ML19254E143
| ML19254E143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/14/1979 |
| From: | Kenneke A NRC OFFICE OF POLICY EVALUATIONS (OPE) |
| To: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19254E144 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7910310148 | |
| Download: ML19254E143 (7) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES
[ Dd g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g pg a g WASHING TO N. O. C. 20555
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September 14, 1979
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman Hendrie Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Kennedy Comissioner Bradford Commi i
er Ahearne FROM:
Al '
e, Acting Director, OPE
SUBJECT:
TH Ot$1ISSION'SDEC,ISION-MAKINGROLEINEMERGENCYRESPONSE
Background
As requested, OPE has examined the subject of the Commission's role in responding to nuclear emergencies.
In preparing this paper, we have reviewed the transcript of the Comission's discussion of emergency planning, the NRC Manual Chapter 0502 ("NRC Incident Response Program" approved February 6, 1978), and the report of the Task Force on Emergency Planning (SECY 499).
We have also elicited the views of individuals in NRC who played key roles in the response to the Three Mile Island accident.*
Although the opinions of those we interviewed were diverse, one opinion seemed to be shared by a number of individuals, namely that the Commission should not directly participate in making decisions for responsive actions.
This view was based primarily on the belief that, in an emergency, the time available would be too limited for Commission decision-making.
As expressed by one individual, "... the Comission should limit its actions to an overview function rather than participating directly in the decision-making process In this mode, the Comission can make an unbiased review and evaluation of those decisions made by the staff and can also serve as a ' court of last rescrt' when needed to resolve differing views on proposed alternative actions among the staff."
I N
"A cefin1:e ano detaileo analysis of how the Commission operates under k
normal (non-eme gency) conditions -- such as would be provided by the proposed management study (OPE 9/11/79 memorandum to the Commissioners) --
would be of significant value in better defining how the Commission should operate under emergency conditions.
In a sense, the Comission's role in nor. mal operations represents an " upper limit" of its role under emergency conditions.
CONTACT:
Joan Aron (OPE)
}243 284 634-3302 Jim Beckerley (OPE) 7910310 / 9 I 634-3295
)
For the Comission It appears that the different perceptions of the Commission's role primarily concern decision-making by the Commission.
Other possible roles, such as carrying out appropriate implementing actions (e.g. personally briefing the President, members of Congress, governors of potentially affected States; contacting heads of appropriate Federal agencies to confirm their support in responding to the emergency; resolving with participating Federal agencies any problems that might impede effective actions; acting as spokesmen to press and public) -- were considered proper and feasible in emergency situ-ations.
In the following discussion, we emphasize the possible decision-making role of the Commission since this appears to be the focus of attention and debate.
Summary In the real world of the TMI-2 accident, the Commission was not limited --
rightly or wrongly -- to providing " general policy which determines the overall course of action NRC takes in response to incidents" as described in the NRC Incident Response Program (Manual Chapter 0502).
On an ad hoc basis the Commission assumed a much larger role.
The Commission neeos to sort out that experience and determine tt? extent to which it can and should participate in NRC's response to nuclear e.nergencies.
The response to a nuclear emergency is likely to require decisions involving value judgments ard agency commitments of the kind which the Commission would normally be required to make.
If the Commission were to assume a role that ircluded making such decisions, it would be subject to the severe constraints created by emergencies, particularly the limits of available time and information.
Becausa these constraints might make full collegial decision-making infeasible and even counterproductive, a less-tnan-collegial format may be required, i.e. a " lead Commissioner" mode, or delegation to pre-designated staff.
We present a list of decisions likely to involve judgmental and non-technical considerations the Commission might make in responding to nuclear emergencies.
Finally, we propose a series of questions for a future meeting with the staff to illuminate the fundamental issues and better define the extent of the Ccmission's proper role in responding to nuclear emergencies.
Desirability of Commission Particioation in Emergency Resconse Decision-Making In the TMI-2 accident, the Commission participated essentially as observers in the initial stages.
However, the prolonged period of potentially serious public risk led to individual and collective Commissioner attention and action, particularly in connection with the hydrogen bubble concern.
The Commission acted as advisers to senior staff at the site through daily telephone conferences and made contacts with the President, governors and heads of other Federal agencies.
The Comission was involved either directly or in a confirmatory posture in many decisions including those related to generic implications of the accident and initiation of investigations into the accident's causes.
It is not our purpose here to evaluate the effective-ness and appropriateness of the Comission's TMI actions but simply to point out th&t in this real emergency the Comission did take an active role, albeit on an ad hoc basis.
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For the Commission Although the Atomic Energy Ac; is silent on the role of the Commission in nuclear emergencies, the Commissioners, Presidentially-appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate, would likely be held accountable to the public for NRC actions in a nuclear emergency -- irrespective of the actual extent of their involvement.
