ML19254B049
| ML19254B049 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1979 |
| From: | Miller A, Shackleton O METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190229 | |
| Download: ML19254B049 (18) | |
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i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSIr.1 l
II In the Matter of:
IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW i
31 of Adam W. Miller i
Shift Foreman Operations Si 61 T
81 Trailer #203 9!
NRC Investigation Site i
TMI Nuclear Pcwer Plant 10j Middletown, Pennsylvania lli July 13, 1979 12!
(Date of Interview) 13l July 31, 1979 (Data Transcr1pt Typec) 1 41 333t
- 15i, (Tape Nuccer(s))
16j 17!
181 19!
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2i; NRC PERSONNEL:
22!
Owen C. Shackleton Dorain R. Hunter 23l Thomas T. Martin
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79091 9 229 7
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l SHACKLETON: The time is now 7:11 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, July 13, 1979. This is the voice of Owen C. Shackleton, and this is an interview of 2!
Mr. Adam W. Miller.
Mr. Miller is the Shift Foreman for Operations for the 3
Metropolitan Edison Company assigned to the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power gj Station.
This interview is taking place in Trailer No. 203 which is parked 6
just outside the south security gate at the Three Mile Island installation.
7 Present to conduct this interview from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is Mr. Dorvin R. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter is an Inspection Specialist for the 8l gj Performance Appraisal Branch in Inspection and Enforcement for Reactor Construction Inspection.
Also present to conduct this interview is Mr.
101 Thomas T. Martin.
Mr. Martin may be referred to as Tim.
Mr. Martin is an 11!
Inspection Specialist for the Performance Appraisal Branch in Inspection 12!
and Enforcement for Reactor Construction Inspection.
My name is Cwen C.
131 Shackleton.
14!
I am an Investigator assigned to Region V.
Adam, just prior to coming on this tape I discussed with you just for a few minutes the two page advisement document from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and you informed me that you understood and the conditions of this statements 171 still are in effect.
To make it a matter of record I would like to repeat 1$
the questions at the end of the statement which you have signed previously 19!
during prior interviews.
Do you understand the statement that I am referring 20i to, Adam.
21!
22f MILLER:
Yes I do.
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If SHACXLETON:
And do we have your permission to tape this interview, i
21 3j MILLER:
Yes.
41 Si SHACXLETON:
And would you like a copy of the tape?
Si j
MILLER: Yes.
/t Si SHACXLETON:
All right, we will provide that for you at the conclusion of g
the interview.
At this time now I will turn the interview over to Tim Martin.
11!
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i MARTIN:
13!
We have looked at the sequence of events and you've seen some problems the operators had in starting makeup pumps.
Have we had problems 14 with the makeup pumps before this event.
16:
MILLER:
Not...we never really had a problem where we lost the makeup pump and had to start it and couldn't start it that I was aware of.
IS:
19f MARTIN:
20!
Have we had problems in starting them before where it took several attempts to get it started.
21!
22 MILLER:
Yea, there were several...at least one or two occasions that I can 23l remember where there was one problem or another to get it started.
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3 MARTIN:
Okay, do you remember if these problems have become more frequent gj recently or...
31 4;
MILLER:
No.
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6 MARTIN:
Has this been since. day one.
7!
MILLER:
Well it was just occasionally now and then for one reason or another the pumps wouldn't start when we tried to start it, you know, g
we...after maybe half an hour or an hour, whateve" it toort, 101 we finally got I
it started.
11:
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MARTIN:
Okay Adam, on the day of event, about eight hours into the event, if I remember correctly, they couldn't start a makeup pump.They finally went tc " pull to lock" on it which makes the B pump, the pump selected by the ES, and they actually started the B pump to run it the rest of the day.
Subsequent to that the A pump has been started, I guess several days later 4
Do you remember or do you know of any investigation that was done to deter 18l mine why the pump couldn't be started.
20:
MILLER:
No I don't even really remember that they had a problem starting 21l j
the A pump that day.
22!
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MARTIN:
Okay.
New subject area.
24!
I believe you arrived in the control room approximately 6:20 in the morning.
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MILLER:
Uh huh.
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3j MARTIN:; At 6:48 we last some output on the typewriter.
The indication i
4; that we see on the utility typer were the alarm printer was then printing g
but it appeared to indicate that. the memory and the alarm status for print-6 out had been updated, brought up to current time.
We're'trying to find out what the philosophy was for using I think the thing that they would use i
8j would be the " alarm suppress" function or maybe even computer initialization.
g And we are trying to determine why this was done.
