ML19256B660
| ML19256B660 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/30/1979 |
| From: | Flint J BABCOCK & WILCOX CO., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7908160279 | |
| Download: ML19256B660 (57) | |
Text
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_______________________________________x r
~ PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND
,-------x OEPOSITION of BABCOCK & WILCCX COMPANY by JOHN HOWARD FLINT, held at the offices of Babcock & Wilcox Company, Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, Virginia, on the 30th day of June, 1979, commencing at 6:30 p.m.,
before Stanley Rudbarg, C.S.R.
and Notary Public of the State of New York.
y
$908160%
f BENJMIIN REPORTING SERVICE CERTTFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS FIVE BEEKM,tN MTREET NEW YORK. NEW YORK 10038
1 2
2 3
3a3CCCE 2 'd LCQ3 C03253X:
4 MORGAN, LEWIS & SOCKIUS, ESQS.
Attorneys for Sabcock & Wilcox Company 1800 M Street, N.w.
5 Washington, D.C.
20038 6
BY:
GEORGE L.
EDGAR, ESQ.
of Counsel 4
-and-8 JOHN C.
MULLIN, ESQ.
9 House Counsel 10 Cggg;gg;gy:
11 STANLEY M.
GORINSON, ESQ.
Chief Counsel g
13 WINTHROP A.
ROCKwELL, ESQ.
Associate Chief Counsel 14 15 SL!9_EBE!?UI:
16 RONALD M.
EYTCHISON 1-MICHAEL E.
STERN CLAUDIA A.
VELLETRI g
19 20 21 o0o 22 23 1834 i63 21 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
3 3
JO H N H O W A R D F L I N T,
having 4
been duly sworn by Mr. Rockwell, was called as a witness and testified as follows:
5 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. RCCKWELL:
4 Q
Would you state your full name and spell it.
8 A
John Howard Flint.
9 Q
And would you state your present business 10 address.
11 A
post Office Sox 352, Middletown, Pennsylvania.
1 Q
And your current employer?
13 A
sabcock & Wilcox.
Q Your current position?
g A
I am resident engineer, Three Mile Island site.
l a.
Q Mr. Flint, in preparation for this deposi-16 tion did you prepare a resume?
l~
A I did.
18 Q
Which we have marked as Flint Deposition 19 Exhibit 18.
(Indicating.)
4 20 A
That is correct.
21 Q
Did you prepare that yourself?
A Yes, I did.
m Q
And is that complete and up-to-date with respect to your employment history and educational 21 i884 164
- s EENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G service
1 2
Flint 4
3 A
Yes, it is.
4 (Above-described document was marked 5
Flin Dep siti n Exhibit 18 for identification, this date.)
O Q
Mr. Flinc, with respect to the startup i
report that you were preparing just prior to the TMI 2 8
transient in late March of 1979, can you tell us what 9
the startup report is and what it encompasses?
10 A
Essentially the startup report will cover all 11 activities from initial fuel loading until completion 12 of the testing program at essentially 100 percent full 13 power.
This will be all required procedures that are part of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's startup and la, testing program.
16 Q
Is this essentially a document established 17 in compliance with the FSAR?
18 A
It is.
19 Q
Does it go beyond that?
A 20 A
well, the technical specifications could be 21 more specific.
gg Q
But that is its orientation in the sense that it documents compliance with the various technical specifications which must be complied with?
24 A
Yes, that is correct.
i834 165 2s BENJAMIN R EUC RTIN G S ERVICE
1 Flint 5
3 Q
Do you go beyond that in your startup 4
report to discuss other matters which may not directly relate t tech spec compliance?
5 A
Yes, we do.
,o Q
How long is this startup report?
i A
I have not completed it, so 8
Q It is still growing?
9 A
That is correct.
10 Q
How long is it now?
11 A
I would estimate perhaps 125 or 130 pages.
12 Q
Are you the sole author?
13 A
For all intents and purposes, yes.
Q When do you expect to complete it?
gg A
Two months.
15 Q
Will that be submitted to the NRC?
16 A
Yes, it is.
17 Q
Is it required to be submitted?
18 A
Yes.
Portions of it have already been submitted 19 under the 90-day requirement 20 MR. ROCKWELL:
Could we have a copy, 21 George, of those portions of the startup report
~
which have been submitted to the NRC?
THE WITNESS:
They would be made available f rom Met-Ed.
Met Ed would be actually providing 2%
do at it.
Met Ed is the licensee.
B&W 1884s 1n7*6 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
Flint 6
3 this time have any portion of that document.
4 Q
You don't even have a copy of what you have written?
3 A
I have a copy, but I an a representative for the utility on master services, i
Q I understand, but do you have an accurate 8
copy of what has been submitted thus far to the NRC, 9
in your own files?
10 A
At Three Mile Island, yes.
11 Q
Could we have a copy of those portions 12 which have been submitted, and could we request further that as additi nal p rti ns f the startuo report are 13 r submitted to the NRC that they be submitted to us at the same time.
Mr. Flint, I see from your resume that l a, you were employed at Davis Besse from September of 1976 16 t6 September of 1977.
17 A
That is the approximate dates, yes.
18 Q
And you were involved there with tests on 19 Davis 3 esse systems during pre-operational testing?
20 A
That is correct.
31 Q
Was that Davis Besse 2?
A Davis Besse 1 is the only unit.
Q In September of 1977 did you become aware of a transient there?
24 A
I was not at the site when that transient occurred.
25 1834 167 B ENJ AMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 2
Flint 7
3 Q
were you aware of it though when it did 4
occur?
A I *** inf ***d f th* t 3"81*"t' 7*8*
5 Q
Can you tell me what your understanding is of what that transient involved?
t A
I only was informed that there had been a 8
transient, that there was a problem with level indica-9 tion, and that was essentially all I knew of it, that
'~
10 information.
11 I don't have any direct information on it, only 12 third or fourthhand.
13 Q
Did you know what the problem with the level indication was?
g A
No, I did not.
l a, Q
Did you know whether it was a problem with 16 maintaining a high or low?
1~
A No, I did not.
18 Q
Did you know the FORV valve was associated 19 with that transient?
4 20 A
Yes, I did.
21 Q
And that it failed opet?
no A
Yes.
Q Did you "t
-iew the site problem report generated from TECO ua cuna<etion with that transient?
24 A
No, I have not.
i884 168 2s SENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERV;CE
1 Flint 3
3 Q
You did become aware of that transient at 4
the time it occurred or shortly thereaf'a r ?
A Afterwards.
Since I was never given a specific 3
date and it was only an informal conversation, I cannot place a time on how long afterwards.
t Q
Can you give me a time frame, within a 8
month?
9 A
Perhaps two weeks.
10 Q
Did you ever discuss that transient with 11 anyone at B&W7 12 A
No, I did not.
13 Q
How did you become aware of that transient?
A The Three Mile Island operators.
Q Unit 1 or Unit 2?
15 A
I cannot answer because I don't remember the 16 operators that I discussed it with at the time.
17 Q
Which operators specifically?
18 A
I don't remember the operator.
I just remember 19 the discussion, and we talked about it, and I don't 4
20 remember which unit or which operators.
31 Q
When did you talk to them about it, within two weeks?
A Within two weexs of when it reportedly occurred.
Q So that would be relatively shortly or 2%
almost immediatel*
'ter you arrived at Three Mile 25 1884 169 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 Flint 9
~
3 Island?
4 A
That is correct.
5 g
From Davis aesse?
A That is correct.
6 Q
Did the TMI operators who told you about t
this Davis 3 esse transient indicate how they learned 8
of it?
9 A
No, they did not, not to the best of my knowledge.
10 Q
What did they indicate they knew about it, 11 the information you just gave me?
