ML19254C677

Comments on Proposed Rule 10CFR50:site Emergency Plan Is Ineffective.Plan Needed to Inform Public of Measures to Be Detailed,Analyzed & Tested

ML19254C677
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	09/12/1979
From:	Evans K AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:	Jamgochian M NRC OFFICE OF STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT
References
FRN-44FR41483, RULE-PR-50 NUDOCS 7910170106
Download: ML19254C677 (30)

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7,.. Losile liiggins, Acting Director, Bureau of Civil Emergency Preparedness State House Augusta, Maine 04333

Dear Mr. Higgins:

We are a group of residents of Westport, Maine. We under-stand that your office is assuming responsibility for revising the so-called Maine Yankee Radiological Incident Plan, commonly known as the evacuation plan. As you know, Westport is probably the closest community to the plant, being just across the river from it, and therefore is the one most heavily impacted by the plant. Because of the keen interest and concern which we share in all matters related to plant safety, we have extensively re-viewed the plan as it affects Westport and of fer the enclosed comments. While we h~1e detailed our comments on the attached, we are briefly summarizing our major points below: 1) There is a need for public information about the plan and about those measures which should be taken in the event of an accident Maine Yankee causing off-site radiation exposure; 2) There should be a public alarm system designed to quickly and effectively alert the public to the existence or threat of a radiation hazard; 3) There should be detailed, analyzed and tested evacuation plans based upon known capabilities and various likely contingencies; 4) All accidental discharges of radiation should be immediately revealed to the public; 4 c-nn, ._w

5) As the effectiveness of any plan is dependent upon the accuracy and use of monitoring equipment, there is a serious need ~ for the installation of a greater number of sensitive off-site monitoring devices which are either manned on a reasonably constant basis (as with a mobile monitoring unit) or are designed to auto-matica11y trigger an alarm if radiation is detected above a certain low threshold. We ask that you keep us informed concerning any hearings or public meetings which mm.y be held in connection with proposed revisions to the plan and that you advise us specifically as to what action your office intends to take with respect to the enclosed recommendations and suggestions. If you have any questions or,wish to correspond with us, you may do so through Jeffrey Pidot, RFD 2, Westport Island, Wicassset P.O. Maine 04578. Telephone no. 882-7001. Thank you for your consideration. We wish you success in this difficult but important work. jlq< v' nnn

5) As the effectiveness of any plan is dependent upon the accuracy and use of monitoring equipment, there is a serious need for the installation of a greater number of sensitive off-site monitoring devices which are either manned on a reasonably constant basis (as with a mobile monitoring unit) or are designed to auto-matically trigger an alarm if radiation is detected above a certain low threshold. We ask that you keep us informed concerning any hearings or public meetings which may be held in connection with proposed revisions to the plan and that you advise us specifically as to what action your office intends to take with respect to the enclosed recommendations and suggestions. If you have any questions or,wish to correspond with us, you may do so through Jeffrey Pidot, RFD 2, Westport Island, Wicassset P.O. Maine 04578. Telephone no. 882-7001. Thank you for your consideration. We wish you success in this difficult but important work. j l f: s,, u

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'v cc: Governor Joseph E. Brennan Elwin Thurlow, President Central Maine Power Company. Peter Bradford, Commissioner, Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ralph Celder, Public Utilities tommission Senator Edmund fluski(. Senator William Cohen Sena tor Gary liart Representative David Emery Representative Olympia Snowe Senator John Chapman Representative Rufus Stetson Representative John Martin Representative William Garsoe Senator Joseph Sewall Senator Gerard Conley Representative Richard Davics Representative Sherry lluber ?!r. Edward Stritzsky Selectman Richard Malone C, e ^n7 e 7

O.'e_'ENTS ON ? \\DIOLOGIAL DiCIDE iT PI.A:I v,.\\lti.:.-

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O..." "a y" - ' ~L w -* " s- -. I d." */ d ".. V a.'..' ':> r.i., "..%. s _v a _- s_ C' c, S I'..~3.. s A v,., k.. a r o e,O S .I b l o o o m.:, c - r s, m. - v. u r- -- 4 < r o .r. O o.r. g a C.'a.o - ,J'n.i a h.. ., 3..i 1 a f y o . a. w-u .s v CGStilt in a plan in Which we, a3 affecCO' CitiCenS, Can hala Con-2 2.ae nc e. Our cor.nents ufe s pecifica3 3.-i .acrossec to various espects of the plan as they impact our communit, of Uestport (locatec just a c t.v .:, the river from Maine Yan'cae). I!Owever, many of these sugges-tions are ecually appl ca' ale to '.ha plan as a whole. We have assessed the.olan in terms of the follcwinc. ove rriding. n. u r.o c s e s and goals which we believe it should, but does not pr2sently, envision: r-y-31,,.,,..-- ~ u, = t.. c. u i.,. e,.

