ML19253C378

Transcript of 791114 Meeting in Washington,Dc.Pp 1-83

ML19253C378
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Issue date:	11/14/1979
From:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7912050288
Download: ML19253C378 (84)

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MS.TTER OF:

PUBLIC MEETING BRIEFING BY NRR ON TMI LESSONS LEARNED REPORT k

Place - Washington, D. C.

Date. Wednesday, 14 November 1979 Pages 1 - 83 T.I. phone:

(202)347-3700 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS,INC.

OfficialReportersQJ QfQ \\- 444 North Capitol Street Washington, D.C. 20001 7912050 Z 9 P NATIONWIDE COVERAGE. DAILY

1 3302 / DISCLAIMER This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held onWednesday, 14 Nov. 1979 in the Commissions's offices at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. The meeting was open to public attendance and observation. This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain inaccuracies. The transcript is intended solely for general informational purposes. As prov'ided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matter's discussed. Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not necessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs. No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any progeeding as the result of or addressed to any statement or argument contained herein, except as the Commission may authorize. S e be 1503 061

CR8342 2 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA e 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 m 4 PUBLIC MEETING S BRIEFING BY URR ON TMI LESSONS LEARNED REPORT 6 7 Room 1130 8 1717 H Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 9 Wednesday, 14 November 1979 10 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m. 11 BEFORE: - 12 DR. JOSEPH M. HENDRIE, Chairman of the Commission 13 VICTOR,GILINSKY, Commissioner 14 RICHARD T. KENNEDY, Commissioner 15 PETER A. BRADFORD, Commissioner 16 JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner 17 PRESENT: 18 l Messrs. Bickwit, Gossick, Denton, Hanrahan, Mattson, and 19 Shapar. 20 21 22 23 i 1503 062 24 l

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22 01 01 3 .macDAV 1 PR0CEEDINGS 2 (2: 10 p.m. ) 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY (presiding): Could you go 4 ahead, Mr. Director? 3 MR. GOSSICK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you recall, we were here on October 16 f or the o t treatment of the Lessons Learned Report which had not been 8 prepared, or at least had not been an issue at this point. 9 The report was sent out to you on October 22, as the 10 Commi ssion requested. 11 As you recall, there was a briefing on the whole 12 full content of the report. 13 Harold, you indicated that you had something you 14 wanted to say. 15 MR. DENTON: Just to mention that we had included 16 this Task Force Report before the President's Commission 17 Report was availaole. We have provided copie s of this 13 report to tne ACRS to solicit their comments. We're still 19 developing an action plan to be sure that in our 20 considerations of that report we include all sources that 21 will be coming out in the future. 22 Roger will now make the presentation. 23 DR. MATTSON: Well, although the last briefing 24 pre:eded the publication of the report, the final draf t of 25 that report -- you'll recall we talked policy for a couple ~ 1503 063

)2 01 02 4 mgeDAV 1 hour in that briefing and didn't spend a whole let of time 2 on the specific recommendations. 3 What we're going to do today is skip the front end 4 of the report, which is the policy section which we've 5 already discussed, and start at the back end of the report 6 so that we can review the recommendations one by one at whate ver pac e seems to be appropriate. That is, whatever e S questions come up, we'll try to answer them. If there are 9 none, we'll just forge ahead with the next recommendation. 10 There are 14 in all in the report. There are 13 11 in tnat little handout that you have up here at the t aole. 12 There are 14 listed. Two of them got pulled together. 13 For those people in the audience who don't have a 14 hancout, despair not. You can have a copy of the report 15 which was in tne oack of the room when you came in. Just 16 turn to Appendix A starting with page A-4. Ie Tne first of the 13 recommendations has many 13 suoparts, but all have to do with personnel qualifications 19 and training. The overall thrust from the policy point of 20 view was to increase, of course, the level of 21 qualifications, not only for reactor operators but also the 22 other members of the operations' organiza tions --- the 23 technicians all tne way up to the Vice President for 24 Operations, and these recommendations are intended to head 25 Us in that airection. 1503 064

2 01 03 5 macDAV I You'll recall we said at the f ront of the report 2 that there were some new policy objec tives, new safety ~ 3 objec tives, that we thought needed to be articulated in a 4 number of these areas. And as time goes on here in the next 5 couple of months and we get an action plan to head ourselves 6 toward rearticulating the oojectives, the Task Force thought 7 that these specific recommendations were the kind of things 3 that would put us in the right direction for obtaining those 9 o bjec tive s. 10 So we acknowledged as to how some of tnem might be 11 lost in developing an action plan. That is, there might be 12 better ways to approach some of these pro ble ms. Some of 13 them might ce modified. But in general, they were in the 14 right direction. I must say, having read the President's 15 Commission'~s Report of several weeks ago, that we seem to be 16 pretty much on the mark with the directions indicated by 17 that report. 18 Tnere are a couple areas where we.go beyond the 19 President's Commission, and one particular area that we'll 20 ta14 about a little later, the preparation of training 21 organizations, where we seem to have come at the proolem a 22 little oit differently, but overall, I would say that we did 23 not undershoot the mark in very many of these areas. 24 Well, under personnel cualification and training, 2a the first thing we talked about was utility management i503 065

22 01 04 6 mgcDAV. I involvement, and the thrust here was to try to accomplish <~ 2 the same kind of commitment and recognition _ of 3 responsibility at all levels of an operations organization 4 that Naval reactors had beeri so successful in achieving down 5 through the years with the personal involvement of its Chief 6 Executive, if you will, the Admiral, It seemed to us that the repsonsibility for s 8 chosing the right people to execute the operations of the plant resided at the corporate management level. We chose 13 to focus in on the Vice President for Operations in the il corporate management organization. .Ne said it was, in our 12 judgment, the responsibility at that level to assure that 13 the s elec tion, training, and qualifications of operations 14 perso nnel were done correctly. And one mechanism to assure 15 that corporate management was involved was to require the 15 Vice President for Operations to certify to the NRC that Ie individual applicants for operator and senior reactor 18 operator licenses were appropriately qualified to hold those 19 positions. That is, it would be that corpora te manager's 20 responsioility to see that the training program, the 21 selec tion program, are what they snould ce to assure that 22 the right caliber and character of person was selected for 23 the job. 24 Tne way we do it today is usually the Statior 25 Superintendent or Plant Superintenden t woula ce responsicle 1503 066

s s )2 01 05 7 macDAV ~1 for such certification. Now, an applicant f or a license -- 2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You had in your Short-tera 3 Lessons Lect ned Report, Roger, you had a recommendation f or 4 a Senior Technical Advisor to be present. Would you involve 5 this Vice Precident of Operations in some certification with 5 respect to that individual or any other individuals? I am 7 curious as to why you restricted it to just the operators. 8 DR. MATTSON: Later on in this first 9 recommendation, you'll see that we recommend consideration 10 of licensing other personnel in the operations organization 11 and Shift Technical Advisors would oe prime candidates for 12 such consideration. 13 I guess what we said in the recommendation was for 14 those people we license, we should see certification of 13 capaci11 ties with the license application. cor those people 16 we do n't license, we still hold the corporate management il responsiole for assuring a competent and capable crew but 13 without the certification. 19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE2 To be specific, does that 20 meen that the Vice President f or Ope"ations would be held 21 accountacle to certify the competence overall of the crew? 22 DR. MATTSON: I think we could procably do that. 23 We aidn't encose to do that. That's what you do. Howard 24 can help me sort it out here because we get confused with 25 the semantics in the regulations. The licensee is called 1503 067

22 01 06 8 mgc DAV-1 "the-person", but in fact there is no single person who is 2 the licensee, as I understand the law. 3 MR. SHAPAR The licensee is the person, ana the 4 licensee as a whole is the one that we hold accountable. 5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: But this is the corporate 5 p erso n. 4 MR. SHAPAR: The person, in the legal terminology, S is the licensee. 9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But the lay terminology 10 would be an individual, like this Vice President of 11 Operations is an individual. That's not the licensee. 12 MR. SHAPAR: No. Of cource, the other licensees 13 are licensed operators. 14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: They have individual 15 l ic en ses. 16 DR. MATTSON: So you hold the licensee responsible il for the competency of the license organization when you 13 issue a license and reach judgment that they're safely 19 qualified to opera a the plant. It's a little bit different 20 than this particular one whicn is a diff erent licensee. In 2i this case, it's the licensed operator. 22 What your asking is, as part of the package he 23 orings to you to seek a license -- contain a certification 24 f rom his corporate management that ne's qualified. 26 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Ana a specif ic individual. 1503 068

)2 01 07 9 mocDAV~ l The' chief op5 rations person. And I guess what I would 2 prooably pref er is to extend that certification-of 3 compe tence on the part of that individual. s 4 DR. MATTSON: Remember what we said last week to 5 Dr. Press at the White House about our views on the 6 President's Commission's Report. We said that'one area that I needed furtner attention --- and we were going to give it 8 promptly -- was this question of general management and 9 technical competence to operate a plant safely. What you're la sugge sting might ce a way to come at that problem. If 11 you're going to require that corporate official to certif y 12 that certain criteria, they have to be articulated 13 pertaining to competence overall -- management, technical 14 capabilities. la COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Is it without question that 16 we are empowered to designate this soecific corporate 14 official in a corporate management chain which is not under 18 our direction, per se -- that a specific corporate o fficial 19 named shall oe, in f act, responsible? 23 Ms. SHAPAR: I think so. There's a reasonable 21 nexus to health ano safety. He has a handle on the person, 22 the licensee, and I think we could have a regulation that 23 would have a health and safety base that would say a high 24 , management o f ficial -- 25 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Ah, a high management 1503 069

8 4 )2 01 08 10 mgcDAV i . o ffic ial. ' 2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And -- no, go a he a d. 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The last question about h, 4 that is, is it clear the utility has a Vice Presiou t for 5 Operations in its management chain? ~6 DR. MATTSON: That's a good poir.t. I think you e would have to go utility by utility and select the right 3 person. We used the generic term, Vice President for 9 Ope ra tions. It carries the picture of the level we're 10 interested in, but I think it very well may be they have 11 different names. 12 CO MMISSIONER AHEARNE: In my view, it's not so 13 much whether we can do it as to first decide whether we ( 14 should and then find out how we can. 15 DR. MATTSON: Yes. 16 COMMISSIONER ERAD 0RD: Roger, let me pinpoint il this in scace and time. If I were a utility executive on 13 the receiving end of this report and I read that first one, 19 I had a nuclear plant, what should I be thinking about doing 20 rignt now? 21 DR. MATTSON: What we're intending is whether that 22 that Vice President f or Operations shoula ask himself 23 whether he's been personally involved enough in assuring 24 that the organizational structure accountacle to him pays 25 the right kind of attention to the selection and 1503 070