17 A
Yes.
13 Q
That they understood it involved a problem 2
with level indication?
y; A
Yes.
la.
Q That a failed open PORV was involved?
16 A
That is correct.
g-Q Did they indicate that voiding had been 18 involved in the primary?
'9 A
No, they did not.
20 Q
rid they give you any other details as to 21 what had happen *~?
A No.
They were trying to find out details from
.,3 me, since I had just come from Davis Besse.
,3 iRR4 (70 Q
Did they appear to be concerned abbdt it 24 A
I would say more curious to understand what had 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 m
Flint 10 3
actually occurred.
4 Q
Where had they picked the information up?
A They did not say, or at leasr I do not remember 5
them saying.
b Q
When they asked you about it, did you do i
anything to try to gather additional information in 8
response to their inquiries?
9 A
I told them if I heard anything I would get back 10 to them, but at that time I was heavily involved in 11 preparation for Unit 2, and I did not have time to 12 track it down.
13 Q
Did you ever hear anything?
A Nothing further.
yg Q
And did you ever get back to tnem?
la, A
One of them mentioned it one time later, and I 16
- said, "I heard nothing at all on it,"
and that was the 17 extent of it.
18 Q
You are sure you don't remember whether it 19 was Unit 1 or Unit 2?
20 A
I don't remember because I worked both units, 21 and there is no way I could at this time.
Q Where were you when you had the conversation with them?
23
)bbk l71 A
It was in the control room.
24 Q
Was there anything about the control room 25 B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Flint 11 3
that you were in which would prompt your recollection 4
as to which one it was?
A N
it w uld n c.
I r utinely g t t both of 5
them.
6 Q
What time of day was it?
i A
I don't remember.
8 Q
How many people were present?
9 A
I would say since I don't remember any unusual 10 activity, there were probably four or five people 11 present.
12 Q
Were all of them involved in this conversa-13 tion?
A No, I only believe two, but I can't remember y
which two.
15 Q
Do you have any recollection that they were 16 all young, fat, thin, that kind of thing?
17 A
No.
If I did, I could probably remember who they 18 were.
I just don't remember.
I have numerous conver-19 sa' ions with operators, and that just happened to bg 20 one of the conversations.
21 Q
Did you bring up this conversation that you had had with these control room operators with anyone else from B&W?
A No, I did not.
25 1834 172 es S ENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE
1 14 2
Flint 12 3
Q with anyone else at all, did you bring I
this up?
5 A
Not that I can remember.
6 Q
Let me try to recapitulate.
You had a 7
conversation with what you believe were two operators?
A Yes.
g Q
In one of the TMI control rooms?
g A
That is correct.
10 Q
You have absolutely no knowledge of who that was?
12 A
No, I do not.
13 Q
You never discussed that conversation 14 with anyone?
15 A
To the best of my knowledge, that is correct.
16 Q
That was the first information you had about the Davis Besse transient?
18 A
That is right.
19 Q
You never acquired any further information ab ut that transient?
20 A
No, other than the fact that it did occur.
That recently came up again, nn Q
"Recently" meaning since TMI 2?
34 A
Today it was mentioned.
r 25 Q
You never discussed it with anyone else BENJAMIN R EPC RTING S ERVICE
1 13
.2 2
Flint 3
other than those two operators?
4 A
That is correct.
5 Q
And you never discussed it with these two 6
operators again?
7 A
I believe I met one of them later and mentioned m
I,ust did not have the time to pursue it.
g 9
Q What was his reaction?
A He understood.
We were trying to get Unit 2 10 on the line.
gg Q
Did they have specific que'stions at the time you had the conversation that they wanted answered?
14 A
It seems to me that they would just like to 15 know more of the details.
That was all they had known 16 at the time.
17 Q
You don't have any specific recollection 18 that they were asking about particular details?
19 A
No, I do not.
I am certain if they had par-20 ticular details, I would have pursued it further.
'l Q
Did you make any notation or memorandum 22 or note to yourself about that conversation or about 23 the facts that they had given you?
1884 174 34 A
No, I did not.
25 Q
Do you remember the time of day?
B ENJAMIN R EPO RTI N G SERVICE
1
.3 2
Flint 14 3
A No, I'm afraid not.
4 Q
If this transient took place in late 5
September of 1977, the likelihood is this occurred sometime in early October?
g A
Probably.
I can't pin it down.
I just don't 4
remember.
8 Q
You are absolutely sure that this conver-sation was with a TMI operator in one of the control 10 rooms?
11 A
Yes.
l
Q In the fall of 19777 13 A
Yes, to the best of my memory.
14 Q
Did they indicate that they had discussed 15 this question with anyone else within their organisation?
16 A
No, they did not.
17 Q
Did they indicate they discussed this 18 Davis Besse transient with anyone else at all, other 19 than yourself?
4 A
Not that I can remember.
0 31 Q
And there was no indication that they gave you as to how they got the information?
A No, not that I can remember.
23 Q
But they specifically referred to Davis 3
i884 175
"**"*?
2s BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1
.4 2
Flint 15 3
A That is correct.
4 Q
There was no doubt in your mind that that 5
is what they were referring to?
A N
d ubt in my mind.
6 7
Q On March 28, 1979, were you present at Three Mile Island?
8 A
That is correct.
9 10 Q
w::a t was y ur first word that the transient had occurred?
How did you receive it?
A when I arrived at the front gate and found security peop.e there restricting people from going 13 on the Island.
14 Q
What time did you arrive?
15 A
Approximately 0830.
16 g
were you able to gain access?
17 A
20 minutes to 30 minutes later, yes.
18 Q
And how did you do that?
Did you have to 19 call through?
4 A
one of the security personnel called through 20 for me.
g 33 Q
And where did they call you to?
A I believe it was a Unit 2 control.
Q And they cleared you in?
A That is correct.
2s 1884 1,/6 B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
1 Flint 16
.5 3
Q Where did you go?
A To the Unit 2 control.
4 5
g so to your best understanding, you would have arrived in Unit 2 control room between 8:50 and 6
9 o' clock?
4 A
I think it was closer to 0900.
8 Q
Were you with anyone?
9 A
No, I was not.
10 Q
Was that your normal hour for reporting 11 to work?
12 A
That is correct.
13 Q
You simply were going to work that day; 14 all of a sudden you arrived there and found something 15 was happening?
16 A
Yes, that is correct.
17 Q
Who did you get your initial information 18 from, or did you get your information by a look at the 19 control room indicators or instruments?
20 A
Could you be more specific on the question?
01 Q
Sure.
Did anyone brief you when you 22 walked into the control room?
77 23 A
I spoke to Lee Rogers.
oI Q
Did Lee give you a rundown on what had 25
'3appened and what was happening?
SENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
Flint 17 3
A only that we had had a transient and that he 4
would like me to pursue obtaining information further.
5 Q
What did he want you to do?
A He asked me to check on the computer core 6
condition and to essentially make an evaluation.
t g
Q Was he more specific than that, or did he just say, " computer core conditions"?
9 ki-being any more specific A
I do not rememba-s 10 than that.
11 Q
When you say " computer core conditions,"
do yoc. mean core conditions as reflected by available 13 information from the computer?
14 A
That is correct.
15 Q
Did you then proceed to do that?
16 A
I did.
Q Was the computer on-line at tha.t point?
18 A
It was.
19 Q
Were you aware that it had been off-line 20 for a period of time?
21 A
No, not at that time, Q
Was the time when it had been off-line no previous to the time you arrived?
1884 178 A
That is correct.
24 Q
Were you able to get access to the
,a_
BENJAMIN R E;:C RTING SERVICE
1 2
Flint 18 7.
3 information that was available from the computer 4
relatively promptly?
A Yes, I was.