Do you know of anybody 10i that was in the area at that time that might be able to provide us the philosophy of why they had to update the computer at that time.
12!
MILLER:
I don't know, again I wasn't aware that that happened.
I can only g
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guess as to why it would have been done.
The alarm printer was so far 14 behind, maybe somebody did it just to get more of the current alarms rather 15; than the alarms that were half hour to 45 minutes old.
That's the only thing I could guess.
18i MARTIN:
Is this standard practice.
Is this the way the operators normally 19!
use the alarm status printer.
21:
MILLER:
No.
Normally on more routine type things the alarm printer doesn't 22!
get that far behind and, you know, you might only be a few minutes behind.
23t So it is not something that's done every time the alarm printer gets a 24i' little bit behind.
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gj MARTIN: Okay do you remember anyone around the typewriters at 6:30 in the 2
morning.
31 MILLER:
4 All I can remember about it any more is just that there were pe ple all ver the control room.
Now as far as who was around the computer 5
6 typewriter I don't really remember any more.
7; MARTIN: Okay.
New subject area.
When you entered the control roont what g
was the status of the diesels.
g lot MILLER:
I don't rememoer if they were running at the time or nct when I 11;,
came in.
I know several times after I got in I believe they started at least once or twice that morning but as far as what the status was right 13i when I came in I couldn't tell you.
15i MARTIN:
In reviewing the alarm status printout we get the impression, we are not positive, we get the impression that the diesels were in fact shut 17!
down at that time and we don't have any indication that they ever restarted.
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We don't know if this is a computer problem or what.
19!
20!
MILLER:
You mean restarted up until what period of time.
21,'
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MARTIN:
Up until about 8:00 o' clock that evening.
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!lj MILLER: Well I know at least one time, maybe more, but I can remember i
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specifically at least one time when they restarted.
i 31 4:
MARTIN:
During the morning we believe around 9:30, one of the engineers Si who 'was in the control room at the time observed, I think it was the over-g speed trip annunciator alarm.
What does that signify?
7!
Sj MILLER: On the diesel?
91 Oj MARTIN:
It would be in the control room on one of the overhead annunciators.
f It was an overspeed trip or something like that alarm. What kind of status indication do you have in the control room for the diesels.
I1 MILLER:
They have their own separate alarm panels.
15 MARTIN:
Okay.
17!
MILLER:
Okay and there would be an overspeed trip alarm for it.
Each one has it.
191 20i MARTIN:
And if it was lit, what would that indicate to you.
21!
22 MILLER:
I think it could indicate that it was shutdown and never reset.
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MARTIN: Why would it do that, I don't understand.
2l 3i MILLER: Well when it starts on an ES signal diesel, the only way to shut it down is to locally trip the fuel racks and when you do that you get that 43 g;
overspeed trip alarm. Okay, and that won't clear until you reset the 6i machine and hit the reset push button, a local reset push button down at 7j the diesels.
I 81 MARTIN:
Okay.
It is recorded that this engineer observed these alarms up g;
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e m rning.
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ese s were inoperaMe 10i at that time.
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MILLER:
Un huh.
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14!
MARTIN: Were you aware of this status at this time of the morning.
15; 16i MILLER: Well I think it was right around that time that I believe it was Tom Morck, an engineer, went down there to reset the diesels.
He either went down there to reset them or shut them down.
I don't remember right now, but it might have been he went down there to reset them.
20t 21!
MARTIN:
And this was an engineer that went down, not an auxiliary operator.
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23l MILLER:
Yea, I don't know if he took an auxiliary operator with him.
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MARTIN: Would it be normal for an engineer to operate plant equipment like 2j that.
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MILLER:
No.
4j But under those...under the circumstances that were going on f
at the time, he was more than capable of doing that, cause he helped write 5
6j the procedures to do it so there was no problem as far as not being capable 7!
of d ing it.
I 8!
MARTIN: And this individual's name again was?
g, 10!
j MILLER:
I believe it was Tom Morck.
l 12 MARTIN: Okay.
So the diesels you believe were probably reset at approxi-mately that time.
15-MILLER:
Un huh.
17!
MARTIN:
Can you explain then why during subsequent ESs the diesels didn't start.
191 20t MILLER:
Yea, I think what happened then after that, we were in a situation 21:
where we were getting a lot of the 4 pound signal ES signals, okay and so 22' what was done, there was a control switch for the diesels.