12 01 09 11 mgcDAV 1 qualification and training c.* personnel to do their job -- 2~- specifically, operators and senior reactor operators. 3 COMMISSIONER BRAD?ORD: And when am I going to oe - 4 expected to sign on the dotted line to the ef fect that, in a fact, my company seems to me to be qualified. o DR. MATTSON: From simply reading this document, I you won't ge t the answer to that. I would expect that is S something we could reasonably expect to accomplish in a relat ively f ew months. I have just given notice that we're 10 going to expect then to certify, and it mignt well oe that 11 in some organizations the Vice President for Operations is 12 completely confident in the organization he's head of. It's 13 oeen, in his judgment, an implicit certification on his 14 level all along, and he's willing to sign that dotted line 15 tomorrow. 16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Now wait. There are two il ciffe rent things here. IS Wnat you have descrioed is a certification that, 19 in f act, the organizational structure and the procedures are 2J such as to give an unquestioned level of confidence in that 21 the organization is producing qualified people. That's a 22 different thing, it seems to me, than that senior of ficial, 23 the Vice President for Operations, certifying that John 24 5mitn, Senior Operator, is compe tent, which is what the 25 recommendation of AJ-4 says. 1503 071

12 01 10 12 mgcDAV I ~ DR. MATTSON: It's the _latter that we have in 2 mind, but it's through the former that an executive at that 3 level would probably reach his confidence. I don't think we 3 4 would expect a Vice president for Operations to be 5 intimately involved in the months of training provided to 6 these people to assure himself that day by day they've / accomplished what he thinks they should accomplish in order _ S for him to certify. 9 COMMISS IONER KENNEDY: He's not being asked that. 10 What he's teing asked, according to this recommendation -- 11 and I'll just read it -- that as a part of the application 12 f or operator and senior operator licenses, the corporate 13 management certify the competence anu fitness of the 14 applicants" -- that is the competence and fitne ss of John la Smith, Appl-icant -- not whether you've got a system which is 16 going to produce competent and fit people, out whether John 1i Smitn himself is competent and fit. Thet's what it says. la DR, MATTSON: That's right. That's what it means. l> COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Okay. You can't nave it 20 both ways. You can't say, okay, well you know we know that 21 this fellow is going to take the broad view of this and look 22 at this from the oig management concept, and at the same 23 time tell him that he is personally responsiole for the 24 o utco me. 25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Mell, what he has to be 1503 072

)2 01 11 13 mccDAV I accountacle for is the outcome. 2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Okay. 3 DR. MATTSON: All I would s ay is that he can't do 4 so without taking into account both the broad and the 5 specific. It isn't simply certified to us that you've got a 6 system for turning out good people. It's certifi<3d to us that you have turned out good people person by person. e 9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Or you are accountacle for 9 the people you turn out. To me, it was very consistent with IJ tne approach -- 11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, I'm not arguing with 12 that. But you can't fuzz it over if indeed this individual, 13 the V,1ce President for Operations or whatever he is called, 14 is oersonally responsible for the fitness and competence -- 15 and those are tha words used here. Now John Smith, Reac tor 16 Operator Applicant -- that's a rather different thing than 17 what you were describing. I just want to be sure that IS that's clear. 19 DR. MATISON: I didn't want to f uzz it over, but 20 it is as you descrice it. 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I want to De sure that we 22 are absolutely clear about that. 23 DR. MATTSON: I think we are. 24 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It's tne accountablity 25 chain. That's what NASA has used, what many weapons systems 1503 073

22 01 12 14 mgcDAV 1 have used. 2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I understand what it is, 3 out I don't want us to talk in one set of terms and mean T 4 something else. I want to be sure that we have brought 5 together meaning and language. 6 DR. MATTSON: But in answer to Commissioner / Bradf ord's question, if you were the corporate executive, 8 what would you be doing today -- I'd be looking at my system 9 in addition to looking at my specific people. If I had 10 operators I knew were going to require licenses within the 11 next six months, I'd be making certain that I picked the 12 right candidates and that they had the right kind of 13 qualifications and that the system that was training them, 14 that they wsre involved in, before I would be required to ( 16 make that certific ation, was a good system, because if they 16 waste d their time doing the wrong things with the right le peopl e, I wouldn't ce able to certify them at the time I had 18 to make a certification. 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY What does the certification 23 then imply in terms of responsibility on the part of this 21 o f fic ial? 22 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY: Le t me just follow up on 23 that question. Suppose the man does certify. how do you 24 tell whether he is properly certifying or not -- on the / 26 basis of whether the applicant in the cast has already done 1503 074

32 01 13 15 mgcDAV 1 it? 2 DR. MATTSON: There are. several things later in 3 these recommendations,. If you'll look on paga A-5, this 4 operator licensing business, it calls. for improvement of the 5 IE interf ace -- that is, better communication between the 6 operator licensors and the inspectors, and it calls f or f eedback through licensee event reports of information about e 8 who commits operational errors. The intent would be, 9 through operator licensing experience, through f eedoack f rom 10 the individual plants both via IE and via licensee event 11 reports, to see how well these people were Joing. And if 12 trends were established for a particular licensee -- that 13 he nas a particular power plant licensee or a particular 14 operator licensee, then the intent would be to go back to 15 the corporate management official who had been making such 16 certi fication and examine why, if it had happened, 11 performance had gone downhill. 18 I don't think it would be the intent to pick on a 19 particular mistake by a particular individual and go back to 20 the corporate vice president and say, "How come Joe Blow 21 made that one particular mistake", out instead to create a 22 system where you monitor and track the quality of operator 23 perf ormance over a period of time and understand the 24 goodness of the oerf ormance according to that certification. 25 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY: Wnat you're really 1503 075

)2 01 14 16 mgcDAV 1 talking about is a high executive of the company who is -2 responsible for the performance of the operators, rather 3 than one who' is certifying applicants it seems to me. 4 Dd. MATTSON: Yes, that's what I said at' the 5 introduction. The idea is to have high corporate management in olvement and accountability f or operations overall. The v 6 7 certification of the fitness and capability of individual 3 operators is one method of assuring that involvement at a 9 given point in time. 10 CO MMISSIONER KENNEDY: What is the responsibility 11 of this official having once certified? Suppose it turns 12 out that this operator, having passed the examinations and 13 whatever an: having been certified as to his fitness and 14 compe tence, makes a gross mistake and causes damage and 15 potential, not necessarily real, harm to the public ? What 16 is the responsibility of this certifying official who is le responsible for certifying as to his competence and fitness? IS DR. MATTSON: We didn't speak to that. 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: We know. 20 DR. MATTSON: There were several alternatives that 21 speak to the question you raised that de discussed and did 22 not come forward with them as recommendations. One was to 23 issue operator licenses, much as driver's licenses are 24 issued, so that a person could accumulate points against 23 them for errors made -- the number of points accruing in 1503 076

32 01 15 17 mgcDAV 1 prcportion to the kind of mi +.akes that were made, and that 2 when your ticket was punched a sufficient nubber of times, ~ you lost your license. 3 4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Does this apply to the 5 opera tor or to the Vice President? 6 DR. MATTSON: To the operator. ~ o 8 ) 10 11 I N. e y 13 ( 15 16 17 IS 19 23 21 22 23 24 25 1503 077

18 02 02 01 DAV 1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY 2 What about the vice ~ p[esident who judged his fitncss and competence and thus 2 3 m.ade it possible for him to get his license? 3 4 DR. MATTSON: That would be another way to come at 5 it, to issue a certain number of points to the vice 6 president f or operations, a ssuming that you would have to 7 license him. e MR. SHAPAR: To license him, which he is not now, 9 and you'a probably have to change the law to license him if 10 he's not actually manipulating.the controls, 11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I will take that one step 12 further. Vic Stello has indicatec' the thought at least that 13 he's thinking aoout penalizing operators f or mistakes they ( 14 make. Now, if a penalty were to be exacted against an 15 operator once the vice president had certified that Ic operator, would that mean then that the penalty should be 17 levied ag61nst the vice pre sident? Ic MR. SHAPAR : You can't levy a penalty against the 19 vice pr e side n t. 20 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You're talking about the 21 way the law is right now. What I am trying to do is -- I 22 view the Le ssons Learned recommendations as sets of 23 recommencations on what we ought to do and then, given that -24 tna t's wha t we ought to do, we look at wnether we can do it / 25 with existing law, and if not tha t means that additional 1503 078

19 02 02 02 DAV 1 laws should be requested. So, I was really more trying to ~r ~ 2' f ollow that. 3 DR. MATTSON: Well, what you're trying to do with 4 any penalty is to increase or arsure that the incentive to 5 do the right thing is the right ' ncen tive. It seems to the 6 task force that it was wrong to put that incentive on the 7 individual operator. The place where it belonged was on the 8 operations organization; hence, a high corporate of ficial y responsible f or o perations. 10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But it's hard to, at least 11 in some organizations. Coming out of the military side of 12 the world, the way you end up putting responsibility is you 13 find it indiviouals, it's when you, say, pu t the 14 responsibility upon the corporate organization, that's 15 diffusa. Io COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You don't mo tiva te 17 o rganization s t you motive people, human beings. 18 DR. MATTSON: But the intent is for the licenser 19 to motivate the licensee. And recognizing. I think, the 20 desire to not literally license every individual in the 21 plant, you may want to license more than just operators and 22 senior operators. We also want quality performance out of 23 all the technicians and all the auxiliary operators and all 24 the supervisors and all the engineers, tha t the reach of J 2' personal accountability from us to,the corporate management' 1503 079