3 6
Q And were you consulting with anyone else as you reviewed that material and analyted it?
7 A
With Bill
- ewe, shift supervisor, and Ed Fredricks, 8
control room operator.
9 Q
Were you reviewing the computer printout 10 together, or did you review it yourself and then talk 11 to them?
lo
~
A I reviewed it myself and then talked with them.
13 Q
What conclusions did you arrive at, based 14 on the information you acquired f.om the computer?
Ib A
I decided that at that poinu in time, I would 16 have to have discussions with Lee Rogers and with 17 the operators to obtain more information.
18 Q
And what information did they give you?
19 A
They provided the fact that there had been a turbine reactor tripoed and tha* t-ht, aus nae ~@ression 20 they had recriticality or an aceroach
- n recriticality.
g I looked at the charts and informed them that 3
in all probability it was not a recriticality but a x
change in the leakage flux from the core.
24 1884 179 3
Q A change in the leakage flux?
25 S ENJAMI N R EPORTING S ERVICE
1 2
?.ini 19 3
3 A
Yes, from the core.
4 Q
What was their response?
5 A
yust that they had apparently not thought of 6
this possibility.
7 Q
Did they appear to accept your conclusion?
A T
the,best of my knowledge, yes.
8 9
Q In retrospect, was your conclusion accurate?
m A
Yes.
g w
11 Q
Once you had analyzed the computer informa-13 tion, and once you had acquired additional information from Zewe and Fredricks, and once you had given them your analysis, did you do anything more?
14 A
Well, of course, during the time I had reviewed la_
the other strip chart recorders in the control room 16 and talked with Lee Rogers about my findings.
17 Q
And what did you tell Rogers?
Was it the 18
~
same thing you told them?
19 A
Essentially the same thing I told them at that that time, yes, and advised him thaE 4e.iculed to
'l induce natural circulation or run a reactor coolant 20 pump.
'~
'3 Q
What was his response?
jg]
'l
~
A He said that he would discuss it with Met Ed m
Ob management.
EENJAMIN R EPO RTING S ERVICE
1 Flint 20 3
)
Q Did he?
4 A
As far as I know, yes.
5 Q
Did he tell you what the result of tha
- S?
6 A
They were then filling a steam generator to 7
m try to induce natural circulation.
8 Q
Did you have a conversation with him after 9
you had given him your recommet.dations?
A I did.
11 Q
And he had indicated that they were 12 trying to establish natural circula ion?
13 A
That is correct.
14 Q
What happened then?
Did you continue to 15 acquire more information and analyze it?
16 A
That is correct.
17 Q
Did you have any specific goal in mind?
la A
Attempting to get in core thermocouple tempera-19 tures primarily.
20 Q
Was that i formation available?
21 A
Most of them were off-scale highs.
22 Q
Did you do that at someone's specific 23 request?
1334 13l A
No, I did not.
25 EENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE
1 2
a.in t 21 10 3
Q You made the decision that that would be a useful thing to do, and you did it?
4 A
That is correct.
D 6
Q What conclusions did you reach on the basis of those thermocouple temperatures that you could read i
and on the basis of those which you saw off-scale high?
8 A
That we had an extremely hot core, superheated, 9
in effect.
10 Q
Did you infer anything else from that?
A Not at that time.
12 Q
Did you infer something else from that 13 later?
14 A
When I knew more of the circumstances, yes.
c-15 Q
What did you infer later?
16 A
_That wn e-abably had had, you know, circon,ium-17 water reaction, and the core had been uncovered,,for 18 an extended period of time.
c.
j 19 (Continued on Page 22.)
20 21 22 23 2*
1884 182
,D w
B ENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 Flint 22 3
g when did you reach that conclusion?
4 A
on the uncovering of the core?
perhaps an hour 5
or an hour and a half after I had arrived at the site.
You reached the conclusion about an hour to 2,. hour and a half after you arrived at the site that t
7 the core had been uncovered for an extended period of 8
time?
A Yes.
10 Q
You said there was a =irconium-water 11 reaction?
12 A
Not a circonium-water reaction.
That did not 13 come until probably the following day at the earliest.
At that time I was not aware of the extended period of 14
<=
time that the block valve had been s t u c.s
-pen s; of la.
the throttling of high pressue injection, so I had no 10 reason to assume that.
1,4 Q
When you arrived, did you ascertain the 18 status of HPI?
10 A
I noted that they did have high pressure injeqtion 20 on at the time.
21 g
As far as you know, was it on then 22 continuously from the time you arrived?
A Most of the time.
I believe there were one or o_3 two instances when
-ka
-"mos were off for a short period 44 w
of time.
25 C
1884 i8-,3 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 o
Flint 23 3
Q When you reached the conclusion that the hour"yo 4
cor3_had been ncovered approximately an an hour and a half after you arrived, which would be a
something in the order of 1 0 : 0_0 _ t o 10:30, did you tell 6
anyone?
t A
Yes, I did.
I believe I mentioned it to Lee 8
Rogers at the time.
9 g
snat was his reaction?
10 A
I believe he went to discuss it with Gary Miller 11 and George Kunder.
12 Q
Were you present during that discussion?
A No, I was not.
13 Q
Did he report back to you?
A I don't remember him addressing that specific 15 question, no.
16 Q
Did you ever find out what discussion he 17 had with with Kunder and Miller with respect to core 18 uncover?
19 A
Not that I can remember, no.
20 Q
oid you tell anyone else that you had N
reached the conclusion that the core had uncovered?
21
~
N A
Bill 3 ewe, Ed Fredricks.
,.o.
Q What was their reaction?
A I would say surprised.
g Q
It was news to them?
25 B ENJAMI N REPORTING SERVICE
1 o
Flint 24 3
a
- yes, 4
Q It was news to Rogers too when you told him?
5 A
That is correct, so far as I know.
6 Q
Other than surprise, did Zewe and Fredricks
~
comment specifically with respec' to your opinion that t
the core had been uncovered?
8 A
Not that I can remember.
9 Q
Was there any discussion as to what the 10 implication would be for operational plan at that point 11 between you and Zewe and Fredricks?
12 A
At that time we were primarily concerned with 13 cooling the unit down, lowering the temperature in the 14 primary system and regaining pressure, starting natural circulation.
3 Q
At the time you reached the conclusion that 16 the core had been u.; overed, did you have any sense of 17 anybody else in that room had reached that conclusion?
18 A
No one that I can remember.
19 Q
Did you talk to anyone else about the fact 20 that the core had been uncovered?
21 A
Not that I can remember at thag, time.
7 33 Q
Going back to your discus, ion with Zewe and Fredricks, they were surprised, they were concerned g
about establishing natural circulation in getting
)bbk pressure up, is that correct?
25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 o
Flint 25 3
A They were in the process of doing that at the 4
time, yes.
Q Was there anything you thought that was
.a required as a result of your conclusion that the core had been uncovered, in terms of operation?
7 A
Just attempting to cool it down, establish 8
natural circulation or force flow.
9 Q
So what they indicated they were doing 10 appeared to be consistent to you with what ought to be 11 done if the core had been uncovered?
12 A
ihat is correct.
13 Q
Was there anything else you thought should be done in light of your conclusion that the core had been uncovered?
15 A
At that point in time, no.
16 Q
When you arrived in the control room, were 17 you able to tell who was giving direction for operstion 18 of the plant?
19 A
It would be Gary Miller.
20 0
It was clear to you when you came in?
31 A
He was the senior individual present and would automatically assume the control room responsibility.
