ML19254B051

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Transcript of 790712 TMI Investigation Interview of Bj Rittle,Met Ed,In Middletown,Pa.Pp 1-17
ML19254B051
Person / Time
Site: Crane 
Issue date: 07/31/1979
From: Rittle B, Shackleton O
METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
References
TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190234
Download: ML19254B051 (18)


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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION i

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In the Matter of:

IE TMI INVESTIGATICH INTERVIEW 2!

of Barry J. Rittle Foreman Maintenance Nuclear 5

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Trailer #203 9)

NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 10:

Middletown, Pennsylvania u;

1 July 12.1979 12!

(Date of Interview) 13!

July 31, 1979 (Date Transcript Typeo) 14{

331 15i (Tape Numoer(s))

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21l NRC PERSONNEL:

t 22i Owen C. Shackleton Anthony N. Fasano 23:

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SHACXLETON:

The time is now 9:10 a.m. Eastern Daylight time, July 12, 2

1979, this is the voice of Owen C. Shackleton and this is a interview of i

Mr. Barry J. Rittle, Mr. Rittle is the foreman of maintenance nuclear for 3l

,p the Metropolitan Edison Company assigned to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Sj P wer Generation Station, this interview is being conducted in Trailor i

6l number 203 which is parked just south of the south security gate at the 7

Three Mile Island Installation, present to conduct this interview from the gj U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is Mr. Anthony Fasano, Mr. Fasano is an Inspection Specialist for the Performance Apprasal Branch of Inspection and g

10j Enforcement, Reactor Construction Inspection.

My name Owen C. Shackleton, if I'm an investigator assigned to Region V.

Just prior to putting this

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interview on tape I presented to Mr. Rittle a two page document from the U.

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S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission which explains the purpose and scope of this investigation and identifies the authority of the U. S. Nuclear Regula-tory Commission to conduct this investigation, it also advised Mr. Rittle 15i of his rights to refuse to be interviewed, to have someone of his choice present during the course of the interview and that his rights to not have to furnish any type of a statement signed or otherwise.

Mr. Rittle, for the record sir, did you understand the document that I am referring to?

191 20l RITTLE:

Yes sir I understood it.

21 22' SHACXLETON:

And do we have your permission to tape the interview?

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11 RITTLE: Yes sir.

l 2r SHACXLETON:

And would you like a copy of the tape and a transcript?

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RITTLE: Yes sir, I would.

5 Gi SHACXLETON: Alright we'll provide for you a copy of the tape a' the close gl of the interview and upon completion of the transcript we'll see that one is mailed to you, and now Mr. Rittle if you would please for the benefit of g,

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briefly give us your work experience in the Nuclear Field.

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l RITTLE:

Yes sir, my name is Barry Rittle and I worked for Metropolitan 131 Edison Company for 9 and 1/2 years, of the nine and 1/2 years approximately 14!

8 were working at Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2.

Prior to working for the Metropolitan Edison Company, I went to a Technical School after getting out of high school specializing in Industrial Electronics in the Electrical 17)

Field.

I was in the Navy for four years as an Electronics Technician 181 working on communications and navagation electronics.

I then came and 191 worked for Met Ed, worked a year and 1/2 in the Lebanon office, working in 201 the relay department and the ECM department, the ECM department is a 21l department that constructs and maintains susbstations in the underground 22!

i distribution network in the City of Lebanon.

I then came to Three Mile 23i i

Island and worked in the Unit 1 startup, 1 or 2 refuelings in Unit 1 and 24l then came down and worked on Unit 2 startup, and was working Unit 2 up to 25i the incident.

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SHACKLETON: Okay Barry, thank you very much and I'll turn the interview 2!

now over to Mr. Fasano.

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FASANO: Oka) Barry what I'd like to do is have you in your own words gj describe when you became knowledgeable of the event on March 28, 1979, 6j where you went, what you did, and in general if you can go through the 77 first 3 days and then we'll get back to specifics.