If you put it 23 in maintenance exercise that will prevent it from starting on an ES signal, 2 41 okay, it doesn't make it inoperable because to start it all you have to do 25i t
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~ is,a go back to the emergancy standby, hit that cont:ol switch and it,
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2' wouid start, but to prevent the thing fiom starting and having somebody go I
31 don... every time they start with the ES sig.ial somebody would have to go i
4; down,thare locally to reset the fuel racks ;nd hit the reset.
So wnat wai' c!
dele wal the switch was put in' maintenarco exercise so that if we would
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6l need then1 all we would have to de is @ tc the emergency standby and they
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7 would have started it, performed their nor=al function.
8!
MARTIN;' Okay, where is this switch at k.
101 MILLER:
That's on the panel up ir, the control' room, panel 26 and 29.
12' 13!
MARTIN: Okay, would there bE any indic3 tion that this switch was in this i
positi an-14'
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15i MILLER:
There wodid be an indication that the emergency generators'weren't 16i i:1 standby, emergency standby.
There's a local alarm that would say some suitch, I don't remember the exact wording, but it's scmething 1ike, some switch not in " auto" or something similar to that.
20!
MARTI:1:
Okay so the reason we didn't see it then start in subsequent ES's 21!
i was really because this switch was in, wl;at was the term.
22!
I, 23 MILLER:
Maintenance exercise.
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_ MARTIN: Maintenance exercise.
I 2!
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MILLER:
Uh huh.
4j Sj MARTIN:
Okay. Who put it in that position.
Si 7
MILLER:
I don't remember exactly who it was.
I d!
MARTIN:
Do you remember who it was discussed with or why, you know.
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guess' I don't really understand why it is bad for the diesel to start on 101 these times.
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MILLER:
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Well it was... I think right at that time we were getting multiple ES and the 4 pound signal, there is no way to defeat that until you get it Okay so you have to receive it and then you defeat it and it was, I don't know who made the decision, but the decision was made that it was just b better to put the switch in maintenance exercise for the time being rather than to have somebody go back and forth or else stay down there and it was 18; confusing enougn to not have to do that.
20!
MARTIN:
All right.
Was Mr. Ross or Mr. Miller or Mr. Logan aware that 21:
this thing was in the maintenance exercise position.
23l MILLER:
I don't know.
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1 MARTIN: Were things going on in the control room that I guess the people 2:
who were suppose to be controlling things weren't aware of, I mean, this is 3;
fairly I guess, you know, -a fairly good size decision.
Were decisions made 4;
all around the control room and not communicated to the the head people or 51 was it a well controlled, well organized decision. process where every major
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6 decision was made by one or two people.
7l MILLER:
8!
Well I would say most every decision was made by not more than two people that I was aware of.
g, 10i MARTIN:
But was it communicated.
Did one guy have...was he the guy that g
g all decisions had to pass through or was it generally made all around the g
control room by different people and different little areas.
1 41 MILLER: Again, you know, I...for most of the time I was in one area and I can't really tell you that for sure.
From my point of view it seemed like 16t there was one or two people making those decisions and that's all I know 17,;
about it.
lar 19!
MARTIN: Who were they by the way.
21; MILLER: Well Bill Zewe was the shift supervisor and Fred Scheimann was the shift foreman ar.d from where I was it seemed to me like they were making 23; most of the decisions that were going on or at least they were aware of what being done.
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HUNTER:
Okay, Adam you indicated that you had seen the diesel at least 2!
once start one time.
Do you recall when that was or can you put a time on i
f i t.
3 4!
MILLER:
Sj Oh it must have been before 9:30 from what we have been talking 6;
about.
I don't remember.
8:30, 9:00 o' clock, I don't kilow.
7l 8l HUNTER:
O kay.
One of the items that we were looking at is the isolation g;
of the B steam generator and 3cu were on the back panel, the radiation 10l m nitor area and the B steam generator had been isolated earlier.
At a
.j, little before 7:00 the main steam stop valves opened and then reclosed in g
seven seconds, somebody just opened and closed them.
Do you recall anything about that. At the same time that that occurred and the radiation monitor 13 at 7:48 went off.
15ig MILLER:
You said the MSV 4's and 7 17!
18r 19!
MILLER:
For seven seconds 20r 21!
HUNTER:
And then closed very quickly.
23l MILLER:
Well I know that the valves take about two minutes to stroke so and their jaw valves so who I don't know.
If somebody opened them for seven seconds they wouldn't have opened too far.
I didn't know that.
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1.l HUNTER:
Okay I just wondered. And scmetime shortly thereafter they...
2 after apparently pushing the button to open the 4's and 7 drove them right l
3; back closed apparently as you indicate.