In view of this, the question is not whether the Commission should participdte in emergency response but to what extent it can and should participate.
Many of the decisions that would be made by NRC in response to a nuclear emergency are likely to be based almost entirely on technical considerations.
These would be made by the staff in accordance with NRC's emerger.cy response plans.
But there are other important decisions in which the Commission could participate, e.g. the need to recommend evacuation, that involve primarily judgment, a balancing of values, and coordination with the President and the Congress and the States.
And, as the TMI-2 accident showed, there are also decisions normally involving only technical considerations that may assume a judgmental character in an emergency because of incomplete or uncertain information.
It is prudent to assume that the emergency response process will involve value judgments and agency commitments of the kind which the Commission, under normal circumstances, is required to make.
In addition, there are likely to be differences of views on proposed alternative actions within the staff, and resolution by the Commission (the " court pf last resort") may be necessary.
Limits to Commission Particioation The extent of Commission participation in responding to a nuclear emergency is likely to be severely limited or even negated by the singular circumstances of the emergency, particularly:
the time available for respons ve action the location of the Commissioners at the time when the emergency occurs the effectiveness of the communications link between those at the scene of the emergency and the Ccmmissioners the amount of information which each Commissior.er may require in order to decide on responsive actions the capabilities of those at the scene of the emergency authorized to make en-the-spot decisions concerning responsive acti
.s.
The primary constraint is the time available for effective action.
The time constraint is reflected in the NRC Manual Chapter 0502 by categorizing incidents according to three levels:
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For the Comission Level I:
an incident constituting "an actual or iminent serious threat or hazard" Level II:
an incident constituting "a potential serious threat or hazard" Level III:
an incident presenting "no imediate potential threat or hazard" Although a Level III incident may develop into a serious threat or hazard, we do not consider such in:idents here.
Level I and Level II incidents, as defined in the NRC Manual, do not differ in perceived severity -- both are
" serious" threats or hazards -- but differ in perceived imminence.
A Level II incident appears to be one for which a judgment must be made lhether to institute full response (Level I) or to stay on alert (Level III).
For present purposes, therefore, we consider only events characterized as Level I.
The perceived iminence of a serious hazard can change during the course of an accident, as it seemed to do during the course of the TMI accident. An incident may proceed through several phases, and depending upon the perceived urgency of the response, Commission involvement during the several phases might vary accordingly.
The extent of delay resulting from Commission involvement must be traded off against its possible value.
During " crisis" phases the time available for deliberation and decision-making might be limited to minutes or a few hours.
Under such circumstances, rapid decisions are required and Comission involvement may be infeasible.
The processing of information required to make responsive decisions con-tributes in major part to the time constraint.
The acquisition of the information needed for making effective decisions requires time and, since most of the essential information must come from those at the scene, infor-mation-gathering may interfere with their efforts to cope with the emergency.
The fact that five individual Commissioners would be involved in requesting and receiving information would pose serious impediments to prompt response.
If the Comission were to choose to participate directly in emergercy response decision-making, it would seem particularly advisable to coordinate and consolidate individual Comissioner requests for information and restrict the requests to an absolute minimum.
Advance preparation of information sources and channels as well as advance plans for hazard evaluation would reduce the time and effort needed to acquire the data for decision-making, particularly if the Commissioners were to participate.
A protractud incident may provide sufficient time for decision-making, particularly if the emergency persists for more than a day or so.
The Comissian may be able to become directly involved in such key decisions as recorw.nding to the appropriate authorities that protective actions be taken.
Even under these circumstances, the Comission may find much of its tim:. taken up with Congressional briefings and responding to the concerns of Federal, State and local officials, and
., the TMI experience shows, the Comission may find it difficult to isolata itself from extraneous matters.
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For the Comission Modes of Commission Participation The practical limits to Comission participation in an emergency response also affect the mode of that participation.
For the rapidly developing incident, use of the collegial format may increase the public risk by delaying decisions to the point where effective protective action might become impossible.
In such an urgent situation, pre-designated members of the staf f may have to make key decisions and the Commission may have to limit its role to that of official, after-the-fact spokesmen.
Alternatively, the Commission may designate a single or " lead" Commissioner to oversee the emergency response (in its entirety or in specific aspects) or to resolve differing views on proposed alternative actions among the staff.
A lead Commission approach implies more rapidly decisive leadership and a limited period of deliberation.
The approach would provide a single decision-maker at the top of the agency able to respond with requisite speed and flexibility but able also to call on the other Commissioners for support in performing the necessary tasks.
Emergencies in which only less-than-collegial participation would be feasible cannot be ruled out.
Con-sequently, the concept of lead Commissioner needs to be carefully studied with respect to its legal and practical implications.*
Soectrum of Possible Nuclear Emergencies Although the TMI experience was a milestone event and can provide valuable guidance in identifying the proper Commission role in emergency response, future emergencies may involve other types of nuclear facilities, safeguards threat situations, etc., and may tai place in entirely different geographical and political settings.
