ML19254E097
| ML19254E097 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 10/16/1979 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7910310090 | |
| Download: ML19254E097 (53) | |
Text
i.
a NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I
I i
I i
IN THE MATTER OF:
I i'
PUBLIC MEETING DISCUSSION OF COMMISSION'S DECISION-MAKING ROLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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Place. Washington, D. C.
Date - Tuesday,16 October 1979 Pages 1 - 43 T.t.een.:
x-(202)347-3700 ACE -FEDERAL REPOR'ERS,INC.
Of.%aB, wreart o0 M4 North Capitol Street OI 7910310 fs
-Washington, D.c 2000,
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NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY
1 1
CR7705 1
DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held onTuesdav. 16 October 1979 in the Commissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
The meeting was open to public attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies.
The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.
Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.
No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
3!
l PUBLIC MEETING 4
I i
I DISCUSSION OF COMMISSION'S DECISION-MAKING S
l POLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE 6
7 i
1 Room 1130 8;
i 1717 H Street, N. W.
9l Washington, D. C.
I 10 l Tuesday, 16 October 1979 3:20 p.m.
i 11 ;
j BEFORE:
12 l
DR. JOSEPH M.
HENDRIE, Chairman 13 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 14 l
RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner j
15 PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 16 !
l JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner 17 PRESENT:
18 Messrs. Bickwit, Case, Gossick, Kenneke, and Stello.
19,
20 t
21 i
22 23 i243 233 2,
.....i n 25
3
. $ th Q f f (UI $ M~
il JUA PR0 CEEDINGS pv urv 2
CHAIR.JAd HEUURIE:
The meeting will come to orcer.
3 Doe s it continue to be our uncerstanding that we 4
can proceed to an af firma tion ?
5 MR. BICKW IT:
that's my understanding, o
COMi.ilSS I0dEd BR ADFORD:
I would rather do it at 7
the enc of this mee ting.
c CHAIR.4Aa HEdJRIE:
I can.
Let me then explain v
w ha t the scheoule loors like for the rest of the afternoon IC on the ba si s of.tha t requ es t.
ine cocmission was scheduled il to meet now, or, ra tner, 20 minute s age, on the subject of 12 its oecision on taking a role in emergency re s,tonse and to 13 discu ss w ha t, in
,t -ticular, the cocaissioners and the 14 commission collegic '.ly ought to do in the event of an is emergency., I am going to start tha t mee ting in a T.oment and to allow it to run until 4: 15.
At that po in t, where ver we are 17 in the discussion, we will terminate it.
16 The commission, as some of you may know, has since 19 late last weck considering the question of the operation of 20 EPICOR-2 at Three Mile Island unic 2, ana a commission order 21 has been promised on tha t subject. It's my understancing 22 tha t we have an order which is acceptable to all of the 23 commissioners, and assuming that to still be true, at 4: 15 I 24 will ask my colleagues to join me in voting to hold a 25 short-notice affirmation se ssion or meeting to vote that i243 234
51302 4
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oraer.
2 At 4: 30 the commission #2)i"ti adjourn.
cle have a 3
neeting on some personnel matters that I have to make sure we get in tnis af ternoon.
And a couple of us have to leave 5
by 5 CC, so that the scheoule runs f airly tight.
o With that introouction as to where I think we're 7
going tnis af ternoon, le t us turn to the commission's o
decisionmaking role in emergency re sponse.
By way of -- I v
see either tne off ensive team, or the def ensive team, has 10 taken tne field -- I'm not sure which 11 (Laugnter.)
12 CHA IR 4A.4 HENDRIE:
-- O r pe rha ps i t's t he s pe ci al 13 team witn the suicide squad members.
I'm nc. quite sure.
14 (Laughter.)
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I have been watching Monday lo night f ootball.
17 Ey way of a preliminary note to this discussion, 16 in which I will ask Al Kenneke to lead us througn a briefing 19 on some work that his group has cone on the subject, I will 20 note that as an interim measure and until the collegial 21 commission decices diff erently or however it may decide on 22 w ha t role the commission itself and commissioners ought to 23 have in the event of an emergency situation.
24 Last Friday I decided that until the collegial 25 commission decision is in hand on corcissioner roles, that i243 235
5 13 03 s
cd s 5
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if we, 've an emergency and the emergency managament team of 2
the agency is mustered, that I am going to go off to the 3
response center and join that effort.
4 A1, wny don't you go aheac.
I take these are --
u MR. KENNdKE:
ihese are some sli de s that we've o
prepared iron the pa pe r.
7 CHAI R..tA.; nENURIE:
iha t you're going to talk fron?
O UCoa.
v MR. KENNEKE:
I thought I would best start back 10 with tne origins of the specific problem, other tnan Three 11 Mile Island itself, wnica was a meno from 12 Commi ssioner Eractora, in May, in which he called to your 13 a tten tion the need to make some decisions about what your l-role would be.
15 Can we have -- I hope - a slide 1,
plea se ?
Io They've lost the bulb.
17 You each have sheets in front of you.
From the le audience's point of view, I nope the bulb is fixeo quickly.
Iv CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Notice the smcoch way in wnich 20 we ceal with this emergency.
21 (Laughter.)
22 MR. KENNEKE:
Commi ssioner Bradf ord pu t it very
' asically tha t the basic question was whether or not the 23 c
24 commission could act collegially in the event of an 2S emergency response, an NRC emergency response, and if not, i243 236
i 13 04 6
- v JA/
I then various celegations should be made and the matter 2
clarifiec.
Par ticularly, mattars that he suggested be a
considerec on your agenda woulc be One locus of the o
commission during an emergency --
o (Slide.)
7
-- uecisions to a ssign personnel to sites --
c ColBiISSIOi;ER GI LIi4S.G :
" Locus" is like where the commission is going to be?
y 10 lJR. Kd?:NE.<d :
(es.
The base of cperations, I!
wne ther it's going to be in some corner office on H Street, 12 out in the heart of things, or on site.
13 CO.WIS5IGNER KEI4NEDY:
5t. Louis ~
1, CHAIR.4AN HENDRIE:
nell, I am ;oing to have ta buy 10 more ashtrays if we're going to run any more out of my lo o f fice.
17
- 4R. KEIlNEKE
The ma tter of recommending that Ic protective measures be taken, wha t the generic implications lv might be for the plan ts, setting up post-accident 20 investigations in the various matters of liaisons.
21 As a result of tha t memo, the cocmi ssion me t in 22 June ano discussed the matter in very broad terms with the 23 s taf f -
Harold Den ton ano Vic 5tello, prinrally, and 24 yourselves.
25 And the questions that seemed to us to summarize 1 2 4 3
.y,3 /
c
M MOh, !
I UbPs 13dildanni L 7
5 5 13 05 3v sal I
cnst aseting were:
are there clearly defined areas of 2
crisis..anage aen t in whicn the com:ission's input is 3
desirable or nece ssary; if so, should these responsibilities Inis is the secono slide.
Excuse me.
o Slide 2, please.
o (Slide.)
7 I.f so, should the se resconsibilities be nendlau sin.jly cr colle:Jially?
If ind ivi dua lly, c ', w han ?
o 9
COM!4I55 IONER GILI13KY :
Actuall, on tnat point, 10 on the singly, the g:neral counsel had s;ne conments on this 11 subject 12 MR. K E.','N EK E :
I will come back to that.
13 ColtMISSIONER GILIN5KY:
-- At the meeting last 1,
w eek.
Anc I think you ought to addre ss tha t po i n t.
Ib MR. KENNEKE:
Yes.
lo Wha t would tne threshold points for commi ssion 17 involvement be?
And finally, w ha t would the agenda be in lo the event you participatec?
17
.ie t he n. ba seo on the carnission's request, 20 developed what we hoped would be the basis for f urther 21 discussion that reflected the views of everyone.
There were 22 very strongly held f eelings that needed to he sorted out, 23 and that's casically what we a ttempted to do, to break the 24 problet down and lay it out in a way t ha t perhaps would 25 allow us to a pproach it more rationally.
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AnJ I nava on slice 3 --
2 (511da.)
An outlina of tha t mema.
