ML19253C714

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Answers to Util Third Set of Interrogatories Re Contentions 9,10,14 & 17.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML19253C714
Person / Time
Site: Allens Creek File:Houston Lighting and Power Company icon.png
Issue date: 11/13/1979
From: Mccorkle B
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To:
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
References
NUDOCS 7912120006
Download: ML19253C714 (4)


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In the Patter of x HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER COMPANY x '

x Docket No. 50-466 (Allens Creek Nuclear Generating x Station, Unit 1) x MCCORKLE' S ANSWERS TO 'IMIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES FROM H. L. & P.

A. Contention 9:

1. It was a few miles southwest of Wallis. The well cau6h t fire around September 4, 1979
a. Hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, sulfuric acid, and some chlorine and hydrochloric acid.
b. There is no known concentration that has no toxic effects. Sulfur dioxide is thought to cause cancer. Hydrogen sulfide kills at very low levels. Short term levels are: 1 ppm for chlorine 5 ppm for hcl; 10 ppm for S0 ; 20 ppm for H 2S-2
c. Levels of several thousand ppm are possible at the source of the fire. If it is carried by a wind that does not change direction these concentrations will not change much over the distance of several miles.

2.a These rail lines can carry anythin6, including, but not limited to, Phosphine (.05 ppm),Arsine(D5 ppm), Phosgene (1.0 ppm),Eromine (1.0 ppm), nickel carbonyl (1.0 00m).

b. I have no documents at this time.
c. I do not have this infor:ation.

Quantities of toxic Sas may be transported to the site by the d*

rupture of one of the nearby pipelines or by the crash of a car 6o plane near the site.

3.a. The concentrations possible can easily overburden the few safety measures called for in Reg. Guide 1 95 Also, the Guide does not prove compliance with the regulations which are not proven to provide safety in all cases.

b. No allowance is made for a plane crash which could carry the gases into the control room.

1534 299 7912120 00 6

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4. a. The control room is not a Type A control room,
b. No provisions have been made to protect against the gases listed in 2.a. above.

5 Stated in #s 3 & 4 above.

6. a. Reg. Guide 1.23 was not sent to me. Many sets of conditions could cause this problem. No special conditions were used. Certainly, a 5=ph wind speed, with most reasonable temperatures, and inversion conditions could cause these problems. ,

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b. I have no calculations at this time. Weather data is available at Hobby, Galveston, Alvin, and Intercontinental airports.
7. a. I do not know what toxic gases will be stored at Allens Creek site.
b. See above
c. See above B. Contention 14
1. a. It is a metal that has a hi 6h activity or electromotive potential.

The fuel rod clad is an active metal,

b. Pages 4-5 of the SER shows that cladding has hydriding problems.
2. Zirconium is reactive with hydro 6en. Source: Page 4-5 of SER.
3. a. I do not know all sources of hydrogen from the plant site that could get inside the fuel rods. Hydro 6en from the air may be a i source.
b. Any quantity of noisture would contribute to the failure.
c. I do not know if there is a threshold level of moisture below .

which failure of the fuel rod will not occur.

4. Several operating reactors have had fuel rod failure due to hydriding.

This is referenced on Pa6et 4-5 of the SER.

5 The hydrogen getter material has not been used long enough to get a history as to how effective it will be in the long term.

6. The initial density of the fuel pellets is within the knowledge of the applicant. I do.not know the initial density or the expected

. amount of density increase.

7 Initially,13.4kW/ft. After densification the rate may rise to above 30 kW/ft for short distances and durin6 transients. See Page 4-4 of SER.

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8. Any increase in the densification increases the linear heat generation rate which increases the clad strain which increases the chance of clad failure which increases the possibility of dcwn time or an accident.

9 Heat transfer to the reactor water from the fuel rods does not stop completely as a result of densification. The heat transfer coefficient will changed by the ratio of the conductivity of the EaP to that of the UO2-

11. I do not have this information.

Contention 17 l.a. About 100 ft 3/hr divided by 100 equals about 1 ft3 /hr. By wei6ht of containment air.

b. No, Measure total containment leakage, then divide by 100.
c. Twenty-four hours for test purposes, but it wotild have to be net under all conditions.
d. The bypass of any more than 1% would not sufficiently protect the health of the public.

2.a. All intake filters.

b. I do not know what filters at ACNGS are located in the reactor build-ing or their function.
c. The heat follows the air as it travels throu6h the pipes.
d. The noble 6ases and Iodine.  ;

Contention 10:

1.a. I do not have a copy of this study in my possession. This study was done by the Houston Chamber of Commerce,

b. I do not have the names of the eight airlines or the number of fli6 hts.
c. See b. above.

2.a. I do not know at this time.

b. Same as 2.a. above. 1534 01 Under oath I state that I have answered these interrogatories to the best of my ability.

A ~ 0. , O Tn6d a SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, this /$ day of_ 7v&e/44 ,1977.

E. F. BURLE!GH .

Netary Pd!!c in Harris County, Texas My Cs:nmission Eoires November 15,1980

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UNI'IED STATES OF AVZRICA EF0?S THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD -- DOC 12T #50-466 CERTIFICA'IE OF SERVICS I hereby certify that copies of the fore 5oing McCorkle's Answers to Third Set of Interro5atories From H. L. & P. in the above-captioned proceeding were served on the followin5 by deposit in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on this 13th day of November, 1979 Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chairman, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Dr. E. Leonard Cheatum Pr. Gustave A..Linenberger Mr. Chase R. Stephens Richard Lowerr6, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Texas Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Steve Schinki, Staff Counsel Ms. Carro Hinderstein Fr. James Scott, Jr.

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Mr. Wayne E. Rentfro

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