The Commissioners' situations -- in town, out-of-town -- and the time of the incident -- during the day, night, weekend --
will vary.
For these reasons, while some freedom of action and flexibility should be present in whatever arrangement is selected, it would be useful, if not essential, to establish in advance general criteria for determining what emergency situations would warrant Commission participation, what decisions would be appropriato for Commission affirmation, and what mode of participation should be used If the Commission is to make certain decisions, the decisions must be clearly defined so the staff knows the limits of its respc sibilities.
The staff role would also have to be adjusted to be cen-sis'.ent with the Commission's role.
Not only would functions and criteria describing plans for Commission involve-ment be set down in advance, but the plans would be tested using realistic scenarios that reflect the spectrum of emergencies to which NRC may have to respond.
Realistic scenarios of nuclear emergencies are being prepared by an NRC contractor.
Although we anticipate the scenarios will be helpful in M stucy of tne concept of leaa Commissioner is being proposed for inclusion in the management study contract.
The subject seems likely to be addressed in both the NRC (Rogovin) and Presidential (Kemeny) investigations.
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For the Comission better defining the Comission's role, we believe -- from considering a few crude scenarios we have drawn up -- that the spectrum of possible emergencies may be too broad and the range of at least two of the critical parameters (time available and information required for decision-making) too great to expect a single " blueprint for Commission action" to emerge from the scenarios.
However, when these scenarios become available they could be used to test the appropriateness and effectiveness of proposed Comission participatien.
Additional more realistic testing could be accomplished by Commission partici-pation in some of the emergency response drills to be conducted by the staff with licensees and local and State authorities.
Possible Items for Commission Emergency Response Agenda Because of the range of possible emergencies and the differences in time scale and information needs, the extent of Commission participation in emergency response actions is necessarily t1certain.
This does not mean that a definite agenda cannot be set; it merely suggests that the agenda would constitute a comprehensive list of the possible decisions that might have to be considered by the Comission with the clear understanding that, in an actual emergency, circumstances would determine which of these the Comission would be required to make and would be able to make.
The value of the list of possible decisions would be enhanced by broadly categorizing the decisions in terms of probable judgmental and non-technical content, i.e. th; relative desirability of full Commission involvement.
The most sign cant decisions
- trom the standpoint of meriting full Comission involv ment -- would be made collegially (if feasible); decisions of lesser significance would be handled in a collegial or less-than-collegial format or by the staff.
While this procedure appears to be reasonable, it should be understood that " relative significance" would generally depend on the specific details of the emergency.
A decision may be clear-cut and non-controversial in the context of one emergency while in another emergency it may be controversial and involve significant judgmental considerations.
Again, because of this, the agenda should be tested against realistic emergency scenarios.
An example of a possible decision-making agenda (presented in chronological order) is as follows:
Cencurrence in staff's assessment of potential severity and iminence of threat to public health and initiation of NRC Incident Response Progra:n.
(If hazard is " actual," this would amount to verifying reliability of the source of information.)
Decisions to assign senior NRC officials to site.
[Supplementaryto pre-approved emergency response plans.]
Decisions to recommend (to public authorities ) or to order (licensees) protective actions based on the balance between the advantage of protective accions and the potentially adverse consequences of inaction or hasty action.
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For the Comission Decisions to seek supplementary governmental resources or technical assistance and advice from public or private sources.
Decisions to take follow-up actions on the generic imnlications of the incident.
Decisions to recommend (to public authorities) or to order (licensees) modification or termination of protective actions as necessary, based on appraisal of consequences of chosen course of action.
Decisions to downgrade the incident (from Level I to Level II or III or from Level II to Level III).
Future Action In view of the importance of better defining the Commission's role in emergency response situaticns, we believe another meeting with the staff would be desirable to pursue the subject, focusing on the issues raised in this memorandum, namely:
Should the Commission limit its role to oversight, high-level (President, members of Congress, governors) liaison, and " court of last resort" service; or should it extend that role to include decision-making?
If the Comission wishes to assume a key role in making decisions on substantive issues, what is the preferred mode (collegial, lead Commissioner, other) of participation and interacticn with staff?
What additional resources would the Commission need (e.g. informational, technical, physical) to assume a substantive role in decision-making in emergency response situations?
Whatever the Commission decides, the NRC Manual Chapter should be revised to spell out, in more specific terms, the role of the Ccmmission (and the adjusted role of the staff) in emergency response situations.
cc:
Len Bickwit Lee Gossick Dan Donoghue Sam Chilk Harold Denton Bob Ryan Joe Fouchard Vic Stello Howard Shapar Carl Kammerer Bill Dircks Tom Carter Jim Cummings Bob Minogue 1243 290