Simply, as the 3
4 backgrcune that lec to the memo, it croke the problem down 5
into talking acou t the values of commission pa r ti c i pa tion,
6 what the limits snould oe, snould you participate, how tnat 7
mignt take place, wnat kinds of accidants night neeu to be a
con side re c, and "that ite:as might be on that agenda, as well y
as raccamenda tions f or fu ture action.
10 (311de.)
11 Slide 4,
I uoulu l!.ke to proceed and talk in more 12 ca tail abou t the me.io.
Under the heacing of "Value of 13 Commission Participa tion" --
1-COlJHI3S IO.idd AHEAm.d:
A1, cefore you jo into the 15 de tails, I am sure it's obvious, but I would like you to say 16 just a word or two about your enswer, your first major 17 question, " Are there clearly defined areas in which le commi ssion inpu t is cesirable or necessary?"
The " desirable ly or necessary" is from tna stancpoint of protecting the 20 public health and saf e ty, and solely tha t; is tnat correct?
21 MR. KENNEKE:
Yes.
I think tnat's the e ssence of 22 the basic que stion.
The question is whether your 23 involvement woula add to saf e ty or de tract trom safety, 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
- .ine.
25 MR. KENNEKE:
Many individuals that we talked to 1,'>d3 239 a
P00R O!!!BiMAL 2 la. 07 9
Ov vAV 1
felt very stron.;17 the cornission shouldn't pa r ti c i.ca te in 2
. nae;ing decisions on responsive action, primarily because it 3
goes exactly to tha point we just s pok e of :
it coulc cause delay end creata difficulty and make things le ss sef e.
4 b
The re are dif f e rent perceptions, however, of the o
coaaission's role, anc it goes to the question of 7
decisionmaking.
'Gaere really i sn' t any great question. I o
think, aoou t the role of indiviuual conmissioners acting in specific roles, such as s, coke smen in particular areas.
y 10 There is no question that /cu have policymaking 11 re sponsibilities beforenand and in tne af termath.
12 COMMI SS ION E.4 AHEAR:i E:
Coula I ask you a question 13 on that.
You say tha t there is no concern about individuals I,
acting as spokescen.
~las any concern expre ssed about having 15 mul ti ple spok e sme n?
16 MR. KdNNEKE:
Yes.
17 COIMISSIONEd AHEARNE:
So, when you say there was le no concern -
i, MR. KdNNEKE:
,. ha t I was trying to say is tha t 20 those wno were concerned about the commission not 21 participating or participating were conc ^rned that your 22 collegial activitie s coulc interf ere with deci sionmakings 23 They were not saying that you could not vote to be 24 participants as individuals in some specific specified way.
25 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Who is "they" now?
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MR. Kd:4.q EK E :
I woulc say primarily aembers of the 2
staff, nne members :nat we talked to, anc what we sensed 3
many of the Jifficulties you yourselves raecing between the lines.
5 Co.4?.iI SS IONER GI LINdKY :
Jid you ask tnem about o
ncn-crisis activities?
-/
(Laugnter.)
g o m.g\\ o g d d lih a
..i d..sdNiEKE:
'ci e focuseu on emergency v
requirements.
A few other fora exist for that.
10 Tha re i s, ha. lever, de spi te people's concerns about 11 you not par tic i pa tin;, I woulu say a resicual concern tha t 12 there is a specific value to having the commission 13 participate, anc they were no t trying to say somehow not to 14 capture tha t value.
What value was tha t?
16 MR. KdNNEKE:
Tha t the resconse to a nuclear 17 emergency is likely to require decisions that involve value lo judg:r.ents and agency commitments of the kind that the ly commission would normally oe required to make.
In that 20 sense, if we coulu find a way, that would be the sense in 21 which the commission coula come in.
22 Clearly, the limi ta tions to commission 23 participation related to your decisionmaking role.
The 24 constraints on that primarily was the question of time when 25 you neeaed to make a decision.
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COM.4I 5S IOJER AHEAR.IE:
Let me continue to push on 2
this, because, as I understand it, you aid -- I guess Joe 3
and Jim went thrcugn this -- did interview a lot of people 4
or talk to a lot of people; is that correct?
5 l.i R. KENNEKE:
f e s, one way or another.
o CO 4MISSIONER AHEAR.iE:
The flavor I am getting is 7
Ina t the concern was soiety because of the dif ficul ty of something tnet's moving rapidly and the cifficulty of c
bringing in a collegial group to try to have in,6ut into a y
IC rapidly evolving 11 4R. KEhdEKE:
That's the heart of the ma tter, yes.
12 CohWI6SIONER AHEARNE:
That's the heart of the 13 ma t te r.
Then you're saying it wa s no t a concern, A,
if the I,
ma tter weren' t ceveloping rapicly, nor, E, on the judgment 15 that might be rea c he d.
16 MR. KENNEKE:
The question of how much time was 17 available woulo be the single area in wnich it seemed Ic f ea sible tha t one could define that if there was suf ficient lv time.
20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
There was no concern that 21 tha Jucgments tha t woula be reached would not be the one 22 MR. KENtlEKE:
I think -- and this is my own 23 reaction to my own understanding, and this is generalizing a 24 lot of people's points of view -- that while individuals 25 might differ, t he y, I think, unanimously agree there needs 1243 242
5 13 lb I
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l to be a sin gle " decision anc 3 clear-cut cecision, wha te ver 2
that cecision is, even thouga they might personally cisagree 3
witn the par ticular action.
4 VOICE:
There is also concern about the 5
information proolem.
o CO!Cil 5S IOJE:t AHE Ap.:iE :
You mean ge tting enough 7
inf orma tion in to make the informed decision?
e VOICE:
Yes.
CO:0.iISSIONER KEliNEDY:
Because individual 10 co=nissioners would each be seeking dif f erent information, il or oecause it's difficult to ge, that much inf orma tion to 12 all commissioners, or both?
13 Md. KENNEKE:
Both in the first com pounding 14 sense.
Wha tever you ao, whatever you decide, I chink there 15 was a unanimous reeling tha t the mechanism for informing the lo cosaission and receiving requests f or tha t information goes 17 through a single channel, whatever you decide, to sim plif y lo the problems of response, so that if the situation was 17 rapidly ueveloping, I think it's pretty clear that the 20 commission woula have to limit i ts re sponse.
I think there 21 is a universal f eeling.
22 And f rom wha t I read in the newspapers and what I 23 sense in the air, I get the feeling tha t among you all, 24 similarly, that you recognize that.
25 And so, in that case, you'd have to limit your 1243 243
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I role to of ficial af ter-tne-f ac t spokesman, perhaps, or 2
possibly aesignate a single or lead commissioner to oversee 3
the response or resolve.
That's the only otner possibility, and I will come 5
back to that, ihat's the poin t tha t Commi ssion ?" Gilinsky o
na s raisee.
t 7
CO:.C4ISS Iai!ER BR ADFaRu n Is there in back of this o
sort or a pic ture tha t I guess is pretty close to the pic ture of the E.iT that I would have had bef ore ihree. Mile y
10 Island; t ha t i s, it's a group aesigndted and e pproved by the 11 commission, f unctioning under proceaures ano criteria 12 approvea by the commission, and t he ref ore that's a good 13 situation for tne commission itself not to be involved in?
14 MR. KENdEKE:
I think they're saying ena t wha te ver 15 organization you set up in advance, that that organization lo should be allowec to proceed, and everyone should bef orehand 17 knod what his role is in the event of such a thing, so there Ic woulc be no confu sion.
Each would retire to his place to do 17 his thing, or to carry out bu sine ss if he's no t involved.
I 20 think that's the essence of it.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I think, in following up 22 some part of what I interpreted in Pe ter's question, did you 23 get any sense f rom these people who f el t tha t it was 24 appropria te because of the pull of the events not to have 25 the commission involved, tha t they f elt that they hac enough 1,')k3 2k4
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5 13 12 14
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in the sense of procedures and guidance?
Secause tne way a
2 the thapter is written is tha t it's su opo sed to be operating 3
under the colicie s laij out by the commission.
uid you get 4
the sense from then that they felt there was adequate laying 5
out of the policies?
o
.'.!R. K E N N E K E :
lic can talk more to this.