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RITTLE:

g I'll try to remember as best I can, I got to work, I was working 101 day shift which I'm normally a daylight worker, since the incident we've h

all been placed on shift work, and now I'm on the day shift prior to that I was a strictly daylight worker and I came in to start work and I got here about a half and hour early and I noticed there was a backup at the security processing center and they had just declared the e-ergency prior to that and that's why things were held up, people were trying tu get through the security area so...

17l FASANO:

Excuse me would this be about 7:00?

ISI 191 RITTLE:

It was just prior, somewhere between 6:30 and 7:00, I then got through the security processing center and they were holding all nonessential personnel in the north auditorit i or in the auditorium in the service building at Unit 1, you waited in the auditorium, and of course we were 231 picking up rumors and bits and pieces of what was exactly going on and 2 41 happening and we really didn't know a whole lot other than that there was a 25i

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4 1l problem in Unit 2 and they had some types of releases and they were wearing 2:

respirators and whatnot all over the auxiliary building and in Unit 2 area 3j and to the most part of the morning I just stayed in the auditorium on 4t standby.

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FASANO: Okay so, well lets stop then on the first day and we'll go with 6i 7j May at the time, you arrived at the gate, you came in and went to the Unit gl 1 auditorium is that the 50 called emergency control center.

91 RITTLE:

10f No the Unit 1 auditorium isn't the emergency control center, that's where everyone goes to be accounted for that isn't part of the emergency team and a specific member of the team, on the we have one super-g visor which Hilgery Mitchell normally takes that place and one workman, one electrician, and then has the rest of Os on and we're accounted for and we

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stancby in case we're needed then they know right where to get us and then we can supplement the emergency team as necessary.

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FASANO:

This then would be about 7:30 that you assembled in the auditorium.

191 RITTLE:

As the people came in the morning to start their normal day shift 20t that's where they were directed to go, to the auditorium and standby 21:

there.

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FASANO:

Did you participate in any of the activities on that morning?

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!y RITTLE:

Not really, I was told that I was requested to report to the Unit 2l 2 control room and Charley Rippon had already gone to the Unit 2 Control 3l Room, they got him as soon as he came in and he went to the Unit 2 Control 4

Room, I think he took three, two or three electricians that had gotten to g

work a little bit early, he took them along to the control room with him 6i and I didn't have my dosimetry with me and of course they had made the area 7

going down to the Unit 2 Jontrol Room you needed dosimetry and things to go g{

down there so I couldn't go down there until I go my dosimetry, I worked g

all morning trying to get my dosimetry running around, and I finally got that around 9:20 or 10:00 and I was proceeding to the Unit 2 Control Room and that was right at the time that they decided to take the people, the excess people, that were in the Unit 2 Control Room and evacuate them so I no sooner got there and we turned around and came back and then we were 131 then taken off the island and went over to the observation center.

10 15; FASANO:

So you never got to the control room.

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RITTLE:

I never...

I made it to the stair, back stairway going up to the ISI Control Room and the rest were coming down, I turned around and left.

19 20i FASANO:

In leaving, then you went to the observation center.

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l RITTLE:

That's correct.

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Via the 500 KV station or directly to the observation center.

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3j RITTLE:

I was one of the ones that went directly to the observation 4

center, we got the cars, my car was gone over with the friskers, I exited g;

the north bridge and I went right to the observation center, then there was Si other ones that they frisked down at the 500 sub, I got off, I was one of p

the first ones off and I got mine frisked at the north bridge.

8l FASANO:

Then you went home, and that was about...

g; 101 RITTLE: Well we stood by, we stood by at the observation center until I y,

9-g would say the, I think I would say I was there till 4:00 in the afternoon, 4 or 5 in the afternoon, my regular, would have been in my regular work 14li day, we told our men we didn't know exactly what we would need of them and what was happening from minute to minute at that point, so we gave them directions to come back to the observation center the next morning and report for duty there, we didn't know what we'd be doing but that's what we 17; were directed to do to come back there.