20 32 02 03 nv D.4 V 1 level will, in turn, cause him to reach for accountability 2 up and down his organization. 3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, it seems to me there 4 is a good deal to be said for having one point of contact 5 with the utility at a high level on this subject, and when o problems aevelop you can go directly to the pe son that can 7 do some thing abou t it,. penalty or not. e DR. MATISON: And recognize that with the people 9 you do license, with some f eedback as to their perf ormance 10 when they come up for relicensing, you can ask yourself very 11 serious questions about whether their performance reflects 12 t ha t they shoula be relicensed. There are no criteria f or 13 relicensing at the moment that would affect sucn a judgment 14 other than some subjective evaluation of that kind of 15 information by the oral examiner, which might lead that 16 person to ask special questions or to ask special light on 17 his a cceptance of whatever an swers he got. 16. The points you bring up are very good. It's ly exactly the kind of thought we meant to stimulate by this 20 recommenaation. 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDYr Well, let me suggest tne 22 recommenaation doesn't answer any of the questions. And 23 t he r ef o re, I con't find it a terribly satisfying one, except 24 in the level of generality in which it is now written. It 25 seems to me to be a useful recommendation, and to be useful 1503 080

21 02 02 04 UAV 1 in terms of guidance to the licensees. The questions that ~ 2 we've asked need to be answered. And I think I would like 3 to see somebody put their minds to some potential answers to 4 those que stions and I perhaps could hear something on tha t 5 maybe in the next week. o DR. MATTSON: Well, I think what you wan t to do is 7 not addre ss that question in isolation, because I think you 6 have to aodress the question of who else do you want to y license, and in order to address that question you have got 10 to ask yourself is the way training is conducted and 11 feedback of operating experience of all those things that go 12 into continuing re training, is that being done. 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Let me clarify. I 14 understanc all those things. And speaking specifically of ( ~ 16 w ha t is expected of and what will be required of and what to the responsibilities will be of the vice president for 17 opera tions, or whatever one calls him, specifically what is lo he to co, precisely how is it expected that he will go about lv i t, anc what the result will be. And that doesn't come 20 through all that clearly. It's come througn a lot more 21 clearly in the discu ssion here as the discussion has emerged 22 than it did in the beginning. 23 MR. DENTON: We will clarif y that when we come 24 back. Remember, on the fir st Le ssons Learned report, we ha d 25 met several times witn the ACRS, and had branched out a lot 1503 081

22 02 02 05 '* UAV I of questions that came from reading the text, and we tried 2 to clarify it finally. This has not had that purpose yet. 3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I understand that. I don't 4 intend to be critical. I am saying, you know, if this 5 recommendation is to accomplisn the purpose, which I think o i s clear, then it needs to be fleshed out. ~ 7 MR. BICKWIT: Do you also want to know what the 6 consequences would be for failure to live up to the v re s ponsibili tie s? 10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Certainly. And the answer, 11 I think, right now is "None." Because we don't license this 12 fellow. 13 MR. BICKNIT: But what would be recommendec when ( 14 the legislation is needed. 15 COMMISS IONER KENNEDY: Right. 16 MR. SHAPAR: We mignt have a handle against the 17 licensee if there were something wrong with the proce ss of le certification. 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, we need to go into 20 that and see where it takes us. 21 MR. SHAPAR: It's depending on what results sie 22 founc on the examination. 23 "R. MATTSON: Maybe I said this obtusely. 1 think 24 what you would wa7t to do i.s to tie this to whatever new 25 requirements we decice upon fo a licensee to demonstrate 1503 U82

23 02 02 00 0AV continued technical and managment ca pability to operate a '~' 2 plant safely.. The thing we said last week we were going to -S, 3 pay prompt attention to, this would be one element of that. 4 And if certain criteria were violated, I think the 5 bottom line would bet having failed to continue to 6 cemonstrate such continuity, they should shut the plant 7 down. I think that would be the way that we would intend to o Pead with this particular piece of that overall question. 9 (At 2:35 p.m., Chairman Henorie enters room.) 10 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I would like to do that a 11 little more, because I Inink there might be some real value 12 in trying to establish controls or penalties on 13 indivicuals. ( 14 MR. DENTON: I wonder if there is any precedent 15 from the produ t liability laws as to how it's evcived in lo t ho se case s. 17 COMMISSIONER KdNNEDf: Also, in thinking about 16 t ha t -- and I understand what you're saying, Jo hn -- there 19 is anotner side to that question. That is, if one begins to 20 f rom the outside take gn the disciplinary function whien 21 ought to be discharged essentially by tne management, you 22 are destroying the very tool which probably is tne only one 23 which is ever going to get you saf e ty anyway. In other 24 worcs, I am simply saying I can't think you f ellows in 25 Eetnesca or all une rest of u s pu t together are going to ge t 1503 083

24 02 02 07 mi DAV I saf ety in this business unless the individual managements in 2 this industry put their mind to it. And if they eze 3 relieved of these responsibilities by our assuming them, 4 that's not likely to get that kind of result. 5 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD2 Yes, it would be odd to o treat this as a unique area in which we would fine an 7 indivioual employee rather than the company when you b consicer the whole host of other things that can go wrong. 9 It we rere going to shift to a policy of fining the 10 indivicual within the structure, ra ther than holding the 11 company itself responsible, this procably isn't a logical 12 starting place. 13 DR. MATfSON: This is the gut question of this 14 small recommendation, ist which are you going to do, tne 15 indivicual or the company? 16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Well, the way you've 17 sta ted it here, I just assumed it was the com par:y. Id CR. MATfSON: Tha t's the cecision we came to in lv making the recommendation. Tha t's right. But we dic 20 consider the alternative, which was going to the individuals 21 -- in this case, the reac tor o pera tor s. 22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I am sorry. I t hough t 23 t ha t what sonn was talking about was the vice president. 24 MR. SHAPAR: There are three further points rather 25 t han tvlo. 1503 084

25 02 U2 06 pv DAV 1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: You always have the 2 handle on the operator. Then he is the licensee. Not that 3 he can be fined, necessarily, but lose his license. 4 But if, f or purposes of this recommendation, we 5 start looxing at the vice president, I assume they raised 6 really a mucn largcr question, which is whether whenever 7 something goes wrong in a plant we should be looking at the indivicuals responsible f or the error with regard to a e possible fine, rather than the company. y 10 DR. MATTS 0d: That was not our intent. Our intent .11 was not to be aole to go back to the vice president f or 12 operations and say, "You lose your license." It was instead ~ 13 to nave as part of a license condition on a reactor the f act ( 14 that there was demonstraole high management attention to 15 these ques'tions, whereas.tooay there is no such licensing lo requirement. 17 Okay. In tne area of training programs, the lo second recommenda tion, 1.2: was to accomplisn croadening of I> the reach of regula tion into operations training f rom what 20 we had in tne past, in two ways: 21 First, in the sense of who gets trained for wnat 22 level of assurance s tha t is, we caCed for the performance 23 or position task analysis f or the entire operations 2e organization, and tnen a cemonstration that the training / 25 progran on each level corre sponced. to tne position task 1503 085

26 22 C2 Oy Fr UAV i analysis. ~ 2 The second way of broadening training, or the 3 reacn of regulation into training, was to increase the kinds .s 4 of events for which training was accomplished. And we went 5 not only to the multiple f ailure, complex transients sorts 6 of events that we've been talking about since April of '79, 7 but one step f urther into the beyond-design-basis training 8 in the sense of core melt and cegraded core cooling events. v T ha t is, even though the oesign of the plant does not 10 include specific features f or mitigation of core-melt ll accioents, the training ought to include use of the 12 equipment t ha t is in the plant and procedures and 13 aaministrative things for. core-melt accidents. We thougnt ( 14 of the latter as an interim step.before a decision on a 15 later recommendation, No. 10, I will talk aoout l a ter. 16 I don't tnink there is much quarrel if you read 17 the cresicent's Commission re port. They also talked about to training up and down tne operations organication. If you lv look at the. Navy program, it's a cornerstone of it. 20 Unless you have any comments on tha t one, I will 21 pass over it. 22 The tnira one was in-plant drills. This is 23 something we talked about the first time we briefed you on 24 the final re por t. Your cuestion was: are in-plant crills 25 on simulators gooc enought snould there ce prototypes? And i503 086

27 22 02 10 DAV i as we said at that time, we had stopped short of prototypes, 2 thinking tha t tne use of in-plant drills and simulators was ~ 3 s uf f ici ent to cover the situations of interest. I don't 4 think our thinking has gone much further than where it was 5 two or three weeks ago. 6 Here again, the recommendation is f or the 7 licensees within a relatively short time scan to reconsider 6 the use being made of in-plant drills in their training 9 program and to make sure they're used and develop a schecule 10 for them. Ana once we see wnat can be done with in-plan t 11 drills by the people who are responsible f or training, it 12 coulo be that we would want to issue some sort of minimum 13 criterion. Heretofore, we have not. 14 COMMI SSIONER BRLDFORD: Wnat do we now require by t 15 way of in-plant drills? lo DR. MATTSON : I think none, but I may oe wrong. 17 Jim, could you speak to that? le VOICE: 'We recuire in-plant drills only in certain 19 instances, such as in the radiation protection program. 20 There are certain in-plant drills a ssociateo with reactor 21 opera tors, but it's very miminal, it's very general 22 requirements. 23 COMMISSIONER BR ADFORD: But see, that's the 24 protection of tne operator. 25 VOI CE : Tna t's corre c t., 1503 087

28 02 02.11 DAV I DR. MATTSON : They'd be things like putting on N 2- 'f ace masks in the event there was radiation in the control 3 room and that sort of thing? 4 VOICE: That's correct. 5 DR. MATTSON: But i t isn't "here's an ini tiating 6 event, here's what the machine should perf orm, here's how 7 the machine should perf orm, here's what the auxiliary 6 operators would do, here's wha t the technicians.would do," y and then everybocy kind of walk through the procedure? 10 VOICE: I understand there are no specific - 11 criteria for such drill programs. 12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Is it po ssinle to do that 13 fairly realistically, just at or prior to a shutdown for ( 14 other purposes? 15 DR. MATTSON : We did not have in mind the lo simulation of the re sponse in the control room by using the 17 controls of the reactors. So. our thougnt was to do it when Ic the plant was snut down, where you have people moving in and 19 out of tne control room, going to assigned cuty stations, 20 rollowing orders, uncerstanding the time required to get 21 to the various parts of the plant, and that sort of thing. 22 I suspect there are some drills that could be 23 conducted at power or curing startup testing or at ho t 24 standoy, wnere those conaitions of operation woula add some 25 realism. But tney would be conditions wnich, if we were 1503 088