Then they shut the, a little after 4j 7:00 they shut the 15 feed valves that was supply to the bypass but you are Si n t aware of that particular evolution.
6i MILLER:
No.
I don't remember that.
I thought that B steam generator was 7
l isolated before I got in.
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was earlier isolate 1 Okay, another Mem dat occurred later 10j g
in the day at the time the containment pressure spike occurred.
They had a few minutes after that apparently they lost an electrical bus, two buses, the 242 and 232 buses, in the auxiliary building which in fact killed the 13!
reactor building sump pump, auxiliary building equipment, a lot of things.
It was recorted at that time that a radiation menitor panel was also lost.
15.
15i MILLER:
Yea.
17) 18i HUNTER:
At the time of the bus what panel was that that was lost.
19) 20l MILLER:
It was the, let me think, 21' 22!
HUNTER:
Is it air monitor panel.
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MILLER: Yea, that was it, the whole area monitor panel.
2!
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HUNTER: Do you know why it was lost.
l 4i 5l MILLER: Yea, I think they traced that down that there was one or two of 6
the monitors inside the reactor building apparently were shorted out and 71l that lost tt's whole panel. When they lifted the leads for the affected 8
monitors, then they could reenergize the area monitor panel.
10j HUNTER:
Do you recall how long it took them to reenergize those monitors.
11!
MILLER:
I was there ar. the time and didn't seem like it was too long, 13l maybe an hour, hour and a half, two hours.
141 15l HUNTER:
Okay I understand it was due to the monitors in the containment being sprayed.
Si 17f MILLER:
Yea, right.
19f HUNTER: On the...when the containment building was spiked, the pressure spika oc::urred on the 28th panel, did you discuss that, was that discussed with you at any time, at that instant, at that moment or within a few 22!
I minutes.
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MILLER:
Right after it happened.
I 2l 3j HUNTER: Who did you discuss it with.
4!
l MILLER:
It was Fred Scheimann and I forget... one of the CRO's. We were S
Si just saying, you know, it was a high pressure spike, we didn't really know at the time exactly what caused it, whether it was electrical problem with the recorder or if it was real or...
8 9I HUNTER:
10f Adam, was that tone of the time, try to recall, was there any discussion at all of what it could have been other than electrical or was g
it just discussed as an electrical problem.
131 MILLER:
The way I remember it I don't think anybody thought like now, it was brought out that was probably a hydrogen exposion, but at the time I don't think anybody was thinking that or I didn't hear that idea brought forth.
17 18I HUNTER:
Okay.
I have no further questions.
20!
MARTIN:
One final question, Adam.
Sometime early in the morning, probably 21!
while you were there, the core flood tank isolation valves breakers were 22l closed and sucsequently it has been reported to us that they were actually 231 I
shut. We know they got opened again.
We're trying to find who had the 24) insight to do that.
Do you know of anybody who reopened those things so 25i
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y that we could finally use them around noon.
Otherwise we don't know the f
level in that tank went down.
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MILLER:
Yea.
I remember they were open because we were floating on the gj core flood tanks there for awhile.
l Gi MARTIN:
7; Do you remember somebody reopening those things.
Because we got l
one guy that says he really, you know, he shut them and if he shut them g
g then the level can't go down the tanks and we don't understand, we can't find anybody that says they reopened them.
g 11 MILLER: When were they shut.
12!
r 13; MARTIN:
I guess before 7:00 o' clock.
15' HUNTER:
They shift supervisor who came over from Unit 1 in the initial depressuri:ation, the pressuri:er was flooded and they didn't want any more water in the reactor, didn't need any more and so it was around 6:00 o'clo:k, right prior to going towards the lowest point that that pressure went at that point so it was in that time frame.
So sometime after that down the 20:
line apparently as Tim indicates the valves would have been reopened to l
float the core flood tanks and we are trying to find out when they were 22!
l reopened.
It doesn't show up on computer printout or any...there were no 231 log entry showing that they were reopened.
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k 17 lj MILLER:
I don't remember anything about that.
All I remember about that 2
was that we were floating on the core flood tanks for awhile and I don't f
remember that there was a scrambler to open the valves in any hurry so they 3
4 must have been open for quite a while before that.
Si 1
MARTIN:
0kay Adam that's all I have.
6 i
SHACKLETON:
g; Thank you very much Adam, we appreciate your coming in here g,
after working all night and for your two prior meetings with us and trying Of to help us find all the information that would develop.
We'll close this interview at this time.
The time is now 7:37 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time, July 13, 1979.
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