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P00R OFML Me 'DellCvc t.aat rew OE Cur SuggesClon5 ~./O u _3 a. rQCuire SignifiCan; a;u m n_ _. g_, n -. m._ c., 3.&- ~. u ...., o.r. <a m.. _... y n.. .3. p.' m.. y w.,

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.a, u _, 's. e .i.. m. _ this canter vary ser;.ously (curs being t' e clo.ns t com.tuni:y to a the o.lant) a n-i v e ha.ce and ex.ect our cuc. estions to be fully considered and even given weight; we are, af ter all, the fira-lire of.notar.tial evacuaes f or ';hom tha F1. n is supposed to afford .cratecbion. c..L,e w C n. ".... S The following ara observations and suggesticas about. the plan in general: 1. 3 m a.=. 3.- , L, O. ; s.,. .L D.= O,..... _.: v-, 4-6 1 - 6. '1' h r' publi._ is unin for - d caout tc'.e o x 1.a ' e n c e o f the plan, CO 1. ! s S,"'. h O t i t E.h O pCO7LG17nS C G r. C "l in J C' in it. / e r 'l.e r group 3 ..,. %. n a a O., s.s.'.s.., n .,.s... .. u t.

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P00R ORIGINAL ~ addition, by means of a handy informational booxlet, which should be disseminated +o all musehoids at the af fected areas, the public should be .de aware of what tc; do in the case of a radiol.ocical emergency (i.e., stay indoors; close windows; tune in ta a par-ticular radio station; call the local police - or, in car:2in situations, avoid use of the telephone). Tha oublic shoul: reg-ularly (at least once 2 year) be re.ninded of such information so that new and old community members tiill become familiar with it. 2. Need for an Ef fective Public Alert S.vstem Unile the plan de-tls w' th how.3 tate and local officials will receive informatio:' in the evan t of an emergency, it doe. not adecuately describe hou aff..eted m=~b.-rs of the pt:blic cill w., c1c,_tcd. d, o "

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~ 900ROREM ~ have households 'thich do not contain a telephone. Comnunicacion 'y o radio poses many o f the same pr:sblens. We strongly reccamend the ins :21'.2 : ion o f a clearly ludible and highly distinctive system of strategically placed sirens to alert cicitens to the need to tune to a local radio stetica for instructions or, at the least, to come indcors and take other .orecautionary measures. Such sirens could be set off 'oy the plant operators themsalves or bv. others in author itv., upon occur-rence of an incident h2ving certain defined radiological or other significance or potentia.i signiF'0ance. Settar vet, an a1 arn sys-1 tem chould be develop =:d.Aich is triggarad automatically by the detection by off-a'.tc monitors of a sp wified la i le:re t o f radia_ tion. he -uco of such a siren systen could result in in s tan taneous c o....". 4a. a. o - t h... x'.'. -~.s.. o~ P- [m'., i b '. ' s.. u. b a.. - o..' t > ~...', o. 1. 2 m ~ u He do note that the plan calls fo' the UMtport fire siren, currenbly locatad near tha fira station, to be used for i c;t this u ur.oa s e. Howevar, that siren is not clearl; a;..l i b l e to 12rce oortions o~ the is la d ' :, popula' ton. ".r iaI, au th1t c t r r-is .c r e s en tlv use, :or.aur. roses oz... e na t t aci.. _.c i r e.s, we beli2tre that J jc C 3. am a 'n o c, ',) .,,., e,.m..,- .n $ 4 7 'n in I - ~ - -. g i.t. I c. ew, f n.r. 7 { - o:- .e..s 2_, i.,.i. t e o significanca in th2 e"ent et a rad io lo gical inc id en t. Finallj, it