29 02 02 12 r -- OAV 1 trying to drill to t5nse conditions, they wouldn't be highly -2 important or complex conditions. I don't think we can 3 define that much. c-4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You in your recommendation, 5 Roger, point out tha t the actual manipulation can be done in 6 the simulator. Do you at some later point -- I have now 7 f orgo tten -- recommena doing such a d: ill? 6 DR. MATISON: Well, the use of simulators with complex transients for training and retraining -- that is, v 10 f or initial licensing and relicensing -- is required by the 11 recommendations of the operator licensing branch commission 12 paper that you had bef ore you and commented u pon, 330-E. 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes. But I have the 14 impression here that you're really adding a whole crew to 16 work on it. 16 DR. MATTSON: A good point. It's our intent that 17 it be a crew, anc I thought it was our intent in both le places. We'll make sure that as people implement 330-E they Iv understanc it's not naming individuals only in all cases. 20 The t hough t here is.to make sure that the crew carries 21 through the drill on the simulator. 22 COMMISSIONER GILIN5KY: Roger, I have been toic -- 23 I don't know whether this is true -- that in NASA drills are 24 run even curing missions. In other words, the operator in ~. 25 front or the panel or in Iron t of,,tne TV screen will be 1503 089

30 32 U2 13 Pv. UAV I given an alternative version of tne output page being a set 2 of concitions tnat could happen of a way down the road, and 3 he's asked how he would responds "What if you're f aced with s 4 this, wnat are you going to do?" And this goes on b continually during the mission, obviously. 6 DR. MATTSON: Well, he recognizes it is a drill. 7 I t's no t the real thing. e COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Oh, yes, yes. 9 DR. MATTSON: Tha t seemed to be a useful thing to 10 do. iou couldn't do it in a control room where you have no il synthesizer of information put forth in a visual display of 12 some kind.. If you were to try to give him in a control room 13 witnout such inf ormation a diff erent set of instrument 14 readings f or the whole control room, I think it woula be too 15 complex. le But think about, say, an advanced control room, 17 where you could say to tne operator, "You are about to lo receive a drill over the central visual display. Treat it lv as a drill and give us the right answer." 20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY I t's in a sense partly a 21 drill and partly simply a planning process. 22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That's another one, what 23 NASA uses it for. It's aovanced preparation, because as 24 missions unfold, they look ahead ano try to construct 25 COMMISd IONER GI LI NSKY : Contingency planning. 1503 090

31 22 02 14 UAV I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Contingency planning, yes. -~ 2 DR. MATTSON: What I tnink I hear you saying is 3 the analogy in the reactor, if you were coming to a shutdown s 4 and then several days before the shutdown you would with the 5 right kina of equipment in the control room if they all had o it, simulate through the visual displays -- 7 COMMISSIO14ER KENNEDY: Anomalies that mignt occur o in the process. Y DR. MATTSON: Or how you would no.mally expect to 10 go. The operators haven't shu t the reactor aown for six .11 months. It's now time to shut it down. Here's a drill in 12 the control room a f ew days ahead of time for remembering 13 steps, refreshing on the steps as they occur at the control ( ) 14 room. 4 q 15 16 17 16 19 20 21 22 23 24 \\ 2D 1503 09i

CR,8302' 32 HOFFMAN t-3 mte 1 1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes. 2 DR. MATTSON: You can do that with some kinds of 3 visual displays. Leo, would you like to speak to that? s 4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Vector displays. 5 VOICE: I think you have to be careful in terms 6 of, say, some of the current control rooms, because you've 7 got to consider the failure and the impact of failure of this 8 kind of concept, say, on your normal operations. 9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE (presiding) : You start introducing l 10 signals in your ten channels. Il VOICE: Particularly with the proper restoration, 12 and make sure that you're back into your operating mode. 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: As I understand it, they 14 just do it' on paper. They give the guy a sheet. 15 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You said that your pressure gauge has just started to fall. You know, the advantage of 16 17 the in-plant walk-throughs is that they allow you to extend I 18 the sort of exercises you can do on the simulator, where you l M can simulate what the control room does to a reasonable degree,! l 20 but if part of the emergency procedure is to get a guy out to 21 do something with the fuel racks in the diesel room or 22 something like that, why it's useful to run Phrough that and 23 actually have a guy go out to the diesel room, you know. And l l 24 he discovers, no, it's raining tonight, there's mud on the i w werei nepenm. ix. 25 road, and you know, he falls down.and takes 30 minutes instead i 1503 092 l

mte 2 33 1 of ten, or something like that. n 2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: There~seem to have been some 3 recent events, though, w2've been reading about that are s 4 similar to that. 5 CHAIRMA*! HENDRIE: There's an awful lot of plant 6 out there that you need to be able to get around in some 7 walking-through emergency procedures. 8 DR. MATTSON: That's more the way we were thinking. 9 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: In effect, you don't have a way 10 to have a simulator which is a whole plant, so that you 11 actually have to cover the physical range of the plant. You 12 can use the r eal plant for that walk-through and the 13 simulator. ( Id 'D R. MATTSON: One walk-through might involve activa-15 tion of the on-site technical s upport center or the off-site 16 technical support center and the full exercise with off-site 17 emergency planning. Those are.the kinds of walk-throughs, 18 the aat of the control room activities, in coordination with l l9 in control room activities, that we're thinking of. 20 But Commissioner Gilinsky suggested something that 21 hadn't received a lot of attention, and I think it's a useful i l 22 idea. And you could do it with paper where you don't have the ! 23 visual display. You're going into a shutdown procedure. Here's the kind of things that are permutations and combina-I 24 w emi nwomn. ine. 25 tions of a possible shutdown procedure. How would you react? i 1503 093

mte 3, 34 I And do it several days before you knew you were going to make 2 such a maneuver. 3 MR. DENTON: One place I recall it being done in 4 addition is emergency planning-Some companies have a list of 5 paper drills to an extent far beyond this. 6 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Should the resident 7 inspector or special inspector be able to trigger a drill 8 like that? 9 Vic, do you want % comment? 10 MR. STELLO: I thin'; if you do require to have 11 drills such as the type you're talking about, you're going to 12 have to keep drilling to be spontaneous, which would be to 13 have a special inspection and ask them to spontaneously run ( Id some drills, just to see how proficient they might be. So I 15 would think the answer is yes. 0 DR. MATTSON: You'd have to give some thought as I7 to which people in the control room you wanted to involve and 18 what you wanted the o thers to do to watch the control room while you were running the drill. 20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Do you feel you have the 21 authority to do that now? MR. STELLO: Yes. j 22 i 23 (At 2: 50 p.m., Commissioner Gilinsky lef t the room. ) i \\ 24 MR. STELLO: Given that you're required to have xerei aecon.n. inc. 25 drills, I would think that, yes, you should have the authority, l 1503 094 l I

mt.e 4 35 1 to go in and have the spontaneous exercise. You've got to be a little bit careful how you're going about having us require 2 3 it._ COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I would think you want to 4 5 be quite careful. 6 MR. STELLO: If they only have five operators in 7 .there and they're in the middle of a startup or a shutdown, and you wanted to superimpose some other drill on that, I think 8 9 you ought to be careful. I am making the assumption that 10 people! exercise that care and caution. 11 MR. SHAPAR: I think you basically have the 12 authority. I think the question is now you want to implement 13 it. 14 -D R. MATTSON: In the area of operator licensing, 15 we said we supported the things that were in the Commission 16 paper from the Operator Licensing Branch, and then spoke to 17 seven other things we'd add to it. I've already talked about 18 a couple. 19 One is to have I&E and NRR talk a little more with 20 one another about operator licensing per se, feedback of i 21 information on individuals, as well as the program in 22 general. 23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I'm delighted that that 24 notion has only taken five years, to my certain knowledge, I a,serai neoonen, inc. 25 to come forward. l 1503 093 i

mte 5 36 1 DR. MATTSON: One shouldn't read such a recommenda-tion as implying that there is not, and in fact there is a 2 3 fair amount having to do with plant safety. Of course, it's 4 more a question of individuals and how do individuals 5 perform, individual licensed operators. Then again, the 6 licensee, event report is another way to keep track of how 7 well individuals are doing. 8 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: In terms of the paperwork 9 on this one, it's not currently incorporated in 79-330-E. 10 So should we be circulating a separate sheet having to do 11 with these items? 12 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: My next question is -- Harold 13 still has it. As I understand it, this is a report to you. 14 'MR. DENTON: Yes, from a task force. IS COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And you now have to reach 16 your conclusions. I guess you talk to the ACRS and then 17 you're going to make some specific recommendations. IS MR. DENTON: We were going to consider this one i 19 in connection with the President's report and any other 20 inputs we can get, and come back to the Commission with an 21 actual plan that dealt with all the things which were on the f 22 table. Maybe there are some -- I'd hope to pull out what I'd ( 23 call the hot potatoes out of the ones and maybe deal with i 24 them before others. l ^ A.-Weral Regmners, lrc l 25 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Probably the operator; it 1503 096 i

37 mt.e 6 I might be a good idea to pull those out ev-faster. 2 DR. MATTSON: I-was going to say, once in operator 3- -licensing, it may be just as easy to put them in our response s 4 to you on 330-E, because there were a variety of votes on 5 some of those matters. And as we bring back to you a rehash 6

of 330-E you might see some of the specific ones with operator 7

licensing factored in there. That was what the task force 8 had hoped. 9 In that context, some of them are large, in the 10 context of an overall agency plan to respond to the President's 11 Commission. Some of these are very small. 12 The net two, numbers 3 and 4 -- 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Sub (3) and (4) -- s. 14 'D R. MATTSON: Sub (3) and (4), actually the next I, i 15 three, sub (3), (4), and (5), have to do with integrating the l 16 human factor more broadly into our reactor safety considera-17 tions: 18 The first one being an involvement of the NRC as 19 the regulators in the training of licensed operators, by 20 requiring as a part of their training a one-week course in 21 the regulatory perspective of reactor safety, where we could 22 see that safety analyses, probabilistic assessments, current i +, 23 safety issues, how we viewed our responsibility and their ~ i 24 responsibility, what have you, all fit into their overall s weral Reporurs, inc. 25 training program. 1503 097 l i,