Q Who was giving the directions to the{ operators? 5lggCJ 21 A Specific directions would be Bill Zewe coming 25 EENJAMIN R EPORTIN G S ERVICE
1 o Flint 26 3 down from Gary Miller. 4 Q Miller? 5 A That is e rrect. Q How were the decisions arrived at as_to 6 what directions s.'ould be given to the operators? 4 A Gary Miller, George Kunder, Joe Logan, Bill " ewe, 8 Lee Rogers would have a conference and decide what was 9 the mo s t-pro b able course of events. ~ Q So it was that group of five which was 11 essentially the steering committee for decision making 12 in the control room? 13 A That is correct. Q Do you know whether the 11: 00 to 7:00 shift 74 had been relieved by the time you came in? l a. A They had not, since they were still in the 16 control room when I arrived. 17 Q How long did you remain in the control room 18 that day? 19 A Until 2300. J 20 Q Were you aware of the mechanism by which 21 shift relief was effected that day? A As personnel arrived and the unit was brought 3 into a fairly stable condition, people were gradually relieved. 2% Q One by one? [83h )hf BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 a Flint 27 3 A Yes. I do not remember a direct shift-to-shift 4 turnover. It was an individual basis. Q Did you observe what procedures were a followed as turnover was made on a person-to-person basis? 7 A The individual being relieved would inform the 8 person relieving him of the status of the unit prior 9 to being relieved. 10 (A brief recess was then taken.) 11 Q At the time you concluded, Mr. Flint, that ~ 12 the core had been uncovered, did you believe it was un vered at that time r did y u believe it had been 13 uncovered at some earlier time? A At some earlier time. 15 Q What about at the time you arrived at the 16 conclusion; did you believe it was still uncovered? 17 A No, I believed at that time the core was covered. 18 Q why? 19 A The indication on the source range detector was 20 practically what you would normally expect for that' 21 time, length f time after shutdown of the core. If the core had been uncovered, you would expect a higher leakage flux out of the core. Q In arriving at the conclusion that the core 21 was no longer uncovered, did you rely on any other 25 EENJAMIN R EPO RTI N G S ERVICE
1 Flint 29 ~ 3 information, other than those source range detectors? 4 A The fact that some of the thermocouple indica-5 tions go high were not off scale. They weren't in excess of 700 degrees on all in-core thermocouples. g Q How confident were you of your conclusion i that while the core had been uncovered, it no longer 8 was uncovered at about 10:307 9 A I would say extremely high. We also had level 10 in the pressuriser. If the core was uncovered, I 11 would expect cressuriser would be essentially empty. 12 Q So you were very confident of your 13 conclusion? A That is correct. 11 Q Were you familiar at that time with the 10 phenomenon of steam void in the primary? A Yes. l~ Q Did you take that into consideration? 18 A Yes, I did. 19 Q In evaluating pressuriser level indicator? 20 A Yes, because they had said they had cycled the 21 block value for level control. Q The PORV block valve? A nn no . n n /} Oy lyg A That is correct, RC-RV2. 23 Q And what you are saying is because they had cycled the block valve, that indicated to you that there n)- = BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Flint 29 3 could not be a void in the system? 4 A No, there could be a void in the system, but they 5 would be higher than the core. MR. EDGAR: The void would be higher? 6 THE WITNESS: The void would be higher than t the core. 8 Q Why would they be higher than the core? 9 A If they were at that level, and you cycle the 10 block valve, the void will go u into the pressuriser. 11 Q How are they going to go up into the 12 pressurizer? 13 A If they are deep at the core level, then it is 14 going to be a natural tendency, since you have pressure, for them to expand up into the outlet piping and up l a-into the pressurizer. 16 Q So your void would just go up to the top 17 of the core and then through the surge line and into 18 the pressuriser? 19 A That is correct. 20 (continued on following page.) 21 nn 18R4 190 23 24 25 BENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Flint 30 46 3 Q Did you check aaturation? 4 A We_haLs m r.ation, exceeri~a =a* m -ion curves 5 in the hot leg lines. 6 Q You knew there could be voids on the basis 7 of that? A I knew at that point we had voids in the hot g leg lines. g Q You did know that? 10 A That is correct. That was discussed with Ed 11 Fredricks and Bill Zewe. 12 Q You said you told Zewe and Fredricks and 13 also Rogers of your belief that the core had been it uncovered? 15 A That is correct. 16 Q oid you also tell them that you believed 17 it no longer was uncovered as of the time of your conversation with them? ig 19 A I believe I did mention that, yes. In fact, I must have, or I would have been extremely concerned 20 about getting it covered. 1834 191 gg Q At the time of your conversation with them, how long would it have taken to go solid in 3 the system without pressure injection? A At that time? n- =D B ENJ AMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 o Flint 31 3 .2 A I have no way of knowing. A Q Did you tell anyone else, other than 5 cewe, Fredricks and Rogers, of your conclusions with 6 respect to the core uncovering and recovering? A Not at that time, that I can remember. c g Q I take it that they, although expressing surprise, didn't take any specific action mlated to it, 9 other than what they were already doing? 10 A To my knowledge, no. 11 Q Were you concerned about telling anyone 12 else about your conclusion? 13 A No, because Lee Rogers would pass it on to 14 anybody else if there was a problem. He would be interfaced with Met Edison. At that time the operators 16 were dcing what was necessary to recover the unit, 17 which to me was past history at that time. l8 Q Were there NRC representatives in the 19 control room at that time? A N t that I can remember. I do not believe they 20 arrived until 1100 or something like that, perhaps 10:30. I don't remember their being there at that no )O h )h2 time. 23 Q Did you have any conversations with them once they arrived, whoever they were? 25 EENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 2 Flint 32 3 3 A I think once or twice when they asked me about some computer printouts, how to call them up. 4 5 Q Do you remember their names? ^ N I d t-6 Q Did you continue to return to the control room in the days following the 28th? 8 A On the 29th I did for a portion of time. After 9 the 29th, I was assigned to the Data Reduction Group. 10 Q And that was outside the control room? 11 A That is correct. 12 Q Did you have any impression of what 13 contribution tne NRC representatives were making 14 on the 28th or 29th? 15 A They were primarily passing information back to NRC regional headquarters. 16 17 Q Do you have any opinion of the contribution 18 they made to handling the transient and the problems on the succeeding day, the 29th? 9 e A I believe they were still there, not as a working 20 group or in an advisory capacity, but merely to observe g what occurred and that the utility stayed within the no terms of the technical specifications. )83.4 )93 23 Q Did you have any specific conversations, 2% other than what you already mentioned, on any day? n A I discussed something about radiation monitors B ENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
2 Fliac 33 4 3 and some of the meaning of the data that was printed out on the compute r and some console indications. 4 5 Q Were you interpreting that data for them? ^ Y*8' I ""8-6 Q On the 28th, were you famliar with the p 'otential of the primary system to act as a field 8 manometer? 9 A No, I was net. 10 Q Had you ever heard of the loop seal 11 phenomenon? ~ 12 A I know of loop seals, yes. 13 Q Were you familiar with that at the time, += 14 on the 28th? 15 A Yes, in relation to it acting as a manometer? 16 Q Yes. 17 MR. EDGAR: Which? ~ 18 MR. ROCKWELL: The loop between the reactor 19 vessel and the pressurizer. 4 THE WITNESS: I was not familiar with 20 that as a loop seal concept, no. Q Were you familiar with the fact or with the concept that a pressure bubble for a pressure 23 void in the primary could become trapped at the top 21 of the reactor vessel and take over control of the ,s 18R4 194 pressure in the system? BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2 Flint 34 5 3 A I am aware of the concept, yes. 4 Q That it could hold up level in the 5 pressuriser? A I believe if it expanded en ugh, then it would 6 escape out. I'm sure if it didn't expand enough to drop below the ledge, yes, it would act like a 8 manometer, as you were saying. 9 MR. EDGAR: What do you mean by "the 10 ledge"? Would you clarify that for the record. 11 THE WITNESS: Dropping low enough to go 12 up the hot line. 13 Q Did you have.any contact on either the 28th 14 or the 29th with Lynchburg, yourself? A On the 29th, I did. 16 Q Who did you talk to? 17 A I believe, Jim Phinney, Bill Spangler. I don't 18 r& member any other names, although there are other individuals I talked with. 9 4 "O Q Who initiated the call, you or they? A To the best of my knowledge, they did. Q What were they calling about? on A Obtaining additional information on plant '3 18o4 195 parameters. 24 Q Were you able to supply that information? 25 8ENJAMIN REPCRTING SERVICE
