ML19254B044
| ML19254B044 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/17/1979 |
| From: | Miller A, Shackleton O METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-TF, TASK-TMR NUDOCS 7909190208 | |
| Download: ML19254B044 (18) | |
Text
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-.e m UNITED STATES OF AMERICA l
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM1ISSION In the Matter of:
2{
IE TVI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 3l of 4)
Adam W. Miller i
Shift Foreman Si 6i 7J at Trailer #203 9i NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 10l Middletcwn, Pennsylvania 11!
June 29, 1979 12; (Date of Interview) 23I July 17, 1979 14l (0 ate Transcript Types) 322 15i (Tape Numcer(s))
16i 17l 18l 19!
20i 21l NRC PERSONNEL:
22l Owen C. Shackleton 23!
Larry L. Jackson 24;
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SHACKLETON: The time is now 1:48 p.m., EDT, July 29, 1979.
This is 2ij the second interview of Mr. Adam W. Miller.
Mr. Miller is a Shift f
Foreman in operations for the Metropolitan Edison Company assigned to 4l the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Generation Station.
This interview is taking place in trailer 203, which is parked just outside the south 6I security gate at the Three Mile Island installation.
Present to conduct 7
this interview from the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is Mr.
8f Larry L. Jackson. Mr. Jackson is a Radiation Specialist assigned to 9
Region II.
My name is Ower. C. Shackleton.
I'm an Investigator assigned 101 to Region V.
Inasmuch as this is the second interview of Mr. Miller, 11 just prior to going on tape, I discussed momentarily with Mr. Miller 12 the two page documument that he previously had read furnished by the U.
13I S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission witch sets forth the purpose and the 14 scope of this investigation, and the authority by which the U. S.
15 Nuclear Regulatory Commission has to conduct this investigation.
And 16j Mr. Miller's rights to refuse to be interviewed or to submit a signed 17l; statement and his right to have someone present of his choosing.
Mr.
18{
Miller, do you understand sir, that those rules are still in effect?
191 20l MILLER:
Yes, I do.
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SHACKLETON:
And do we have your permission to tape this interview?
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l lli MILLER: Yes.
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SHACKLETON: And would you like a copy of the tape or transcript of 41 this interview?
5 6{
MILLER:
Yes, I would.
7l 8I SHACXLETON:
At the conclusion of this interview, if time allows us, 9!
before you have to depart. I'll give you a copy of the tape, if not, 10 we'll furnish it to you at a later date.
And now I'll turn this in-11{
terview over to Larry Jackson to conduct the interview.
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13 JACKSON: Adam, would you start out by briefly telling us what your i
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period of work was on Friday morning of the 30th?
15:
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MILLER: On the 30th, I believe I was working the 7 to 3 shift.
It was 17!
in that 6:30 to three, or 3:30, in that area.
18i 191 JACKSON: What time would you normally report to work for that shift?
20l 21l MILLER:
Roughly those hours.
Approximately 6:30 in the morning, and 22; I'd be there till somewhere between 3 and 3:30.
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@CXSON: And are you familiar with the problem that Unit 2 was having 2l with the makeup tank pressure on the morning of the 30th, with the 5,
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relief valve being opened and water being put into the bleed tanks?
4i MILLER: Well, when I first got to work, I wasn't aware of the problem, c;
"j 6l and after I was there an hour or so, that's about the time when I became aware of it.
Approximately 7:30, roughly... roughly that time.
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JACKSON: What were your duties that morning.
Were you doing the i
10f normal things you normally do on shift, or were you :ssigned special duties because of
' situation on... or what?
12!
13 MILLER:
Because of the situation, the Shift Fore-an's duties at that 14i time and for the next several weaks, were not at all normal.
And there 1:
is a shift Supervisor who basically formed the role of the Shift Foreman 16i in the Control Room at the time.
And the Shift Foreman was there 17 mostly to perform the paper work type duties that were normally the 18!