One of 7
his a ssignments in the ganeral plan of action is to revamp c
the manual cnapters.
v Now, I have got in the back here, a t tne bottom 10 line, some t hing that was not in the memo.
It would 'ce a 11 proposal that Vic could take into account.
12 COMMIdSIONE.4 AMEARNE:
Ma i t, now.
I am not really 13 calking about revamping manual chapters.
I am really asking 14 ne que stion:
Jid the people in your discussions -- and I 15 can uncerstanc this conce pt tha t they f eel that once things to get started the people operating the emergency response want 17 to have control, single-channel direction, et cetere.
But Ic the way -- at least the words say that they do all this l 'y under policies laid out by the commi ssion.
20 My question is:
did you get a sense tnat they 21 believe that there is adequate laying out of those policies 22 so that they feel that they have enough guicance f ramework?
23 MR. KENNEKE:
Everything tha t I know of sugge s t s 24 the staff believes there is plenty of room for improvement.
25 COMMISSIONEW AHEARNE:
Okay.
Is that another way 7/R
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of saying, "Yes, they believe the C there must he" 2
MR. KENNEKE:
There should be more improvements, 3
yes.
Tne emergency planning task f orce toic you tha t, among 4
others.
Vic is working ca the manual chapters, 5
s pe ci f i cally, o
One of the things we thought wa s in cor:an t to 7
pcint cut was tne significance of Three,!ile Island itself as a background to tne cecision with regarc to tnis natter.
c 9
Tl..I was, I think, not expectec in the sense of being drawn 10 out.
It wa s no t visualiced as the f undamental s:ar cing 11 place for planning.
One always thought in terms of the 12 immeciately unfolding situations or decisions went too fast 13 for any kind of questions.
In the case of Three Mile Island 14 it lastea for some period of time, anc a peak in terms of 15 public concern arose a couple of days after the beginning of to the event.
And it seemed to us that it was that very fact 17 vaat drew the commi ssion more heavily into it.
le And there is a le sson in that, in the sense that 19 if the r.iatter is arawn out, it seems inevitable that the 20 conaission will be lookea to as the chief spoke sman f or the 21 agency.
They will be the points of contact for various 22 inquiries and so on, and no t the staff.
And in that sense, 23 it argues for carefully considering whether or not you 24 shoula remove yourselves from emergency response.
25 On the other hand --
17/I 746 1ans a
5 13 l b i
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Cotii4I dd IONEH AHhAH:lE:
In that case, Ai, once 2
Harola got establisnea in Harrisburg, the public lookec to 3
darold to be the chief s,cokesman.
4 JR. Kdi'NEKE :
Wo, we're talking about drawing up a b
policy that will guiae future response.
o Cat.U.il 55 IOilER Ad EARW E I thougnt I was de tecting 7
your f eeling tha t be c au se it stretchec out, the public inevitacly looks to tne cocmission.
I am just saying I o
y didn't think that was the case.
10 Q. KE.'i;;EK E :
The decision to have additional
[5 11 pecole go to the site, as I understand it, began to involve e'
12 coini ssion advice, in part.
13 CoriMISSIOiiER AMEARdE:
I am only adore ssing the la question of t he s po ke sman.
I didn't think that there was 15 any cifficulty once Harole was speaking on this matter.
Io 17 lo l>
20 1243 247 21 22 23 24 25
5 14 01 17 (a puA /
I MR. KENNEKE:
I'd like to speak to the matter of 2
s poke sm en.
I'll break that matter down further a little 3
f ur ther on.
There are spokesmen for the internal workings 4
of the thing, people who are involved in protection, and 5
those who are simply inquiring.
o On the other hand, though Three Mile Island is 7
stretched out, we've got to be caref ul that we not use tha t e
to bias our thinking, tha t that's the only kind of thin v
t ha t can ha ppen.
And there are other types of situations, 10 such as saf eguards even ts that one has to be careful of.
Il The gist of that is tha t we should be thinking about 12 planning what kind of emergency situa tions might require 13 Commission participation, assuming that you should decide 14 you should be involved in soas form.
15 What decisions would be appropriate for Commission 10 decision?
And what modes might that participa tion take ?
In 17 any event, whatever you come up with it would seem to u s 16 would have to be tested by realistic scenarios, and your 19 role and your activities would have to be par t of that 20 test.
In terms of assuming you had a role, the kinds of 21 things that one would rela te to with regard to 22 decision-making would be the subject of the concurrence and 23 perhaps the staff's initial assessmen t of tha severity and 24 the imminence of the threat, whether or not to send higher 25 level officials to the site, whether or not to recommend i243 248
5 14 02 18 kap 0AV 1
that protective actions be taken, whe ther or not to seek 2
supplementary resources, what ac tions to take with regard to 3
generic concerns, setting up investigations, for example, 4
decisions equally important to recommending modif ying or 5
terminating protective ac tion s.
6 At that time, we concluded that this discussion 7
should focus on the followir.g issues s hould the Commission 6
limit its role to oversight, '71gh level liaison, court of v
last resort, or should it extend its role to 10 decision-making?
11 (Slide.)
12 If the Commission a ssume s -- one more slide,
13 please.
14 (Slide.)
15 If the Cosnission a ssumes a key role in 16 deci sion-making, what would be the preferred mode of its 17 participa tion anc interactions with the staf f ?
Given tha t, le what accitional resources would you neec, informational, Iv technical and physical, to assume a substantive role and to 20 make that role effective in emergency response 21 cecision-making?
22 Whatever you decide, it seems to us the manual 23 chapter among other things should be revised to spell out 24 more specifically what the Commission's role as well as 25 aajusting the role of the staf f will be in emergency 1243 249
5 14 03 19
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I response.
At s tha t time we cidn't recommend a specific 2
r e sol ution.
That's a monta ago.
It was premature, it 3
s.eemed to u s.
We dicn't knod what your individual views 4
were, you neeced time to think about it, you n eeded to have 5
pieces paper ano otner tnings had to happen.
o Well, since then -- and the la st mon tn ha s been 7
very eventful in tha t re s pe ct -- you've haa a chance to e
thing about i t.
tou've had the opportunity to talk with a y
number of the investigating groups within NRC, outsice of 10 NRC.
It seems to me now, at least for talking purposes at 11 this meeting, a particular proposal might help to solidify 12 the thinking, or at least serve as a poin t of departure.
It 13 seems to us that you neea to be specific at this poin t to 14 come to grips with it and answer.
15 The Chairman has laid out, at least for the lo interim, what he intends to do.
I think you as a group now 17 might re s pond to tha t specific question.
Slide seven --
IS (Slide.)
IV
-- is a copy of the present inciden t re sponse 20 organization.
It has a lot of detail to it, but I want to 21 focus your attention on the very top little box that says 22
" commission," and everything else beneath that, think of as 23 the IRO, one box, however that is now or however tha t might 24 be recensitituted.
0502 now merely says that the Commi ssion 25 has a policy-making role.
Ye t in diagrams, by the line 1243 250
51404 20
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nature of it, it seems to suggest tha t you have a 2
decision-making role in the line of decisions.
The document 3
is pre tty clear.
Tha t was nc? the intent.
4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
In tne manual chapter it's 5
pre tty clear.
o COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
What's pre tty clear?
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
That the Commissioner was o
to be in general policy, but as far as the instant response y
and emergency action, that EMT was the group f ronting.
At 10 least tha t's w ha t I t houg h t it was, il COMMISSIONER KENNEDf:
Yes, that's what the manual 12 chapter says.
13 COMMISSI0 DER BRADFORD:
What is ambiguous, I 14 guess, is wnether there is an ongoing policy f unction during 15 the acciden,t-I must say I would have interpreted it as lo not.
But that's not absolutely certain.
17 MR. KENNEKE:
The meaning of it becomes kind of 16 3mbiguous or it's almos t i rre le van t in the sense of -- it is 19 not decision-making and it's not really involved in the 20 event.
I t's an of f-line o peration.
21 (Slide.)
22 Now, in slice eight, we have drawn there, on the 23 lef t of the c har t, a simplified diagram of the 0502, the 24 Commission and the incident response organization.