1 35 2 Flint 6 3 A some of that information, yes. 4 2 What specifically did they want? 5 A cepending on the time, they were trying to establish parameters they would like to look at on 6 an R-10 on the SG, temperatures, pressures, l e ve *_ s ; t primary system temperatures, pressures, in-core datar 8 pumps that were running, high-pressure injection flow, 9 any change in evolutions that they were doing at the 10 unit. In other words, any of the operating 11 condition s that would have relevance to the condition 12 that was existing out there at that time. 13 (continued on following page.) 14 15 16 17 18 19 4 20 21 22 23 1894 196 3 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTING SERVICE
1 Flint 36 3 Q Was there more than one conversation with 4 them on the 29th? 5 A That is correct. Q How many? g A I don't remember. t Q Did they make any recommendations or ask 8 you to pass along any recommendations in any of those 9 telephone conversations? 10 A They may have, but it is blurred now between then 11 and a later time. I am sure they did, but I cannot 12 remember specific in f o rma tio n. It has been too long. 13 Q Were you having conversations directly from the control room? 14 A Some from the control room; others from the la. process control center, which was down in the security 16 building. We established an office down there. 17 Q Did you learn of any recommendations that 18 were being made by Lynchburg on che 29th, other than 19 ones which may have been passed to you or through you? 20 A Not that I can remember. 21 Q You said you did not have anf contact with on them on the 28th? ^ 7"" "#9' 23 Q Who did you have contact with? }{Qf jg7 A Greg Schadell. 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 a ~ Flint 37 3 Q You were using the communications loop set 4 up by Rogers? 5 A That is correct. 6 Q And what messages passed through Schade11 between you and Lynchburg? i A I would provide them with various plant parameters, 8 which he would then forward down to Lynchburg. 9 Q Did any recommendations or suggestions 10 come back through that loop? 11 A Not that I can remember, to me. He may have on 12 those talked directly with Lee Rogers. 13 Q Were you aware of any recommendations that 14 Lynchburg was making on the 28th.? A No, I was not. la. Q Are you aware of whether he 16 A I want to correct that. There was a recommenda-l~ tion that did come in about high pressure injection 18 'flow, which we were doing. That is the only one that 19
- recall, I can 20 Q
Were you aware that information was being 21 passed to Floyd at the simulator here at Lynchburg on 33 the 28 th ? A Yes. ., J Q Were you involved in that? A No, I was not. $00k f90 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
1 2 Flint 38 3 Q But you were aware of it at the time? 4 A Yes. He I believe was calling into Unit 1, and Unit 1 mentioned that they did have some contact with 3 Jim Floyd. Q Who was supplying the information? What I was the information chain from Unit 2 control room to 8 Floyd? Q A It would one of the control room operators or 10 auxilliary operators in the control room. 11 Q In which control room? 12 A Unit 2 control would talk Lo Unit 1 control room. 13 Q And Unit 1 would talk to Floyd? A That is correct. 1 +, Q Do you know who specifically was involved? A No, I do not. 16 Q Were you involved in that process at all? 17 A No, I was not. 10 Q You didn't talk to Floyd at all? 19 A No. 20 Q Did you have any knowledge of whether there was any system here in Lynchburg by which telephone 21 conversations were taped or by which conversations or reetings either in the simulator or elsewhere here were being taped that day here on the 28th? 04 A I had no contact with Lynchburg. I had no idea 25 !8o4 199 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERvtCE
1 2 Flint 39 3 of what they were or were not doing. 4 Q The question is whethe r you have any 5 knowledge of the taping system. A No, none. (Document described below was marked 7 Flint Deposition Exhibit 19 for identification, 8 this date.) 9 Q Mr. Flint, I show you what has been marked 10 as Flint Deposition Exhibit 19. Can you identify that. 11 A Yes, I can. 12 Q Is that a transcript of an interview that 13 was taken from you on April 20, 1979 by E. F. O'Connor? A That is correct. g Q Is that your signature on the last page? la. A Yes, it is. 16 Q And did you sign the statement after you 17 had read it? 18 A Yes, I did. 19 Q And when you signed it, were you satisfied 20 that the statements in the statement were accurate and 21 true to the best of your knowledge? A Yes, I was. .,o Q And you are still satisfied that it is accurate and true to the best of your knowledge? 21 A I have not reviewed it since the initial review, 4 2,00 SENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERvlCE
1 o Flint 40 3 but, as far as I know, there are no major discrep-4 ancies in it. 5 Q Mr. Flint, could you describe to me your educational background? A I have a high school equivalency certificate and approximately 44 hours of college credit. 8 Q How many hours? 9 A Approximately 44. 10 Q And what college was that taken at? 11 A Mesa Junior College, San Diego, California. 12 Q When were you at Mesa? 13 A Approximately September 1967 till approximately June 1970. 4 Q And did you go on from Mesa to any more la_ formal education? 16 A I took one graduate level course at the University 17 of California while I was at San Diego. 18 Q And what was that? 19 A Nuclear engineering. 20 Q When was that? 21 A Approximately the spring of 1970. i-gg Q Was that a required course for something you were doing or something you did because you just were interested personally? A I did it because I was interested personally. 25 SENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 9 Flint 40-a 3 Q Were you registered for that course? 4 A Yes, I was. 5 Q Which campus of the University of California did you take the course at? O A The course was given at General Atomic. There-fore, I'm not certain which of the campuses offered it. 8 Well, at that time there were three campuses, but since 9 it was given on site there, I cannot be certain which 10 one of the branches gave it. 11 (Continued on following page.) 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 4 20 21 nn }88/1 202 23 21 25 EENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Flint 41 3 Q This course was conducted in the facili-48 ties of General Atomic? 4 A That is correct. o Q Was it taught by a faculty member? 6 A It was taught by Dr. Baxter, an employee of a General Atomic. 8 Q He was also a member of the faculty, is that it? 10 A I believe he must have been because he did 11 give courses and they were accredited by the university. 12 Q Did you go on for any other formal education, 13 other than what you have already described? 14 A No, not that I can recall. 15 g You had training in the Navy, six months 16 of bacic nuclear power school, is that correct? 17 A That is correct. Q And you had twelve weeks' specialist gg training school at New London, is that correct? A That is correct. 20 Q And three months' prototype training course at S3G facility, West Milton, New York? 22 A Yes. 23 Q Did you have any other training? '4 A Six months radioisotope technicue school, 25 4 on7 3nn 3 BENJAMIN R EPC RTIN G SERVICE
1 42 2 Flint 2 3 20-week hospital corpsman school, three-week hazards 4 of nuclear weapons course, and normal nuclear bio-logical and chemical warefare courses that you ge a in the Service. 6 Q And were these courses all in the 1958 to 1966 time period? 8 A No. The basical hospital corps school would 9 be 1954. The nuclear weapons course would be 1952. 10 I also attended basic submarine school in approxi-11 mately 1970. 12 Q You became a certified reactor operator 13 when? 14 A With General Atomic, you are referring to? 15 0 Yes. You indicated you were licensed as a senior reactor operator? 16 A That was in 1966, the summer. ig Q How long did you maintain that license? A For six years, until I left General Atomic. g Q Have you kept it current since then? 20 A It is not allowed. I am no longer employed by 21 General Atomic. I cannot keep the license current. oo ~~ Q Do you currently hold any NRC licenses? '3 A No, I do not. 2% Q Cid you have any training while you were 25 at General Atomic? i834 204 S ENJ AMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Flint 43 3 3 A I had a training course in prepara*. ion for my 4 reactor operator's exams. 5 Q But that is the only specific training at C*"*#^1 ^*