Shift Foreman's job.
And the Shift Foreman wasn't anywhere near as 191 directly involved with operations at that time.
And like I say, for 20t the next several weeks, because of the unusualness of the operation 21!
goirg on.
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i On the morning of the 30th about 7:10, the decision was made 1
JACKSON:
to open the relief valve and that would have been MUV-13 on the makeup 2'
Were you tank, because of the pressure problems in the makeup tank.
31 p
4:
involved in that decision in any way?
i 51 1
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MILLER: Well, not directly. We were faced with the problem of... we And the pressure that 7i were running out of water in front of the BWST.
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was in the makeup tank was great enough that it wasn't
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E water to get into the makeup tank. And all the water was going into a If we So, we were pretty much stuck with the decision.
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bleed tank.
left things the way they were, we'd run out of water to put into the RC 11!
12) system, and the only alternative we would have had at that time wocid have been to take the contaminated water out of the Reactor Building, 13 So... really which... that wa.;n' t an acceptable alternative at all.
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there wasn't... now that I look back on it even, thero really wasn't 15i
... there weren't many alternatives other than to relaase some of the 16i It was either pressuring up so we could 17l pressure in the makeup tank.
have the letdown go into the makeup tc.nk and get to a stable situation, i
181 191 which we weren't in at the time.
20' Were you present when the operator was told to open the 21!
JACKSON:
Do you have any idea what his instructions... his specific valve?
22l instructions were as far as opening the vent valve?
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'6 The way I remember it was... I don't remember exactly who l'
MILLER:
You know the Shift Supervisor... there was several 2'
made the decision.
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31 higher mamagement people there.
And the decision was made. We've got j
to do something fairly soon and, you know, we've got to open up the And then the Control Room operator was just told to open t
a vent valve.
6 the vent valve to relieve the pressure in the tank.
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Did you get involved in any of the discussions with the 8!
JACKSON:
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supervisors about potential radiation consequences, or radiological 1
consequences from venting this tank?
11!
i Well, not in any detail or anything, but
- hink everybody 12!
MILLER:
involved knew there would be a fair amount of radioactive gas released 13 14i when that happened, because we knew that normally there is a... if 1
you'd open up MUV-13, normally the waste gas compressors would have put 15t 16:
it into tha *aste gas decay tanks, and depending on how long you have the 13 valve open, you wouldr t really get too much released out into 17!
But everybody there knew that there was a problem with 18!
the atmosphere.
So there wouldn't very likely be a large release; 19i our waste gas system.
as far as exactly how much of a release and how much public reaction 20!
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... now looking back on it, all those consequerces weren't looked at i
I too closely, at that time.
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JACKSON: Do you know, when +. hat valve was opened, do you know if it i
2' was closed any time later in the morr'4g?
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MILLEA: Yep.h... I don't know... I don't rememoer exactly, because I c:!
know there for a while we were opening and closing it a lct.
I think I
6i it was closed though, we relieved the pressure down to a certain point,
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which I don't remember what it was.
But, it was at a point, where the 8
water could get back into the makeup tank.
And... I don't remember 9
for sure, but I think it was closed a little later on that morning.
10!
JACKSON: Were you involved in any notifications of the Emergency 12!
Control Station or any calling of offsite agencies... Civil Defense, 13[
the State, and things of this nature?
141 151 MILLER:
No.
All I remember was at least 15 or 20 minute = befare the 16i valve was actually opened, maybe longer, but I know it was at least 15 17!
or 20 minutes... the people over in the Observation Center were notified 18 that it was necessary to open that and th t was going to happen shortly.
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I don't remember the specifics. What person actually got the message, but there were... a lot of people were notified before the valve was 20!
21 actually opened.
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Ob e8 s
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i Do you know if people in the Control Room... anybody in the i
l' JACKSON:
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Control Room talked with the NRC representative present in the Control 3f.
Room?