What we 25 suggest for your consideration, at least as a point of 1243 251
14 05 21
.apuAV I
departure for discussion, is that the Commission consicer 2
re pla cing the worc " Commission" by "di rector," the chairman 3
of the NRC, that that be understood to be the 4
decision-making site, unambiguously clear that that person 5
makes the cecisions in emergency reponses.
o COMMISS IONER AHEARNE:
Now, if I understand it, 7
what you're saying is that you ha ppen to be using the same
~
o line block on tne left-hana side of the manual enapter but v
since in the manual chapter that really is not a 10 decisien-making line be tween the Commission and IRO, w ha t 11 you are saying is tnat you would change that to make that 12 your proposal is to make it a decision-making role.
13 So in e ssence, whereas in tne manual chapter EDO 14 is sort of the senior cerson making the decisions, you would 15 move tha t u p.
Io MR. KENNEKE:
I would say that's right.
I would 17 also like to comment, I think there is as diff erence of 16 opinion as to wnat the manual chapter says with regard to lY who makes decisions.
Even within the staff, it's not c) -
20 absolutely, unambiguously, that ECO is in charge.
It 21 to us we need an unambiguous --
22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Wait, wait, wait.
7 thy 23 isn't it clear that the ELO is in charge?
24 MR. KENNEKE:
If you read it again you can 25 in ter pre t it to mean that he is first among equals bu t not 1243 252
5 14 06 22 kapuAV 1
quite in charge.
2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
'tihere co you read that?
3 Coula you read that over to me?
4 MR. KENNEKE:
Lee. I know, knows how he interprets 5
it.
But wna tever you decide --
6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I assume wnen ne 7
interprets it tna t he is in c harge, am I wrong?
e COMMISSIONEH AdEARNE:
As f ar as I can see it says y
the ELO is director or the executive management team.
And 10 when it goes cown to I&E it says, " serves es a.aember of 11 EMI."
URR serves as a cember of EMI.
This is 05C2 cart 12 one.
It's tne response planning cuties.
I'd just co mment that that's been 14 clear in my mind.
There are a ttendan t problems with it, but 15 tha t's my understancing of the intent.
16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:
Did anyone dispute it?
17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It certainly seems very to clear.
19 MR. GOSSICK:
They dicn't dispute it, but there 20 were some actions tha* < 2re taken without my knowledge that 21 were a carry over f rom the cay-to-day kind of operation 22 which is the normal course of behavior.
23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Le t's s ee, what attendant 24 problems are you ref erring to specifically?
25 MR. GOSSICK:
Peopic are used to acting on their i ~,_' d )
/U
i 14 07 23
- apvAV I
own without communicating with EDO during the normal course 2
of business around the NRC.
And when you're thrust toge the r 3
in the EMT set-up, in the crisis situation, there's a 4
tendency f or that kind of action to carry on.
5 COMMISS IONER AHEARNE:
People use resources as o
though they were --
7 MR. GOSSICK:
No, I'm talking aceut telling people o
to do tnings, wnether it's their resource or not.
9 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I take it you're talking 10 atou t actions tnat are of suf ficien t magnituce --
11 MR. 00SSICK:
I'm talking about specifically 12 telling the representative of the state programs office to 13 acvise the Pennsylvania people that we're recommending an I mean, an evacuation.
I was not aware of that.
I 14 alert 15 thoug ht he ac ted on his own, overhearing the conversa tion 16 that had gone on within EMT, where we were in a position 17 where we called you to tell you that that was our le recommendation.
And which we did, promptly thereaf ter.
19 MR. KEtiNEKE:
Well, I'm unable to document it at 20 the moment, the source of my ambigui ty.
I don't have a copy 21 which I marked up, but let me see if I can do it.
There is 22 an ambiguity.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Le t's just note that if there 24 is one it needs to be cleared up.
25 MR. KENNEKE:
That's right.
I think we all agree i243 254
5 14 Oc 24 kap 0A/
1 that it should ce unambiguous as to who will make decisions 2
and wno will spea4 for NRC.
I think that's really the 3
clearest element.
4 Col4MISSIONER GILIh3KY :
Could we re turn to this 5
alternative pro posal that a member of the Commission, o
particularly the chairman, direct this center?
7 COMMISSIONER AHEARJE:
Endorsec by at least one o
member of tne Commi ssion.
y CHAIR:4AN HbilDRIE:
But tnere's an interesting 10 tning Vic's allucing to.
The re's an in te re s ting pro po si tion 11 which we'll ask the general counsel to leac us through, and 12 that is the proposition that in a sser ting that I propose to 13 go to the response center and take charge of the E:4T, if it 14 has to activate, at least as I say up until some further 15 description.or Commission is enunciated by the collegial 16 booy, it's not altogether clear wha t my legal authority is 17 to co so.
le The law says we can delegate to an officer of the 19 Commission the Commission's powers and so on, but apparently 20 we can't celegate to a comnissioner.
21 COMMISSIONER KEhNEDY :
Could you explain that?
22 CHAIRr4AN HENDRIE:
We might very well be in the 23 position cf having to exercise moral suasion on the officers 24 of the starf.
25 MR. KdNNEKE:
May I ask a point of personal 1243 255
5 l* 09 25
- apdAV i
privilege, and finisn the proposal, the bottom line of whicn 2
is a hand-off with regard to the legal aspect, with regards 3
to wnetner it can ce done, ana if so hcw it can be done.
Sut tne point of our suggestion is that t he 5
cnairman -- since now we are seeking a way to nave o
Commission in volvement, the line of succe ssion would not be 7
down.tc the staf f but woulu be to the other commi ssioners.
o If the chairman were not available, wnoever was acting would v
be anc it would folloa, in effect, cne national emergency 10 line of succe ssion unless otherwise specified.
11 As part of the --
12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Thu same problems woula 13 a ttac n to that.
14 MR. KENNEXE8 Right, exactly.
That'll be the 15 hanc-off, and Len can take it on f rom there.
Part of it to would be because each of you then would be somehow giving up 17 some thing, something along the lines of a best effort 16 requirement on the part of tha chairman, to keep you fully is informec ana to involve you in coll *;ial decision-making to 20 the extent tha t's f easible.
21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Can you explain, going back 22 to the reason I originally asked the question, you're solely 23 f ocused upon improving healta and saf e ty?
24 MR. KENNEKE:
Health and safety, right.
25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
How that requirement gets 1243 256
5 14 10 20 (3pdAV i
into that 4
MR. KdhNEKit
?'hicn one, specifically?
3 CO,4AISSIONEd AHEARNE:
The last ene.
The be st 4
erfort to kee p inf ormed, et ce tera.
5 l4R. KdhMEKE:
Because if tne idea is to involve o
you in an advisory way, collegially, to tne exten t feasible, 7
then you mu st have the information avcilable to yo'1 as best e
you can, so that celay would no t ce in vo l veu.
Ths primary emphasis is on making you capable of advising on a moment's y
10 notice, should that be po 31ble.
Il CHAIR 4AN HEduRIE:
I think John's asking, why coes 12 tha t ala safsty?
I guess the delicate answer you ought to 13 make is tna t 14 COMMISS IONER KENNEDY :
Whose health and safety?
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
If there is time in the lo decision-making process, then hopef ully five conni ssioners' 17 points of view collectively gathered, are better than one.
le MR. KENNEKE:
Ycu stole tne words right out of my 19 mouth.
20 VOI CE:
There i s also the third line.
21 CHAIRMAN HENJRIE:
I don't know how strongly I 22 endorse that.
23 (Laug hte r. )
24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
You startea off very well.
25 Thank you.
1243 257
i 14 11 27
- apuAV I
VOICE:
Al's tnird line it also involvec here.
2 Namely snat if the Commission uncertakes any liaison 3
activities, clearly you nave to be in phase with the 4
information, anc there would be health and saf ety if you are
~
5 aavising people on the basis of inf ormation.
o CO 4MISSIONER AHEARNE:
That's absolutely right.
7 VOICE:
So it doe s nave a health and saf ety o
im pli ca tion.
v MR. KENNEKE:
It seems to us also, then, that the 10 commissioners snould consider seriously putting yourselu s 11 in specific roles within tae organization, particularly at 12 the interrace of the internal workings, wnich is yourselvec 13 and the licensee, and the sta te and locals who are working 14 specifically to deal with the emergency.
