6
Washington, D.C.
20'036 7
BY:
ALAN R.
YUSPEH, ESQ.
of Counsel 8
COMMISSION ON THREE MILE ISLAND:
9 PRES _IDENT.S 10 JOAN GOLDFRANK, ESQ.
11 Associate Chief Counsel 12 13 ALSO_PRESENT:
14 LOUIS F. COOPER 15 16 t
17 18 19
' 20 M I C HA E L J.
RO S S,
having been was recalled as a wit-pre viously duly $ worn, 21 E
22 ness and testified as follows:
1 23 MS. GOLDrRANK:
We will continue the Ross.
24 deposition of Mr.
1907 128 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
120 1
Ross GOLDFRAN}b you explain to me what type of BY MS.
2 Q
Cou 3
in fo rma tio n you receive on a routine basis from 4
the NRC7 5
A I receive nothing dituctly from NaC.
6 Q
What do you receive indirectly?
7 Indirectly, it varies.
At times I can receive A
O NRC bulletins, follow-up action, sometimes NRC infor-9 mation bulletins.
I th ink they have three different information bulletins and 10 kinds of categories of 11 something else.
12 Q
Who do you receive these from?
The s uperintendent normally would forward them 13 A
14 to me, 15 g
wonid he forward all of the information 16 bulletins, or would he select certain ones to forward 17 you?
i A
I can't answer that.
10 them weekly or monthly?
19 Q
Do you receive 20 A
I don't think there is a fixed frequency.
21 Whenever he gets them, I guess he would forward them.
22 Q
You don't know if you receive every one 23 that he receives?
1907 129 24 A
I do not.
25 Q
oo you receive any standard information, BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE i
121 1
Ross 2
and by " standard" I mean any information in a periodic 3
memorandum from other B&W plants?
4 A
There is a B&W plant status letter that comes 5
out.
It is a one-liner on all plants, tnd I usually
~
6 receive that.
I th ink that is..a monthly or bi-weekly 7
letter.
I'm not sure.
8 Q
Do you receive that directly?
9 A
no.
10 Q
Would that go through the superintendent 11 also?
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
What kind of information does thatcoontain?
14 A
Basically, it is the status of each plant that 15 B&W has, Three Mile Island, what their status is, j
16' and one-liners on what the report is.
i 17 Q
And is that B&W7 18 A
Yes.
19 MR. YUSPEH:
Have there been any transients 20 that this status report mentioned where there has 21 been a major transient?
22 THE WITNESS:
Nothing that I can remember...
be provided with 23 MS. GOLDFRANK:
Can we 24 a sample of one of these B&W plant status 25 letters?
1907 130 l
BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE e
122 I
Ross 2
THE WITNESS:
Yes.
3 Ms. coLorRAux:
Preferably prior to 4
March 28, if possible?
5 THE wITuess:
okay.
6 Q
Do you receive any standardized memo-7 randa or newsletters from other B&w plants?
8 A
No.
9 Q
Do you know if anybody else at TMI does?
10 A
I don't know.
11 Q
Y e s te r d ay, you mentioned that you had 12 raised a concern in completing a field questionnaire 13 to Burns & Roe concerning the polishers.
You also handwritten note 14 mentioned that you had written a
15 and directed that field questionnaire to Mr. Seelinger?
16 A
Cor ect.
That is my recollection at this time, 17
- yes, 18 Q
And you also indicated that you did not 19 have a copy of what you sent Mr. Seelinger?
correct.'
20 A
21 MS. GOLDFRANK:
I would like to request 22 that Mr. Seelinger's files be searched for 23 that handwritten memorandum from Mr. Ross 24 if possible prior to his deposition.
i 25 g-Yesterday, you were explaining to me that BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE i907 13f
I Ross 123 2
there was a GPU startup group that was involved at 3
the time of construction, co rrec t?
4 A
Correct.
m 5
Q Could you explain to me how the trans fer 6
responsibility from that GPU startup group to Met 7
Edison worked?-
8 A
Well, GPU sLartup had, basically,overall, I 9
guess, responsibility of the plant until the fuel 10 was really loaded, and we had licensing responsibility.