- 7 6
A That is correct. 4 Q Have you been trained at all since you 8 have been at B&W, in terms of formal courses or 9 seminars or training programs? 10 A There was a two-week training course for 11 Lynchburg Pool Reactor and several weeks of simulator 12 training. 13 g what was the purpose of simulator training, 14 as far as you were concerned? 15 A Preparation for site assignments. 16 Q Is that standard at s&w to run people 17 who are headed for site assignments through the simulator, do you know? yg 19 A I do not know. Q Do you know of any other people who are. g site representatives or who work on sites at BGW and SSS systems, who have been through the simulator? nn A Yes, at the time I went through it was 23 standard policy in the Reactor operations Group to 44 do that. j (y a !j gg)r ~ iUUT CU 25 B ENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 44 Flint 3 Q Is it now? A I do not know if it is now. 4 Q Have you been required to go through a the simulator since you have been assigned down 6 at Three Mile Island? A No, I have not. 8 Q Is the opportunity available to you? 9 A To the best of my knowledge, yes. 10 Can you be more explicit? Q 11 startup of a unit or field assignment is a A 12 very time-consuming task. I just haven't taken 13 the time to pursue whether or not I could be incor.- p rated in the class down here. 14 15 Q Is there any standing offer that is made t pe ple in your position to go through the simulator, 16 by the company? 1,, A I do not know of any policy either way. [g MR. ROCKWELL: We have marked the deposition 19 4 as Exhibit 19. 20 (TMI staff interview of John Flint 21 dated April 20, 1979 conducted by E. F. O'Connor was marked Flint Deposition Exhibit 19 for identification, this date.) n, 24 Have you given any other statements, or which have been have you had any other interviews n BENJAMIN REPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 Flint 44a 3 reduced to written transcript? A Yes, I have. 4 (Continued on Page 45.) 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 ~ 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 d 20 21 r 23 21 18 4 207 23 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G S ERVICE
1 2 Flint 45 49.1 3 Q Can you tell me what rhose are? 4 A An interview with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at Three Mile Island. 5 Q What was the date of that interview? A I believe the 23rd of April, 1979. Q Have you been given a transcript of that 8 interview? 9 A Yes, I have. It has not been corrected yet for 10 typographical errors and so forth, 11 Q Have you reviewed it for accuracy in terms 12 of transcription? 13 A A r ugh review. I have not completed a review of it. 74 Q When do you anticipate completing a review l a. of it? 16 A Next week. 17 Q When you complete that review, could we 18 please have a copy? 19 A Yes, you may. 20 Q Have you had any other interviews or made 21 any other statements? A I have not had any otner interviews, but I am g3 scheduled on Monday to have another interview with the NRC. 24 Q That will be the second NRC interview? 25 SENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICEv U t 208 1 Poi
1 Flint 46 3 A That is correct. 4 Q We would also rec _uest a copy of the tran-script of that interview when it becomes available to a youT~ , 7 All right'.~ 4 Q Who was the first interview with at NRC? 8 What department of the NRC did the interviewer come 9 from, do you know? 10 A They were three individuals: James Crestwell, 11 Region 3 Inspection and Enforcement; Cwen Shackleton. [2 I believe he was with Regulation, but I'm not positive. And there was an individual by the name of Kirkpatrick, 13 and he was just described as a nuclear engins I do not know which branch he was with. 15 Q Do you know who is scheduled to interview 16 you nex. Monday? 17 A I believe it is Owen Shackleton. 18 Q Anyone else? 1894 209 19 A Not that I know of. 20 Q Was this interview set up by IGE? 21 A That is correct. Q And are there any other statements or 3 3 interviews that you have given? A Not that I remember. 24 MR. ROCKWELL: Mr. Flint, thank you. We 25 SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE
i 2 Flint 47 3 are going to recess your deposition so that you 4 will be available and subject to recall for further testimony if that is required. We don't a know if it will be, but we are going to recess so we can call you if we need to. Thank you. 7 (Whereupon, the hearing concluded at 8 7:30 p.m.) 9 10 John Howard Flint 11 12 Subscribed and sworn to bef re me this--------- 13 day of----------------- 1979 15 16 Notary Public 17 18 19 00o 20 21 o..n. 23 18P4 210 a n-D B ENJAMIN Q CCO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 48 3 I-N-D-E-x 1 'di3D2!S 91E255 5 John Howard Flint 3 6 E-X-H-I-B-I-T-S Flint Deposition jgg_]Qgg3}((ga31gg gagg 9 18 Resume of John Howard Flint 4 10 19 TMI staff interview of John 39 Flint dated April 20, 1979 11 conducted by E. F. O'Connor 12 13 14 15 000 16 17 18 19 ) 8 9 /[ '/ ) ) m 21 22 23 21 25 SENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
1 2 49 3 C-E-R-T-I-F-I-C-A-T-E 4 STATE OF NEW YORK ) ) ss: COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) a I, STANLEY BUDBARG, C.S.R. and Notary Public of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the foregoing deposition of JOHN HOWARD FLINT was taken 8 before me on the 29th day of June, 1979. 9 The said witness was duly sworn before the 10 commencement of his testimony: that the said testimony 11 was taken stenographically by myself and then 12 transcribed. The within transcript is a true record of 13 the said deposition. I am not related by blood or marriage to l a_ any of the said parties, nor interested directly or 16 indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor am I in 17 the employ of any of the counsel. IP IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 19 hand this-----day of---------- , 1979. 4 1 _t _5__'_s_ W_____ _ ___________ 21 Stanley Rudbarg, CSR ~ 20 23 ) 9 0 d. 2)?,- s 23 25 BENJAMIN R EPO RTIN G SERVICE
i .} / bb JOHN H. FLINT EDCF /k psr FOR IDENTIFICATION U. S. NAVY .ByN M h [<, 1. January 1958 to December 1960 Graduate of six month Radioisotope Technique School followed by 2.5 years at the Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, Maryland, participating in radiation effects research. 2. January 1961 to March 1966 Graduate of the six month Basic Nuclear Power School and twelve week Specialized Training School at New London, Connecticut. Completed three month prototype training course at S3G facility, West Milton, New York. Assigned to pre-commissioning detail for U.S.S. Hunley AS-31. Assisted in operational testing of Nuclear Facility systems, system modifications, and construction progress. Two years in Scotland assisting reactor related system repairs, especially temporary shielding and radiation dose rate evaluation and reduction. Only Nuclear Medicine Technician aboard U.S.S. Long Beach CGN-9 for 16 months interfacing with the Engineering Depar tment. Performed all radiation related functions associated with biological effects of radiation including microwave and nuclear weapons hazards. GENERAL ATOMIC COMPANY, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA April 1966 to June 1972 Licensed as a Senior Reactor Operator on the TRIGA Mark 1, Mark F and Mark III reactors. Assisted in training personnel for licenses, scheduling and conducting various reactor operations, etc. Participated in new fuel development evalua-tion test program and co-authored a subsequent report. }Pld 2)) BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY, LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA July 1972 to Present Assisted in the develocment and testina of the Auxiliarv Neutron
l I t 4 e, Assigned to the Oconee Nuclear Station for 16 months to be an ,on-shift Physics Test Engineer during the startup testing of Oconec Units 1 and 2. Transferred to Three Mile Island Nuclear Station during April 1974 as an on-shift Physics Test Engineer. Upon successful completion of startup testing, retained at Three Mile Island as one of five engineers providing advice and consultation to the utility. During the period September 1976 to September 1977 was assigned to the Davis-Besse Site working for the Toledo Edison Company. Prepared, conducted and evaluated tests on numerous systems during pre-operational testing. Assisted in initial criticality and associated Zero Power Physics Tests. Reassigned to Three Mile Island as Physics Test Coordinator, Unit 2 for the utility. Prepared test procedures; interfaced with the NRC, B&W and other organizations for resolution of test criteria. Supervised shift personnel in the actual per-formance of tests and reviewed test results for conformance with test criteria. Just prior to the TMI-2 transient, I was preparing the official Startup Report for transmittal to the NRC for the utility. 1894 214