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P00R OR M L J sys ems be instalieu, we have heard t_he criticism that use of such a siren system would result in unn.c assary public panic and would be subject to the " Chicken Little" or, oppositely, the " boy who criad wolf" syndromes. He do not see how either of these s itua c:.cns could.cossibiv. a.colv. when, accordin~s to Central Maine Pow =r Coc.oan.y, there have b wa but 'wo lac td en h, OE accidental di.ccharges of radia-tion during the plant's 7 year history. Moreover, we finc cuch observa tions to be condescending and patronizing of the local citizenry. We have heard no such criticicas of the use of sirens to warn of military attack or fire. Here, the risk to our f ami. lies could be great in a radiological emergency, and we find unacceptable a public no tification scheme wh t;'.-' has as its only justificctio. ti.e po:sibility that i t will % D panic to a m_nimum. In f ee t,

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g simply stay indcors and take other pcecautions or may decide to voluntarily leave their homes for the time being); there may be those situations requiring evacuation of certain persons who are particularly sensitive to radiological hazar.d (such as young chil-dren and pregnant women) ; there may be situations justifying complet evacuation. The current plan seems to be founded on the assumption that only the last of these actions will ever be contemplated and that, unless the need arises for such a total evacuation, the popu-lation need not be involved or aware of the situation. This is an extremely serious flaw in the plan, in our judgment. On the other hand, while flexible approaches to public notifi-cation and action are required in any practical plan of this order, there is an important distinction between the need for flexibility and the creation (as in this plan) of vague and illusory options which of fer little or no practical guidance in the event of real emergency. Thus, at a minimum the plan should be revised to speci-fically contemplate the various types of contingencies which may exist and to formulate concrete responses for public action in the event of each such contingency. For instance, in the event of an accident which results or is liheiy to rese'.u in low level dis-charges of radiation or radioactive materia. s, there should be a defined plan of ac cion for public notification and instruction as to the areas a-d ac tivities to be avoided until further notice. Where the trigJering event is core s ig nif ican: (out does no: justify comple te evacua tion), again there shoulu be a clear canningency jlC( non ~ w / y3 Y nd$ o Nb$1 k _ evac-plan for prompt public notification and i La untion or merely standby alert, as the case may be. Where evacuati is needed, the plan should clearly delineate the manner in which it will be carried out. It is simply inadequate to allude generally to the f act that the choice of routes and assembly points will depend upon wind direction. After all, the wind only blows in so nany directions, and there are f ew possible evacuation routes or means available to us (in fact, there is only one route available by car). While particular wind conditions and accident severity ma dictate an evacuation for some by helicopter or boat from the south end of the island (in the direction opposite from the only automobi well as the capability for sea or air route), these conditions, a3 evacuation, should be reasonably known and planned for in advance. is an astoundingly ill-conceived plan that calls for Moreover, it the possibility (as this one does) of cvacuation of the entire 's-land's population by boat from the south end when a good part of that population lives near the bridge exiting the island cn the north end, and departure for then via the south end would require to the east of the pla first driving several miles south and right More spacifically, we reccamend that the plan, as it relates to Mestport, develop different contingency plans for dif f arant are of the island, different levels of radiation hazard, and different wind directions and seasons.

Tnus, thile those who live north of the plant would seem to invariably evacuata the Is la nd b;, the brid (which also lies north of the pl2nt), those who live south of the piant ;ould, depending upon the a' cove variables, either evacuate

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P00RDH!NAL by car via the north end bridge (even though this course would require driving very close to the plant in order to get away from it) or evacuate by boat or helicopter (assuming such capabili-ties in fact exist) from prearranged locations at the south end. Perhaps the plan should contemplate only car or helicopter evacua-tion in the winter, and perhaps only car evacuation at night. In sum, we believe that the plan should thoroughly explore and define the various options for evacuation or other public notification and action which may be required, the known capa-bilities for each such option and the various conditions which may dictate the choice of option which is pre ferred in a given emergency. The population in each area of the island should be s made aware in advance of what the likely evacuation routes and assembly points may bs for their area. 4. Heed for Adequate Tes ting of Public Motification Systems and Evacuation Plans. Uhile we understand that the current plan is occasionally " tested" by aler ting some of the sta te and local of ficials eho are responsible for carrying it out, we believe tha t accura te appraisal of an evacuation plan requires at a minimum a test of the e f fectiveness of the public notification system, which is the keystone of suc'r a plan. Such a test should involvo attempts to actually notL2; the public b;. the laste st means possible. :n order to eliminate the psssibilley of ur.ecessary ci:bi;; cancarn, 1}rc vn, ii-. _4 =].

