ML19254F960

Summary of 790523 Meeting of ACRS Subcommittee on Safeguards & Security in Washington,Dc Re Evaluation of NRC Safety Research Program,Safeguards & Security Research & Recent Safeguards Events

ML19254F960
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/04/1979
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-1640, NUDOCS 7911190527
Download: ML19254F960 (14)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:i Meeting Date: 5/23/79

• ".3 b

y(f [b a !]6$ Issue Date: 6/04/79 .f y t }4 l MINUTE SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY /d1/71 "$Is' ";77 p# - M4g A meeting of the Subcommittee on Safeguards and Security was held in Washington, DC at 1717 H Street, NW on May 23, 1979. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss with the NRC Staff the 1979 review and evaluation of the NRC Safety Research Program, Safeguards and Security Research, and to discuss recent safeguards events. Notice of the meeting appeared in the Federal Register, Friday, May 11,1979, Vol. 44, No. 93, Pgs. 27775-6. The schedule for discussion and list of attendees at the meeting are attached to the minutes. No written statements were received from members of the public and no requests were received from members of the public to make oral. statements. Attachment A is a copy of the meeting schedule. Attachment B is a list of attendees. A complete set of slides and handouts is attached to the office copy of these minutes, and selected handouts are attached to this copy. EXECUTIVE SESSION (8:37 a.m. - 8:45 a.m.) Dr. Mark, Subcommittee Chairman, called the meeting to order at 8:37 a.m. He explained the purpose of the meeting, and rules and procedures for conducting the meeting, pointing out that Mr. Richard Major was the Designated Federal Employee. He then asked the NRC Staff to proceed with their presentation. DISCUSSION WITH NRC RESEARCH STAFF AND CONTRACTORS (8:45 a.m. - 1:20 p.m.) Mr. F. Arsenault, Director of Safeguards Fuel Cycle and Environmental Research, presented the opening remarks. He indicated that Research has taken into account ACRS recommen. tions in its focus, and that the U.S. Congress has shown continued interest in this area. In perfomance of rule making and licensing, the Staff directs its attention to three questions: (1) Are all potential attacks covered? (2) What are the plant responses? and (3) What criteria are used to evaluate these responses? In the past, the Staff review tended to be system-specific, but now it tends to go for increased performance of present setup, allowing more flexibility to the licensees. I. Sacks, Lawrence Livemore Lab. Mr. Sacks discussed the Material Control and Accounting (MCA) program, an NRC-sponsored program that hai'been on-going for three years. This program is directed to prevention of diversion of special nuclear material (SNM) by insiders. Much of this research is done by computer, which handles a large quantity of infomation in the fom of matrices. The MCA assessment does not specify what material it is protecting, nor does it try to design a protection system. 7 911190 [ck 7 32 % 278

3afeguards & Security The MCA program views SNM diversion at four levels of sophistication, and calculates the probability of success at each level. These levels are: diversion by different paths, coverage adequacy by detectors, failure sensitivity of detectors, and tamper vulnerability of security devices. The The ultimate goal is to provide inspectors with a check list as to what to look at. For example, an audit of detector power supply shows that one maintenance man can disable all detectors, or one accountant can alter all the records on the quantities of material transferred. Mr. Mathis asked how the MCA would help to avert the "K. Silkwood type" of diversion (small amount over long periods of time, such that the total quantity appears within the measurement error margin). Mr. Arsenault responded, saying that this may be a fact of life that diversion of such quantities just has to be tolerated. Potential inaccuracy can occur in measuring and accounting, and the discrepancy can be positive or negative. It is the negative discrepancies (material lost) that get all the publicity. Mr. Durst added that all inventory discrepancies occur in wet processes, especially during chemical transformation of uranium compounds. Mr. Arsenault said that the MCA program does not attempt to establish an acceptable quantity of diversed material, but it identi-fies diversion potentials and alert the licensee to provide physical remedies. Dr. Siess asked if DOE is doing anything comparable. Mr. Arsenault said that DOE limits its work to safeguards system design and methodology, whereas NRC concerns itself with evaluation of safeguards systems. Mr. Bender asked if the MCA concept can be used at enrichment plants, Mr. Arsenault replied it is applicable. Dr. Mark remarked that the MCA program may not be applicable to the thorium fuel cycle. L. Chapman, Sandia Labs. The Sandia effort is directed toward prevention of sabotage. The targets of sabotage are determined by the plant characteristics, layout and mode of operation at the time of sabotage. Five steps are involved in evaluation of protection systems. Step one is facility characterization where plant layout, targets and vital areas, operational and environmental conditions., protection system and guard characteristics are taken into account. Step two is facility representation where the plant lai,out, vital features, principal barriers and points of ingress and ?gress are repre:ented on simplified diagrams. Step three is component performance evaluation (both hardware and personnel components) where the techniques of fault tree analysis are used. The fourth step is adversary path analysis, with the objective of reducing the enonnous numbers of adversary paths to a manageable set for evaluation. Step five is overall effectiveness 3v 4 279