11 At that time, it was kind of a shared responsibil.ity, 12 until the plant was commercial, and they were off the 13 job.
14 Q
Once there was a cold license 15 A
once we loaded fuel, they were not involved lb' in things such as fuel loading, things that required l
l 17 license.
a 18 Q
At that point, once fuel was loaded, it 19 was a shared responsibility between GPU and Met Ed?
I 20 A
They were running the test program.
They had i
21 responsibility for the test program and the perform-22 ance.
At that point, they were the. guys on schedule.
I 23 They had overall, I would say, actual responsibility 24 for the plan t.
As soon as the plant went commercial, 25 they would, of course, leave quite rapidly,- and the--
B ENJ AMIN REPORTING SERVICE 1907 132
124 I
Ross 2
plant would be ours.
3 At the same time, you are escalating your 4
license responsibilities, and none of them were f'
l' 5
licensed.
6 Q
None of them had control room operator's 7
license or sao license?
I, 8
A no, 9-Q You indicated that they would have respon-i 10 sibility to the President, correct?
11 A
- yes, r
12 Q
Who, at that point, when there was shared 13 responsibility, would have the responsibility for 14 instructions on a day-to-day basis?
A Well, at that point, you really have two organi-15 h
16 zations.
GPU would be giving instructions as to what l
to do with the plant, "We want it at 40% or 8 0 %,." and I
17
)
18 Met Ed would be giving instructions as to what mainten-i ance must be performed, and also carrying responsibility 19 l
20 for the licensing.
It was kind of a gray area.
It 1
i l
21 appeared right at the end of construction where every-i f(
l 22 thing is functional and the plant is being taken up.
23 Q
And once the plant went commercial, the 24-responsibilities all rested with Het Edison?
GPU A
As far as I know.
I don't know what 25 SERVICE 19 07 133 BENJAMIN REPORTING
s 1
Ross 125 2
startup would leave the site.
They would leave the 3
unit, yes.
4 Q
What function do you see the engineers on C
5 the site as having?
6 A
Well, most of the lead engineers on the site 7
are members of-the Plant Review Committee, and they 8
carry responsibility of that Committee, which is to i
9 review plant operations, approval of the procedures 10 in the plant.
They also carry responsibility for 11 certain line maintenance items that require engineer-12 ing assistance.
They also carry responsibility for 13 engineering changes, although some changes they would 14 carry responsibility for at least initiating, that 15 would not be approved here on the site.
Id' For an engineering change to be approved, 17 there is a different category of technical support, l
18 where some can be approved here and some must be 19 approved off-site.
20 Q
When you say "off-site," you mean Reading?
21 A
Reading Generation Engineering.
22 Q
Does each unit have their own engineers?
23 A
- yes, 24 Q
And the engineers are assigned " Unit'1,"
25 all of them are on the PORC for Unit 17 Sg g(~ BENJAMIN REPORTING
126 I Ross 2 A "All" is a big word. I don't th in k all. 3 Q Which ones do you know that are? 4 A 11ormally, th e principal members, the lead en-5 gineers, which would be the lead mechanical, Icad 6 electrical, and lead IrIn engineer. Of course, the 7 Superintendent of Technical support would be chairman I am sure 8 of the four. Some of the junior engineers 9 do not. 10 Q But the lead engineers would be? 11 A Yes, the principal. 12 Q And this is written out in administrative on PORC? 13 procedur<.s that they should be 14 A I think what you will find in the administrative 15 procedura is that the sup e r in t e n de n t will designate in 16 writing PORC members, and that is all he is doing. 17 what that comes out to be is the lead engipeers, and supervisor of Maintenance. 18 supervisor of Operations, 19 Q So the members of the PORC would be differ-on the appointment 20 ent on Unit 1 and Unit 2, depending 21 by the sup e r inte nde n t? l ? guideline for what the 22 A I am sure there is a 23 requi reme nt s for those are. I am not aware of what 24 it is at this time. 25 g-sut the sup e r inte nde n t for Unit.1 indi- ~ ~ 1907 135 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE _._L