.E P00R ORML the public could be informed in advance of plans for the test. Afterwards, a survey could be made to dstermine how many people actually received the alert, by what means they received it and at what time. Only in this manner can an accurate assessment be made of the feasibility of the plan's notification system. Of course, the best way to test the ef f ectiveness of the evacuation plan itself is to hold a full scale plan drill with public participation. While we recognize that such a drill might be a rather major undertaking, we do believe that it is particularly important to develop a scheme for testing the ef fectiveness of those elements of the evacuation plan which require large scale use of boa ts and helicopters. We are. frankly very skeptical about tha capability for a sea or air. evacuation, particularly in the absence of testing and drill. 5. Need for Adequate Monitoring Of course, any evacuation plan is only as good as the conitoring equipment and personnel who trigger it. Unforcunately, this plan does not even address the issue of monitoring. Our concern is that there are currently in place insuf ficient radla-tion air monitoring devices and that thos e w'tich do e: is t a re read only sporadically and usually by company personnel. In addi-tion, these devices are not sufficiently sensitive to register low level doses of radiation. These same problems b. ave plaguad various govern.antal ago_r.cies

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?0DRORRLI. Pennsylvania. We highly recommend deployment and use of more air monitoring devices (or perhaps roving mobile units) having greater sensitivity to low level radiation. We suggest that such monitoring devices be manned by other than company personnel or be designed to automatically trigger a public alarm or at least immediate notifi-cation to public officials. Further, we believe that monitoring devices of sufficient sensitivity should be distributed to each af fected town, with of ficials and citizens therein taking responsibility for regular readings (at least once a day). The costs of such monitoring devices, as with the costs of initiating the other precautionary measures suggested here (which costs are trivial when cor. pared to the costs and benefits of operating the plant), should be paid by Maine Yankee which is the source of the need for such precautions. 6. Plan organization A final general observation is that the plan seems to be disjointed and to lack any comprehensible organization. While this problem should not be too difficult to resolve, it is worthy of mention here becausa in its present state the plan is e::tremely hard to follow -- a quality which is at best disturbing in an emergency action plan. SPECIFIC CO.'DIENT3 The followir.g are observa tions and suggestions addressed to certain specific elements of the plan, with references./.ade to the paragraphs and pages where such clerents appear: ]1q(

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i 1. Page 6 - first paragraph: Although unclear, this para-graph seems to indicate tha t the company will notify government officials only if a radiation level of 10 mrem per hour is reached. This seems far too high, as 10 mrem per hour would indica te a whole body exposure amounting to one x-ray every 2 to 4 hours. Is the implication here that an accident resulting in radiation levels of 9 mrem per hour for extended periods will not result in notification of the public or even of state of ficials? We strongly recommend that the company be required to immediately notify state and local officials in the event of any actual or potential abnormal release of radiation. Following such notifica-tion, the state, guided by the plan, can then assess the need for and course of notification and evacuation of the public. In addt-tion, we believe that prompt public notification is essential in all incidents involving abnormal releases of radiation from thn olant, whether or not evacuarion is appropriate. t 2. Page 6 - paragraph numbered 4: This paragraph is vague and its subject matter should be more fully developed. Particularl; it is important that va rious courses of public no tifica tior and ac tion (including alert or total or partial evacua tion) be assessed and the various conditions triggering eacn such action be defined. 3. Page 7 - first paragraph numbered 1: The. manner and capabitity of available Coast Guarc assistanca should be de a tlad. It is simply inadequa_n to allude gen 2 rally to c!i; patching patro; b o '. t s to the area unless i is kmwn e: n c t l,- uut.;oa ts a r 2 2rai_- able 2 d how q u i r 'r'. l y t'.' T Can b. m2..h T.lU;'. L, <- n,3

