ML19253C944

Forwards Addl Info Re Safety Evaluation in Support of Amend 47 to License DPR-59.Encl Responds to Paragraph 3.2.1, Re Fire Hazard Analysis

ML19253C944
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	12/06/1979
From:	Early P POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:	Harold Denton, Ippolito T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
JPN-79-80, NUDOCS 7912120421
Download: ML19253C944 (6)

Text

• POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK to COLUMBUS CIRCLE NEW YORK. N. Y. too19 (212) 397-6200 TRUSTEES GEORGET. BERRY JOHN S.DYSON OPER ATING OFFICER JGHN W. BOSTON GEORGE L. ING ALLS , g$'nf,gego, y

flC E CM A!R M AN OF POW ER OPER ATIONS RICH AR D M. FLYNN JOSEPH R. SCHMIEDER ROBE =T o uiLLoNn December 6, 1979 "",'*;,,'",'*c"

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OFFICER SENIOR V CE PRES! CENT Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulations "*""**"

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention: Mr. Thomas A. Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 3 Division of Operating Reactors

Subject:

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Fire Protection System

Dear Sir:

We are enclosing additional information in response to NRC staff concerns on the JAF Fire Hazards Analysis. This response is consistent with your request in the JAF Safety Evaluation Report supporting Amendment No. 47 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59 dated August 1, 1979.

The enclosure relates to the SER Paragraph 3.2.1 Fire Hazard Analysis (PF-ll).

Very trul yours,

/

/

Paul

/ . Earl Assis' tant Chi,f Engineer-Projects 1539 355 Aooc.

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u 3 JAliES A. FITZPATiut K N1'ti.EAl. P0t.'ER PLi!;T FIPJ: ILiZAI:Ie; /';AlXS 1S SliPPl.):!!L!.TA1. b < ! "r i:a . 50-333 REFEREWCr: NRC Letter of September 22, 147o, Enclosurc No. 2 Response to ' it Conn rn Pr-ll :

Fire lla.:arJ Analvn is NRC S ta f f n ; t ern :

'lhe fi re liau..rJ s an.. ! vs is subnitted April 29, 1977 emd subsequent additional information subuittcJ Augu: t 3,1975 has not provided sufficient i;.formatien for the staff to conclude that safety related systems ars ..Jequately protected from fires in all fire areas. The submittals h..vu listcJ the major components locatcJ in each fire zone and destribed the engineering criteria estahtished for the installation of safeguatJs electrical circuits; howcVer, it has not been shown that adequate design consideration wa: given to preserving the operability of one division of safety related system require.1 to achieve a..J maintain cold shutdown conditions given an c::posure firc in any tire sne. The licensec has connenced a study to determine the exact loc ation of electrical raccuays for those systems and auxiliaries required to safely timtJxn and cooldmz:t the plant.

NRC Staff Position:

An analysic chould be pcrfat ned for each fire area containing safety related cables racevays (trays tunduit) or components, to verify the effectiveness of the spat 1.: 1 separation, tray covers, and/or fire stops in preventing simultancou:. da..: age L.,

reJundant safety systems from a possible exposure fire involvi:m the fixcJ combustibles in the arca and a reasonable amount of transicut combustible materials, which may be in the area for routine plant operations and maintenance. In addition to the damage resulting from elevatcJ temperatures in the imediate vicinity of the fire the analysis should consider the effects of: *

(1) Smoke and heat propagation via open stairways, hatches, and unrated penetrations in barricrs; (2) Smoke and heat propagation via HVAC ducts not equipped with automatic closing fire dampers; and (3) Water spray damage from fire hose streams.

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Where the an:. lysis indicates that the present design in inadequate, corrective in..Jifications should be proposed.

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Response

The James A. FitzPatrick Plant was reviewed to determine where fires within single fire areas could jeopardize the ability to safety shut down the plant. The analysis was performed using assumptions shown below. These assumptions become more con-servative in light of proposed modifications to provide greater

" defense in depth" against fires in the plant. These modificat-ions include increased number of early warning fire detection systems (response to NRC request PF-19); additional fire hose stations (response to NRC request PF20); augmented and upgraded fire door supervision (response to NRC request PF-8); revisions to assure greater independence and reliability of the fire water header system (response to NRC request PF-36) ; fire protecting of structural steel (response to NRC request PF-22); and major modifications to confine, detect, and fight any fire in the crescent (safeguards) area of the plant (response to NRC request PF-23).

As a result of the analysis performed in response to NRC request PF-ll, further modifications are recommended in the areas listed below where it appears that safe shutdown capability may be jeopardized by fire. These recommendations to be implemented will include fire protecting 23 sections of conduit; protecting or rerouting 18 cables; fire protecting 4 cable trays; providing redundant control power to actuating valves for the pressure relief system; providing an local emergency control station for Manual ADS value operation outside of the control room / relay room / cable spreading area complex; closure of openings which connect certain safety-related areas (see attached table); andinstallation of a spray barrier and sleeve sealant on reactor building El 272.

These modifications will assure that the plant can be safely shut down with a minimum of operator action in the event of fire.