38 mte 7 1 Suggestions for this kind of involvement come both r 2 from industry and.from the NRC. It seemed to us to be a way 3 to begin to salt the training program with engineering 4 perspectives. It seemed like a good idea. 5 Number (4) was to -- 6 MR. DENTON: It would be, in a sense, a professional 7 society meeting for operators. 8 DR. MATTSON: No, that's No. (5), Harold. It had 9 been different. This is part of the training program for 10 1 each operator. 11 No. (5) says that annually the same kind of people 12 get together and compare notes about how it's going. I think 13 before Three Mile and since Three Mile we've had indications 14 of a wide gulf between licensed operators and the people who 15 review, analyze and license plants. We say they don't pay 16 attention to safety, and they say we do things counterproduc-17 tive to safety. And there's a need to cross that gulf, to 18 provide people the opportunity to sit down and talk about 19 these things better than there has been in the past. 20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Can I ask a question about 21 sub (4)? It suggests that there be interviews, interviews 22 of potential shift supervisors or shift technical advisers, i 23 before assuming assignment in this role, and then on a 1 24 biennial basis thereafter; these interviews to be an inter-l wrmeral Retzners, inc. 25 disciplinary group within the NRC staff. Now, is this l 1503 098

mte 8 39 1 . interdisciplinary group of the NRC staff comprised of the 2 group of people who are experienced either as shift supervisors 3 or shift technical advisers, or they have ever experienced the 4 job for which they are interviewing this guy? ~ 5 DR. MATTSON: It would be nice if we were able to 6 say that we had sufficient staff who were experienced in these 7 occupations to be able to do it. Obviously, we do not. 8 " Interview" may be the wrong word here. What is 9 envisioned is that this would be an adjunct to the current 10 licensing and relicensing requirements for these people. II That is, in addition to the oral examination th'.c they receive 12 from the operator Licensing Branch person, these supervisors j 13 or more responsible people for the conduct of operations in 14 the contr61 room would get this additional treatment. 15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: What I'm particularly focusing 16 on was the last part of the first paragraph: "In this area, 17 the interview should probe the individual's technical know-18 ledge in the area of transient and accident response." That's i 19 understandable. 20 Then it goes on: "And in the case of the shift l 21 supervisor, the managerial ability to command and control i l 22 the activities of shift personnel." l \\, 23 on what basis will our perple be able to make that i 24 judgment, if they've never done anything 'ike that? I mean, A ederal Reporters, Inc. 25 it will be a little bit like -- 1503 099 I

40 m%e 9, 1 DR. MATTSON: That's a little bit.different question 2 than I answered the first time. We clearly have competence 3 on the staff in shift supervisory responsibilities and capa- -m 4 bilities. We have people who have trained those people. We 5 have people who are experienced in those occupations. 6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's what I wanted to know. 7 DR. MATTSON: What I was responding to is that if 8 you're going to move in this direction, you probably haven't 9 the resources to have one of those people on each interview 10 team. We certainly have the expertise in order to establish 11 the kinds of questions that ought to be asked and the kinds 12 of answers you should expect to receive when you ask those 13 kinds of questions. We do have that today. 14 ' COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Let ne just follow the train. 15 You'd expect these interviews to take a couple of hours? 16 DR. MATTSON: Yes, a couple of hours. I 17 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Now, a plant should expect l 18 to have how many of these kinds of people? I i l9 DR. ha?TSON: We went through the numbers. I don't 20 have them off the top of my head.- It is a large resource. l l 21 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It sounds to me tha'c you l 22 could easily end up with this a full-time job of a group of j ( 23 people. 24 DR. MATTSON: It looked to us like we could have -- I .wwei aneners ine. l andIdon'trememberthenumbersexactly-k50Salffh0dzen 25 i i

mte 10. 41 ~l or so people all year round doing this. And what we thought ~ 2 was we would want to cycle people in and out of those assign-3 ments, because it gives you a cross-fertilization of ideas, m 4 both in the people in the field doing the operation and the 5 people in headquarters normally involved in other occupations. 6 If you want to write some standard questions and 7 some standard protocols for how to conduct these things, so 8 that they'll accomplish what they have to accomplish in each 9 of the interviews, that is, rather than dedicate six or seven i named staff to do it year-in and year-out, you can assign l 10 II people to these kinds of duties. I2 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Now, is the interview a test? l l DR. MATTSON: That's why I say that " interview" may l (~ 13 Id have been a poor choice of words. I think we envisioned it i 15 as an adjunct to the oral examination for licensing and I0 biennial relicensing. I7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It's a sort of a pass-fail l l 18 type meeting? DR. MATTSON: Yes. 20 The sixth item here -- i MR. DENTON: Let me put in a plug for this kind of 2I 22 thing in general. It is true that we rarely deal with the s, 23 licensing manager of a utility. He sends down a group whose 1 job is to get a plant licensed. These are not always the i 24 c reon.i Reponers, inc. 25 people who operate the plant. And we've begun to notice t I

mte 11, 42 I this gap between the people who are really the ones who ran 2 the plant and the so-called licensing staff. All these have 3 put some communications between the people who run it and the 4 people who are here to do the licensing. 5 We're going in the right direction -- or whatever 6 we could find to increase, between I&E and the licensee and 7 ourselves. 8 DR. MATTSON: No. (6) has to do with certification 9 as an alternative to one of the recommendations in this 10 330-E Commission paper. II COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Do you see this as an alter-I2 native or as one way -- the quote that you have indicates that (~ 13 they would be required to participate in applicable requalifi-Id cation program. Now, isn't that another way of saying that 15 NPO would be such-a program? DR. MATTSON: Provided they're exa.nined and found to 17 be acceptable, yes. I3 VOICE: We're more focusing in this recommendation, I9 establishing the technical ability of the personnel; but in 20 addition, the ability of the person to instruct, which is 21 the instructor qualification requirements in the particular training program, since he's involved in the training l 22 \\ / l 23 The continued participation in the requalification l program. program is already there, so it's more important on the 24 A Merat Reporurs, Inc. 'S instructor requalification from this recommendation. That was l l i

nte 12' 43 1 our focus. 2 DR. MATTSON: The seventh one had to do with 3 licensing a resident operator licensing examiner in each of w 4 the major geographical area., the idea being to interject the' 5 presence of ope:ator licensing personnel into the ongoing 6 training. 7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Haven't we already done some 8 of that? Haven't we already moved in the direction of increas-9 ing efforts in the regions of operator licensing? l 10 MR. DENTON: We have a test ongoing with operator Il licensing examiners in Region II. 12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: How is that working out thus 13 far? ( 14 MR. DENTON: The last time I talked to the 15 individual involved, he had some pros and some cons. And we 16 do owe the Commission a report at the end of, I think, a year, i 17-on the program that evaluates its success. I i IS DR. MATTSON: That was a little different, though. l 19 That was a case where you put the licenser in the regional 20 office and he conducted the examinations from that point, l 1 i 21 whereas this would be to put an operator license examiner in i i I 22 a geographic region where there were a lot of simulators, a i 23 lot of training going on, so that he had more day-to-day 24 ' knowledge of the conduct of that training, and to observe wreerat Rmorters. IN. l 1503 103 25 licensing training. \\JUJ f

mte 13 44 I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: He's not doing the licensing 2 -in that context? -3 DR. MATTSON: He'd be doing some licensing, too. S 4 But part of his job, in addition to licensing, would be to 5 observe training, the training process itself. 6 Well, the next recommendation, on NRC staff coordina-7 tion, really says that organizationally we need to bring 8 together the diverse staff elements who are involved with 9 operator qualifications, operators, staff qualification. And 10 I think more important than that is the need to give organi-11 zational emphasis, as we said in our letter to Dr. Press 12 last week, to human factors matters. l ( Harold will be talking to you about some ideas in that regard quite shortly, I think. 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Does "quite shortly" mean 16 this afternoon? 17 MR. DENTON: I could, but I think we could do it i 18 with a paper in another day or so. 19 COMMISSIONER ^AHEARNE: Oh, fine. 20 DR. MATTSON: The next one is where we think we 'l ought to be heading in the future with shift supervisors, 22 senior reactor operatorr, in terms of their base qualifica-l 23 l tions. Basically what we say is, within five years shift f' 24 umdun ugh % have at lea n a bache h M M ence ....oer i Reporters, inc. I 25 degree or equivalent training and experience. They should ~ 1503 104

45 mt.e 14 I also hold a senior reactor operator license and have served 2 as a senior reactor operator for a specified period of time 3 before assuming shift supervisor responsibilities. And that, 4 because they are leaders and commanders and decisionmakers, 5 with important societal responsibilities, we talked about 6 several thirgs above and beyond their technical capabilities. 7 We've seen there, for example, attention to not only their 8 engineering and science education in determining equivalency 9 with a bachelor's degree, but also their founding in some of e-3 10 the liberal arts and their leadership training. 11 12 13 ( u 15 16 l 17 18 l 19 i i 20 21 I 22 / 23 l 24 4 . merei Reporters, Inc. 25 l 1503 105

46 32 04 01 mgcDA/- 1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: x couple of questions. I T.-- notice. you called for a Bachelor of Science as opposed to a .._3 Bachelor of Engineering. 4 DR. MATTSON: I thought most Bachelors of 5 Engineering were in f act Bachelors of Science. 6 CO MMISSIONER AHEARNE: I'm not sure. I know mine e wasn't. 3 DR. MATTSON: Well, mine wa s. 9 (Laughter.) 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: There you have a li repre sentative sample. Is this a matter of great import? 12 CO MMISSIONER AHEARNE: Curiosity. 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I was going to say, should 14 we change it and say Bachelor of Science or Bachelor of k_ la Science in Engineering or Bachelor of Engineering or 13 anything suitable ? Ie CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think we should immediately la move to impeach John. 19 (Laughter.) 23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: There, mine's a B.S. 21 (Laughter.) 22 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: So it's there. 23 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: A second question. You say 24 within five years. Do you have in mind that it could be 25 done more rapidly, and if not, why not? 1503 106

47 32' 04 02 mgcDAV 1 DR. MATTSON: Two reasons for picking five years 2 and then a third reason why we think we can wait.