Interface with 15 those on the outsice who are inevitably going to inquire --
lo you can start with the White House, Congress, o ther agencie s
. ho have not been involved, industry, insofar as they need 17 w
16 to know what the implications are, the international 19 community -- all of these things occur.
20 And i t seems to us that it would be well for you 21 to consioer seriously assigning t ho se.
22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But, A1, let me ask a 23 cirficult question:
you have this situation where you have 24 an emergency unfolding in which there is great tension, 25 great concern anc you have a variety of groups that you've 12A3 258
5 14 12 26
- apuAV 1
mentioneo -- now, the most concernec being the public in the 2
aff ec ted area, out all of these others, the White House, 3
Congress, et cetera.
Is it a principal responsibility of
' tne circ to make sure tnat t ha t information link or liaisc.
5 be as accurate as possible?
o MR. KiNNE&E:
tes.
7 COlJMI 55 IOilER AMEARNE:
So doesn't that come into o
some conflict witn your suggestion that there ce the be st v
erfort, cut not nece ssary -- all I'm saying is tna t I can 10 recognize a certa in sensicili ty pro to col issue but it's not 11 ocvious to me that that best inf orma tion link is servea by 12 having the commissioners being the link.
13 LiR. KENNEKE:
Le t me try to make a distinction.
14 Tha t be s t effort related to providing you general 15 informa tion, acro ss the bo ard, that would allow you to 16 provice good advice to the director of the cecision-making.
17 Tha spokesman aspect has each of you, as I would visualize lo i t, in a specific role -- a limited spectrum of the 19 information, that you indeea would be the expert.
You would 20 be backea up.
21 For example, Congre ss.
The impor tan t a spe c t, it 22 seems to us, is not solely the question of whether you have 23 the cecision-maker of the spokesman have authority to do 24 that.
But wnat is also their sta ture ?
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
It seems to me it's more i243 259
5 14 13 29
- apvAV i
che protocol siue tnat you're getting wra pped up th3re with, 2
ratner tnan good information transfer.
3 Md. K:NNEKE:
'lell tha t is a lesser aspect of it.
4 Suc it seems to us that you snould seriously consider that.
5 The neart of our notion is to make it cJ ear tha t enere's one o
person wno spears f or tne entire agency, that makes the 7
decision.
There's a clear Aine of su cce ssion.
But that c
there be a mecnanism for involving tne otner cornissioners collegially through tha t indivicual.
y 10 And then taircly, and tertiarily, that you 11 consider involving yourselves as the nominal spokesmen for 12 these various interf aces that will invariably occur.
13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
You're really saying we 14 ougnt to take over public aff airs and congressional aff airs.
16 MR. KENNEKE:
I think for example, puolic affairs.
16 COMMISSIONEH AHEARNE:
Do you mean, Vic, on a 17 reu.ine basis?
Io COMMISS IONER GILINSKY :
I don't want to answer ly that.
20 MR. KENNEKE:
Okay.
Slide nine --
21 (Slice.)
22
-- more precisely puts cown the proposal.
23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
I thought at the bottom of 24 this you were going to --
25 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
He's trying to get througn his 1243 260
5 14 14 30 kapvA/
1 slides.
Until general counsel gets a hold of the i ssue s.
2 MR. AdNdEKE:
There is a bullet on that that says 3
it is recognizec that clarifica tion of the legal eff ec tivene s of these recommendation may be needed.
But it a
seems to us f airly straightforware.
My understancing is o
that it can be done, but in the interim whatever decision 7
you make, if you deciae to do it, tell Congre ss wha t your e
intent is and ac t on it as an interim measure.
I think your intere st here, as you point out, is y
IC heal th ano saf ety.
'Tha t is the best thing for health and safe ty should another emergency occur?
And I will leave the 12 legalities and mechanisms and how that might best be said 13 for Len to describe, but as I understand, it can be do7e.
14 The question to you is whether it ought to be.
15 CC)MMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Since you're still lo fin _aning your slides --
17 MR. KENNEKE:
I am finished.
,o COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
But I wanted to ask one lv last question.
You focuse;, as I think you starteo out 20 saying, on the role -- would I be correct in a ssuming that 21 you also believe that we must, no matter how we come out of f
22 this role, we have to pu t ou t policy guidance that is clear?
23 MR. KENNEKE:
Unam'iguous.
o 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:
Okay.
25 1243 261
P.M,uli onLe -
..s.i 31 gsn i
42. 3033ICX: I'c just 11%? to ma%e a comment 01 4
that point, Commissioner Ahearna.
3
.se're essuming tnat tne role of the whole inciden; response organization end staff action is aosolutely clear as to wnat the oojectives are.
03 T4I53 IO.lER AHEAR:lE: Tha t's what I was tryiq; t7 get a
/
at, /ou see. I can't think it is.
I think tner?'s 3 lot of 3
pol :y.
'42. G055ICK: That's my poin t.
There era certainly is assumptions oeing made acout commana control 2nJ 3e:isions.
AqJ I'm contencing that those decisions com? pretty few ano 12 far cetween, even at Three '411e Island, that there's am 13 awfui lot of o tner in terac tion, communic ation, end notification I,
that goes on that is provid? J for oy the current struc ture,
la whicn I thick, you know, ona mustn't lose sight of.
1:
'42. XETTEKE t And there are those specific occasions I/
ahen soceon? of th? :ommissioners would ce appropriate es 13 an la tervenor for the spokesman a spec t.
le 03 T4 I 53 IO.45R AHEA.?;J E : 'Vhat I thint I was trying to 2]
get at is taat there are sets of evacuation procedures.
21 Commissioner Gilins%y was having them worke-J up in tne middle 22 of the accident.
23
.Jow that's the kind of a f ramework, a policy that I thin'<
24 nas to be in place, and that's what I tnink is very appropriate 23 for the commission to lay down cuidance on.
1243 262
?00R BRENAL
2 u
g3h i
.a cidn't
've it.
f.:. K E.U EXE: Our focus nere was,
_s I tried to show 3
oy these two sli es, was the focus merely at the top.
.nare aces the final decision erisa ?
Whataver you do wi:nin tne internal 00x, whether it's :ne present organization or some "eviseo one, presumaoly, that woulJ flow.
3u t we've got to Jaal with that ultimate decision-macing.
3 i ha t's tne oe sic question, ana that ;uiaes everytnia; else the s taff's pl annin7 IJ Ti AIR."A:I MENDRIE: Jo you want to near oriefly, one 11 nopes, from che general counsel?
Now couch your a vice witn ld 3 certain amount of discretion.
13
- 47. 3ICKMII: I understana.
14 (Laughter.)
1; C[iAIRMAN HENDRIE: I would prefer to ce at leest 13 f orma lly somewhat ignorant of any illegality I contemplate in Il tne ections et hand.
13 You might point out in a theore tic al sens e --
1/
COTTIS5IONER KENNEDY: Let us not f orge t our 20 ex parte and conflict of interest rules, however, as you te.<e 21 that advice.
22
- 4R. BIC4dII: We ll, I didn't suggest this meeting.
23 (Laughter.)
24 MR. SICXWIT: I'm not in any way suggesting thac 25 you're taking over the E:4T would as illegal in all respe:ts.
1243 263
i5.15.3 33 i
gsn i
(:.augnter.)
C.i A I ?:.i. A J HE.idR I E : Listen, you've got to 09 graceful for what you can get these ays.
a COMMIS5 IaciEp GILI.13KY: It reminds me of tne story of tne : glish guest who openso up his morning egg and sort of stepp9d 02ct.
And the host as?.90 him what was wroq7 Wi:n i
i, and ne said, oh, parts of it were excellent.
(Laughter.)
1]
'G. BICXWIT: The civicing line as to whi:n per:s are 11 excellent an d which p arts are not comes in One phrase, l_
commi ssion action, s used in the sta tute.
13 ihere's very little 1s,islative nistory on wnst :onmission la actio n is.
But vnat the statuta says is that conmission 1;
action can pnly oe taken by a majority of tne commi ssion, tne la
.7a jor ity of a cuorum.