rd / QC f' Emmt 'DfI STAFF INTERVIEW FOR IDEtmnCAT10N John Flint 1550 Ers. April 20, 1979 1.H. BENJAM Conducted By: E. F. O'Connor O'CONNOR: John would you briefly state when you came on site, what your role is at,*DiI and what you saw as you entered the control room the morning of the 28th of March. . INT: My position on site was to be Physics Test Coordinator to the Unit 2 startup. Prior to this transient, I was writing the Unit 2 startup report. At approxi=ately 08:30 on the 28th of March, I arrived at the North Gate to the Island only to be stopped dbe to secdrity personnel restricting anyone fro = cocing onto the Island. During approxi=ately the next 20 minutes to half hour I atte=pted to have one of the security personnel contact the control room to find out ' if my services were required. This is based on the fact that I am fa=iliar with the reactor core physics of the unit. At approximately 09:00 per=ission was received for ce to go on the Island. I i==ediately drove to Unit 2 and entered through the Unit 2 search trailer and went directly to the control room. Upon entering the control room I noticed the nor=al alarms were lit, the typer was printing out as nor=al af ter a turbine reactor trip. I also noticed that the emergency team for a radiation type of e=ergency was in attendance in the control room. In talks with the control room personnel pricarily Bill Zeve, Shift Super-visor, Ed Fredrick, Control " nom Operator, and Lee Rogers, B&W site ^ representative, quickly established that conditions were abnormal for this type of a transient. In talking with these personnel and looking at the console indication and the computer printout noted that the hotleg tecperatures for the primary system were in excess of 620F, that the coldleg te=peratures significantly varied from this, they were quite a bit cooler. Pres, we was low in the reactor coolant system. All the control rods were on the bottom. The indication for the source and intermediate range appeared to be normal for a shutdown condition. I did,however; notice the two blips on the recorders for the source and inter =ediate range, Ed Frederick infor=ed ce that they had thought at the time that they wereioing critical and that they added boron. At this time I informed him that in all probability that was not the case, ' that there had been a change in the leakage flux path from the reactor core to the detectors and it was not in fact a case of the reactor going critical again. Looking at the recorder that prints out the OTSO's and Reactor Coolant Tecperatures on vide range 0-800F there were several temperatures that were reading from 770 to 800F in the Hotleg of the reactor. coolant system. Since these thermocouples are not nor= ally calibrated at that range, I knew that the tecperatures were high but did not totally believe the indication. Ivan Por.a the Me t-Ed I&C Engineer showed ne a setup where he was readinc appron weely 243 OEMS which converts to approximately 725F on an R", that he set a especially off the side of the control room, Talks v.ch various personnel in the control room, Gary Miller,and the rest r. the operations personnel informed me of the sequence of events chat had lead up to this position. At the ti=e I talked with Ed Fredricks, we were convinced that we in fact had a solid steam bubble in both loops of the hotlegs. At the time they atte=pted to initiate the filling of steam generators to induce natural circulation or at least re=ove enough heat to collapse a bubble sufficiently to run the reactor coolant pu=p. 18% 21 e3 3
1 i I s 2. i 2 Flin; t O'CONNOR: John, let me ask you a question at this point. You said sometime af ter you got there which was after 9:00 they started to atte=pt natural . circulation, from that can I infer that the control room staff up to that time was not trying to establish natural circulation? Ihere was so=e doubt at that time as to whether they were trying to FLINT: establish natural circulation or not. They were filling the generators but it was not clear that they were going to try to .to so=e extent, / establish natural circulation. t O'COUNOR: Ihat was not their goal?' FLINT: I didn't infer that at the ti=e. I talked to several different people and I can't remember exactly who said what, but some of them said they were merely filling the generators to obtain a level in them and to remove some heat, others said they were trying to induce natural circulation and some said that they were doing it in order to just cool enough to try to run a pu=p. I think most people at this time did not believe that there was in fact a superheated steam bubble in the hotlegs. O'CONNOR: And this is af ter 9 o' clock. 1 LINT: Sometice after 9 o' clock, between approxicately 9 and 9:30. O' CONNOR: What was the control room staf f trying to do at that time to reestablish some flow in the reactor coolant system? FLINT: The operators reported to me that they had atte=pted to run reactor coolant pu=ps, had seen a low current indication on the pu=ps, had not observed any flow indication of any significant degree and, therefore, had concluded that the Reactor Coolant Pu=ps were totally steam bound or that the pu=ps were cavitating and not operating correctly. O'CONNOR: Were they trying to increase plant pressure to prevent pu=ps from cavi-ta ting? FLINT: Shortly af ter this period of time there was an attecpt to pressurize the system and to collapse the bubble that way. I explained to them at the time if the te=pera:ures we were seeing were anyway near true, we could not in f act collapse the bubble. It would be in excess of allow-able pressures even if we gaged the code safeties. The code safetics would lif t before we could reath this pressure and the syste=.itself was not designed for this pressure. ^'CONNOR: That was because the stea= bubble was superheated. )hO} 2)h / iLINT: That is correct.
i m -e 3. s Flint O'CONNOR: So, John, in su==ary you are saying that the temperature of the steam bubble was so hot that its saturation pressure was greater than the set points for the code safeties and even if they charged the system up the code safeties would have lif ted before they could have suppressed the bubble. FLINT: That is correct. The rough approxication would be to take in excess of 3000 pounds, and the code safeties are set for 2400 to 2500 psi, so there would be no way we could have done it. At that time for approxi-mately 1-1/2 hours, they, were du= ping out of the atmospheric du=p on the A generator. We then received a call that stated the Governor re-quested that the valve be closed it=ediately. The request was in a form that =ade it a de=and. Gary Miller co= plied and at that tima was preparing to go to talk with the Governor. O' CONUOR: Do you recall why we were lif ting the atmospheric du=ps? FLINT: We were using the at=ospherie dumps to try to steam the A generator and re=ove enough heat so that we could use this as a heat sink and collapse the bubble that way; induce natural circulation. ONNOR: Both the vacuu= and the condenser weren't available at ibat time. FLINT: No, we had lost the auxiliary boiler and they were atte=pting to regain it. I believe they gained one boiler for a tice, lost it and it was quite some time before we got both boilers back." }{}( 2}7 O'CONNOR: What did we use as the heat sink once the plant staff stopped du= ping steam to the atmospheric du=ps at the request of the Governor. FLINT: Some of the heat was re=oved by du= ping through the electromatic relief valve into the building, some of it was taken away with the filling of the generators. About this time the level in the B generator was also increased. They did du=p some down into the condenst on the bypass valves, but that was not in that portion of time. I jua t don' t remember exactly which sequence. That was our only method of heac re= oval at that time. Finally verified, in fact, that we could not collapse the bubble, the pressure was then reduced again. At thr.. noint in time they tried to reduce the pressure to the point where we could go down on the core flood tanks. There was some concern that the core was not, in fact, covered. I felt that it was since the leakage flux as seen by the source range channels appeared to be in a normal range for a shutdown condition considering the length of time we had been shut down. However, as a p recau tion, the pressure was reduced. The core flood tanks slowly equa. lized with the system and we did not see a significant pressure change or a rapid dropping of the core flood tank levels. They feed directly lato the downcocer annulus of the reactor vessel itself. From that we presu=ed that the core was covered and that we were essentially feeding in and either bypassing the core or just barely coming out of the core, coming back through the legs and du= ping out the pressurizer for cooling We were not getting anything up through the loops themselves. water.
