ML19254D034
| ML19254D034 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07002623 |
| Issue date: | 08/31/1979 |
| From: | Ketchen E NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD) |
| To: | Hand C, Luebke E, Mark Miller BODEGA MARINE LABORATORY, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7910220018 | |
| Download: ML19254D034 (14) | |
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UNITED STATES 9 - j[ j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COf.'f.llSSION i,, - "C C
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August 31, 19/9 Marshall E. Miller, Chair:ran Dr. Enneth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
':ashington, D. C.
20555 Washington, D. C.
20555 Dr. Cadet H. Hand, Jr., Director Bodega Marine Laboratory University of California P. O. Box 247 Bodega Bay, California 94923 In the Matter of
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DUKE POWER COMPANY (Amendment to Materials License SNM-1773 for
,s Oconee Nuclear Station Spent Fuel Transportation C, and Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station)
Docket No. 70-2623 x
' x-Gentlemen:
Enclosed is the Staff's supplemental report to the Licensing Board in the following subject areas:
1.
Cask drop analysis.
2.
Physical security at McGuire Nuclear Station.
3.
Physical security of spent fuel in transit.
The Staff continues to be of the view that no contentions are before the Board on topics 1 and 2 and, therefore, any cross-examination in these arcas would be improper.
Also, the latter t<.o items are treated in abbreviated fashion in the report as it is the Staff's position that details in these areas are subject to with-holding pursuant to 10 CFR 82.790(d)(1).
The Staff would note that cross-ex3mination of the Staff panels presenting information in these areas will likely extend to the specifics of the actual security provisions to be impicmented by Duke Power Ccmpany.
Should this occur, the Staff ';ould request the Licensing Board to cond;ct an in camera procaading in order to maintain the confidentiality of this informaticn.
To this end, the Staff iculd request that the Licensing Board issue a Protective Order in a form similar to the one attached as Attachment A ahich wculd require that Counsel or representatives for the parties maintain security information in confidence.
In addition, shculd a party representative or Ccunsal seak to 1190 109 7910220 0 "a t
_2 have the assistance of an expert to aia in the interrogation, the Staff would urge the Licensing Board to require any such party representative or Counsel to denonstrate that the expert has the requisite competence to aid the interrogator as directed by the Appeal Board in the Diablo Canycn decision.1/
Furthermore, even in the event of such a showing, the expert should be required to execute an Affidavit of Non-Disclosure to assure that the information will be maintained in confidentiality. A form of such affidavit is enclosed as Attachment B.
Sincerely,
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Edviard G. Ketchen Counsel for NRC Staff
Enclosures:
As Stated cc (w/encls.):
W. L. Porte., Esq.
Anthony Z. Roiccan, Esq.
J. Michael McGarry, III, Was.
Mr. Jesse L. Riley Richard P. Wilson, Esq.
Atoniic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Docketing and Service Section 1/
In the Matter of Pacific Gas and_ Electric Ccgany, (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB 410, 5 NRC 1393 (1977).
i190 ii0
STAFF REPORT related to SPENT FUEL STORAGE OF OCONEE SPENT FUEL AT McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - UNIT 1 DUKE POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 70-2623 On March 23, 1979, the staff informed the Board of two topics relative to the Oconee/McGuire transshipment licensing action which were being evaluated further. These topics included 1) a cask drop analysis, and 2) physical security at the McGuire site. Also subsequent to the issuance of the staff documents, the EIA and SER, the Cormlission promulgated new regulations pertaining to the safeguarding of irradiated reactor fuel in transit. This report addresses these three areas and renders the str.; 's final evaluation.
Cask Droo Analysis As a result of new information furnished to the staff, a cask-specific analysis was performed. The applicant has furnished detailed infomation regarding the use of the NFS-4 and the NLI-1/2 casks at the McGuire spent fuel pool. The staff has evaluated the use of these two casks at McGuire under the three accident scenarios listed below.
1.
The crane is traveling at its maximum speed when it hits the stops causing the cask to swing toward the spent fuel pool.
The cask breaks free at the top of its swing and falls, 2.
The crane is traveling at its maximum speed when it hits the stops. The cask breaks free the instant before the upward swing motion begins and, therefore, falls in a vertical position.
3.
The cask is dropped so that it catches the far edge of the cask pit and then falls toward the spent fuel pool.
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. These accident scenarios provide a bounding envelope for the cask drop accident. For Case 1, calculations performed by the staff confirm that both casks will fall on the edge of the spent fuel pool wall and fall away from the spent fuel pcol due to their center of gravity being located on the cask pit side of the wall. Calculations performed for Case 2 confim, for the NFS-4 cask, that the cask will not hit the scent fuel pool wall but will fall directly into the cask pit.
