ML19256B075
| ML19256B075 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Black Fox |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1979 |
| From: | Olmstead W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7901230191 | |
| Download: ML19256B075 (12) | |
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01/08/79 q
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2,,,
-l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of W DOCINE.VI' noog PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA
)
Docket Nos. STN 50-556 ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
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STN 50-557 AND
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WESTERN FARMERS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE,
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INC.
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(Black Fox Station Units 1 and 2)
)
NRC STAFF MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING THAT THE PLANT MUST BE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND FIRES RESULTING FROM NON-ELECTRICAL CAUSES IN ORDER TO BE LICENSED The NRC Staff moves that the Board issue a preliminary ruling that the plant must be designed to meet fires resulting from non-electrically initiated causes, U as well as electrical causes, in order to comply with 10 CFR 550, Appendix A, Criterton 3, and that absent such design criteria a construction permit cannot issue.
See Petition for Emeroency and Remedial Action, CLI-78-1, 7 NRC, 400, 406, 420-428 (April 17,1978).
I.
NUCLEAR PLANTS MUST BE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND FIRES STEMMING FROM MANY CAUSES TO MEET 10 CFR 550.34.
Section 50.34 of the regulations of the Commission,10 C.F.R. 550.34, provides that an applicant for a construction permit must file a Y A fire from a non-electrical cause, in contrast to one electrically
. initiated, is generally referred to as an " exposure fire."
7901230191 h
. preliminary safety analysis showing design basis of the proposed facility, and how that design will meet principal design criteria set out in Appendix A to that part of the Regulations.
In this connection information relative to materials of construction, general arrangements, and approximate dimensions must be supplied by the applicant to show that the final design will conform to the design bases "with adequate margin for safety." Among the design criteria in Appendix A, is General Design Criterion 3, which provides:
" Fire Protection.
Structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions.
Noncombustible and heat resistant materials shall be used wherever practical throughout the unit, parti-cularly in locations such as the containment and control room.
Fire detection and fighting systems of appropriate capacity and capability shall be provided and designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on structures, systems, and components important to safety.
Firefighting systems shall be designed to assure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these structures, systems, and components."
The Commission, in its opinion in Petition for Emergency qd Remedial Action, supra at pp. 420-421, stated that the "defens.e-depth" required by the general design criteria, called for not only adminstrative and other measures to prevent fires from starting, but also required the plant be designed to minimize the effects of fires that might start fromanycause.3 As the Commission further stated:
3 7 NRC at 421.
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The single failure criterion requirements of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 and 550.55a(h) applicable to fire protection and environmental qualification requirements do not establish a set. af design basis events.
- Rather, they establish standards for design and performance of electrical systems to ensure that such systems are capable of performing as required._3]
Frequent past experience involving the failure of administrative controls, showed that an exposure fire must be considered the design basis fire for nuclearplants,evenwhereexposurefiresareunlikelytooccur.O Fires are caused by many types of incidents. The Browns Ferry fire demonstrates that fires in any area of a nuclear plant could stem from many causes, and not just from the internal overheating of electrical cables.S The Commission considered the initiation of exposure fires which might engulf electrical cable trays, as well as electrically initiated fires, and concluded that just meeting the standards of the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) in areas not likely to have exposure fires was not sufficient.
It concluded that nuclear plants must be designed to minimize the effects of all fires in safety-related areas.-
For as was also demonstrated in this proceeding, exposure S
I_d. at p. 427.
-l 4
Behn, Tr. 7028-7031.
S 7 NRC at 420-421.
S 7 NRC 421.
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4 fires could have much more serious consequences than electrical fires.
For example, although electrical fires would not spread among separate divisions of fire retardant cable conforming to IEEE standard 383 separated in accord with IEEE standard 384, exposure fires could spread among these separate divisions destroying redundant cables.
The Corm 11ssion has agreed with the Staff that "no one level of defense-in-depth can be made invulnerable."
' Without designing systems and components to minimize the effects of exposure fires which could have safety consequences, as well as preventing their initiation, General Design Criteria 3 is not met; and certainly not met with the " adequate margin of safety" required by 10 CFR 150.34(a)(3)(fii).
II. A CONSTRUCTION PERMIT MAY NOT ISSUE UNLESS APPLICANT SHOWS IT PRO-POSES DESIGN BASIS CRITERIA WHICH WILL MINIMIZE THE EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE FIRES.
Section 50.35 of 10 CFR provides that a construction permit may be issued, although an applicant has not supplied all of the information required to complete the application; if the applicant describes the proposed design 3 7 NRC 720-721. Behn, Tr. 7041, 7051; Engman, Written Tr. p. 6, Tr. 6846-6847; Cox, Tr. o986.
3 7 NRC at 721.