1/
CD't'tISSIO !ER AMEA. LIE:.Jo you in terpre t taet as 13 ceing physi: ally present?
11
'.t2. BICXWIi: Yes.
Even if a ma tter involves 2) 0,ani ssion ac tion, it is possiole to delegate the carrying out 21 of that commission action to a memoer of the staff.
22 dowever, the statute seems clear that it is not possible to 23 aelegate to a commission any function.
24 30 that the question is, if we're talking acout taking over 2;
une EMT, tna t include s the authority to issue orders, so.ne tni ng
- ) O 4 l24/7J 9
L
k 5.15.4
,a 34 gsh I
that, in my view, would procaoly os vitnin tne meaning of e
- ommi ssion a c tion.
3 We've got e proclem.
There's very little prool en if you're 4
ta' ming scou t actions vhich wouls not fall within tne meaning a
of i.: term.
And since the term is very fuzzy, ve' r e in a muddy area.
M4. 3053IJ': Len, you've got the same situation I
wita the Eva as the cirectoc of the E:4T oe:suse I don't nave
/
the celegation issue orders.
Il
- 12. SICK'llIT: The oiff erence is that uncer tne 11 statu te, you coulo ce celegated it tomorrow.
I:
4R. G053ICK: At the present time it's not.
Otay.
13
'R. BICKWIT: That's true.
But also, it could ce la the understanding of the commission that you would o tnis.
15 That would not ce regarced as in any way a way around tnis.
i; MR. GOSS ICK : The question on this is:
Is it 1.
ill3 gal for the Chairman es it is f or ne in the event tnat it should oecome nece ssary to direct Vic or Centon to issue 1/
an order?
2)
CD'4MISSIONER GILINSKY: What he's saying is if 21 that's a proolem, we can fix it.
Ano he's s aying tnat tne 22 other proolem --
23 1R. GOSS ICK: Is mora complicatec.
24 COMMISSIONER GILInsKY: That's rignt.
It neecs a 2a change of tne law.
17/T 7LG lL4J LUJ
T O V' \\ h 35 g
. g gd g
a. l o..a
- sh I
CJ '.r.'I53 I 3.!E2 AHEA2J E But in your view, can we a
fix that or7alem?
In other woros, coulo we in some aey give 3
Joe che autnority to direct Harold to give n orcer?
4
'U. B IC.Gil i: To give an or er, I'd be in: linea to d
ce :oncerned acout tnet.
23 'N I S3 ID.i2R G IL IN5 sY: You know tnere's e ouestion.
4 I've thougnt ecout tais a little uit and one ouestian ist iow
/ou distinguisa en emergency situation from a non-amergency 3
20
/
s i tu e tion ?
IJ I mean Joe's liaole to g3t comple tel/ carrie2 away with 11 ains31f.
12 (Laughter.)
13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I plan to declare one at 4: 13.
1+
( Laughte r. )
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I'm hcping to have the authority la oy cnen.
1.
C:HEISS IONER GILI.15KY: No, s e ri ous ly, it's hara to 15 see now you can categorize :hese sorts of situations.
It 1/
woulo os simple if the commission itself haJ authority to 2]
delegate to one of its members or simpler.
21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You run into the same definition 24 proolem cecause you'o want to do it oeforehand ratner taan 23 hava to convene the commission ar.a asclare en emergency 24 cefore you can delegate them.
2a Then you nave the same problem of defining an emergency.
1243 266
5.15.5 i
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dut I'm assuming tnat that cen ce 0099 in some '<inJ of ter7s that makes it f airly clear taat the Chairmen isn't, or vn]ever 3
migat ce designate d to run o f f some Thursday afterncon, a
aeclare an anergency, and vota all tne ? aper that he happens to nave under his ara.
2 C3,'4 4 IS3 IO.iER AHEA7.iE t Altaougn, just to ce clear i
since some oeople vill be dis appearin g, I gather, ju s t from 3
my.aoint of view, it is, I'm sure, i mpor t ent ena diff icult s
and subtle and a haro legal issue, out were an emergency le to occur, I think taat Joe shoulu nevertheless do tnat cecause nanaling the emergency is re ally more important.
12 MR. 3IOf/II T I'm not suggesting tnet i t wou ldn' t oe.
13 00 M'4ISS IO.lER BR AD?O RD: I guess I woula r3tner that 14 the :urrent 2'4T fun: tion, until we've taken the steps 15 necessary to do it some other way, I mean is it clear, Al, la in all that you've laid out, is it clear tnat there is a li 21s tinct advantage to having the Chairman running tne E:4 T 13 as distinguished from the EJa ?
1/
MR. KE:UE.<E: ihe aistinct advantage is, I've tried 23 to say, more than jus t authority; it's a question of stature.
21 CO MMI SSIONER BRAD.:0RD: First of all,' given that we 22 ao nave this bizarre physical distance ostween parts of the 22 a genc y, sup.aosa the accident moves f ast enough that some 24 Oritical decisions nave to ce mace while the Chairman is in 23 his car.
I?A3 267
2.I5.<
t.
37 CiAIRMX:l HENDRIE. Then wnoever the senior offi:er gsn present is dill nave to make tnem if decisions nave to an a
naae.
1
'H.
KENdE.<Es I':'s suggeste; that you need ommunicetians for tnat car.
s CO Ml.{IS3 I3riER 3R AD93RD: That really won't ;o it.
034 MIS 3IO.lEP AMEALIE: The senior aerson, inetner it's 3
et :he site, if conditions nave oroken ;own, or at isthesda, i
has to make the 2ecisions.
And wae:ever the protocol is, IJ we'd have to worr/ ecout some later time.
14
! hen an anergency decision hes to ce made, it has to ce 12 made.
13 C H A I R.M A:1 M E N O R I E : Let me te ll you what my thougnt 14 has oeen in taking this intarim step.
la I've thought some over the months since Three Mile on what la che configur ation ought to be, and I've about conclucec that 1/
there is no way tnat the commission, and particularly taa 13 senior commissioner or the Chairmen, if he's on the grouno, 1/
is 731ng to 03 aole to stand 010 '< out of the frey and ma.<e what 2) are c alled policy dec isions.
21 We were pulled in as soon as things warmed up at Three 22
- 411-Island and the same will be true, I'm sure, if anything 23 comparaole ever occurs again.
24 It has seemed to me, then, that ceing the case, that 25 whoever is ranking -- I've spoken for myself on this interim 1243 268
3.15.
I 38 g
osh i
cesis, is simply going to os in much cetter shaos to deal with whetever, as heed of tne agency or acting heaa, you he/e 3
to asal wita if you're there at the information center, or
+
at L3ast the oest inf ormation center we've got within, you a
know, half an hour or wnerever we're likely to oe.
5 If things mov+ slowly, wny, I'd expect to see commissioners come on out anc ge taer tne group end have such aiscussions 5
and make r' a decisions as seem appropriate.
And if things move fast, why, thoever is ranking on tne spot is going to 12 1av3 to do.ihat has to 09 Jone.
11 Sut I think tne tine scale then Je termine s to e very 12 heavy degree who decides what, when.
13 Su t I see no edvantage and consic+raale disady2ntage la having had the experience cace of ceing yet one more la communication 1:'.nk removed from Setnesda, waere even there, la the state of inform 9 tion wasn't what I woula tall admiracle, la and oy the tim 6 it furthermore got filtered into, you know, li one more step through the phone lines and so on, the first 1/
tima, why, it was just that much poorer.
20 I think it's much better to be right there.
21 I have no lack of confidence at all in the E'AT as 22 constituted, simply to go ahead and manege an emergency and 23 for all of us to step back end to put our hands in our 24 pocke ts.
2; it's just that tnat isn't going to be allowed to hap.aen.
1243 269
o.15.
l 39 gsn 1
?eo?le are going to want to near wnat tne commissioners ano 2
t%e Chairmen nava got to say for themselves an oenalf of th?
3 agency.
An. I tnink in tnat circumstan:e, it's better to go down there in the trench.
CO T4IS3IO.lER AHEA?NE: I TJess, Joe, I'd have to a
disagree. I tnink we really, ano coviously, in three mir:u te s
/
it isn't tna time we're going to do it, out in going ac. to 3
the point earlier on that I was trying to make, we c.sve ;o
/
addra ss what is the oest for getting the protectic.) to tne 12 puolic health ana safaty.