Safeguards & Security evaluation with the objective to provide meaningful aggregate measures of physical protection performance. Preliminary results show that short protection system re-sponse time ensures high probability of interruption, and that " hardened" equipment also increases probability of interruption. Mr. Bender asked when should techniques developed in this program be applied, and if they are being used in the regulatory process. Mr. Chapman said the techniques should be used in the design stage of a plant, and some applicants are already doing so. Some of the techniques, those of Vital Area Identification, have been incorporated into the regulatory process and used on 20 or so reviews. Dr. Siess remarked that the usefulness of this program can only be demonstrated by its eventual acceptance by the S ta ff. B. Varnado, Sandia Labs. Mr. Varnado described the Vital Area Analysis (VAA), whose main goal is to provide NRR with a simple, systematic and consistent method for comprehensive identification of vital areas. Vital areas are all areas that contain vital equipment (10 CFR 73.2). Sandia has developed a number of generic sabotage fault trees for typical plants, and these generic fault trees can be modified with specific plant data to yield detailed trees for specific plant / site combinations. VAA does not limit itself with single failure, the traditional accident analysis practice, but looks at the combination of failures that are necessary to cause loss of function of a piece of equipnent. Techniques developed are being used by licensees and the Staff. Mr. Bender asked if these techniques have helped to uncover previously not considered vital areas. Varnado said some cable areas at one plant were so identified. Mr. Varnado then proceeded to describe the design concepts for the Sabotage Pro-tection Program. The purpose of this program is to determine whether new plant design criteria are needed for sabotage protection, to determine design criteria, and to identify acceptable damage control measures. The values of this program are possible reduction in number of sabotage sequences, reduction in number of vital areas, reduction in number of paths to vital areas, and increase in probability of interruption / neutralization of sabotage. To obtain such values, Sandia proposes 1714 280

Safeguards & Security to " harden" critical systems (" harden" means to make a system much stronger than would be needed to take design loads), modify plant layout, change system design and add more systems. Due to the complexity of the program, much technical effort would be needed from reactor vendors, utilities and architect-engineers. Sandia is not looking at improving system hardware, but is concerned with improving security with the present level of hardware installation while changing plant design to see if better security would result. J. Durst, NRC Staff Mr. Durst gave an overview of the 1981 research budget. Spending is held to a relatively constant level of about $5 million, and goes into three major areas: ins pection, evaluation, and alternative strategies. There is, however, little research being done to safeguard people against releases. The MCA and VAA programs both belong in the ' evaluation' area with gradually decreasing levels of spending to less than $1 million by 1983. If the nation goes for fuel recycling, a heightened level of safeguards research would be needed. There was concern that Research was doing work that may not have applicability. Mr. Arsenault said that currently, all research work is user-endorsed. Mr. Durst committed to the Subcommittee to provide a document on breakdown of the FY 81 budget into new and old projects. Dr. Siess said that the Subcommittee should look at the last 2 or 3 years of research and comment on whether or not the results have been "useful". Clearly, "usefulness" would be evaluated from different points of views (GAO, OMB, NRC-NMSS, etc.). If rules or criteria have been changed, then research results must have been used. Or, if it can be shown that hazards to the public has been reduced or safety has been improved, then the research is useful. Mr. Arsenault said he would try to generate information for the Subcommittee on how they see the usefulness of the research. i u 4 281

