ML19256A248
| ML19256A248 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Big Rock Point File:Consumers Energy icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/27/1978 |
| From: | Lainas G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Ziemann D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7811030277 | |
| Download: ML19256A248 (9) | |
Text
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UNITE D STATES ys NUCLEAF REGULATORY COMMISSION
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007 27 193 MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. Ziemann, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #2, Division of Operating Reactors FROM:
G. Lainas, Chief, Plant Systems Branch, Division of Operating Reactors
SUBJECT:
FIRE PROTECTION - BIG ROCK POINT Facility:
Big Rock Point Plant Docket tio.:
50-155 Licensee:
Consumers Power Company Responsible Branch:
ORB #2 Project Manager:
S. Nowicki Reviewing franch:
Plant Systems Branch Status of Review:
Site Visit Completed; additional information is required On March 3, 1978, we provided the assigned ORPM with certain requests for additior.al information and staff positions resulting 'from our initial review of the Big Rock Peint fire hazard analysis.
During October 10-13, 1978, the NRC staff visited the Big Rock Point plant. The suoplemental requests for additional information and staff positions that resulted from the site visit are enclosed.
The specific information requested is identified in Enclosure 1, rie staff positions are identified in Enclosure 2.
The list of meeting attendees is included as Enclosure 3.
Most requests and positions were discussed with the licensee during the site visit.
The licensee should be encouraged tc adopt the positions and to describe how he will comply.
Responses to the enclosa,es are required to complete our review.
To maintain our review schedule, the licensee should provide formal responses to the enclosures by November 13, 1978.
3 v,
,f!! V G. Lainas, Chief Plant Systems Branch Division of Operating' Reactors
Enclosures:
As sta ted
Contact:
J. 't. Knight, X28077 9sL1.000377
i ENCLOSURE 1 REQUESTS FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BIG ROCK POINT FIRE PROTECTION DOCKET N0.-
50-155 32.
The CPC response of July 14, 1978 to NRC request item el previded drawings showing the required rating of criti;al fire barriers.
Verify that ventilation duct, electrical cable, piping, and doorway penetrations of these barr as will be protected to a rating equivalent to that ret
.ed of the fire barrier.
Justify those that will not be so upgraded.
33.
Describe the measures to be taken for the power and control circuitry of the valves on the shutdown cooling letdown line to preclude a fire causing these valves to both open.
34.
Verify that self contained battery powered lighting units will be provided in access ways to safety related areas and in the control room.
35.
The CPC letter of October 6,1978 to NRC indicates that test results to demonstrate the adequccy of cable perstration firestups at Big Rock Point were submitted on the cocket for the Palisades facility for w:ich the tests also 3Anly.
Provide drawings and a description of final firestop design to be used at Big Rock Point.
36.
Provide calculations to demonstrate that either fire pump can supply enough water at sufficient pressure for all of the sprinklers in the condenser - pipe tunnel area, in addition to supplying hose lines for manual back-up fire suppression, and supplying make-up water for the emergency condenser.
37.
Provide details of the floor drain system tc show that the drain system cannot spread fire involving combustible liquid leaks into areas containing sa.fe shutdown equipment.
38.
Provide the results an ar.alysis of the potential for damage to safe shutdawn equipment by a hydrogen exDlosion in the off-gas system.
. 39.
The July 14, 1978 response to item 1.d indicates that certain fire doors are not alarmed, locked or equipned with a fusible link closure device.
Identify those existing and proposed fire doors that will not be alarmed, locked or equipped with a 'usible link closure device.
40.
Page IV-66 of the March 29, 1977 comparison to BTP 9.5-1 injicates that spent HEPA filters are stored in meta' containers and placed in the baler house, but does not address where these are normally usea.
Identify where the HEPA filters are installed in the plant, any fire protectio.
provided on these filters, and pctential fire hazard to safety related equipment.
41.
Verify that junction boxes in the electrical equipment roc, for the RD5 syst m are drip-proof.
42.
For the safety combustion controls on the auxiliary boiler, ider.tify those provisions of NFPA 85, (if a single burner boiler) or NFPA 85D, (if a multiple burner boiler) which are not met.
Justify the adequacy of the boiler controls to prevent auxiliary boiler explosions for those provisions not met.