11 And I think et some point we have to cecide, is it cetter l-for the 5 or collection to 09 trying to run the operation or 13 is i not?
14 If it is ce tter, then I think the instructions have to la be very clear to have that either way it op? rates. It it is la not, if ir.d3 pendent of when you say the public won' t hava it
- 1. 4 or tne Congress won't have it, our primary responsibility is 13 to ma ke sure that the thing si handled the oest way to 19 protect health and safety.
2)
That's a decision we have to make and oear with wastever 21 the pressura s are.
22 001MISSIONER BRADFORD: It doesn't tak? a c' g, I
23 think, change in assumptions aoout Three Mile Island to 24 change the role of the commission quite a lot.
2a If you assume on Friday morning that e'racuation i243 270
1 YH Q*Odell t$ilid0$hk i
40 5.15.10 gsh I
recommencation had oeen, on the one nanc, clearly conveyec 2
to tne State of ?ennsylvanis on oehalf of tas egency, ano 3
on tne other, c1=3rly conveyed to tne commission that, i, fact, had ce99 maan and was ceing c 3rried out.
inen I'm not sure whether tne commission woula have oeen 3
going in the same sense that we were througn tne waekenJ.
/
30 the re may as some difficulties an; I neven't re a ll/
3 thought this enrough in generalizi7; from w7st may have osen an almost flukish glitch in communications to wnat the i
12 mancatory role of tne conmission will re in accioent 11 situa tions in whicn we get communications rignt and tne 12 criteria right in tne future.
13
'4y concern aoout the pro,ao si tion is, I suppose, is a 14 legal one, and that is that these decisions are of such 15 importance, granted the need to ge t them maae clearly and la articulated cledrly curing the accident.
I would hate to la
%nowingly se t in motion a machinery which would, aftar tne 18 accident, open endless legal cans of worms about whether le things are done on propar autnority.
23 Taat's wny I tnink Len's concerns, as exactly stated, are 21 serious ones.
22 COT 4ISS I0 DER AHEARNE: What I was trying to say is 23 I think we ought to deciae what we celieve is to be the 24 aprropridce way and then, if it requires some sort of change, 23 to propose a change to see how it can be successfully done.
1243 271
5.15.II I
i
{
i gsh 1
23 T4I53 IO.lER XENNEDY: I agree with that.
But I thin 4 tnat tne point that Peter makes, one ought not to-3 too quic<1y generalize from what might have ceen an enomaly 4
to each conclusions about now to drei witn the future.
And it is a very good one ano it ougnt to ce thought acout a
car? fully.
I OHAIRMAN HENDRIE: /le il, I will recommend it to your R
urgent thinking and we'll look to receive some conments on Ene OPE proposition outlined here in the last oege or two of the v
12 hencout.
11 I wonaer 'qow much nore 53e 111ng out of tais woul: eitner ce 12 usstui or streigntforwara to do. A1.
13 WR. KEN;1EXE: I offered it f or discussion anc it 14 served tnat purpose.
15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think it's clear enougn as it la s t and s.
I'a ce interested in staff views on it, commissioner il views on it.
I3 MR. G035IOX: I'd just lik3 to address one point le oefore you ask the others.
23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The othe rs aren't going to get 21 any chance.
22 MR. G055ICX: The " running the operation," the 23 term you used, ano decisions, we need to think very carefully 24 about what are we talking aoout when we say that.
23 Ne are not running anythingi we're following a situation 1243 272
1i l
42 5.!5.12 gsh I
and trying to judge Nhether the actions oe.ng taken are acequ ate, 5:f e, and appropria te, and whe ther --
3 As I say, I think it's important that we have it very a
clearly unda rstood and laid out as to just anat the.iRC 5
rola is in en emergency.
And unless somebody can argue us o ff that point, tnat could nave an effect on the cecision we make aoout wno makes "dec isions. "
2 4a. XENNEKE: The strongest one in there des the 9
one a bout ev acu at ion.
That's a quastion that we decided to 13 recommend.
11
- 44. GOSSICK:.Ne can't order it.
12
'4d. KENN EKE Exactly the point that I was making.
13
'47. G055 IOX : But certainly, we can make tne 14 decision to recommend evacuation.
la Cg?4MI55IONER AHEARNE: Then I gather although we la c an't get a chance that Vic, are you going to have something Il coming to us?
13 CHAIRMAN MENDRIE:.ie ll, tne staff has uncerway some 11 cls aning up of the piece. down here lacelled " incident response 23 organization," which underlie s -- it's sort of one 21 nierarchical step down from where we're arguing now.
22 MR. GOS5ICK: We've put cown on paper, which is 23 currently oeing scruobed, some revisions to procecures.
We're 24 not supposed to formally amend the manual enapter but we will 25 follow until such further guidance or direction may oe i243 273
5.15.13 43 gsh i
fortacoming.
2 0-i AIRMA:l HENDRI E: 3kay.
Nell, practical 1/, as 3
promised, I'm going to tnank Al and participants in the discussion aqd recommend this suoject to */our attention for conment 2rt recommenoations and furtner thought.
3 And turn, then, to the EP ICO2-2 order.
(.'thereupon, at 4:!3 p.m.,
the co t11 ttee ad journed. )
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1243 274
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t CDBt11.SEL0fLIlEElllL_dUtlE.20d9Z9dnit&&lHIL8ESf_QHSE TO [MERGENCY REQUIREMEIRS.
e N
N Tile MAJOR QUESTIONS TilAT SURFACED:
m a
N ARE TilERE CLEARLY DEFINED AREAS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN WHICII COMMISSIOil O
INPUT IS DESIRABLE OR flECESSARY?
IF So, S110VLD Tl!ESE RESPONSIBILITIES BE ilAtlDLED SINGLY OR COLLEGIALLY?
5l O
IF INDIVIDUAL, BY WH0i.?
(
s llflAT ARE THRESHOLD POINTS FOR COMMISSION INVOLVEMENT?
o WHAT MIGHT BE AN AGENDA FOR COMMISSION CONCERNS?
O t
4
J DP.E_I1EM0_ Tf_1011111S10tL_33EPTEMBER liL 1979','
"IllE__CDIVILES.LQNis_EEC_LSJON-flAKIRG3GLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE" N
N r
N F
R OUTLINE
-cr N
~
0 BACKGROUND
.)
0
SUMMARY
t DESIRABILITY OF COMMISSION PARTICIPATION IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE DECISION-
[.
0 MAKING i
O LIMITS TO COMMISSION PARTICIPATION
\\
O MODES OF COMMISSION PARTICIPATION O
SPECTRUM OF POSSIBLE flVCLEAR EMEPGENCIES POSSIBLE ITEMS FOR COMMISSION EMERGEN,CY RESPONSE AGENDA O
0 FUTURE ACTION
b" QEEligtto_ml0nutSS.t0m_SEP_IEMBER lil.1979, "THE COMMISS_WN' S_lMC_LSION-?lAKWG P.0LE 111 EMERGENCY RESPONSE" VALUE OF COMMISSION PARTICIPATION:
m o
MANY INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE INTERVIEWED BELIEVED TilAT Tile COMMISSION SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN MAKING DECISIONS FOR RESPONSIVE ACTIONS.
O DIFFERENT PERCEPTION OF Tile COMMISSION'S ROLE PRIMARILY CONCERN COMMISSION DECISION-MAKING.
l o
RESPONSE TO A N'JCLEAR EMERGENCY IS LIKELY TO REQUIRE DECISIONS INVOLVING VALUE JUDGMENTS AND AGENCY COMMITMENTS OF THE KIND WHICH Tile C0MMISSION WOULD NORMALLY BE REQUIRED TO MAKE.
\\
f LIMITATIONS TO COMMISSION PARTICIPATION:
9 IF THE COMMISSION WERE TO ASSUME A DECISION-MAKING ROLE, IT WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SEVERE CONSTRAINTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE TIME AVAILABLE FOR RESPONSIVE ACTION AND THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO IT.