Safeguards & Security DISCUSSION WITH NRC STAFF ON RECENT SAFEGUARDS EVENTS (2:20 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.) L. Bush, I&E Mr. Bush briefed the Subcommittee on physical protection, inspections made in 1977 and 1978. There was increase both in inpsection frequency and site time in 1978 due to a change in the inspection module. It is I&E's intent to do two complete inspection modules per year per plant. The largest number of non-compliance occurs in " access requirement," which was also given the largest emphasis. Dr. Mark asked if licensees show any consistency in non-compliance. Mr. Bush was not sure but indicated that the frequency of non-compliance demonstrates the management's attitude to security. Mr. Bush further said that NRC has communicated its licensing requirements to licensees by a Security Plan Evaluation Report Workbook, a document similar to the SRP (Standard Review Plan). R. McCormick, I&E Mr. McCormick said that there were 26 bomb threats in 1978, 41 in 1979 so far. Twenty-one threats were made against Diablo Canyon. Most of the bomb threats were made by students or construction workers who, usually, wanted a Friday afternoon off. Threats are usually not accompanied by real explosive devices. Specific incidences are: A man who is a known liar claimed that he was sent by Trojan a San Francisco group to blow up Trojan. Sticks of dynamite were found in his home but no attempt was made to Trojan. Surry - Several threats but were fakes. Duane Arnold - Letters were sent from ' Eastern Iowan Vigilantes' threatening sabotage and disperion of stolen Pu around Duane Arnold's house. FBI investigation continuing. An underground newspaper claims the incident of TMI March 28,1979, was the result of sabotage. I&E does not believe in this based on known facts. Sixty-two of sixty-four fuel assemblies were found Surry to have Na0H poured over. The fuel assemblies were stored in a building where 800 people have authorized access. I&E has sent information notice to all licensees suggesting that something be done in light of this event. The event is under active FBI investigation. W. Pasedag, NRR Mr. Pasedag indicated that it would not be difficult to build into a computer code the potential for future tampering. Thus, computer codes written for mini-computers which run key-card-controlled doors can be manipulated. Seeing this potential, NRR 17'4 282

Safeguards & Security ' i has asked the Office of Standards Development to v. rite Regulatory Guides to recommend proper QC programs for these computer codes. Honeywell, whose mini-computers are frequently used for security, reported that it has an impressive QC program to pre-vent tampering of software. To combat insider sabotage, a licensee can impost (1) access requirement, (2) need to access, and (3) centrol of activity in vital areas. It is, however, difficult to enforce these; a licensee may have a lax attitude Dard all these. It is not clear how one can legislate attitude. I&E and NRR are working closely such that.4RR gets feedback from I&E on security plans it okayed, and I&E is being kept infonned of r.11 that goes on during the licensing phase. The meeting was adjourned at 4:00 p.m. NOTE: A transcript of portions of ths meeting is on file at the NRC public Docment Room at 1717 H Street,NW, Washington, DC or can be obtair.ed from Ace Federal Reporters, Inc., 444 North Capitol Street, Washington, DC 20001 (202-347-3700). 1'^4 285

LIST OF DOCUMENTS AVAILABLE TO SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THIS MEETING 1. Presentation Schedule (Attachment A) 2. Slides and Viewgraphs used by Speakers 1344 284

.k@ c h m c.rt. TENTATIVE SCHEDULE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY MAY 23, 1979 1717 H STREET, NW, NASHING' ION, DC - ROOM 1046 8:30 a.m. I. Preparation for the 1979 Review and Evaluation (Open) of the NRC Safety Research Program - Safeguards Research: Discussion of 1981 proposed budget - PIS

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • LUNCH ***********************

12:00 noon 1:00 p.m. II. Discussion of Recent Safeguards Events (CLOSED) A. Surry Fuel Tampering B. Midland - Cut Wires C. Diablo Canyon, Surry - Bomb Threats

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • BREAK ***********************

3:00 p.m. D. 'IMI Runors of Sabotage E. Others 1. Recommendations of Consultants (Open/ Closed) 4:30 ADJOURN 17^4 285

LIST OF ATTENDEES ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY WASHINGTON, DC MAY 23,1979 ACRS J. C. Mark, Chairman C. Siess W. Mathis M. Bender R. Major, Designated Federal Employee P. Tam, ACRS Staff NRC STAFF F. Arsenault G. S. Lewis R. C. Robinson W. Immerman J. Durst E. W. Richard W. Pasedag R. McCormick L. Bush SANDIA LABORATORIES D. McCloskey L. Chapman B. Varnado LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY I. Sacks A. Maimoni OTHERS K. Ota, Kansai Electric B. Whithick, Ace-Federal J. Burns, Ace-Federal Attac_hmmt 3 1744 286

AucA.a C pertinent to this review.ne Subcommittee - may then caucus to determine whether the matters identified in the initial session have beeft adequately covered and whether the project is ready for review by the full Committee. In addition,it may be necessary for the Subcommittee to hold one or more closed sessions for the purpose of l exploring matters involving proprietary information. I have determined, in I accordance with Subsection 10(d) of Pub. L 92-463, that, should such sessions be required. it is necessary to close these sessions to protect proprietary information (5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4)). Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled. the NUCLEAR REGULATORY Chairman's ruling on requests for the COMMISSION opportunity to present oral statements and the time' allotted therefor can be Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards; Subcommittee on blamed by a prepald telephone call to Safeguards and Security; Meeting thy Designated Federal Employee for this meeting. Mr. Richard K. Major. The ACRS Subcommittee on (telephone 202-634-1414) between 8:15 Safeguards and Security will hold a a.m. and 5:00 p.m., EDT. meeting on May 23,1979 in Room 1046. Baekground informstion concerning 1717 H St., NW, Washington DC 20555 items to be considered at this meeting to discuss recent safeguards events, can be found in documents on file and advice from its consultants, and the 1979 available for public inspection at the Review and Evaluation of the NRC ' NRC Public Document Room.1717 H Safety Research Program. Notice of this Street. NW, Washington, DC 20555. meeting was published March 23 and April 20,1973, (44 FR 17837 and 44 FR Dated: May a,197s. 23009, respectively). I'" CN