127 r Ross 1 2 cated that the lead engineers should sit on PORC7 3 A Yes. 4 Q Yesterday, you were explaining to me the C 5 process of every two years that you would review 6 systematic. ally the operating and emergency procedures, t 7 correct? i 8 A Yes. 9 Q And when was the last time that that i 10 review was undertaken? 11 A We did emergency procedures prior to last are duc 12 January. I believe operating procedures 13 prior to this January. I have to go back to my files, 14 but I believe that is the way it is. 15 Q So that you would first take a look at l 16 the emergency procedures, and then take a look at 17 the operating procedures, in evaluating your review? i 18 A No. I'm saying that all the emergency procedures 19 were reviewed prior to last year because it was their 20 time for review. I'm saying the operating procedures t 21 are due this year. l 22 Q So that you would alternate in years, year you would look at emergency procedures, 23 where one I i and the next year you would look at operating procedures? i 24 25 A yes. 1907 136 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE e
128 1 Ross 2 Q So, about two years ago was the last time 3 you looked at the operating procedures? 4 A On a formal basis? C 5 Q Right. 6 A They are looked at continuously, and procedure 7 changes are written almost continuously. 8 Q But in this formal process? 9 A Yes. 10 Q Do you remember what changes were initi-11 ated with regard to the emergency procedures in your 12 formal review in January? e 13 A No, I do not. i 14 Q Would you have a record of that? 15 A I think you could probably find that in the I 16 ' master file, when you get that through the PORC f 17 secretary. When you say " re co rds, " you talk with 18 him. 19 Q now many changes were made last January 20 as a result of that review? 21 A I'm not sure. ) 22 Q Would it have been three or four? I 23 A no, it would be more than that. i 24, Q Twenty? 6 25 A I'm not sure, but it would. be some. number BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE 1907 13T
I Ross 129 2 more than three or four. Fifteen, maybe. 3 Q Do you remember any specific changes? 4 A No, I don't. C 5 Q And with respect to the operating pro-6 cedures that were reviewed about a year and a half ago, similarly, would there have been a record with 7 i 8 the PORC secretary in the master file? i t 9 A Yes. 10 Q Do you remember about how many changes 11 were undertaken at that time? 12 A no. 13 Q Would it also have been about fifteen? 14 A It would have been probably more, because there 15 are more procedures involved. l Id' Q About double that? r, 17 A Probably. 18 Q Do you remember any specific operating 19 procedure that was changed as a result of that review? 20 A no. 21 Q Was there a history at TMI 1 of failed ! (7' ) 22 open PORVs? 23 A A lot of failed open PORVs, yes. i 4 24 Q Was there any incident at TMI 1 that 25 involved a failed open PORV7 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE i
130 Ross l I 2 A None that I am aware of. 3 Q Was there any incident at TMI 1 that 4 involved a failed to lift PORV7 I 5 A none that I am aware of. site at 4:00 a.m.7 6 Q On March 28, were you on 7 A No, I was not. called by the TMI to come on 8 Q Were you 9 -site. called, but not necessarily 10 A Yes and no. I was called for a Unit 1 problem. 11 to come on site. I was i 12 Q Who called you? 13 A The Unit i shift foreman. And what time was that? 14 Q 15 A 4:35 in the morning. i 16 Q 4:357 ~ l 1 17 A Yes. 18 Q And what did he say to you? i 19 A He related to me that Unit 2 had tripped, had turbine trip, and that we reactor trip and had a 20 a 21 had lost the steam that we were using to heat our i in the ~ 22 feedwater in Unit 1. Unit 1 at the time was 1 were i fuel outage,.and we of a l 23 process of coming out from Unit 2 to heat feedwater to main-j 24 drawing steam 1907 139 i '~ 25 tain steam... BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE WWm p -