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P00R OR E l 4. Papa 7 - second paragraph numbered 1: The capability of Human Services to dispatch trained radiological health personnel should be detailed. See comment 3 above. In addition, there is no present capability, described in the plan, for contacting such sta te of ficials except during of fice hours. 5. Page 7 - paragraph related to Inland Fisheries and Wilclife. See comments 3 and 4 above. 6. Pages 3 and 9 - paragraph C: The differentiation between local, site and general emergenc,ies here seems to be wholly arti-ficial and not to be a proper basis for the choices of public action options which must be made. Who is to determine what type of emer-gency applies - and by what standards? All radiological emergencies will undoubtedly stem from problems in and around ti.e reactor, but any such emetgency is likely to have the potential for impact upon the entire surrounding community. Therefore, any " emergency" relating to the plant is an emergency having the poten:ial to affect the community and should be addressed as such. After all, the preferred time to initiate an evacuation plan, if one is necessary, is presumably before an existing " emergency" in the reactor results in a release of radiation into the cormunity. Furthermora, this section C contains vague references to procedures that personnel "may be alerted to condition status and initiate standby operations", that " radio communications be established and tonitored", and that the Nation.1 Guard shall consider "the possibil-ty cf the si ua tion bein; upgraded tc a General Emergency". These strike us as meaningless jargon unich needs refinement and definarcion. jjc{ .n-1 I

I 7. Page 10 - Paragraph 2(b): The implication here is that the " site emergency director" at Maine Yankee will determine whether a ' local emergency" in the reactor should be upgraded to a " site or general emergency". Even if such categories of emer-gencies made sense (and they do not to us), such decisions should best be made by, or at least in concert with, a governmental re-presentative. We note with concern the fact tha t, unless Maine Yankee determines that a local emergency should be upgraded, the plan does not seem to call for immediate notification of the Governor, any officials of the NRC, Department of Human Services or various local governments in the vicinity. 8. Pages 13-15: These pages relate to the so-called general emergency plan, which ic triggered only if a radiation level of 10 mrem per hour is recorded. He have already commented on the validity of the 10 crem standard and about the f ac t that the plan is silent on the need for monitoring lower levels of radiation and for public action and notification in the event of such low level releases. In short, there is much more attention paid by the plan to the relatively easy task of notifica tion of go fern-ment officials than there is to the dif ficult task of alerting the public. In fact, the only reference here to possible public notification appears in paragraph D at the bottom of page 13: '! Institute any protective measures for the public as desmed nacessary b; the energency coordinator". This type of statecent in symptomatic of many of the plan's shortromings. 9. Page 16: The terms of this roadblock piar neee_ refine-ment A number of possibla rondolock conditions are described, 11EC 7m' _13_ i I a -v

?00R BRIGM ~ appended by the following language: "All of which can and will vary from time to time and which prevent the es tablishmen; of positive action, prearranged". This sentence indicates that plan-ning for such emergencies is not possible. We do not agrae. We believe that such planning requires consideration of various poss-ible contingencies and establishment in advance of various road-block and other traf fic measures which may be necessitated to respond to each such contingency. 10. Page 18 - paragraph numbered 1: This paragraph is loaded with terms which require definition or refinemen t, i.e., what is a " radiological inc iden t" ? Who are " civil authorities"? What are the " areas involved"? What is " proper action"? What constitutes " notification of personnel"? 11. Page 19: The references here to boat and aircraft capabilities are without conte::t. The reference to " aircraft from Cape Cod" is not only T.eaningless but indicates the probability of serious delay. 12. Page 20. The sta tement here tha t local radio stations will be issued prepared releases for broadcast in curious. If such releases are to be prepared in advance of an incident, our checking has indicated that at least some of these stations do not have any prepared material on this subject. If such rel2ases are to be pre-pared after an incident, the obv:cus delays involved negate che val-o f this menn; of communica tion. ..il of the rad > o 5 :ations irtolved as /:11 as all telet/isiCn S ta tionS '