6 IN A RAPIDLY DEVELOPING SITUATION, Tile COMMISSION MAY HAVE TO LIMIT ITS ROLE TO 0FFICIAL, AFTER-THE-FACT SPOKESMAN OR DESIGNATE A SINGLE OR " LEAD" COMMISSIONER TO OVERSEE THE AGENCY RESPONSE OR RESOLVE DIFFERING STAFF VIEWS.
OPE SEPIEf1BEILJJL 19Z9_MEM0_T_010MMISSION (CONT'D) m ADVANCE PLANNIllG CONSIDERATI0 tis:
0 EMERGENCIES MAY IilVOLVE OTHER TYPES OF FACII.ITIES, SAFEGUARDS INCIDENTS, ETC.
~
'~-
0 GENERAL CRITERIA SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR y;
O IIHAT EMERGENCY SITUATIONS REQUIRE COMMISSION PARTICIPATION 0
DECISIONS APPROPRIATE FOR COMMISSION AFFIRMATION qi l
e MODE OF COMMISSION PARTICIPATION APPROPRIATE TO DIFFERENT SITUATIONS AND DECISION-MAKING N
REALISTIC SCENARIOS WOULD BE USEFUL TO TEST VALUE AND FEASIBILITY OF COMMISSION ;
o
\\
PARTICIPATION
?
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AGENDA (EXAMPLES)
,i 0
CONCURRENCE IN STAFF'S ASSESSMENT OF SEVERITY AND IMMINENCE OF THREAT O
ASSIGNMENT OF SENIOR OFFICIALS TO SITE O
DECISIONS TO RECOMMEND PROTECTION ACTIOflS O
DECISIONS TO SEEK SUPPLEMENTARY RESOURCES 0
DECISIONS ON FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS 0
DECISIONS TO RECOMMEND MODIFICATION OR TERMINATION OF PROTECTION ACTION e
h QEE_IJEliol0llCLUBER o
co N
m FUTURE DISCUSSION Sl100LD FOCUS Of1 Tile FOLLOWINd ISSUES:
N
~
-- Sil0VLD COMMISSION Lif11T ITS ROLE TO OVERSIGHT, li!GH-LEVEL LIAISON AllD
" COURT JF LAST RESORT", OR SHOULD IT EXTEND ITS ROLE TO DECISION-MAKING?
--IFTHECOMMISSIONASSUMESAKEYROLEINDECISION-MAKING)WHATISPREFERRED MODE OF PARTICIPATION AND IrlTERACTION WITl1 STAFF 7
-- MHAT ADDITIONAL' RESOURCES MOULD COMMISSION NEED (INFORMATIONAL,' TECHNICAL, N
PilYSICAL) TO ASSUME A SUBSTAtlTIVE POLE IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE DECISION-MAKING?
-- ll0W Sil0ULD THE IIANUAL CllAPTER BE REVIJ:EDTOSPELLOUT[MORESPECIFICALLY, COMMISSION -- AND ADJUSTED STAFF ROLE -- IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE SITUATIONS?
.g
CO
,=
NRC INCIDENT RESPONSE ORGANIZATION EN N
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COMMISSION
!t x
S.
m
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o" 2,
EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT TEAM (EMT) o4 EDO P
r~~--~~~~~~~~-
Director, IE C
i g
I Director, NMSS r-q 5
1 Director, NRR vr
,s CJ
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5M I
^
^
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INFORMATION ASSESSMENT TEAM (IAT)
"" ' E '"
"*'"*E " ' "'
Representative, NMSS
"'"'U" N
Representative, NR R Y
Representative, IE Inspection, IE Director, Division of Safeguards Inspection, IE y;
Director, Division of Operating Reactors, NRR Director, Division of Fuel Cycle and Materials Safety, NMSS Director, Division of Safeguards, NMSS me o
IR ACT SUPPORT STAFF OPERATIONS ST AFF h
Staffed, According to Type of Staff of Executive Office for
- 8 incident, liy any o" all Operations Support, IE, 8
NRC Of ficek Maintains NRC Operations Center {
~ !!!!!!!!IIlII3Il!lII!!!!!!!!!!!!Illl!!!!!!!!! Ill!!!IIIIIIll!IliIFIIIIIIS *Wl!!!,ll!IIIIIIIIIIIII~ ~ IIIIIIIIIIlI!!I!!!!IIIll!!!II}!!!!!!!! !!!Ill!!!Ill!!!ll
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OPE PROPOSAL Nco N
~
69 Ni COM!!ISSION i
4 Commissioners DIRECTOR 4 _ _,_y (Chairman,NRC) i Major 5
interfaces INCIDENT RESPONSE
/-
ORGANIZATI0rl IllCIDENT RESPONSE j[,
3
\\
ORGANIZATION E "s wv: A y
h DECISION-MAKING FUNCTIONJ IF CHAIRMAN NOT AVAILABLE, OTHER COMMISS10NERS SERVE IN ORDER OF SENIORITY.
(THIS ACCORDS WITH LINE OF SUCCESSION IN NATIONAL EMERGENCY PLAN, SECY-77-637 APPROVED 1/19/78.)
CHAIRMAN MAKES BEST EFFORT TO KEEP COMMISSIONERS FULLY INFORMED, REQUESTS AND RECEIVES ADVICE IN MAKING SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT FEASIBLE.
COMMISSIONERS SERVE AS KEY SPOKESMAN WITH RELEVANT GROUPS AND AGENCIES OUTSIDE NRC.
EACH COMMISSIONER SERVES AS HEAD OF INTERFACE GROUP, IS SUPPORTED BY STAFF SPECIALISTS AND HAS A SPECIFIC LOCUS OF OPERATION.
INTERFACES INCLUDE:
MEDIA, WHITE ll0USE, CONGRESS, FEDERAL AGENCIES, STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES., INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, NUCLEAR INDUSTRY, NRC STAFF NOT INVOLVED IN INCIDENT RESPONSE ACTIVITIES.
..V)
UI'll RUPO:i AL co THAT AUTHORITY FOR DIRECTING THE INCIDENT RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (IR0) BE DELEGATED TO N
THE CHAIRMAN, URC, AN OFFICI AL WITil STATURE COMMENSURATE WITH HIS RESPONSIBILITY AS HEAD m
v OF THE AGENCY.
m
+',
-- IN CASE OF THE CHAIRMAN'S UNAVAILABILITY, THE OTHER COMMISSIONERS IN ORDER OF SENIORITY WOULD SERVE IN THE CAPACITY OF DIRECTOR.
(IHIS WOULD ACCORD WITH THE LINE OF SUCCESSION
,4
~"
SPELLED OUT IN THE UATIONAL EMERGENCY PLAN, SECY-77-637, APPROVED 1/19/78.)
-- DIRECTION OF THE IRO WOULD REMAIN WITH THE COMMISSIONERS AND COULD NOT BE DELEGATED TO
( ,
TO THE IRO -- AS IT IS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED -- OR AS IT MIGHT BE RECONSTITUTED SOME TIME IN THE FUTURE.
s e
THAT THE REMAINING COMMISSIONERS SERVE AS KEY SPOKE 05CN WITH RELEVANT GROUPS OR AGENCIES OUTSIDE OF NRC.
(
-- EACH COMMISSIONER'WOULD SERVE AS HEAD OF AN INTERFACE GROUP AND BE SUPPORTED BY STAFF
- l SPECIALISTS AND HAVE A SPECIFIC LOCUS OF OPERATION.
-- INTERFACES WOULD INCLUDE:
T;iE MEDI A,' THE CONGRESS, THE WHITE :0USE, FEDERAL AGENCIES, STATE / LOCAL AUTHORITIES,' INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY; INDUSTRY, AND NRC STAFF (NOT INVOLVED IN IRO),
THATTHECHkIRMANMAKEEVERYEFFORT(1)TOKEEPTHEREMAININGCMMISSIONERSFULLYINFORMED t
AND (2) TO USE THEM AS AN ADVISORY BODY IN MAKING SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PRACTICABLE.
IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT CLARIFICkTION OF THE LEGAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE RECOMMENDATIONS 4
MAY BE NEEDED.
CONGRESS SHOULD BE INFORMED OF OUR INTENT TO IMPLEMENT THE PLAN As AN INTERIM MEASURE.