I Ross 131 2 Ile related that both shift supervisors were 3 in Unit 2 and he called me to discuss chemistry. 4 We discussed chemistry control in Unit 1, and I gave 5 him instructions as to what to do with the steam 6 generator. At that time, I had no concern. I i 7 came sometime later. i 8 Q So, with your discussion at about 4:30 9 with the shift foreman, you addressed his specific 10 issues and you did not proceed to come to the site, 11 correct? 12 A Not right away. I later thought about it a 13 while and decided I might go in-and help him out a 14 little bit on the chemistry and later proceeded to 15 the site about 5: 30 or 20 to six, and went to Unit 1 j 16-Q And when you arrived about 5:30 or 20 to i 17 six, you went to Unit 17 18 A Yes. 19 Q And what happened when you a rrived at 20 Unit 17 21 A Well, I came to the Unit 1 control room and C 22 reviewed what he was doing. We discussed what he I 23 should be doing, and I pretty much satis fied myself 24 that everything was under control in Unit.1. I 25 Then we were discussing further plans for 1907 140 B ENJAMIN R EPG RTING SERVICE I l
132 Ross 1 2 startup during that day. We had no reason to suspect 3 anything was wrong. 4 Q And then what did you do? 5 A sometime after that, I received a call from one ( 6 of the shift supervisors who was in Unit 2 asking me 7 to come to unit 2. I still was not overly alarmed. 8 They said they had an alarm and would I look at it. 9 Q Do you know about what time that was? 10 A sometime after 6:00 o' clock. Il Q And do yon remember who that was? , 12 A Bill Zewe called me. 13 Q And what happened when you got to Unit 27 ~~ ]4 A Well, I qJ to Unit 2 and talked to Bill briefly, 6 15 and I started to ascertain the plant's status. At remember.' I it is a little hard to 16 that time I 17 have already been taped on this particular thing, l l' 18 so I want to be sure I say the same th ir. 7, to be i a I 19 quite honest. 20 I guess we had some exchange about high-21 pressure injection at that time. 5
- i (;
22 ?.f te r I got there, I saw the source range l 23 levels increasing. That was the first thing I and I told Bill to high-pressure. inject l 24, remember. 25 emergency borate and he verificJ to me that 'he SERVICCl 907 141 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G e.
I Ross 133 2 was in fact high-pressure injecting and emergency 3 borating the ' plant. It seemed like just a few 4 minutes thereafter. I got there just be fo re the 5 first radiation alarm, and just a few minutes 6 thereafter we got a bunch of radiation alarms, and 7 within a few minutes, Gary Miller was there and de-8 clared a site emergency and general emergency. At 9 that point, Miller assigned me operation responsi-10 bilities. 11 Q Were you assigned operations responsibili-12 ties by Gary Miller? O A Yes. 14 Q And was that pursuant to the emergency 15 plan? 16 A Yes. I was assigned as one of the emergency 17 directors that would have.a lot of people talking l 18 to them. 19 The way we always worked our drills, there 20 were only three or four people who could talk to I 21 the emergency director. One of them would be the j CF. 22 health physics guy, and one would be the maintenance i 23 guy, and one of them would be the operations guy. 24-I was assigned that duty by Gary Miller. 25 Q With that responsibility, what duties 1907 142 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
I Ross 134 2 were assigned to you? 3 A Also, I was assigned as part of the management 4 team to determine what we were going to do with the 5 plant, part o f cary's think-tank. 6 I would also relate orders from the think-tank 7 to the operations pool personnel and shift supervisor. 8 Q So, did you act as an interface between 9 cary Miller and Bill zowe? 10 A Yes. 11 Q So that you would discuss with Bill Zewe 12 certain actions that were taken and also gave instruc-13 tions to him from Gary Hiller? 14 A Yes. 15 Q And you also indicated that you were a 16' member of the management team? 17 A cary calls it the management team. It was a 18 group of people ;iho occasionally stepped back and i 19 determined what we were going to do next with the 20
- plant, we would go into another room and sit down i
21 and talk about the plant and what we were going to 22 do to get out of the conditions we were in. 23 0 who else was on that team? 24 A Miller, me, Dick Dubiel, and George
- Kunder, 25 Lee Rogers of nsw, and I probably missed a guy.
BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE e ~ ~ 1907 143
I Ross 135 2 That is the type of people. 3 Q When you arr!.ved in Unit 2, this was 4 prior to the discovery that the PORV was failed open, 5 is that correct? 6 A I'm not sure. It was right about the same time 7 or shortly thereafter. 8 Q Do you know who d'.scovered that it was 9 open? 10 A I do not. It was one of our shift supervisors, 11 but I'm not sure whether it was Ken Bryan or Brian 12 Mehler, somebody. 13 Q And so initially, when you arrived in f l 14 Unit 2, you really were just discussing with Bill 15 Zewe the status of the plant? 16 A I tried to assist him in any way I could. 17 Q Was there any point in time after Gary 18 Miller appointed you in charge of operations responsi-19 bility that you instructed Bill Zewe to take a certain i l 20 action that he disagreed with the action that you sug-l i 21 gested? l I j 22 A No, none that I can remember. I 23 Q You don't remember if he articulated to l I 24 you a concern about any action that you suggested jg@ ]M 25 to take? B ENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE i
1 Ross 136 2 A No, we had a free exchange, but I don't 3 remember what I would call serious disagreement. 4 Q Do you remember any specific questions 5 that he raised with respect to certain instructions 6 that you gave him? 7 A Nothing specific. We had several exchanges 8 and several items, but nothing specific. t 9 Q Do you remember which items you discussed 10 specifically that there was a lengthy exchange? 11 A I guess our major concern was providing a 12 cooling path fo r the reactor, and we had a long 13 exchange on how are we going to cool the reactor 14 without the heat sink. i 15 That is where we basically found ourselves. i 16 There was an open exchange, and I went over it and i l 17 I guess the next longest exchange we had was over 18 what to do with the steam generators, as far as 19 steaming them. At one point, we were ordered not 20 to dump into the atmosphere, and we had a long ex-21 change over that. 22 Q Who ordered you not to dump into the 23 atmosphere? i 24 A My orders came from cary Miller. I'm sure he 25 got it ~from someplace else. 4 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
137 I Ross 2 Q Did he tell you where he got these orders 3 from? 4 A No, he didn't say specifically. He just said, 5 " Don't do it." 6 Q Did you question that when he told you 7 that? 8 A Yes. comment to him? 9 Q What was,your 10 A The comment we had was that we were concerned, 11 we were losing one o f our available heat removal 12 paths, and even though it was very, very small, it 13 was a small removal path, and we discussed it. i 14 Q What did he respond to that? 15 A Well, he felt that we had cooling established, 16 and if we could really do that, it would settle some 17 of the concerns outside. 10 Q Was there any other instruction that you 19 received from cary Miller that you questioned or-about? 20 raised certain concerns 21 A Well, the think-tank was a questioning group. ~] 22 We established the plan. There was a lot of free think we questioned everything 23 discussion there. I 24 did that day. I think everybody in the group we it.- so, to make out.a 25 questioned every portion of BENJAMIN R EPO,RTIN G SERVICi:907,146 i
138 Ross 1 2 specific -- I believe everything we talked about questioned, "Why do this, why do that," and 3 was 4 we always came out in agreement in the group on the C 5 final decision with cary. 6 Q The decision that was made you never 7 disagreed with? 8 A There was nothing I tctally disagreed with. 9 There were things I was not totally in f avo r o f. 10 Q And did you articulate to the think-tank 11 your concerns? 12 A Yes, I think everybody did. 13 Q Do you remember what specific concerns 14 you raised where you were not in ultimate agreement 15 with the decision that was reached? 16 A I was always in ultimate agreement. The words 17 I used were "not total agreement." That is, I th ough t not the best move 18 putting steam in the generators was 19 for the plant, although I don't think it would totally 20 hurt the plant that much, that type of thing. l I 21 Q oo you remember any other? i (- 22 A No, that was a long day. 23 Q That day, did you have contact with i i l 24 people from NRC in the control room? 25 A Yes, they were there all day...After about__ BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE 1907 147'