Fire Zone Area RBlW Reactor Building Crescent Area - West RBlE - East RB13A Reactor Building El.272 - (NE Quadrant)

RBl3B -

(SE )

RB13C - (SW )

RB13D - (NW )

RBl4C E1.300 - (SW )

RBl4D -

(NW )

I RR1 Relay Room CSl Cable Spreading Room CTl Cable Tunnel - West CT2 Cable Tunnel - East CT4 Cable Tunnel - 4 TB12 Turbine Building - (Mezzanine) 1539 357

The following are the assumptions and design bases '_or the James A. FitzPatrick Plant fire hazards analysis.

1.

The only consequence of fire that is considered unacceptable is the inability to safely shut down and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown mode.

2. It is assumed that:

a.

the reactor is operating at 100 percent power when a fire occurs b.

only onsite power is available in achieving safe shutdown

c. .

the reactor is isolated from the main condenser.

It was at scram also assumed that there would be manual or automatic the direction of the Shift Supervisor to bring the reactor to hot shutdown.

3.

As presented in the NRC Review Reminder (see footnote )

it was assumed that there is a 72 hr period in which to achieve cold shutdown. During this 3-day period, credit may be taken for manual system operation, as well as for reasonable repairs, etc.

4.

No single or concurrent failures other than those directly attributable to the fire were considered.

5.

It was initially assumed that for any fire in a given fire area, all shutdown equipment and cable within that area is lost, and a determination was made whether cold shutdown can be achieved using safe shutdown equipment in the remaining areas.

6.

Loss of a cable does not automatically mean loss of components connected to that cable.

Each cable was evaluated to determine whether it is essential to the functioning of the components to which it is connected before it is concluded that the component is lost.

Other failures due to hot shorts, opens, or grounds were also considered 7.

If the results of the above, indicated that it is not possible to shut down the plant using shutdown equipment in other areas,

the area in which the fire is assumed to have occurred was evaluated to determine where credit can be taken for separation by distance, fire detection and suppression, etc. If it appeared that safe shutdown capability was still jeopardized recommmendations for plant modification were on a cace by case basis, a

(1)

August 8, 1979, NRC " Review Reminder" from V. Benaroya to Auxiliary System Branch Staff members.

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EFFECTS OF HEAT PROPAGATION TitROtJGH OPENINGS Areas or tones Connected Effects on Safe Evaluated Via Shutdown Pecommendations Crescent Area East Directly through stairs, Fi re spread trora RB-1E to Cable penetrat1ons to (R B-1E) to ductwork, cable penetration Rb-13B or vice versa does be modif ied gending Reactor Building not cause loss of safe results of PF-21 testing.

El 272 (RB-138) shutdown capability.

Crescent Area West Directly through spiral Fire spread f rorn RB-1W to Enclose spiral stair, (R B- 1N) to stairs, stairwell, cable RB-13C could jeopardize provide 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire darapers Reactor Building El 272 penetrations, ductwork sate shutdown rasmibility. or other isolation in d uct wor k . Cable pene-(RB-13C) trations to be moditied pending results of PF-27 testing.

Reactor Building Directly through stairs, Reconsnendations made 1b protect switchgear LO16 f rcun f are spreading t rora El 272 (RB-13 3 all hatches, duct ensure that RB-13D to RB- 14 D, the open quadrants) to Reactor Building El 300 for quadrants A, B, and C hatch beside LOI6 should (RB-14 3 all quadrants) shutdown is still pos- be closed with a sible in the unlikely renovable fire rated cover event of f tre spreading or other rnea ns .

irorm RD-13 to RB-14 (or vice versa) in these quadrants.

Battery Rooms 1 and 2 Via corridor BR-5 through All ductwork has fire None (BR-1 and 2) to ductwork and doors dampers and doors are Battery Roome 3 and 4 itre rated.

(BR-3 and 4) meergency Diesel via switchgear rooms Door is 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire None Generator Rooms 1 and 2 EG-5 and EG-6 through rated.

(EG-1 and 2) to doors

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* Dnergency Diesel (y} - Generator Doorns 3 and 4 g (EG-3 and 4)

T Doergency Diesel via SH-1 through Doors are 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire None Generator Switchgear doors rated.

M Rooms (EX',-5 to EG-6) lf)

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Areas or Zones Connected Effects on Safe Via Shutdown P ecomrnenda t ion s Evaluated Via TB-1 through doors All doors 3 hour fire Provide 3 hour fire darrper IE Switchgear in 12" x 16" duct. and ducts and Via AD-3 rated; all ducts, except Rooms (SW-1 to SW-2) direct connection duct (corridor) through doors and Via 12" x 16" equapped with fire dampers. duct Direct through door All doors are 3 hour Provide 3 hour fire safety Related darpers in ductwork Pump Rooms and Via SH-1 through fire rated. us= x 36* ducts into screenwell house.* (SP-1 to SP-2) (2 ducts in each pump room) and Via SH-1 through doors Directly through door Door is 3 hour iire None Cable Tunnel 1 rated (CT-1) to cable Tunnel 2 (Cr-2) Via RR-1 through ducts rire spread could cause Provide 3 hour iire darters Cable Tunnel 3 in ductwork. loss of redundant (CT-3) to shutdown equipment. Cable Tunnel 4 (CT-4) MyrE: 1979.

• For further details see responses to Item 3.1.8 of Saf ety Evaluation Report of August 1,

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