4; I don't remember the person's name, the NRC representative's Si MILLER: Yes.
name, but I know that he was aware at what the problem was and that the 1
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vent valve was going to be opened.
8I Did somebody speci-9l JACKSON: Do you know how he became aware of this?
fically discuss it with him, or was it just because he was there looking 101 i
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over everybodys' shoulder?
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Well, there was... I don't remember exactly who it was, which t
13' MILLER:
But, it was i
c'.mpany person... Met Ed person was talking to him.
l'<l I don't either a Shift Supervisor or higher, who was talking to him.
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I do 16i rpecifically remember.
But, I know it was... I don' t know.
remember that there was a short conversation about it going on, at 17; i
least 15, 20, 25 minutes before it happened.
Because everybody was lar I
aware that there was a problem there, and something would have~to be 196 20!
done shortly.
i 21!
Were you in the Control Room where you could hear the radio i
22i JACKSON:
transmission when the 1,200 mR per hour reading was called in to the 23 :
24 ECS?
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l-t MILLER: Yes.
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Do you remember the general reactions of that?
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i, 4i Well, I can remember raost of the people in the Control Room c;
MILLER:
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could hear the radio, and -it was... I believe it was coming from the helicopter that was flying over the site.
And the reports coming in f
from the helicopter... you couldn't really tell exactly where the 9l helicopter was, but, you know, we heard a lot of numbers..
- 800, 10{
1,000, 1,200 mR... different numbers like that.
And the general 11 reaction I think was... exactly, is the the helicoper directly over the stack, or is he off somewhere, and is what's coming out of the 12!
I 13 stack a lot higher than that unit? But people the Control Room right at that time when the high numbers started coming in, didn't really 1 41 know... or they couldn't relate that t.o how much they were really 15i 16!
putting out.
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18i JACKSON:
Do you recall it being general suprise that those numbers are 191 kind of...
20t 211 MILLER: Yeah, there was generally suprise.
I don't think too many 22!
people expected them to be that high.
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1]1 JACKSON:
In your opinion, was this release... how did you look at 2
this release when you all were preparing to make it? We've had some 31 j
people say it was controlled.
Some people say it was uncontrolled.
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How would you classify the release?
51 I
6I MILLER: Well, it was controlled in as far as it didn't occur without the people causing it and being aware of it.
But as far as planning it 8
in advance, and having a good idea of how much radiation was actually 9f going to be released, and the eventual effect to the'public attitude 10!
and everything else... that part of it was not planned at all.
- But, 11 it was a contolled release.
It wasn't something that occurred that we 12!
weren't aware of. We were aware of it.
I just don't think there was 13 enough time that a real good plan on the release could be made.
Maybe 141 if the people in the Control Room were decided four hours prior '.o the 15i release that we're going to be doing this in about four hours, let's 16i talk about the consequences.
How we can do it to minimize the amount 17!
that we' re going to release.
But, I think by the time we realized that 18t that's what was going to have to be done, and from then to when it was 19l done, there wasn't enough time to do all' that. And that's what in my 20:
opinion, created the biggest problem.
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JACKSON: Were you aware of the level or the pressure in t.be reac tor 2!
l coolant bleed tanks, and also the liquid levels, when this was taking 3l place? Did you look at the level and pressure indication at any time, 4{
and note what they were?
5' 1
6f MILLER: Well, ! remember... I don't remember specifically, but I do remember that the reactor coolant bleed tank levels were getti7g very 8!
high. And we were running out of space to put water in the bliad 9!
tanks, and not only that, we were running out of space in the borated 10f water storage tank.
And... I don't remember exactly but I think it lli was somewhere between 12 and 15 feet right about when we cpened up the i
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vent valve.
And it just seemed like we were getting in a situation 13 where if we didn't do something relatively quick, the plant woulo have Idi been in a state that would have been a lot more unfavorable, than what 15i it was.