1. "" C"'#"

In accordance with the procedu~res N outlined in the Federal Register on ], October 4.1978 (43 FR 45926), oral or written statements may be presented by members of the public, recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee,its consultants. and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the Designated Federal Employee as far in adsance as practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made to allow the necessary time during the. meeting for such statements. The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows: Wednesday, May 23,1979,830 a.m. Until the Conclusion of Bustaesa ne Subcommittee may meet In Executive Session, with any ofits consultants who may be present, to explore and exchange their l qOI} preliminary opinions regarding matters which b ! j should be considered during the meeting and to formulate a report and recommendation to g U a J' dl the full Committee. l At the conclusion of the Executive Session, the Subcommittee will hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff and their consultants, e y 287

~ ..... u.,.. / 3:. .::l.;.:'.Q :s: .g y...,. . J u.:. e.:. C..... m.... -...a.1. 'c:J::.at. CAR.sw.. - , ve;s.G.s ~ :. A xu d w.,1 b s/s.s /n ~ 0% M.k u 6,. g p b L dot,. A s A ;, ft..-( we. . c:. 3 M L4 I e ole s.k (< t-

2. e s sp.ea v, e f w< -*s a,,. >

w A.~ e.A,-Kv v ut tL w . ?:* - Gw W u<.,D. -n- / .s _ f,'l 0 'i ,, s u r v o w ~ ev w t% bil2C.s v r e o - of -{.) t.A. <J-G w s.o O G L Tl'e <s J- % tt.d o@

• • 3 6 A t.b ov

0Pti5, h a ce v, con M

'_;[l

NRc, t-L, rw v a e < s %

RAS .5 c. 4 L,. M M s r. , f fos si L 4 c , - c,, w p , h c fc.,,- wdu.# .s ; t w f e 6.- e, , i-C.A. e.,,,. y 4 c.,, /.=,: w av F< ei Ad* a p.e-m;f, A..# r /,.: c,k k e.~ ~ r412c S6 f( w f a.,. % f p a d-4 ~ ' - Qaff k ~ AJy. ,.j., beca<v $.i [&Lu is c $ ai d k ( A c.. lYS L r ro re s C,4 ". o o m. mm ,Nkm 4 4.W J). $q.:. k .t % ( w k s : G 1.5 TE u L ;f ex At sa 73 # r & .e g c<a <rd.? g .4 If : e-A -f- ~1h 4 g /e s.a., f # c u (rva S. .$;f-(Aak h.,>.sJ E n eu ', 6 /s-4 y sia a s c.,re a i J k-w t., w w iS' n,,-e 4 a.J W

i no

, w < c4 4 y ^9C 2 3zr4 288 .?. ,[ -... ; wy : -- w. x y c.v.p.n.pnmp,mser.p<-mr.. .*?..*:. .n ..e.o. .~.-. e.... r e r. n.: n:e

r..-

.s-POWER REACTORS PHYSICAL PROTECTION NONCOMPLIANCE HISTORY CY 76 CY 77 CY 78 PHYSICAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION 16 16 40 PHYSICAL BARRIERS 54 12 36 ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 33 87 170 DETECTION AIDS 32 11 12 COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS 9 4 27 TESTING AND MAINTENANCE 9 16 46 2>- @s i RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS 2 4 11 [ RECORDS 3 22 21 m J OTHER 87* 10 TOTAL 245 182 363 CC1; '85 PERTAIN TO 73.40 ~ CD W

V PHYSICAL PROTECTION IllSPECTIONS CY 78

1. OF HRS OF

% OF VISITS ITEtis OF SITE VISITS SITE TIME UNANNOUNCED NONCOMPLIANCE FUEL FACILITIES 49 2,076 93 65 REACTORS P01/ER 157 5,319 91 363 fl0NP0ilER 45 680 91 20 .J U r> W CD

.I / PHYSICAL PROTECTION IllSPECTIONS CY 77

1. OF HRS OF

% OF VISITS ITEMS OF SITE VISITS SITE TIME UNANNOUNCED NONCOMPLIANCE FilEL FACILITIES 29 3,000 100 110 REACTORS POWER 108 3,260 80 182 NONPOWER 51 710 88 14 0 / .A n>}}