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FASANO:

So at the coservation center were you, I guess were you informed 20t of what was going on or you just more or less conjectured...

21; RITTLE: Well, we were scmewhat informed because people that knew exactly 22!

what was going on, they were very busy with keeping abreast of the thing t

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and I didn't feel that I really needed to know if they needed me they'd 24) come get me and ask me to do something,1 didn't think that I should be 25i t

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1 adding to the confusion by tagging after them and saying what's going on 2

and try to find out exactly what was happening.

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4j FASANO:

The following 2 days when you came back to work did you then have 5;

assignments that required you to...

i Gi RITTLE:

7 We did quite a bit of support work and of course all the trailers g

started moving in and we did quite a bit of support work at the observation center itself and hooking up electrical power, whatnot to the trailers g

c ming n there, we then operated the maintenance department from the 10t observation center were we only sent maintenance people to the island as required to do a specific job, they would come to the island do that task and then come back to the observation center, the very first two days, I 131 believe.

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15' FASANO:

Thursday and Friday.

17' RITTLE:

Yeah and then after that they would send like to or three men over 181 for like half of the day and the other ones would stand by at the observation 191 center and then the ones that were on and wanted, would come off and we'd 20!

send a new team on in the afternoon but mostly it was standby teams just in 21!

case they needed an electrician, we didn't really have to many, to many 22!

jobs that were really in the main line of the activity, you know they had 23 some problems with lights and recepticals and power and things of this 2 41 l

nature.

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lj FASANO:

The efforts then were not in support of bringing the plant to be i

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more stable state?

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4j RITTLE:

No sir.

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FASANO: And they weren't equipment, was there equipment'that you had to 6j 7l put special wiring or jumpers to or anything?

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RITTLE:

There was not in those early stages, the first job that we, that g,

10,I I can remember that I was involved with that was really relating to helping g

with the accident was on, I believe it was Sunday, the first Sunday after the accident, they were using two valves that weren't fed off of engineered safeguard bus, safety features buses, in other words, if we last offsite power they would'nt be able to use these anymore and they were using these 14, to help them cool down and safe shutdown of the plant, so we ran a temporary feed to those off of a safety featured bus in the event we'd have loss of 17;!

offsite power we could swap these over and power from the safety featured bus, that was, that was about the first job that we did that was really related to helping with the shutdown.

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FASANO:

Okay you said that you had been on the Unit 1 and Unit 2, preop 21:

and startup, in your experience with Unit 2, in particular how was the 22l l

plant as far as the electrical maintenance efforts and electrical maintenance 231 problems, how, what status were they in prior to the 28th?

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RITTLE:

I feel we were in pretty good shape in the electrical department 2

we had... we were normally fortunate, we didn't have quite the amount of 3

work, maintenance work as some of the other departments did and we made a 4i real effort to keep up with what we had and try to keep our work request g

work down, so we didn't deveicp a large backlog and up to the incident we 6

were doing quite well with keeping up with our corrective maintenance and 7

our preventative maintenance program and the plant was, I feel, in good gj shape electrically.

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ere y u, did your people get involved in the checking of the effects on the electrical cables after the bellows on the atmospheric dump ruptured, say that was in January 1979 in the M-20 area?

i 13l RITTLE:

141 Yes sir we were involved in that, we had quite a bit of work in that area, there's two electrical 480 volt electrical buses in that area, the transformers failed, we had tracking and arcing to ground, we failed both transformers, we had to remove them and ship them out, we got them repaired by General Electric, then we had to go over all the switch gear 18t dcwn there, put that back in service and at that time there was also a work 191 request, there were two work requests that I can remember specifically, one 20I that the instrument department asked the men to check all their safety 21l related cables going through the area and we have one to check penetrations 22!