0 of the facility including the pri.ncipal architectural and engineeri.ng criteria for the design and has identified the major features or components incorporated therein for the protection of the health and safety of the public.
Among the principal engineering criteria which must be specified by an applicant for a construction permit is the design basis it proposes for satisfying GDC-3. Although the complete fire protection program need not be designed, at least the design basis, e.g. the type of fire it must protect against, must be defined. As we stated, prior to the issuance of a construction permit, the Board must find that design to such criteria will conform to Comission regulations so as to protect the public health and safety.
See 10 CFR 550.34(a)(3). As the Commission has held and we have detailed, this requires a showing that the design will protect againstexposurefires.S The Staff's view that an exposure fire must be the design basis fire, even where an applicant conforms to IEEE standards and has administrative fire prevention controls, has long been known.
Branch Technical Position 9.5.-1, Rev. O, dated May 1, 1976, defines the design basis fire as "... those S
Point I, supra.
thatareconsideredtocausemostdamage..."E Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 Rev. O, states the design basis fire is the same as~ BTP 9.5-1 Rev. 0.5 The definition of design basis fire in BTP 9.5-1 was clear, as exposure fires "cause most damages." Now the meaning is made absolutely clear in Revision 1 to BTP 9.5-1 as well as Reg. Guide 1.120, both of which are available to applicants, as they specifically state that exposure fires "shall be used as design basis fires."b The documents submitted in licensing applications are voluminous, highly technical, and require extensive review. Since the burden of providing adequatesafetylieswiththeapplicant,b the Staff relies on appli-cants to point out differences of opinion, deviations from Regulatory Guides or Staff positions of any matters which might affect Staff approval of the application.E In this case, a preliminary review of the documents E BTP 9.5-1, May 1,1976 p. 9.5.1-9, see Behn, Tr. 7028-7031.
It also appears that in spite of argument to the contrary that Applicant's representatives do indeed understand the definition of design basis fire in BTP 9.5-1 Ri.; O to mean exposure fire. See Cox testimony, Tr. 6985 and 6964.
N BTP 9.5-1, Appendix A, p. 9.5.1-1115.
N BTP 9.5-1, Rev.1, p. 9.5.1-18 (Sec. b(4)(c).
Rev. 1, which is the equivalent of BTP 9.5-1, Rev. 1 has not been officially published.
Exposure fire as design basis is recommended there on p. 1.120-6 (Sec. b.(4)(c)].
E Consumers Power Company, (Midland Plant, Unit 1 and 2) 7 AEC 7,11 (1974) Virginia Electric and Power Co. (North Anna Power Station) 4 NRC 480, 486-7; af f'd, Vircinia Electric and Power Co. v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Comm., 571 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. T978T.
E See 7 NRC at 406-407.
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- me ew e memp e submitted by Applicant concerning fire protection programs led the Staff to believe that Applicant was designing the plant in accord with the guidance in BTP 9.5-1.
However, substantially af ter issuance of the Staff Safety Evaluation Report and in preparation for this hearing, it became clear that Applicant did not follow the Staff guidance in a signifi-cant area; and specifically was. not designing the plant to protect against the effects of all credible fires.b On September 25, 1978, the Applicant submitted testimony concerning the contentions 7, 8, and 9 which seemed to indicate that the Applicant disagreed with the Staff's view that exposure fires should be used as a part of the design basis for the fire pro-tection program. Staff then performed a more thorough review of the Applicant's Fire Hazards Analysis. This analysis showed several areas where Applicant proposed criteria and components adequate only for electrically initiated fires. Nowhere in the Fire Hazards Analysis does Applicant explicitly indicate that it did not consider an exposure fire a design basis fire. This vital omission only became apparent after an in-depth review of the Applicant's Fire Hazards Analysis.
Indeed, Applicant's engineer stated in testimony that Applicant is in 3 ee Black Fox Station PSAR; 59.5-9.6.1.
S compliancewithAppendixAtoBTP9.5-1,E but contrary to this, the same er',ineer stated that the Fire Hazards Analysis does not follow this guide throughout the plant; nor are the deviations justified by showing how a comparable level of safety is provided in order to confom to GDC 3. E Therefore, the Applicant has not shown that the plant will be designed to be safely shut down in the case of an exposure fire, and has not identified necessary major features or components to be incorporated therein to protect the public health and safety so as to allow the issuance of a construction permit under 10 CFR 650.34 and 650.35.
III. THE STAFF WITHDRAWS ITS PREVIOUS ACCEPTANCE OF APPLICANT'S FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM UNTIL SUCH TIME AS APPLICANT AMENDS ITS PSAR ON THE RECORD TO SHOW USE OF EXPOSURE FIRE AS THE SOLE DESIGN BASIS OF ITS FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM.
An amendment by Applicant on the record of these proceedings showing how it will design to protect against the effects of exposure fires is essential to allow a construction permit to issue.