First, 3

there is a turnover of people in these kinds of jobs that's 4 on the orde" of four or five years. Second, to begin to 5 train someone to achieve this level of competence today 6 would take on the order of four or five years. I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Why ? 8 DR. M ATTSON : People without a bachelor's degres. 9 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: No, I'm assuming you find 10 people with eachelor's degrees 11 DR. MATTSON: And then the training program to put 12 them in a position of being a Shif t Supervisor also takes on 13 the order of f our o-five years. 14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Four or five years? 15 DR. MATTSON: The p rograms lise the Tenne ss ee 16 Valley Au t.hori ty and others. I t t a'< e s a num oer o f ye ars, 1, given a cacnelor's degree, to arrive at a position of Shif t 13 Suparvisor. l/ COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Okay. eD DR. MATTSON: Now the reason we think we can 26 afford to take the time is because of the Shif t Technical 22 Advisor that we've required to be in place within the next 23 two months and the level of education and training required 24 of tnose people and the upgrading of that training through 2; operating experience over tne coming years. 1503 107

32'04 03 48 mgcDAV i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Having required that, what 2 response have we received from the licensees as to their 3 capacility of getting the individual with that competence 4 and level of background? 3 DR. MATTSON: Harold, do you want to say something b first? e MR. 07'liaN: The licensees who have talked to me 8 a bout it -- many of the large licensees are able to comply with that requirement -- Commonwealth Edison, Southern 10 California Edison. In fact, those two uti. ities are 11 complying fully with the Category A's out of the Short-term 12 Lessons Learned which is required by the ena of the year. 13 They seem to be taking candidates from their Engineering 14 O ffice, putting them in the Shif t Technical Advisor f or a k 15 limited period of time, offering them pay diff erentials, lo other days o ff somehow to compensate for shif t work, anc it 1/ seems to De no real hurdle. So I've heard very few 13 complaints. 1) I must admit there was initial opposition to the 2] idea in general, but once we adoptea the requirement, they 21 seemed to have found solutions to it and can get 22 well qualified people from the headquarters to take this 23 position. 24 COMMISS IONER KENNEDY: Yes, I understand. That's 22 heartening. But the question I guess really was aimed at, 1503 108

02'04 04 49 mgcDAV I are we going to f ace a circumstance in the next couple of ~ 2 months where in f act some licensees are going to come bac k 3 and say, "We can't do it because we haven't got the people"? 4 And if they do that, then what? 3 DR. M ATTSON : Not on this particular one. I don't 6 expect it. I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Harold, started it, I 3 thought, by referring in some way to the larger companies. 9 DR. MATTSON: dell the best thougnts I've seen so 10 f ar came from one of the smaller ones, whicn is Rancho Seco, 11 so -- 12 MR. DENTON: Just from personal Knowledge, I know 13 that two of them have complied with all the Category A's. 14 My last memo to them did ask they to responc just acout now k-15 if they were unble to comply, and my intent was to look at 15 any instance s where they were asking for exceptions and le inform the Commission of the action I was recommending in 18 those cases. Once we tabulate them all, I think by the end 11 of the month we'll know the situation with regard to every 20 plant for each of the Category A items. 21 There was a minority whien was very vocal in the 22 industry pre ss about the Shif t Technical Advisor problem. 23 They opposed it quite hard. There is a growing majority of 24 people who are expressing agreement at the corporate level 23 and oelo.v with moving in this direction, but a spectrum of s, 1503 109

50 02' 04'05 mgcDAV i -small utilities and large utilities, there are peop1 uhere 2 that can be organized and brought to bear to these operating 3 experience and accident response functions that we spoke to 4 by January 1 -- people to turn tc and do the job. 5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I would expect that if a 6 smaller utility really can't find such a person on their 7 staff, their option is to go higher. 3 MR. DENTON: I think they're always available. It 9 was just that we offered thsm incentives to take this task. 10 DR. MATTSON: We went on to say that senior 11 reactor operators in that same perind of time should become 12 as we ll grounded in transient response ano :::ic underlying 13 engineering principles of reactor operation as are Shif t 14 Technical Advisors at this day and age. I think it's fair k 15 tc say that if this is the direction we head in, in five 16 years, increasing the training and qualifications of Shif t 14 Supervisors and senior reactor operators in this f ashion and 13 improving control rooms along the lines descriced in the 19 ! ater recommendacion, then I would expect Shift Technical 23 Aovisors may not be required at the end of that five years. 21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: They'd really oe superfluous. 22 DR, MATTSON : They may be. I say "may", cecause 23 it's also af fording time and opportunitf, not only 24 qualifications, that you provide a Shif t Technical 2; Advisor -- that is, having someone with the opportunity to i503 110

51 22 04 06 mgcDAV l. stand back and have no command responsiollity and no control 2 room manipulation responsibility, that you name this special 3 individual. 3ut if control rooms are improved in their 4 opera tor aid and diagnostic capabilities they way we think 5 they likely can be over a five year period, then it's 6 possible that the Shif t Technical Advisor requirement would I go by the board. S The last recommendation in that area is that 12 9 weeks doesn't seem like enough to us. ide'd better take a 10 l ook a t t ha t, il COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Did you consider taking a 12 look at qualifications on entry? 13 DR. MATTSON: I'm sorry? 14 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Did you consider looking at (_ 15 qualifications on entry -- that is, on those people that you 16 allow to enter thi s course? 1, DR. MATTSON: You mean in terms of his education 13 and what have you? I? COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Uh-huh. 23 DR. MATTSON: de didn't look at that level of 21 detail. We are aware that there is an ANS standard that's 22 oeen rerised, that there's a regulatory guide out for 23 comment treating more of those details, and not just for 24 opera tors out for other memoers of the operations staff. 25 Me did not take the time to do that. The people \\505 \\\\\\

32'04 07 52 mgcDAV i who were on the Task Force in this area of expertise are involved in those other things, then and now. 2 3 Jim, was there anything you wantes to add to 4 that? a A VOICE: I think the only otner thing is, I 6 understand that Operator Licensing Branch is letting a e contract which woulo examina that particular contract, out 3 we did not do it in this area. 9 DR. MATTSON: Well this Item 1. 7 is back to the 10 thing I mentioned earlier. 11 ( At 3:15 p.m., Commissioner Gilinsky entered the 12 r oom. ) 13 DR. MATTSON: What should be the criteria for 14 tecnnical and management support at a licensee in order to 15 demonstrate capaci11ty and fitness to operate a plant 13 safely? Ana we spoke about this in a letter to the White 17 Hous3 as requiring more urgent attention. 18 What we said in this recommendation was, complete 19 the s tudy and set a criteria. You've enanged that in the 2] last week. That's fine ano dancy, out it doesn't seem to os 21 as de finitive and dramatic a response as we'd like to see in 22 this area. 23 Ine President's Commission Report seems to 24 incicate more and faster than this kind of recommenaation 23 would indicate. 1503 112

12 04 d8 53 mgcDAV I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Let me ask a somewhat 2 related question. At least I think it is. 3 In this report,. several places you ref er to NPO, 4 and in another report you ref er to NPO as being something 5 that you look with some f avor on. At least it has the 6 potential of accomplishing some things that we. f eel ougnt to be accomplished. 8 Do you see any need for a requirement that that 9 kind of org;nization exists? Let's suppose -- what happens 10 if we end up with a number -- including a number of our 11 requirements whien are really going to ce satisfied cecause 12 we are relying upon NPO to ao this, let's say, three years 13 from now for a variety of reasons -- 14 MR. DEN 1 Then we would go cack to the ( (_. 13 lic en see. I saw NPD having certain advantages. It's easier la for us to deal with one person in an area such as this who 1/ purports to represent all the licensees, la Co'4MISSIONER AHEARNE: No. I understand that. I 19 guess I'm getting perhaps slightly concernea about relying 20 upon an organization whose quality, whose enarac teristics 21 are not in any way defined on anything that we levy -- and I 22 don't know whether we should -- but if they were to fold, 23 they wouldn't do it instantaneously. It would ce gradually, 24 and I just curious as to whether you've given any thougnt ^3 a bout that. 1503 113

54 32 04 d9 mgcDAV I DR. MATTSON: Our thought was to establish 2 criteria and requirements that the utilities would meet 3~ ~ either through participation in something like NPO or 4 indiv idually, and we got a little crossfire on whether or 5 not we shold require accreditation, and we discussed, may be 6 accreditation was good for accreditation's sake, no matter i who aid it. So there was a nuance there. We hadn't 8 appreciated it. I guess I nad assumed that NPO -- that it 9 would be there forever. 13 I read the Energy Daily for October 17 by 11 happe nsta nce this morning, and Dr. Starr in describing NPO 12 appears to imply an interim purpose for NPO. He says NPO's 13 job is to be able to recognize that we face the real 14 situa tion of not oeing able to achieve overnight a perfect k_ 15 design with perfect instrumentation. 16 We earlier talked about using ordinary technicians 17 if fou did the right job in the control room and the 18 automatic f eatures of the design. That could be read to 19 imply an interim period of operation for NPO. 2] C3 MMISSIONER AHEARNE: My concern was more 21 related -- there is at least one counding scenario which 22 says that the plants that are currently under construction 23 ar? a 11 going to oe ordered in the next ten or 15 years, and 24 as such, nuclear steam suppliers mignt oegin closing out, s. 25 and a number of nuclear utilities might begin closing down 1503 114

32'04 '10 55 mgcDAV --l-their interests, and the vitality supporting an organization 2 like NPO might begin to dissipate. ~ 3 MR. DENTON: The one interaction we've had ~ 4 formally has been with the USAC organization it almost 5 formed. There, while we dealt with representatives of what 6 was to be USAC, we did expect and receive replies from each 7 utility involved in USAC, so utilities allowed USAC to S represent them. On the docket for each one, they 9 incorpora ted the results from analyses by USAC. So we're 10 still continuing licensing utilities. 11 DR. MATTSON: de did recommend in here that NRC 12 and NPO get their regional act together witnin the next six 13 months and decide in which way to proceed incependently or 14 collaterally. I 15 CO MMISSIONER GILINSKY: Is NPO in oeing? 16 DR. MATTSON: They are to ar.nounce a Director and 14 a site by the first of January, and I heard Dr. Starr saying 13 Mondsy tnat they're going to meet it. 19 1.S is licensing of additional operating 23 personnel, and we've talked about it already. It's another 21 one that again, there's the need for NPO and NRC to know who 9 24 goes where and to wnat extent. 23 COMMISSIONER C'LINSKY: Is this strictly an NRC 24 product, this report, or did you involve outsiders in the / 25 discussion? For example, operators of plants? 1503 115