For the NLI-1/2 cask, the cask will hit the spent fuel pool wall and tend to rotate about its edge on the wall. The kinetic energy is not sufficient to cause tlie cask to fall into the spent fuel pool.
The applicant's calculations for Case 3 indicate that the cask has sufficient energy-absorbing capability to prevent the cask from pivoting about the dividing wall and tipping into the spent fuel pool.
There is not sufficient detail for the staff to positively confirm the energy-absorbing qualities of the cask and concrete wall. Additionally, the applicant has proposed, and the staff has accepted, administrative control procedures restricting the traveling path of the cask to insure that the cask will not fall into the spent fuel pool. These procedures will be incorporated into the applicant's operating procedures, and will be validated by NRC Inspection and Enforcement (I&E) personnel. We conclude that with the proposed administrative procedures estabiished, the cask will not fall into the spent fuel pool when it breaks free during the postulated cask drop accidents.
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. A diagram of the paths to be traversed by the cask is attached as Exhibit 1.
The staff recommends a license condition to preclude the possibility of a spent fuel cask entering the spent fuel pool. The license condition would state:
Handling spent fuel at the McGuire Nuclear Facility is limited to the NFS-4 and NLI-1/2 spent fuel casks and crane travel is to be restricted by administrative controls to the paths presented in Exhibit 1 when spent fuel casks are being handled.
We further conclude that the use of the proposed spent fuel casks (NFS-4 and NLI-1/2) at the McGuire facility, in conjunction with the proposed license condition presented above to limit the cask traveling path,will not cause undue risk to the health and safety of the public and, therefore, is acceptable.
Physical Security at McGuire Site _
To the extent tha, acts of sabotage initiate sequences of events much like those initiated by accidents, the measures designed into the spent fuel storage facility at McGuire Nuclear Station for mitigation of consequences of such accidents also provide a degree of protection against potential releases resulting from sabotage. The large volume of water and the substantial concrete barriers, constructed for biological shielding and earthquake resistance, provide a degree of inherent protection against explosive attacks and their consequences, but the possibility exists that potential saboteurs may be capable of overcoming the inherent protection il90 113 and engineered safety features in an attempt to create a radiological hazard. Accordingly, analyses of the potential environmental effects of certain sabotage events involving aged spent fuel such as that to be stored at this station were developed and are presented in NUREG-0575, Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Handling and Storage of Spent Light Water Reactor Fuel.
Although there is no infonnation available confirming the existence of any identifiable threat to commit acts of sabotage against a spent fuel storage facility,1, 2 protection against such acts and their possible consequences is dictated by prudence. For this reason, NRC regulations include require-ments for the physical protection of spent fuel against sabotage.
The requirements for protective measures are contained in 10 CFR Part 73, especially Section 73.50.
Principal features include requirements for protective forces including armed guards, physical and procedural access controls, detection aids, comunications systems and liaison with local law enforcement agencies.
In addition to this basic security plan, a guard training and qualification plan, as well as a plan for responding to safeguards contingencies is required by that section. The staff has reviewed the security-related plans submitted as part of the application for this license amendment and has determined that the commitments made by 1" Generic Adversary Characteristics Summary Report," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, NUREG-0459, March 1979. Available from National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, VA 22161.
2" Safeguards Sumary Event List (SSEL)," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, NUREG-0525, May 1979. Available from National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield,VA 22161.
1190 114 the licensee, when implemented (as will be confimed by the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement), will provide a level of protection responsive to the requirements established by the staff.
Therefore, in consideration of (a) the absence of any information confirming an identifiable threat to the proposed storage activity, (b) the features of the spent fuel storage pool design that provide inherent protection against potential releases, (c) the protection features required by the regulations which provide deterrence and a capability for summoning response forces in a timely manner, and (d) the limited potential for radiological consequences as reflected in the staff's analysis of certain sabotage
- events, it has been detemined that the sabotage-related risks to the public related to the storage of spent fuel, as may be authorized by issuance of the proposed amendment, are acceptably small, 1190 115 Physical Security of Spent Fuel in Transit On June 15, 1979 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published new regulations for the protection of shipments of spent fuel against sabotage. (44 Fed. Rea,.
34467; 10 CFR 5 73.37) Under these rules the licensee must:
1.
Give advance notification to the NRC before making a shipment and secure NRC approval of the route to be used before making a shipment.
2.
Make arrangements with local law enforcement authorities along the route to assure their response to an emergency or request for assistance.
3.
Use routes that avoid, where practicable, heavily populated areas.
4.
Schedule shipments, where practicable, without intermediate stops except for refueling and obtaining provisions and maintain surveillance of the vehicle during stops that are made.
5.
Develop procedures for coping with threats and safeguards emergencies.
6.
Assure that each shipment is accompanied by at least one driver and one escort in the transport vehicle or at least one driver in the transport vehicle and two escorts in a separate vehicle.