Until such amendment is submitted and reviewed, the Staff withdraws its previot. approval of the fire protection program.
The most efficient and most effective way of resolving this matter is for Applicant to commit itself to meet the provisions of BTP9.5-1,Rev.1.E As stated in testimony E ox written testimony, p.1.
C E ox testimony, Tr. p. 6870.
C
$ Absent a commitment to confom to BTP 9.5-1, Rev.1, the Applicant would have to detail just where it will and will not meet BTP 9.5-1, Rev.1, and such submission would have to be checked by the Staff to assure that the requirements of GDC 3 are met. See 7 NRC at 406-407.
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in these proceedings, the ultimate consequences of such a commitment willnotcreateagreatburdenforApplicant.b Only 5-10% of the Fire Hazards Analysis does not use exposure fire as design basis. The cable spreading room analysis appears to provide for protective systems adequate to accommodate an exposure fire, even though the assumption used for the analysiswasonlyanelectricallyinitiatedfire.b Since the final details of the complete fire protection program will not be determined until the operating license stage, it is not now essential to document every difference in systems or components that would be provided and the commitment sought is sufficient in this construction permit proceeding.
CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Staff asks that the Board rule that the plant may not be licensed unless the Applicant modifies its PSAR to reflect use of exposure fire as a design basis for its future fire protection pro-gram, so as to comply with 10 CFR 550, Appendix A Criterion 3, and that a construction permit cannot issue without such compliance. The Staff recommends that the Applicant be alloweo to submit such an amendment to N Black Fox Safety Hearings., Tr. pp. 7000-7003.
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- r. p. 7001.
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. its PSAR in writing for the record in this proceeding as satisfaction of this requirement.
In the event the Applicant does not choose to submit this amendment, the Staff asks the Board to deny the construction permit, on the grounds that Applicant's proposed design criteria does not comply with 10 CFR 550, Appendix A, Criterion 3.
Respectfully subm tted, William J. 01 tead Counsel for NRC Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 8th day of January,1979
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0FNISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA, Docket Nos. STN 50-556 ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
STN 50-557 AND
)
WESTERN FARMERS ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
(Black Fox Station, Units 1 and 2)
)
' CERTIFICATE OF' SERVICE I hereby certify that copies o' "NRC STAFF MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY RULING THAT THE PLANT MUST BE DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND FIRES RESULTING FROM NON-ELECTRICAL CAUSES IN ORDER TO BE LICENSED" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, or, as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 8th day of January,1979:
Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chairman
- Michael I. Miller, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Isham, Lincoln & Beale U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One 1st National Plaza Washington, D.C.
20555 Suite 2400 Chicago, Illinois 60606 Mr. Frederick J. Shon, Member
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mrs. Carrie Dickerson U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Citizens Action for Safe Energy, Washington, D.C.
20555 Inc.
P.O. Box 924 Dr. Paul W. Purdom Claremore, klahoma 74107 Director, Environmental Studies Group Drexel University Mr. Clyde Wisner 32nd and Chestnut Street NRC Region 4 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104 Public Affairs Officer 611 Ryan Plaza Drive Joseph Gallo, Esq.
Suite 1000 Isham, Lincoln & Beale Arlington, Texas 76011.
105017th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036 Andrew T. Dalton, Jr., Esq.
Attorney at Law Mrs. Ilene H. Younghein 1437 South Main Street, Room 302 3900 Cashion Place Tulsa, Oklahoma 74119 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73112
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Paul M. Murphy Atomic Safety and Licensing Isham, Lincoln & Beale Board Panel
- One First National Plaza U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Suite 4200 Washington, D.C.
20555 Chicago, Illinois 60603 Mr. Maynard Human Atomic Safety and Licensing General Manager Appeal Board
- Western Farmers Coop., Inc.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 429 Washington, D.C.
20555 Anadarko, Oklahoma 73005 Docketing and Service Section*
Mr. T. N. Ewing Office of the Secretary Acting Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Black Fox Station Nuclear Project Washington, D.C.
20555 Public Service Company of Oklahoma P.O. Box 201 Lawrence Burrell Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102 Route 1, Box 197 Fairview, Oklahoma 73737 Dr. M. J. Robinson Black & Veatch Mr. Gerald F. Diddle P.O. Box 8405 General Manager Kansas City, Missouri 64114 Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.
P.O. Box 754 Springfield, Missouri 65801 Mr. Vaughn L. Conrad Public Service Company of Oklahoma P.O. Box 201 Tulsa, Oklahoma 74102 Joseph R. Farris, Esq.
Robert Franden, Esq.
Green, Feldman, Hall & Woodard 816 Enterprise Building Tulsa, Oklahoma 74103
&O WilliamJ.Olmslead Counsel for NRC Staff u_,..____.~...
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