02'04 'll 56 mgcDAV I DR. MATISON: This is strictly an NRC product. ~ 2 There were outsiders who had an opportunity to know the 3 course of our work as it went along. 4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I meant actually licensed 5 opera tors rather than utilities. 6 DR. MATfSON: No. We as a Task Force did not speak to individual operators. We spoke to people who s 8 trained them, who knew them, who had worked with them both 9 f rom inside and outside the NRC. We had people on the Ta sk IJ Force who had been operators and who had trained operators and who had licensed operators, but we didn't go to 12 individual operators in individual plants and ask them if 13 this or that was so. 14 MR. DENTON: cI think it's f air to say that both G) (_. b 15 this and the fi~rst-one were in-house prooucts working on a '%g 15 tight time s chedule. You did mee t with various groups wno 1/ wanted to come in and say something. 13 MR. DENTON: de met in many puolic meetings with 19 the ACRS where people came and offered comments on this and 23 other aspects of it. 21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I guess I'm concerned 22 aoout whether we have enough operating competence. I'm not 23 sure exactly what the right word is, but enough competence 24 in re actor operations, the actual running of reactors, to q/ 25 really lay out a detailed program on improving training and i503 116

57 22'04 '12 mgcDAV I generally upgrading the competence of reactor operators. ~ 2 MR. DENTON: As Roger said, we have a number of 3 people -- not a lot, but a number of people who have been 4 involved in the most successful programs in the country. 5 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I k now tha t. Obviously, 6 we do, but this is still a pretty tall order -- to lay out a pro gr am. 8 OR. MATTSON: The ways we have to test whether 9 we're consistent or not, doing something bad for operations, 10 are numerous: first, in the relationship with NPO which we 11 have had with Dr. Starr's staff since it was first 12 announced; second, with the American Nuclear Society. 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Dr. Sta rr's staf f, with 14 all due respect to him, is still a substitute, it seems to ( 15 me, f or -- well, I guess I'm not sure exactly who he's got 15 on his staff now. I'm thin'.cing more of EPRI maybe. 1/ DR. MATTSON : Well, let me finish the thought. IS There's also the Standards Committee, which has been writing 19 case standards in this field for years, with which we've had 2) a working relationship all along. There will be a 21 relationship with NPO. There has been our own technical 22 staff with experience and expertise in this ar a, and I 23 think the enance for us to ce moving in the wrong direction 24 is slim. Tne chance f or us to have missed ideas tnat e>uld 23 oe useful, good ideas to f actor into the overall program, 1503 i17

58 02'04'13 mgcDAV i are procably not insignificant. That's why we have an 2 ongoing contractual e ffort to ask aoout some of the details 3 of the Naval program. That's why we think it's nece ssary to ~ 4 establish a working relationship with the Institute. That's 5 why we've acknowledged we need to continue to bring more 5 opera tions experience on to the NRR licensing staff in the e coming ye ars. 3 I think the chance of erring and going in the wro g direction is small. The chance of erring and not n 13 having good ideas here is probably significant. 11 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I'm not so much concerned 12 that what you're suggesting is right, but do we have a 13 program that is really designed to produce a substantial 14 upgrading in a relatively short period of time? And is this ( l.) the right way to go about it? 16 DR. MATTSON: You do have an operations competence 17 on your staff. Tney worked very hard for the last six 13 months. I think they have significant1v increased the 19 recuirements and the capabilit"'s of these people, and all 20 of these things are met. 21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Clearly we're heading in 22 the right direction, but that doesn't necessarily mean that 23 we've got a really solid program, and that's what concerns 24 me. / 25 MR. DENroN: There are a number of legitimate 1503 118

32'04 I4 59 mgcDAf 1 questions that were raised before TMI about the stresses on 2 operators and the increasing number of controls that were 3 perceived to be on operators pre-TMI. And that side of the 4 opera tor, the human f actor itself, and the stresses he 5 f eels, we generally write off as ceing ones that can be 6 , ompe nsat ed by money and other incentives. But that's a 7 subjact that really hasn't been tested. 8 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Do we have people with b d recent industry experience on the large reactors? a y 10 DR. MATTSON: Yes. 11 COMMISSIONER GILINS KY: We do. Okay. 12 13 14 15 15 le 18 19 23 21 22 23 24 j 15 1 C.17 11O IJUJ l i/

~ 02 05'01 60 mgcDAV i DR. MATTSON: Not in-large numbers, but there are. ^ 2 such people in operations. ~ 3 MR. DENTON: Are the educational requirements here ~ 'N 4-consi stent with 330(E)? 5 DR. MATTSON: The educational requirements in 1.6 - 6 are s ignific antly beyond 330(E). 7 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But 330(E), did it address 8 Shif t Supervisors? 9 DR. MATTSON: It didn't address educational 10 requirements per se. 11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I tried to sneak it in. 12 CO MMISSIONER BR ADFORD: Maybe that's why I 13 remembered it. 14 DR. MATTSON: 330( E ) was intended to be a paper 15 for which you would start to require tomorrow as soon as you 16 approve it. 1.6 is, given that, where would you like to ce 1/ f ive years f rom now, and then do the right things in between 18 to get to that plateau five years from now. 19 Staffing of the control room. We finally made it 23 to recommendation Number 2. 21 (Laughter.) 22 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: That'll teach you to write 23 a long first recommendation. Let's s ee, 330 ( E ), if it's 24 approved by the Commission th?n, will become effective 23 f orthwith, out the Vice President for Operations has also i503 120

32 '05 02 61 mgcDAV got this document in front of him. Is he going to De ~ 2 confused, or is it going to ce pretty clear to him what the 3 relation is? 4 DR. MATTSON: He does not have this document in 5 front of him for action. He has it in front of him only for 6 information, and I think a generally held understanding that these recommendations, the President's Commission's 4 3 recommendations, and the ACRS recommendations are being 9 stewed aoout here in Washington, and when we decide which of 10 that set ought to be required on what time f rame, we'll 11 communicate with each of the licensees and tell tnem what 12 they're supposed to do. 13 MR. DENTON: We follow up with all the approved 14 changes and requirements with formal letters to each (- 15 utility, so I think it's pre tty clear to them what's being 16 required on certain time schedules and what might be in the Il works. la COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I haven't talked to any 1/ utili ty o fficials aoout this, but my sense would oe, they 23 would not be comple tely clear, just as we're not completely 21 clear on what we're going to end up requiring as an overall 22 p ack age. And they would, I'm sure, be ge tting that s ame 23 p ic tu re. 24 Ana as you say, Harold, wnen you send them a 22 le tte r that says you are now requiring this, this, and this, 1503 121

02 05'03 62 mgcDA/ 1 they can see that. But as f ar as, what are the detailed-2 outlines of where we're finally going to come out, I doubt 3 if that can be corrected. 4 DR. MATTSON: If we could write one today, we'd 5 sena it to them. We'd send it to you, I think. 6 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I share at least some of I the uneasine ss that I think both Peter and Victor and I'm 8 s ure you do, that we're trying -- we're in the process of 9 constructing a changed program. We want to make sure that 10 it is consistent and effective. 11 DR. MATTSON: Well part of the difficulty with a 12 oriefing like today is that we're looking at one narrow 13 source of ideas. That's why the document you wrote last 14 week was very important to the staff, because it put some of ( la these together in the context of a more oroadly read and 15 undsr stood document where you could s ee all of the pieces Ie together. 18 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: The document that we signed 19 which you wrote last week. 23 (Laughter.) 21 DR. MATTSON: Staffing of control room. We said a 22 couple things here. One, we ought to put in the regulations 23 wha: we've oeen requiring in plant by plant licenses because 24 we've been requiring more than the regulations indicate we 22 should. Second, while we're doing that, we ought to .oq \\SUb \\

02'05 04 63 mgcDAV 1 consider whether we ought to go even a little bit. further. ~ 2 And the little bit further is to require the presence in the 3 control room at all times during normal operations of two 4 reactor operators and one senior reactor operator. 5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Why did you phrase it so 6 hesitantly? 4 DR. MATTSON: Because you have competing 8 interests. If you require that one senior ce there at all y times, you may in eff ect be requiring that there be two 10 seniors at the plant at all times, because you do want il people out in the plant outside the control room performing 12 their control room command and control f unction, as it may 13 be required outside of the control room. 14 I think that's the only reason for the hesitancy ( 15 in the language, because we weren't certain how we'd work 10 out the details -- whether we roald state it simply as one 14 senior in tne control room at all times o'r whether you'd 18 have to state it that each unit shall have two seniors. 19 Jim, do you have anything :o add to that? I 23 recall from the discussion using this language worki.7 hours 21 is a subject that came up. Aside from Three Mile Island out 22 with attention that Three Mile Island brought to operational 23 matters, a number of people took an interest in working 24 hours. de said it looked to us like something that ougnt to 25 ce fixed. If there were plants that had that kind of 1503 123

02 05'05 64 mgcDAV ~ l cifficulty and we were informed they had, they shouldn't 2 have them. 3 C)MMISSIONER KENNEDY: Are there lacor union 4 proolems? 5 DR. MATTSON: There are, and I gue ss my view of 6 those is that those will have to be solved. I want fit and capaole operators in the control room at all times. The s 8 labor unions and the managers will have to get together and 9 figure out now to meet the requirements that I set on what 13 constitutes a fit and capable operator. Il CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think the proolems that I'm 12 aware of are not union connected, but are connected with a 13 numoer of operstors leaving a facility and leaving a staf f 14 or licensed operators which is then very thin, and if one of fk-la them catches cold, why other people find themselves running la doucle shifts and having to do it too often. 1/ CO MMISSIONER AHEARNE: dhich is very bad. 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It's not a condition that's 19 conducive to really sharp, alert, on-top-of-it operators. 20 DR. MATTSON: There was another nuance in that 21 a bou t the way some operators like the ability to work long 24 multiple shifts in order to earn long vacation periods, so 23 this wasn't necessarily in the operators' best interests, 24 while again we're looking at the saf ety of the public's oest / 25 interest, and it seemed to us that these were reasonaole 1503 124

