ML19256B777
| ML19256B777 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1979 |
| From: | Budnitz R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | Rogovin M NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19256B766 | List: |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908290085 | |
| Download: ML19256B777 (3) | |
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION
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June 21, 1979 b
9 MEMORAtiDUM FOR: Mitchell Rogovin, Director NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group FROM:
R. J. Sudnitz, Deputy Of rector Office of Research
SUBJECT:
STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. BUDNITZ CONCERNING POSSI CONFLICTS OF INTEREST THAT WOULD IMPEDE MY LFF IN PARTICIPATING IN THE TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY l
My position at NRC is Deputy Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Resea I have held that position since August of 1978.
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I am on a two-year leave of absence from the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, w I hold a permanent (tenured) Senior Staff appointment.
k to that position in August of 1980.
I fully intend to return
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As far as I know, I had no involvement, substantive or peripheral activities involving the Three Mile Island Plant prior to the accident en
, in any
'4 arch 28.
,cok to look up where the TMI facility was located, what 4
and so oni). However, as the Deputy Director of Research, I do have a stake 'i issues that might involve criticism of that Office's performance of its statu
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tory functions within NRC:
for example, our inquiry might find that the Office j
of Research performed its responsibilities ineffectively over the several yea prior to the accident, f
When the accident occurred, the Office of Research became involved in assi t in responding to it.
and continued substantively for about 5 days thereafter, until s ng i!
h day.
The Director of Research, Mr. Saul Levine, was ccatacted by V. Stello and P. Mattson and asked to assist NRR in understanding the ' hydro
- r Several members of our Office worked very hard on this problem for the next gen bubble' prcblem.
'i several days.
The work consisted of performing calculations, and obtaining i
advice of censultants and contractors who also performed calculations, on this bubble issue.
Experiments were also performe d by our contractors at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
tir. Levine assigned me the following respcnsibilities:
out the physical and chemical behavior of a large bubble of hydrogen gas in t First, I was to work N
esence of an unknown amount of oxygen.
what higher threshold the explosion possibility set in.eygen e reached, and at.
I was then to work out i.
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, O the procerties of a fast C0mbustion event and of an esolosicn, including a
possible mechanisms tha might set off such an explosion inside the primary TMI reactor vessel.
Also, I was to work out the ' pressure pulse' that would result from such a hydrogen burn or explosion, with particular emphasis on the short length of the duration of the burn.
I carried out these calculations with the aid of several contacts around the country whom I contacted by telephone over the long weekend of March 31-April 1.
Secondly, I was given responsibility for ascertaining if thare was any chemical means for reducing the amount of hydrogen in the primary reactor system, by introducing cher.icals into the system.
I contacted a num.ber of chemists, and from them I obtained a list of experts in this area.
I learned sometime on t' arch 31 that th's problem was being att cke d by engineers at the GPU Service Corporatien, and I turned over the experts' names to people there.
I also turned over responsibility for following the progress on that issue to Mr. R. Scroggins of the Research staff.
Thirdly, I was given responsibility for ascertaining if there were any physical means for removing hydrogen from the primary system, by use of a snake-like device that one might insert through a sample line into the vessel.
I contacted officials in several oil companies, and I followed that effort through the weekend util it became clear that such technologies did not exist with enough sophistication to be of use in the TMI accident situation.
rourthly, I followed quite closely the efforts by T. Murley of Research in performing calculations of the yield stress of the TMI pressure vessel if subjected co pressures like what would occur in a hydrogen burn or explosion.
Finally, I followed the efforts by Mr. Levine to get a credible calculation of the actual amount of oxygen that might be present inside the primary pressura vessel.
Levine was obtaining the advice of experts around the country on that calculation, and I pa icipated with him in understanding their content and the issues that arose in : eir successful completion.
However, this was a peripheral activity of mine during the period March 3i-A;..-il 2, since I was concentrating on my main assignments outlined above.
Another responsibility that I shared with Mr. L" vine was the logistical and administrative arrangements for the response by the Office of Research.
As Deputy Office Director, I shared in the effort to assure the fullest response possible by members of our staff and by our cortacts and contractors around the country.
After about mid-day of April 4 my active involverent in responding to the TMI accident stopped, although after that date I continued to be involved with TMI through efforts within our Office to reconstruct and understand exactly what happened there.
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cngoing contractor work and our planned future nork so as to respond to l
[he lessons learned from the accident at TMI.
That process is still going on.
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i Robert J. Budnitz, Deputy Director Office of Researen
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