I in the safety related cables to the area, Catalytic also did some, had some 231 work directed towards checking of the cables, we did most of the penetrations, Catalytic did most of the circuits.

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FASANO:

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On the transformer what system was it part of, do you recall?

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RITTLE:

It's the two transformers for the pressurizer, heater, control 4

center.

Si FASANO:

g Do you get involved in the problems, I believe there was a problem p

with the breakers in that area for the pressurizer heaters?

8 RIH LE:

g Yeah the pressurizer heaters were a large pc M ian of our work

'0l during the outage, we had problems in the past with the pressurizer heaters, the distribution breakers tripping, nuisance tripping and we have written

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preblem reports during startup and at the end of startup, referencing them

13l, and then it seemed that the problem went away, we got direction back frem the engineering firm Burns and Roe to take current readings and voltage 14!

readings and everything in an effort to determine if the breakers were really undersized or if we had a problem and all our data came out, tnat IT the readings were acceptable and it was marginal though there was not much leeway the breakers maybe should of been one size larger but Burns & Roe said it was alright the way it was, but what we supposed and it was only Lgl fair was that the large section cable were transitions from the normal 201 cable on tne outsice of the D ring into the pressurizer itself through the 21:

0 ring and to the pressurizer heaters there's asbestos caDie and if there 22l is any kind of leakage, dripping or condensation dripping on this cable they'll soak it up and you get minor grounds on them and that, of course, 24!'

increases the current and the breakers trip, that and they were also the 25i

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ambient temperature do.<n in that room is quite high and it could have been 2!

affecting the thermal trip characteristics of the breaker just due to the high ambient temperature.

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FASANO:

In that room you mean the M-20 area?

g Si RITTLE:

In the M-20 area, yes sir.

y 81 FASANO: Outside the containment?

g 10i RITTLE:

Yes sir, 11.!

t 12l FASANO:

The, this system the pressurizer heaters is that a, would you have to have quality assurance or quality control look over your wor'< order or your work requests?

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16; RITTLE: No sir, that was on Burns & Roe's list, it was listed as a non 17!

Q.C. system.

18i 19I FASANO:

On the emergency feed, emergency feedwater system of which I think 20!

part is located in that room and part is located just through the wall I 21 guess one is the west and east.

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i 231 RITTLE: Yes sir the steam driven or emergency feed pump is in that room 24!

with the pressurizer heater and motor control centers and pressurizer 25!

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li heaters and your motor driven emergency feed pumps are in, are in another i

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rr.cm, on the east side of the wall.

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FASANO:

And in the M-20 area you also have the bypass valves for the gj emergency feed I guess these are the 32 and 33, these are electrically 6

operated do you recali, are you familiar with that system?

71 gf RITTLE:

Basically yes but I couldn't really tell you if they were in that room or not.

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FASANO:

Okay on the twelve valves which I believe there is one 12A valve is in the room where the steam driven turbine is and the 123 valve I believe is in the wall behind... is in the next room.

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RITTLE:

Yes sir.

16i FASANO: Was there any electrical maintenance work done on that just prior 17;:

to the 28th of March?

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191 RI H LE:

We had done a preventative maintenance check to, I can't recall if it was the 12A or the 123, but one of the 12's we had done was somewhere 21!

within the preceeding I would say six months roughly off the top of my 22' i

head, it was not immediately prior it was at least a few months prior to 23l

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and that preventative maintenance that we did was meggering of the motor 24l and a functional check of the valve operator and limit switches.

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13 lj FASANO:

Can you recall which one you, you opened up 12B or 12 A?

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31 RITTLE: That's it, I don't recall this point.

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FASANO,: Okay, after the steam bath that was given to some of the equipment, S

Si apparently it got thrcugh to both rooms.

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8j RITTLE:

Yes.

91 FASANO:

10l There are penetrations apparently above the location where the steam driven emergency feed pump is located.

It looks like there's a penetration for cabling and there's also a pipu ground penetration that seems to be plugged with bag of something, so apparently steam could get into both areas, and apparently both areas were checked.