I Ross 139 2 9:00 or 10:00 o' clock, we had somebody from the 3 NRC with us at times. I had no formal contact, no 4 interview or anything like that. But, there were 5 people there all day. The NRC sat in freely on 6 our conversations that we held in the think-tank. 7 There were people there, and we neve r held any con-8 versations that they didn't hear or couldn't hear. 9 Q so, when you and Mr. Miller, and Mr. 10 Dubiel, and Mr. Kunder, and Mr. Rogers would dis-11 cuss things, people from the NRC that were present 12 would sit in on those? 13 A They could. We never said, " Sit down. We 14 want you to listen to it," but they were held in 15 the same room th at they were uqing for the phone, 16 and they were free to listen. I 17 Q Would they ever enter into the discussion, 18 or did they merely just lis te n? 19 A Most of the time they were kind o f noncommital 20 and would listen. l 21 Q And the people from the NRC that were ,E \\ 22 there was a Mr. Habercamp? '~ l 23 A Don was not there that day. I'm not too sure i 24 where he was. 25 Q uad you known any of the people _ from NRC_ __ _ BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE I
140 Ross 1 2 that were there that day? 3 A Yes, I did. 4 Q Did you know them from I&E inspections C 5 of THI? 6 A Yes. 7 Q In your view, were the people from the 8 NRC that were in the control room on March 28 helpful? 9 A I would say they did not hinder us. I wouldn't particularly helpful. 10 say they were 11 Q You did not rely on them for information a 12 at that point? 13 A I did not, no. 14 Q Did Gary _ Miller's management team rely i 15 on them for information or seek information from j 16 them? j 17 A I can't answer whether Gary talked to them i 18 separately. They never procided what I call a lot 19 of input. 20 o until what time did you stay on the i 21 site that day? 22 A Somewhere around 2:00 to 3:00 o' clock in the i 23 morning? 24 Q 2:00 to 3:00 in the morning of March 297 l 25 A Yes. BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE - 1907 149
141 Ross 1 relieved from your 2 Q And then you were 3 duties? f We had funny word. Well, " relieved" is a 4 A at least at th a t time. 5 stabilized the condition, which was our
- cooling, force had established a 6
We 7 goal that day. At that time, we were able to turn He station Superintendent. 8 our duties over to a Jim Seelinger hours. for two or three going home 9 was turn over my I was able to think relieved Gary. 10 I who came in. And 11 duties over to a shift supervisor kind of disbanded the team, so to speak. ' 12 we until the plant stayed there 13 Q So, you stabilized? 14 was 15 A Yes. responsi-turned your At that point, you 16 Q 17 bilities over to the shift supervisor? 18 A Yes. control room until 2:00 Were you in the 19 Q t the morning? e 20 or 3:00 in the control room or in the worked either in 21 A We and it the office of the shift supervisor, 22
- backroom, but sometime after 1: 30 or sa.
23 is hard to remember,
- center, observation 24 Gary and I left and went to the there we went home.
25 then from BENJAMIN R EPORTING SERVICE
1 Ross 142 2 Q when the people from NRC came on site, 3 at that point was there any question as to who was 4 in control, whether it was the people from NRC or 5 cary Miller? 6 A Never any question in my mind. 7 Q who did you think was in control? O A All ultimate responsibility for the plant 9 fell with us. 10 Q Did you feel there was any question as 11 to who was in control in the mind of the control room 12 operators or shift supervisors or shift foremen in 13 the control room that day? 14 A Never. 15 Q Have you been involved with the recovery 16 operation since March 287 17 A Yes. we had a couple of dif ferent organizations, 18 disengaged our management, and we went from hav-as we 19 ing a Superintendent, either Miller or Seelinger, on 20 each shift, and we had a technical advisor like myself I 21 with him, to a point where I would be the shift Srser-22 intendent, a guy like me, and an operations type of 23 l guy to the point that we now have. I returned to 24 Unit 1 sometime in April. I was over for a couple. 25 of weeks after. I have been involved only sporadically.. BENJAMIN REPORTING S ERVICE t