I 16; 1,
JACKSCN:
I believe Greg Hit: and Bill Zewe said that they both noted ISI that ** a pressure... that the reactor coolant bleed tanks were pegged ISI off-scale on pressure...
20l 21i MILLER:
High?
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_ SON: High... from the MUR-1 relief valve downstream of the... or 2
on the bottom of the makeup tank being open, at this time. What I 31 thought about was... it's possible that you've got each one of those 4'
l tanks have got a couple of relief valves, and it's possible, I guess, a
that those relief valves would have lifted on those tanks.
It seems to me that they probably would have lifted by the time the pressure indicator 7I l
pegged off-scale.
So, in that sense, it could have been uncontolled.
8 Any release could have been uncontrolled prior to opening MUV-13.
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Would that be a true statement?
i 101 11 MILLER:
Yeah, that would be possible.
I don't know exactly the setpoint, 12!
but I believe it's around 15 pounds.
i 131 14 JACKSON:
The tanks... I do not have the setpoint available here...
15' but, I know the tanks are designed for 20 pounds, and the pressure 16l gauges reads at 30 pounds, which is one and a half times the designed 17!
pressure, so, we would surely think the leak valves would be set less 18{
than 30.
19i 20 {
MILLER:
Yeah.
I think they are around 15 pounds, and the reason that 21!
the pressure was building up so fast, the tanks were getting real full, 22 and there was no place for that gas in the tanks to go.
So, as the 23l l
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l' tanks just filled, the pressure increased.
And it could have been that 2.
the relief valves were lifting part of the time.
I don't remember.
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That could have contributed something to the release.
41 5
JACKTON:
The... do you recall if yo': had any trouble with those tanks 6
registering high pressure any time during the previous 3 days... or 7
during those 3 days?
8!
9f MIL'.EJ:
No. We didn' t.
Everytime you change level in those bleed i
10l tanks quickly, like if you go from a lower level to a higher level, 11 you're going to get a pressure increase, but we didn't chango the level
.c 12I in them that much, that would hi.ve caused that kind of increase up 13 until that Friday.
And like i say, there was a problem with the waste 1 41 gas system that still isn't really comp %tely resolved.
And the radiation 15i levels around the waste gas system were that high, that nobody could 16 really investigate them too throughly to correct the situation.
So, we 17!
sort of had to live with it.
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JACKSON: The bleed tanks, if I'm correct, float on the waste gas 20j system.
Is that true? Would they have been floating on the waste gas 21!
system vent header that morning?
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$LLER: Weii, indirectly the,4 ara some check valves that are connected 2
j oetween the waste gas and the t,leed tanks, that if the waste gas, or if 31
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the bleed tank pressure gets higher, I believe the waste gas system 4!
then is isolated from the gas space of the bleed tanks.
I'd have to c!
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check the flow diagram, but, I think that's the case.
6i i
7 JACKSON: Well, I apologize for having to get into the details here 8
without bringing the prints, but I've got one other question that I'm 9'
going to ask you.
Probably speculation though.
I've looked at these 10 reactor coolant bleed tanks, and the possibility of them being the 11!
release path, through the relief valve vent header... through the two 15 relief valves on each tank, and one question that comes to my mind, 13 when I look at that, is if they were relieving pressure through those
-14i relief valves, why would the makeup tank pressure not drop enough to 15' reestablish flow into that makeup tank, prior to having to open MtN-13?
16; 17l
'4 ILLER: Well, the relief valve on the makeup tank is a lot higher 18(
pressure.
So, the pressure buildup that would be possible in the l$!
makeup tank, before it would relieve to the bleed tanks, is a lot 201 higher.
In fact, it gets that high to the point where the pressure in 21[
the makeup tank doesn't alw any water to be emitted into the makeup i
22' tank from the recirc flow of the makeup pumps.
So, you get in a position 23 24l 25l
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i of having all the water that would have gotten into the makeup tank, 7t
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No... I don't really 26 just go right out the relief to the bleed tanks.
i, 31, understand your question, I don't see a problem there.