7.
Assure that escorts are trained in acccrdance with specified requirements.
8.
Equip the transport vehicle or the escort vehicle (if one is used) with a radio telephone and citizens-band radic, or approved equal.
9.
Equip the transport vehicle with features that per nit immobilization of the cab or the cargo-carrying portion of the vehicle.
- 10. Assure that the escort or driver maintains a shipment 109 The NRC staff has taken steps to assure that the applicant has the capability to comply with the protection requirements. The applicant has submitted information or has otherwise provided a demonstration of his ability to comply with requirements 1, 3 and 8.
With respect to requirement 2, 1190 116
. the NRC staff, in respone to its own responsibilities to establish :afeguards contingency plans, conducts surveys of routes and local law enforcement response capabilities for certain licensed shipments, including these spent fuel shipments. Appropriate arrangements have been made to meet requirement 2 and the NRC staff has made this information available to the applicant, who is responsible for maintaining it thereafter. Applicant's ability to comply stith Requirements 4, 6, and 10 cannot be demonstrated in their entirety prior to the commencement of shipments. Actual compliance with these requirements will be detemined through the NRC inspection process.
Requirements 5, 7 and 9 have not yet been demonstrated in their entirety by the applicant. The staff recommends conditioning the license to transship as follows to ensure that requirements 5, 7 and 9 are met prior to the first transshipment:
Transshipment will be permitted only upon written NRC staff approval of the equipment and procedures to be used by the applicant to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Section 73.37(a)
(5), (6), and (b)(3).
The NRC staff has concluded that the applicant's program, supplemented by staff-approved routing and the license condition outlined above, are sufficient to assure that the applicant will be able to comply with the protection requirements. Continuing compliance will be assured through regular NRC inspection practices. Relevant inspections will be conducted both at the reactor sites and along the route of the shipments.
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w-y Exhibit 1 1190 118
Attachment A UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE TiiE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
)
DUKE POWER COMPANY Docket No. 70-2623 (Amendment to Materials License
)
SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station
)
Spent Fuel Transportation and Storage )
at McGuire Nuclear Station)
)
PROTECTIVE ORDER ON SECURITY MEASURES RELATIVE TO SPENT FUEL TRANSIT AND SECURITY MEASURES RELATIVE TO SPENT FUEL AT THE McGUIRE SITE The Licensing Board orders that questions relative to security of spent fuel in transit and to security measures governing spent fuel at the McGuire site be treated at in camera sessions. At such sessions, NRC Staff witnesses may be interrogated by a party representative or counsel under the terms of inis protective order. Such representative or counsel shall maintain the information presented at such sessions in confidence.
It shall be the responsibility of such representative or counsel to assure that transcripts of the in camera sessions are maintained in confidence.
In addition, any filings to be trade with this Board relative to the subject matter of the M camera sessions shall be limited in distribution to the party representatives or counsel present at that in camera session.
1190 119
. Should any party representative or counsel seek the assistance of an expert to assist at such in, camera sessions, it shall be the responsibility of such party representative or counsel to demonstrate to this Board's satisfaction that such an individual is qualified in accordance with the requirements of the Appeal Board, In the Matter of Pacific Gas & Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-410, 5 NRC 1398 (1977).
In addition, each such individual so qualified will be required to execute an Affidavit af Non-Disclosure in the form attached.
FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Marshall E. Miller, Chairman Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this day of
, 1979.
1190 120
Attachment B UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f.UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of
)
OUKE F0WER COMPANY Docket No. 70-2623 (Amendment to Materials License
)
SNM-1773 for Oconee Nuclear Station
)
Spent Fuel Transpor.tation and Storage at McGuire Nuclear Station AFFIDAVIT OF NON-DISCLOSURE
, being duly sworn 09 oath says:
1.
I will not disclose to anyone, other than Duke Power Company and the Nuclear Regulatory Connission, who has not signed an affidavit identical to this one, any matter with regard to security relative to transshipment of spent nuclear fuel from the Oconee Nuclear Facility to the McGuire Nuclear Facility or relative to security measures govarning spent fuel at the McGuire site.
2.
I will safeguard all materials with regard to security relative to transshipment of spent nuclear fuel from the Occnee Nuclear Facility to the McGuire Facility or relative to security measures governing spent fuel at the McGuire site so that they will not leave my possession and will at all times ba under my control.
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_2 3.
If I have a copy of the transcript (s) of the in_ camera evidentiary hearing (s) relative to security of spent nuclear fuel in transit from the Oconee Nuclear Facility to the McGuire Nuclear Facility or relative to security measures governing spent fuel at the McGuire site, I will safeguard it so it will not be read by anyone who has not signed an affidavit identical to this one.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ~
day of
,1979.
Notary Public My Commission Expires:
1190 122