EhCLOSURE 2 STAFF POSITIONS BIG ROCK POINT FIRE PROTECTION DOCKET NO.-
50-155
- PS A capability independent of cabling and equipment in the control room, Electrical equipment room, penetration areas, and larce oil hazards should be provided to achieve safe shutdown conditions without reliance on off-site power.
This capability should be providad with controls at a single control panel and should inc ude the following:
l Emergency Condenser (at least one functional loop) including a.
power and control for both emergency condenser outlet valves; b.
Puwer and control for the main steam stcp valve; c.
Make-up capability to the shellside of the emergency condense.r (it would be acceptable to rely on manual operation of a valve to align fire wa+er for this function);
d.
Make-up capability to the primary system (use of temporary connections, already made-up, to either diesel generator would be acceptable);
Emergency condenser water level instrumentation (shellside);
e.
f.
Primary system water lesel (steam drum).
Verify that safe shutdown can bc achieved if the above capability is lost due to a fire and if of f-site power is not available.
Describe how this would be accomplished (i.e., describe how the plant could be presently shutdown without using the emergency condenser and without relying on off-site power).
'P6 Measures should be taken to precluoe the potential for a fire causing inadvertent actuation of the reactor depressurizatior system (RDS), unless it can be shown that the potential for such an event is precluded by the design of the system.
Measures to be taken should include a fixed water suppression system, or insulation of RDS conduits, at the penetration area inside of containment.
2
- P7 To protect against a fire resulting from an oil leak at a reactor recirculation pump, provide an oil collection system which will collect oil from all potential leak locations such as sight glasses, lines, bearings, external oil coolers, etc.,
and which will drain to a collection tank. As an alternative, provice a sprinkler sy s tem for the pumps and pit area. The sprinkler syster valve may be manually actuated from the control room b/ mcans of a key operated switch as opposed to automatic o c '. u a t i on.
For either alternative fire or smoke detection de,ites should be provided to alarm in the control room.
If the spri:kler systen alternative is chosen, the conduits and valve operators for the emergency condenser and the main alca-Isolition liive should be insalatec to protect against
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their loss by fire for a ole hour exposure.
- Pb 10 protect the redundant fire pumps and service water pumps in tN screenwell and putp house from a fire at the diesel driven fire pump, provide a sheet metal shield which extands from the floor to a few feet above the diesel punp in the area between this and the other Dunps, or provide sprinkler system coverage to extinguish fires in the area of the diesel driven fire pump
- P9 Provide the.esults of an analysis of the relec:e of radio-active material resulting from a fire in the baler house which consumes all loose corbustible material not in a sealed drum.
The results should include the distribution of isotopes released and the quantity of each.
- PIO To extinguish fires, provide a portable water extinguisher at the Baler House.
- Pll Install valved connections on the dietel fire pump discharge line, upstenam from the pump gate valve, to permit fire hose lines to be laid between this point and the nearest fire hydrant.
Provide calculations to demonstrate thrt the number of hose lines provided will supply sufficient ;ater for manual fire suppression and safe shutdown requirements in the event of a pipe break in the single supply line between the fire pumps and the fire loop.
- P12 Install 3-hour fire rated dampers in the ventila+. ion ducts between the control room arid the electrical eouipment room which will close upon actuaticn nf smoke detectors in the elec'.rical equipment room
.. *P13 Existing and new fire detection and alarm systems should as a minimum have the following features:
1.
Automatic emergency power for all portions of the systen during loss of off-site power; 2.
Electrical supervision of all circuits; and 3.
Fire detectors approved by Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.
or Factory Mutual in suf'icient number and proper place-ment to adequately cover all safety related areas requiring fire detections devices.
Information should be prcvided whica identifies the type and number of approved detectors that will be located in each area.
- P14 Verify that t*e water spray system protecting the yard transformers will be returned to automatic operation by installation of a normally open valve which closes on an ECCS actuation signal.
- P15 Establish a draf ting site for off-site fire apparatus to take suction and pump into the fire loop.
- P16 For each hose cart provide two (?) 21/2" hydrant hose gates, and one (1) 21/2" x 1 1/2" x 1 ;/2" gated wye.
- Pl7 Provide two (2) 21/2" Double Female Connections to be stored in a fire equipment supply room, or on a hose cart in the screen house.