41 i
see if I can Well, let me talk on it just a little bit, and 0
JACKSON:
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make myself clearer on it.-
The... you had, say, 80 pounds of pressure in the ma.wup tank.
8l 91 MILLER:
Yeah.
101 Assuming it was around 80 pounds, when the relief valve would i
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JACKSON:
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have lifted.
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_ MILLER: Uh, uh.
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JACKSON:
And the pressure dropped very sharply.
Not the pressure, the level in the makeup tank dropped down to essentially zero level.
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ISj 191 MILLER:
Yeah, dropped down.
20:
So, we assume at this point that all the water has been 21l JACKSON:
0.K.
22l pushed over to the bleed tanks.
One might speculate at this point, also, that once you've got down this 1cs, you may be putting a certain i
23l Although amount of gas out of that makeup tank to the bletd tanks.
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there would still be water flowing in from possilby letdown and also 2l mini flow from the makeup pumps.
But, it may be possible for gas to 3!
get over there, and it may not be possible... through ?. hat relief 4'
valve.
And I was looking at the possibility of that being a flow path d
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for gas through that relief valve into the bleed tank and then out 6
through the relief tank vents. This doesn't seem to be supported by a great reduccion in pressure in the makeup tank.
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9 MILLER: Well, you would only reduce the pressure down to the setpoir:t 10!
of the relief valve in the makeup tank, which is right around 80 pounds, 11!
in that area.
So, if that was the flow path, your pressure in the 12 makeup tanks still would never get less than 80 pounds and then you'd i
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open the vent.
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JACKSON:
St.t there seems to be a continuous time period from about 16!
4:30 in the morning till sometime after 7:10 in the morning +. hat that i
17!
makeup tank level was essentailly zero, which may imply that the makeup 18
... that the relief valve was opened for that whole time. And if 191 that's the case, there was a lot of water, or a lot of gas or something 20!
going into that tank, and then out into the cleed tanks.
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MILLER:
Yeah.
That's probably wnat happened.
True.
But the volume 2l in the bleed tanks is that great that you'd have a long period of time 31 i
of gas going from the makeup tank tnrough that relief path into the 4:'
bleed tanks before you get up till like 70 pounds in the bleed tanks, Si due to the difference in volume.
6 l
I JACKS (" - We'll drop that right new, because some of that's speculation.
8 And without having the prints here to really trace it sat.
I won't 9
pursue that any more.
I can't think of any other questions that I 101 haven't covered the ground on with previous interviews of other people 1
that were on the shift that morning.
Unless you have something to adtt 12!
pertaining to... my primary purpose was to clarify what had happened i
13!,
surrounding the venting of the makeup tank on Friday morn 1ng, and who 14 was informed and what was the thought process going into it, and unless 15:
you have something to add on that...
16i 17!
MILLER:
Wall, the only thing I can add is sort of a... I said it 18!
before, maybe in different words that the amount of time when it was 19f decided on the course of action, and the time period on that... when 20l that course of action had to be started was that short that proper 21l notification and discussion between all the various groups involved 22l wasn't really possible or practical, in the opinion of the people in 231 the Control :icom at the time.
Maybe looking back on it now, maybe we 24l 25 f
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could have waited an extra half hour, but at the time, it looked like 2
we didn't want to get that much closer to the point where we might have 3
to possibly go into decay heat, and that wouldn't have been too good of 4
a situation.
And that was the thing.
It was such an abnormal situation j
j we were in. We had so many new procedures being cranked out.
And it 6!
was just an abnormal situation.
7 8I JACKSON:
0.K., then. We appreciate it.
Si 10f SHACXLETON:
This will be the conclusion then of this interview of Mr.
I 11l Adam '.i. Miller.
The time is now 2:15 p.m.
And the reading on the 12 meter is 449.
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