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?DDR ORIG M ~ 13. Page 22: The details of the role which the Natio.,a1 Guar may play in an emergency, together with their capability to do so, should be spelled out. 14. Page 23: This page sets forth vague descriptions of the role to be played by sheriffs' departments in the area and is subject to the same comment as tha t in 4 above. 15. Pagcs 24-26: While these pages contain a list of local area hospitals, there is little or no indication of which, if any, of these facilities possess the necessary equipment and medicines to detect and treat persons exposed to radiation. Further, it is unclear whether these hospitals are aware of the role which they may be asked to play in an emergency. We ould recommend that several regional hospitals be provided the necessary equip-ment and training to cope with a radiological emergency. 16. Page 27: We recornead that the public be notified, ce-fore an emergency arises, that Brunswick Naval Air Station is the likely locatica of emergency quarter'.ng. We also reco mend that alternative querters be considered, for instance in the event of winds during an emergency which are blowing in the general direc-tion of Wiscasset to Brunswick. While we recognize that this is not the typical prevailing wind direction, in does occasionally occur. 17. Page 29: These procedures, to b e followed by DCT i.- the event of an emergency, are ill-d2finea and confusing. 18. Page 31 - end of firs: full narn:raph- 'Jhile ta h rte not measured it, '.ta would es tir 2te tha t ' h a p b n t_ is lacace:. l)[{ .' 1 1 ' i g ~. closer to the shore of Uestport than the 2,000 feet suggested her This same comment applies to the last paragraph on page 8 of the j plan. .i l 19. Page 31 - second paragraph: The first sentence here 1 seems to imply that people living on the north end of the island i. (near the only bridge to the mainland) could or would be evacuate to the south end, which is a uholly illogical proposition. 20. Page 32 - first paragraph: There are a number of refer ences here to facilities on tho island where people could be sheltered or fed in a radiological emergency. It is clear that, I l in the event of an emergency which requires people to leave their own homes, an evacuatiot c the entire island would be cpproprint t' For instance, it is unimaginab.'.e that, in the event of an emergen island residents tuuld need to avail the:..u elves of f eeding f acili I ties at Oake,thic'. is only a saa il fraction of a nile away f rom o the plant. T'c.e otaar facilities listed are also within close ran (3 miles). 21. Page 32 - middle paragraph: While there is a descripti here of school buses available on the island, thera is no indicati i in the plan of what use these buses should be put to in event of an evacua tion. 22. Page 32 - next paragraph: There are indeed cattle and local milk suppliers on the island. 23. l'a g e 32 - recaining paragraph 3: There are here refer-ences to locations of iJ ks and helice,rter landing areas on the icic u. Has the Coast Guard bee,. notified as to their whereabou-j E/ <qn 4 ./ _ 7.

I Do the island's population know how to reach these locations? Who will provide helicopters? Does the Coast Guard have the capability to provide suf ficient boats to evacuate the island from the south end, even in summer conths when there is an influx of summer residents? 24. Page 34 - first paragraph: By what s tandards will a-decision to initiate an evacuation of Westport be assessed? What about the possibility of partial evacuation? 25. Page 34 - paragraphs 3 (a) and (c) : What are tha bases for these conclusory statements? If an emergency occurs during a weekday, significant numbers of mothars with children vill be a t home without an automobile. Therefore, the conclusion in 3(a) is suspect. Further, we are convinced that the conclusion in 3(c) ( to the e f f oc t that there now are adequa te mechanisna to' notify all the public) is unjus tified and incocrec t. 26. Pages 34 paragraph 3(f): This paragraph suggests that information orovided by Maine Yan::ee may trigger eithar a public evacuation or merely increased official readiness (the latter where an acciden t at the plant has occurred with than un-known dangers). He believe that any accident resulting in of fsite radiation exposure should result in public notification and public readiness. The plan is ambiguous at best in establishing the con-ditions under ::hich an evacua tion or a public alert should be initiated. 27. Page 36 - paragrap'.- 2 This m>ctio-retuires that, in the event of a rad io log i.ca l iniif.a n t, the.wicat-:: wi'.! notif, a ll cne othar to -in of ficials and all -til assemble at :ha fire 11Ef <1 q _17_ l I s U