\\ ge 4. % Tlint = TLINT: (cont. )We did have a high pressure indication in the reactor building socevhere along this length of ti=e. We had the alarm for contain=ent isolation about the sa=e time there was a double thud. At the ti=e it was not thought to be fro = the building, at least I personally did not think it was fro = the reactor contain=ent building. I thought that it was the ventilation da=pers cycling. It was very close to that sound, and since we had been in and out of respirators due to levels in the control building I just thought so=ebody had cycled the ventilation da=pers e again and related it to that. The reactor building spray pu=ps came on in nor=al actuation sequence for high building pressure; they were bypassed and later shutdown. During this portion of time we finally managed to get the A leg te=perature decreased to where we could see the hotles te=perature on scale. The operator then elected to try to go over to another leg and collapse the B side, in doing so he lost the gain we had nade on the A side, and the A side hotleg again vent off scale. So=ewhere along in here we finally did see so=e changes, the hotleg te=perature was co=ing down, the coldleg te=perature was going up indica-ting that we were getting so=e type of heat transfer across the A Stea= Generator. Later in the afternoon, we were requested to once again try to collapse the bubble by increasing the pressure, once again we tried to explain that we bad tried that in the morning. Pressure had been increased to approxi=ately 2000 pounds and it had' not worked, and the te=peratures at this time were still not significantly different fro = those earlier in the day but we could not pursuade the= that this could not be done. Being unable to convince offsite personnel that the' pressure increase would not collapse the bubble, we vent ahead and increased We pressure to approximately 2300 pounds charging with the makeup pu=ps. gradually throttled back on one pu=p until we achieved this and held it for a considerable period of ti=c. This did not collapse the bubble, however, by this time due to early indications of the coldleg te=perature increasing and the hotleg te=perature coming down in A loop, we felt that we had enough water around the pu=p at the time that we could run one of the A loop pu=ps. The A loop pu=p was chosen for two reasons,1) we had a better chance of establishing circulation there, and 2) the pressur-izer spray line comes off there which would give us =ixing in the loop and help to bring the te=peratures down a little more rapidly plus allow us to get better boron sa=ples if we had to take the= out of the pressurizer systc=. A'f ter trying and failing to start Reactor Coolant Pump 2A, we vent to 1A and ran it for approxi=ately 10 seconds. This was long enough 1 range and to indicate to us that the current appeared to be in the nor that flow was in fact verified in the loop. We then shut the pu=p of f and let it sit for approximately 15 minutes. The 15 minutes was based on the fact during nor=al startup-due to the surge currents; we do not want to start and stop the pu=p anymore frequently than this.
- OmiOR:
Why would the pu=p stop af ter just a few seconds of running? 1894 218
,ge 5. ' hn Flint FLINT: We were not certain what would happen. We =ight pull the steam bubble down into the pu=p and cause severe cavitation or possibly with a rapid pressure change and cass density change fail the seals in the pu=p. We, therefore, just wanted to verify we were moving water and were obtaining so=a =izing. Once we had collapsed the bubble a little further, the pu=p could be run centinuously as this would have verified we could do it without any significant problems. Since the pe=p appeared to be nor=al, the pu=p was restarted and we saw the expected pressure decrease and flow rate that we expected. The pu=p current was normal at approy-inately 600 KK?S. The pressure decrease was due to the collapsing of the steam bubble and we saw the A loop te=peratures on the hotleg co=e down, the coldleg te=peratures were going up indicating that we did have flow and mixing. The smooth trace on the flow plus the pu=p current indicated that we did not have any erious steam bubble problers, that in fact we were pu= ping primarily water, if not entirely all water. Tnat period of time the. pu=p was lef t running to mix the system up. In this period of time we started drawing a vacuum on the condenser and were preparing to get the aur. boilers back on line so that we could start feeding back into the condenser, the nor=al method for cooldown. After a period of time (fairly late in the evening) we established the bubble in the pressurizer, we brought the te=peratures in the B loop hotleg down on scale, and were getting some small amount of. circulation through the B side as well. One point which I forgot to =ention earlier, was that shortly af ter I ca=e in we also started calling up on the co=puter the incere ther=ocouples atte=pting to establish what had happened in the core. Many of the= vere indicating question = arks which indicated that they were greater than their 700F range. Only one or two seemed to indicate that they were-in fact bad. These te=peratures were =onitored for the rest of the day to follow what was happening to the core. O' CONNOR: John, were you functioning as a B&W e=ployee during this event or were you just there providing advice. FLINT: I was pri=arily there providing advice not as a B&W e=ployee, I was still on services to GPU and felt that I was filling the role of advice and consultation to the customer from that standpoint. I was, howe ear, inter-acting with Lee Rogers providing him with the physics parameters. l.b O' CONNOR: Where was Lee? FLINT: Lee was in the control room during this time. Frequently he would be in the =ectings with George Kunder, Gary Miller, Mike Ross, Bill Zewe and the rest of thec establishing what they were going to do next. I was primarily working with the operators themselves, conttoring parameters and helping them try to assess the actual situation in the core and the primary system status. f CONNOR: I see. Was B&W, Lynchburg coc=unicating with lee Rogers? FLINT: Ihere was an open line to B&W, Lynchburg on a centinuous basis, as well as an open line for the NRC to coc=unicate with their personnel, and open lines direct over to the observation center and to other personnel on the outside for advice from the GPU and Met-Ed f acilities.
/ age 6. hn Flint O' C0:0?OR: Were you in a position to observa how the emergency plan was being carried out? ' INT: Du$1ng the portion of time that I was there, it seemed to be extremely well organized, personnel knew what they were required to do, there was excellent co==unications between Unit 1 control roo= which was set up as the emergency control center. The Unit 2 control roo=, the offsite personnel, and I would say that all aux operators, I&C personnel and EF that were associated with this, were functioning extremely smoothly during this portion of ti=e. O' C0?aiOR: How would you describe the atmosphere in the control room during the period of ti=e that you were there? FLINT: I would say that the personnel were extremely calm and well organized. Late 'in the af ternoon it had a tendency to get a little noisy in there. when the 4-ediate proble=s were over and we had a large number of per-sonnel in the control roo= by this ti=e. We had a large nu=ber of NRC personnel, we had at least a shif t and one half of personnel, plus additional personnel fro = Unit 1 and so forth. It got a little noisy fro = that standpoint, but it was still very well controlled and well organized. v' C0ta;0R: People were not running around not knowing what to do, not panicking? FLINT: No, no panic, especially since frequently announce=ents were made over the page system to let all personnel know what was going on. Unnecessary-personnel were released either to their ho=es or were =obilized at the observation center for assistance if necessary. The only personnel that remhed on site were those that were absolutely required, and since they were well inforned of what was occurring and since cost people were in one of the two control roo=s, there was no problem with people appearing not to know what they were doing. O' C010iOR: Are there any other observations that you would like to get into the record? FLINT: No, I do not believe I have any other observations or re= arks concerning the incident. . CONNOR: Thank you very much John, I appreciate it. 1894 220 % r k' - oy-26-79}}