- P18 Provide not less than 2 explosion proof fire se ice type smoke ejectors of not less than 5000 cfm capacity <
.t, with portable ducting.
- P;9 Provide an emergency breathing air supply capability sufficient to supply the fire brioade and operators for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> a* the rate of 3 bottles per man per hour (standard 1/2 aour rated bottles).
- P20 Provide 8 sJits of fire fighter's protective clothing to include coats, pants, boots, gloves, and helmets.
(The OSHA hard hat, while not desireable, may be substituted in lieu of fire fighter's helmets).
- P21 Inspect all yard hydrants for wet barrels prior to freezing winter weather and pressure test cach hydrant after the freezing weather in the spring to assure that no f reeze damage has occurred.
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4
- f22 Either realign er move hose statien #10 in the electric equipment room to remove the obstruction to the hose station valve operating hand wheel.
- P23 Provide a locking device to preclude unauthorized access to the dip-stick pipe opening to the below-grade oiesel fuel ta :ks(s) in the vicinity of the screenhouse.
- P24 Establish a control fire equipment supply room, or sub-depots strategically located where fire brigade equiprient can be secured and held available for the fire brigade at all hours.
- P25 The fire hazards analysis did not address the effects of fires in the electrical equipment room or containment cable penetra-tion areas on fuel pooi cooling; therefore,the following should be accomplished:
Provide a capability independent of the electrical equipment room and cable penetration areas to provide fuel pool cooling in the event of a fire in any of these areas, or provide a means to restore fuel pool cooling capability which may be lost as a result of fires in these areas that affect fuel pool cooling equipment.
If repairs are necessary to restore this power, show by analysis the time available to make repairs, how this time is established from the standpoint of fuel pool design temperature limitations, and the methods and equipment to be used to provide cooling.
- P2 t' Discussions with CPC personnel during out site visit of October 10-13, 1978, indicate that CPC would plan to delay implementation of staff position P5 Jntil implementation of any modifications identified to be required by the SEP evaluation.
To assere adequate capability to achieve safe shutdown in thc interim period until staff position PS is implemented, the following measures should be taken:
1.
Expeditious implementaticn of modifications identified in the Big Rock Point Fire Protection Program Evaluation submitted March 29, 1977, modifications identified in the subsequent CPC submittal of July 14, 1978, and modifications required to satisfy staff positions P6 through P25 and items (2) through (6) of staff position 02C.
A schedule identifying final implementation for each of these modifications should be provided.
2.
Provide two Halon 1211 type and two pressurized water type portable extinguishers for the electrical equipment room to
5 allow judicious application of extinguishment; 3.
Fire brigade drills shauld be conducted for all brigade members in the electrical equipment roorc, exterior cable penetration room. and interior cab' penetratior, room within the naxt six months; 4.
Prohib't any cutting, welding, grinding, open flame work, maintenance or repair cperations in the electrical equipment room, exterior cable penetration room, or interior cable penetration area which may be accomplished in another area; Develop emergency shutdown procedures delineating methods for making repairs to restore power and to operate equipment to achieve safe shutjowr, for fires that damage cabling in the electrical equipment room or cable penetration areas.
A description of the repairs to be made and the methods to be used for shutdown should be submitted.
At the meeting of October 13, 1978, ac Big Rock Point facility, Consumers Power Compaay indicated that they would connly with these Staff positions.
Personnel et this meeting are identified in Enclosure 3.
ENCLOSURE 3 NAME COMPANY J. E. Knight NRC L. P. Herman Rolf Jensen & Assoc.
K. R. Ridgway NRC Region III W. J. Hall CPC0 R. C. Mahaney CPC0 W. C. Cooper CPC0 D. P. Hoffman CPC0 R. W. Huston CPC0 R. B. Dewitt CPC0 D. A. Birel CPC0 C. F. Sonnenberg CPC0 D. S. Swem CPC0 R. E. Berry CPC0 J. H. Riopeile BNL NRC H. J. George US NRC - Plant Systems Branch D. L. Ziemann NRC - ORB #2 S. J. Nowicki NRC - Project Manager G. D. Gubody CPC0, QA-BRP C. J. Hortman CPC0 - Plant Superintendent BRP R. C. Drice CPC0 Prop. Protection D. DeMoor CPC0 Big Rock R. Doa q, Sr.
CPC0 Big Rock Point Plant