s ta tion. At best, in practice this procedure will take signifi-cant time, particularly in winter. We also inquire whee.her all of the selectmen and officials vill be at home near their tele-phones should an emergency occur during a workday. Moreover, we question the prudence of having all the town's of ficials assemble at a place which has but one (or possibly two) telephones, when much of what must then be done involves use of a telephone. Per-haps, it would be appropriate for all the officials involved to be provided with radios in advance, and in.he event of an emer-gency, to communicate with them. It may also be prudent to hava more telephonesinstalled at the fire house, if it must be used as a base of operations. However, the fact remains that it is unwise to create a public notification scheme which depends upon the presence and action of a few geographically dispersed indi-viduals. For this reason, we can only reiterate the crossi ng eed for an ef fec tive public alarm sys tem. 28. Page 37: At the risk of repeating ourselves, we highly recommend use of a distinctive and audible siren systen in the event of an alert. The town's ftre alarm will fail to alert the majority of citizens to the existence of a radiological incident. Marcover, we are concerned about an emergency action plan which responds as follows to the central issue of how to notify the public in the event of an er.ergency: "Those citizens unable to hear a fire alarm to be notiited by other naans da.m-i.md by th2 'iro ch:cf". l (l'rer page 31) f f L~ f 'j 7 We helieve that this plan cannot be considered as fulfilling its purpose unless it describes in detail the mechani::s by which the public will be pronpt'y and effectively alerted in the event of a radiological emergency. 29. Page 39: While the plan assigns to the various of ficials of the town certain responsibilities in the event of an accident, it does not provide for back-up personnel in the event of the un-availability of one or core of these persons. Moreover, it is well known that the telephone at the fire house listed here is usually not menned. 30. Page 40 - Evacuation Routes: Plan options B and C, as stated earlier, are preposterously ill-concoived insofar as resi-dents of the island living north of the plant and close to the bridge are concerned. If such plan options were utilized, such residents would be asked to forego a speedy e::it fron the island and directly away froa the plant and ins tead to drive south and right by the plant to a slow evacuation by uncertain means. I'.o re - such north end residents would constitute an unnecessary

over, added burden on whatever boat and air evacuation capabilities e::ist.

An equally serious failure here is that none of these options is fully detailed or scrutinized. Thus, option B calls merely for all island residents to assemble at the Town Hall. Is that the complete plan of action contemplated under this option? Under option C, haw would evacuation be achirzed by air or watar? Thase issues are at the very cru:< of the evacuation jlan itself, .a th r, require something more than the brief and broal aeneral caticns 11 _,, q

\\ ~ 31. Page 41 - last paragraph: There is a reference here to the fcct that invalids will be " directed to area hospitals". This almost conic instruction cannot be considered an honest effort to plan evacuation for the area's disabled. 32. Page 43 - last paragraph: The statenents here that the population of the town is 225 and that there are few su==er resi-dents are nost curious to us. Ha vould expect that the island's population is far more than this and we know that there ar.e sig-nificant numbers of summer residents. For comparison purposes, there were, at the last Town Meeting, approximately 200 voters present, out of approximately 330 registered, neither of which figures include children or summer residents. 33. Paga 44 - paragraph headed " Training Exercises": See our general comment number 4. 34. Page 45 - ciddle of the page: We ask how these various officials will be notified and whether substituto individuals should be designated in advance in the event thase officials are not avail-able. See also comment 26 above. 35. Page 46 through 48: This section generally describes implementation of the plan for tbe island. It summarines nany of the other sections of the plan, and is subject to many of our comments set forth elsewhara, which will not ba repeated here. 36. Page 49 - first paragraph. The second sen:2nca refers to tha possibility of an evacuation by later off the " east erd" of the island. Westport is a long and slendar is Lan d ru.,ning en tirel;. north-south, and it is hard to visualize 0,here or that the " east c_id" nay be. Perhaps the plan is intend:d here t; ref r to a scu:h c:.d evacuation (as it aeams to als2wharo). 11C' i) J o

o. o... g.' r 37. Page 50 - second paragraph: The sites and capabilities for air or water evacuation should be clearly established. 38. Page 51 - first paragraph: See connent 15 above. 39. Page 51 - second to last paragraph: See comment 20 above. 40. Page 51 - last paragraph: "The recources of the various Governmental, State and County agencies, as the situation demands". What specifically, does this mean? 41. Page 52: These protective action guidelines are, accord-ing to this section, to be transmitted to the public by a notifier following an emergency. The public should be educated concerning them in advance of an emergency. 42. Page 54: Tha list of town of ficials printed here is 'ica-fully out of date. If any of these comments require further a::planation, plcune communicate with Jef f rey Pidot, RFD 2, Lestport Island, Miccasset, riaine 04578. Telephone - home: 832-7001: offica: 289-3051. Thank you for the opportunity to commant. L 71c- ,.4 I

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