Do you recall checking the meggering of the cabling to some of these valves.

the 12 valves in the... I quess there are a couple of more in there, but particularly the 12's?

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181 RITTLE:

No sir, we didn' t do that, like I said, the two transformers to those two busses down there were our major task which tied up a majority of our department and we were working, we weren't on a shift work, then we 21; were working extended hours, we were working 12 and 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> days to get 22l l

those transformers removed and get a temporary feed into those busses, so, 231 i

Catalytic. had the task, they had the work request for checking the valve 24l operators in the area that were exposed to the steam.

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that I assumed that they did those, but I coLidn't tell you for sure without 2j digging back through the paper work and documentation.

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,4j FASANO:

The emergency feed system. Would you consider quality assurance gj necessary for that work request? Quality control?

i Si 7j RITTLE:

I would think that it is but I'm not sure, I'de have to check the 8

Burns and Roe listing, how they classified the system.

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FASANO: What is it, that listing, do you recall the name of it.

Just off-101 hand?

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RITTLE:

There's an equipment classification list, but I'm not sure that's the proper name, its a computerized print out that lists all the equipment 14:

and components by, that Burns and Rowe had, it gives the QC class and the requirements on them.

17l FASANO:

Okay, so you would check... actually, this would be checked for you before you get the job?

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RITTLE:

That's right, when the work request is processed, they take the 21; comoonent, the person processing the work request in the maintenance office 22l j

looks up the component, sees where it falls on the list and then puts what 23J QC requirements are necessary on that work request.

We get the work i

request to actually do the work, first thing we look to see if its a Q 25; l\\

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job.

And then we know if w:s have to write a procedure or take one of our generic procedures and attach it to the, to complete the job.

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31 FASANO: A QCM designation, what does that mean to you?

4; 51 6l RITTLE:

QCM is the thing, is only QC as far as the mounting, its seismic 7l qualification, and it doesn't really matter if the object functions or not, 8l just so long as it doesn't shake loose end perhaps bang in and jeopardize the availability of other egipment in the area.

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FASANO:

Are you familiar and have you done any electrical wiring for the 11 electromatic operated valve that is placed on top of the pressurizer.

13l RITTLE: We, I have worked on it already, ye3.

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15i FASANO:

In the recent past?

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RITTLE:

I would, as best as I can recall, I would think that it was sometime 18!

in the summer of '78 that we worked on that.

191 20t FASANO:

Okay, this would be in a modification?

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RITTLE:

No, it was a corrective maintenance job.

It has a solenoid 23 solenoid operator that operates a pilot on the relief itself and the 24!

return spring on the solenoid operator wasn't strong enough to take the

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l lj weight of the solenoid off of the pilot valve and it was letting it weep 2

through, a little bit.

So I got involved with the solenoid operator itself.

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FASANO:

This would be a work request, this sounds like a mechanicas type Sj j b that the electrical people actually did that.

Si RITTLE:

Yeah, the electromatic relief valve itself is mechanical but the 7,

solenoid operator would be electrical.

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FASANO: And in the case of the spring you would do that?

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RITTLE: Yes, it was a spring in the solenoid operator.

i 13l FASANO: Okay, apparently, as far as March 28, it sounds like you didn't really take part in operations or operations assistance.

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RITTLE:

No sir, I didn't.

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18f FASANO:

00 you have any comments you like to :ake on your experience maybe 19i to benefit others? Just by observation apparently, it was not by direct 20!

involvement on that initial day.

21l 22j RITTLE:

No sir, I can't think of anything.

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17 llj FASANO:

Okay, I have no further questions.

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3l SHACKLETON:

Mr. Rittle, we thank you for coming and giving us your time 4;

and trying to help us to obtain background information on the event.

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there are no further comments, we'll close this interview at this time.

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The time is now, 9:38 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, and this is the conclusion i

of this interview.

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