1 Ross 143 2 When they need something from me in my line of 3 expertise. 4 The day we went to natural circulation on the C 5 unit and stopped the reactor coolant pumps, I was in 6 the control room, that type of thing. 7 Q So you have been called in on certain 8 occasions to assist? 9 A Yes. 10 Q And who is responsible for the recovery i i 11 e f f o r t', Gary Miller? 12 A Right now, Mr. Arnold is responsible for the 13 recovery effort at GPU. 14 Q And when did he assume that responsibility? l 15 A I can't give you a date. After about 9:00 or l 16 10:00 o' clock the first night, we really had senior 17 management personnel established in the observation 18 center, so.it was continuing from there on. l 19 Q Well, in the weeks after March 28, you 20 were involved in the recovery of Unit 2. Would t i 21 Mr. Arnold ask you to come over, or would it have /'. , D 22 been Gary Miller? l i 23 A It would have been someone like George Kunder 1 24 at the request o f Ja ck Herbein, and he would' report 1907 152. 25 to Arnold. BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE i
144 I Ross 2 Q You indicated that one of your exchanges 3 on the 28th was concerning the fact that you did not /, have a heat sink, correct? C 5 A Yes. 6 g And did you feel that after emergency 7 feedwater system was restored, that the steam gener-8 ators were used effectively to remove heat? 9 A No. They never were because the system, I know, 10 had voids in it, and we could never establish natural 11 circulation in the system. They were never used ef-12 fectively again. 13 Q They were not used effectively because 14 there were voids?- 15 A In the primary side. 16 Q That was not known that morning or that 17 day? 18 A I'm sure it was suspected. We were sure we 19 never had a lot of natural circulation in the plant. 20 g on the 28th, at what point did you think 4 21 that the core had become uncovered? Cs 22 A I don't think I was eve : sure the core was 23 uncovered. I had a fear all day that the core was 24 uncovered, but I don't think I ever expressed a con-25 cern about the core being uncovere d. But I ver 19(T7 153 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
145 1 Ross 2 could say it was uncovered here or there. I don't 3 think I could ever do that. 4 Q Do you know when it was first thought C 5 that the core was uncovered? 6 A we were neve r sure. We were just concerned 7 about it. A Q And you discussed that in your management 9 team with Gary Hiller? 10 A Yes. 11 Q When you received a high radiation alarms 12 that day, where did you think they were coming from? 13 A Well, I don't think we thought very far through. 14 We knew we had a problem. I don't think we were aware I 15 of the magnitude. We knew something had happened j f 16 with the core. 17 Q You say you knew something happened in l 18 the core, but you didn't know the severity? 19 A No, th e re was no way of knowing at that time. 20 We were sure that something was wrong. 7 21 Q Did you analyze where or why you were 22 receiving such high radiation alarms? I 23 A We analyzed it, and at that time it was thought 24 that some of the water had got out of the reactor and 25 that is why we were seeing an effluen ha e in-B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Ross 146 2 stack and in the air. That was the consensus of 3 opinion at the time. 4 Q Do you remember what specific emergency 5 procedures were actually pulled at that point? 6 A Loss of coolant procedure was pulled, and I'm 7 sure the turbine trip and reactor trip procedures 8 were pulled. I'm not sure of anything else. 9 Q Those are the only three emergency prei-l 10 cedures that you specifically remember being pulled? 11 A ves. Of course, the site emergency plan is a 12 book like this, that was pulled (indica ting). 13 Q Since March 28th, you have made state-14 ments to various entities concerning the accident 15 on March 28, correct? 16 a yes. i 17 Q you were interviewed on May 10 by the i 10 President's Advisors Commission? 19 3
- yes,
+ l 20 g And you also testified for the Presi-21 dent's Advisors Commission on May 31, 19797 22 A That is correct. l 23 Q Itave you been interviewed by anybody 24 else aside from the President's Advisors Commissio.n? 25 A ves, I have. The NRC has interviewed me-1907 155 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 Ross 147 2 several times. 3 Q Do you remember the dates? 4 A No. The first one was like April 3rd or some-C 5 thing like that. I don't remember the dates. I'm 6 sure they are available. 7 Q Do you remember who from the NRC did 8 those interviews? 9 A It was normally two or three people. One was 10 a chairman Martin. I can't think of the other guy's 11 name unless I really worked at it. e 12 Q Were transcripts made of all three inter-13 views with th e NRC7 14 A Tapes were made of them. I 15 Q Did you ever receive transcripts? 16 A I believe I did. 17 MS. GOLDF RAN K : We would like to be 18 provided with copies of the transcripts of 19 those interviews with the NRC. 20 Q Were you ever interviewed by the TMI 21 staff, the Met Edison staff? .hI I 22 A when you say " interviewed by," I don't believe 23 I ever had a formal interview where we sat and went l 24 through it. 25 Q You never had any interview. with somebody 1907 156 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
148 Ross 1 2 from the TMI staff, where transcripts or a tape was 3 made of the interview? 4 A We had no inquisition interview, in other 5 words, no place where you sat down like you do with C 6 NRC and said, "This is an i n t e r vi e st for such-and-7 such," no. 8 Q Was there an instance where you were 9 interviewed by the TMI staff.and they wrote you a 10 memo confirming what you had discussed in that inter-4 11 view? i 12 A There was a time when we were interviewed as 13 a group and tried to pull our thoughts down before l' 14 we lost them. There was a transcript someplace. i 15 Q Who would have been in that group? i 16 A The people who were there on the 28th, the 17 management group. I believe that transcript has i 18 been presented to the P re sidential group. MS. coLornAux: We would like to be 19 copy of the transcript if 20 provided with a I already been provided with it. 21 we have not b THE WITNESS: I am sure that we gave 22 23 it to them on the 31st. I think that is the i 24 one we read to them on the 31st o f May. 25 I think on the back of Miller's statement BENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE i907 157
149 Ross 1 conglomeration of what we said. 2 is a 3 Q Did you ever testify before the Udall 4 committee? 5 A Not before them, no. I had one o r two phone 6 conversations with a technical representative. 7 Q Did they send you a written me mo randum 8 concerning your telephone discussions with them? i 9 A No. I 10 Q uad you been asked to write any kind of 11 memorandum concerning the incident of March 287 participated in 12 A Mone other than the one we 13 so me time after the accident, two weeks after. It 14 really wasn't our writing, but it was on a conglomera-15 tion of thoughts. 4 i You and Miller, and who else? 16 Q l I 17 A Dubiel, Krinder. I I 18 Q The management group? 19 A Yes. i 20 Ms. coLDFRANK: We would like to request s i a copy of that memo-21 that we be provided with ks 22 randum, please. l 23 Q can you think of any other statements 24 that you have made concerning the March 28th incident? 1907 158 25 A Hone that I can think of. BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE i
150 Ross 1 MS. GOLDPRANK: Okay. At this time, I 2 would like to recess this deposition. I 3 don't anticipate that we will call you back 4 but it is possible further questioning, for 5 that we will have further questions. 6 10:45 a.m.) deposition concluded at (The 7 8 9 i 10 MICHAEL J. ROSS 11 12 Subscribed and sworn to 13 before me this day 1979-14 of a 15 16 Notary Public 17 18 19 r b 1 21 l () 22 1 23 1907 159 j i 24 25 EhENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE i
~6 1 151 2 S TA TE OF NEW YORK )
- ss.:
3 COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) 4 (' 5 ( I, STANLEY RUDBARG, Certified Shorthand 6 Reporter and Notary Public of the State of 7 New York, do hereby certify that the foregoing 8 continued deposition of Metropolitan Edison s 9 Company by Michael J. Ross was taken before 10 me this 1st day of August, 1979. 11 The said witness was previously duly 12 sworn. The said testimony was taken steno-13 graphically by myself and then transcribed. 14 The within transcript is a true record 15 of the said continued deposition. 16 I am not related by blood or marriage 17 to any of the said parties, nor interested, 18 directly or indirectly, in the matter in 19 contr;.versy nor am I in the employ of any 20 of the counsel. 21 ,C IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 34 i 22 day of August, 1979.]}Q[ ]hh 23 4 'b-t- & C.. 8.& 25 STANLEY RUD ARG, C.N.R. BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE i .}}