02'05'06 65 mgcDAV -1 expec tations about how long someone could stay alert and 2 capaole on the job that's demanded of him. 3 COMMISSIONER BR AD.:0RD: Could you explain to me 4 the phrase "f or more than two consecutive work periods in i excess of 12 hours." That is, a work period, I assume, is o normally 8 hours. I DR. MATTSON : We said tnat the ought to set a 8 limit that in any two days in succession, a person could 9 work up to twelve hours as long as there was a 12 hour rest 10 period in ostween. Normally we would expect him to work an 11 8 heur shift. Tne limit would be if he had to work, he 12 could not work more than two 12 hour days in succession. 13 And in any e vent, he always had to have a 12 hour rest 14 period between shif ts. k to It was hard to say, and it's hard to explain. 13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: By the way, lest there be any 1e doubt about that, tne senior officers of the staff are not 16 entitled to the same consideration. 19 U_aughter.) 20 DR. MATTSON: I noticed that. 21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: nouldn't it be useful to 22 make this a more categorical, positive sort of statement? 23 Woulan't that help resolve auch union problems as exist if 24 the management had a concrete requirement laid on them? 23 DR. MATTSON: That's the inten? -- is that you 1503 12-3

32 05'07 66 mgc DAV 1 would make a concrete, categorical statement in the license ~ f or each nuclear power plant that the operators at the 2 3 controls not only should be of such numoers and 4 quali ficatio ns, but they "shall not work more than" and 3 freeze it. 6 MR. DENTON: Whatever the phrase is. We suggested 4 one here. S COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You're not saying it would be general guidance, that it would ce unlikely -- 10 DR. MATTSON: I think we should make this a 11 licensing condition. 12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Rather than regulation? 13 DR. MATTSON: I tnink it would be easier to ma'< e 14 it a licensing condition. 15 MR. SHAP AR: It would be uniform, wouldn' t it? 16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: What are you going to do when 1/ somecody comes in and says, "I've got to run them on 12 and 18 12 for the next two weeks, otherwise I'm going to shut the 19 power down." It's Christmas time, and the lights are going 20 to go out. 21 MR. BICKWIT: Well there's prosecutorial 22 di scr etion. 23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE And we exerc ise the 24 prose cutorial. 25 DR. MATTSON : You'd have to ask how they got + 1503 126

02'05'08 67 'mgcDAV~ l themselve s into that situation, how they weren't thinking 2 aheaa, and a bout their ability to operate the plant. 3 MR. BICKWIT: You don't have to exercise it. I t's ~ ju t there. 4 s 5 DR. MATTSON: Emergency procedures. We said that 6 staff ought to review them. We said it ought to.invc1ve e more than just technical disciplines. It ought to include 8 people who knew things about crisis management, human 9 factors, theories of education. The ACRS has offered 10 simil ar advice. 11 I might mention how we thought a bout impleinenti ng 12 this recomma ndation. In the near-term OLs, this is 13 something that we not only recommended in the final reoort, 14 it's something we promised the ACRS we'd take a shot at. On 15 Salem II and North Annc and subsequent OLs, we assigned a 16 group of people on a project ?.eam for the Salem II, North la A nna II review, who represent several disciplines: analysis, 18 opera tor licLnsing, reactor systems, half a dozen 19 disciplines, from the staff. 23 Wnat they're going to do is take the full set of 21 emergency procedures and not look at them all to begin with, 22 but to select a set of the more interesting complex 23 transients that the Reactor Safety StucY tells you are the 24 more interesting ones -- s_ 25 CO T.iISS IONER GILINS KY: Just as a matter of 1503 127

02 05 09 68 mgcDAV I curiosity, how do you come to theories of education and 2 crisis management? I mean, I can understand it. 3 DR. MATTSON: Maybe the words aren't descriptive, ] 4 .out the reason was to bring into this not only engineering 5 competence in how the machine works but also competence in 5 how people work and how people are trained, which is, af ter 4 all, the pur; ~ se of emergency procedures in the end. 8 W. felt it would simply be a mistake to throw engineers a procedures review. 10 MR. DENTOA: That may be one of our recruitment 11 actions. 12 DR. MATTSON: It is one of our recruitment 13 ac tio ns. It's underway. Anyhow, we've culled down a set of 14 emergency procedures to an interesting few. We're going to ( 13 call the lic ensee in, say the one at North Anna, and ask him 15 to oring their vendor and architect engineer or any other 1/ consultants that were used in the development of these 16 pro:edures and tell us how they developed tne procedures, 19 how they took account of some of these educational crisis 20 management engineering aspects in their development. 21 de want to look hard at the symptoms stated in the 22 procedures. Me want to look hard at the do's ano don't's 23 stated in the procedures. Our review of procedures since 24 Three Mile Island and that of the ACRS nas generally j 25 indi c ated tnat there aren't enough don't's in emergency 1503 128

32'05'l0 69 mgcDAV i procedures warning off operators from improper actions. 2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY Not enough, you say? 3 DR. MATTSON: Not enough. We want to look at what 4 kind of indications they have for contingencies for multiple 5 failures. Some licensees have done more of that than 6 others. We want to know how these two licensees have done / in that respec t. 6 de're going to take the procecures and go to the 9 simulators with a crew for each of thsse licensees, take one 10 of their ope rating crews, go to the simulator, and see how 11 those specific procedures that we've studied work on the 12 s imul ator. We also then want to go to each of these plants 13 that are now nearly finished or have finished construction 14 and walk through those same procedures in tne control room. 15 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Now the way you descrioed 16 i t, this sounded like a pilot program. I4 DR. MATISON: That's sxactly what it is. That was 13 my tag line. The final thing we want to do is talk to the 19 training program at each of these lice.nsees and see how 23 those particular procedures were used in the training 21 program, how people were drilled in them, what engineering 22 or sc ientific things they were told about the basis f or the 23 procedures, and what have you. It's a pilot program. It's 24 exs:tly that, even that we have never reviewed procedures 23 cefore in tais sense. 1503 129

32 05'11 70 ~mgcDAV I de need to establish, what is it,we're looking 2 for? What kinds of criteria ought to be prov.ided? We would 3 intend that we have already interacted with the ACRS. We've s 4 told them aoout this plan for conducting this review. We'll 5 move along with it. We'll bring it back to the TMI-2 6 Implicati ons Subcommittee. We've invited them to sit with I us in some of these meetings with the lic ens e e. 8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Is the intent to get to the 9 point where we would approve the procedures? 10 DR. MATTSON: I think the intent -- I'm not ready 11 to say yet that I think we ought to approve each and every 12 line of that entire stack of procedures for every new 13 plant. I do think that we ought to ce at a point where we 14 ought to be acle to s tate criteria aoout the general form 15 and :ontent of procedures, the process oy which they're 15 developed, the quality assurance checks to which they're 1e suojected, the kinds of expertise that are f actored into IS their development, their testing and startup and that sort 19 of thing. 20 Tnat would be our intent. 'R. DENTON: One of the problems with procedure 21 M 22 approval per se is the need to update and improve 23 pro:edures in the normal course of operations. We are going 24 in depth to see what kina of proolems we face in looking at 25 these procedures. So we real'1y haven't f aced that question 1503 130

02'05'12 71 mgcDAV i of approval. Certainly we intend to find that the 2 procedures are adequate by making the spot checks, out we 3 weren't going to check all the procedures in that case. ^l 4 Certainly in those cases that we pick out and spot check. 5 we're going to do an almost 100 percent audit. 5 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Let's suppose you do a spot check based on the knowledge gained in the final program and s 3 you find that you're dissatisfied with what you spot 9 checked? 10 DR. MATTSON: Thereby telling you that you had to 11 ao more. 12 MR. DENTON: It would be like any other area you'o 13 get into, and do a complete indepenaent review yourself. 14 DR. MATTSON: We don't always agree wi th e ach L 15 other. I tnink I'd be inclined to say, "Here's what I la learned in doing tnese half a dozen. There are 50 or 60 1e there, and I'm not going to do them line by line, 13 Mr. Licensee. Go back ano correct for these kinds of is ce fic ienc ies. " 23 MR. DENTON: There are some aspects of procedures 21 that are just so time consuming -- 22 COMMISSI0 DER AHEARNE: I recognize that. 23 VR. DENTON: It would be easier to check than some 24 other kinds of procedures. 25 CO MMISSIONER AHEARNE: I recognize that. I'm just 1503 131

02 05'13 72 mgcDAV 1 unclear where this ends up. 2 MR. DENTON: We weren't either. We were just xind 3 of willing to get this f ar in and see what we thought. 4 DR. MATTSON: We're also gaining some experience, 5 of course, with the operating plants with the review of 6 procedure guidelines and procedure! themselves for small ~ / breat LOOAs which the Task Force P.as been involved in. We 8 are about to retain a conir:ctar with some human f actors and 9 training expertise to aid us in the approval of those final 10 opera ting procedures for small break LOCAs. 11 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You noted that this is 12 going to require considerable expenditure of resources. 13 What does that mean? What kind of resources? 14 DR. MATTSON: In the course of North Anna II and 15 S alem II, just to do this pilot project, I've assigned with 16 DPM something on the order of five people full-time f or f our 1e months. 13 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: For each? 19 DR. MATTSON: For the two. They're being done 23 s imul taneously. Now you can argue it would take more if you 21 old more, or you can argue that it takes more because it's 22 the first time tnrough. 23 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: You could argue it would t ak e 24 more if thef weren't Westinghouse plants, I expect. 2a COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: A separate cuestion. Anat 1503 132

32 '05 '14 73 mgcDAV 1 are your plans now with respect to' operating plants? ~ 2 DR. MATTSON: What we recommended here was that 3 what we've done with operating plants for the small break 4 LOCA is enough for operating plants now. We've learned some 5 things there. We'll go to the one that I just described on 6 a few of the near-term operating licenses. Then we'll gather that information together, see if we can't write some 4 8 c rite ria ove r a period of a year or two f rom now, and then 9 require -- here you'd want to consult with a broad segment 13 from the ACRS and the industry and NPO as people begin to 11 make progre ss in this area -- then in a period a year or two la from now, require that all procedures in all plants to be 13 recycled to some new plateau. 14 I think there's a real reason f or waiting to do b. 15 that. If you go at it piecemeal, especially if you make 16 mistakes going at it piecemeal, you will be cycling 1/ opera tors with procedures, and you'll get into not just 18 pumps-on, pumps-off isolated questions, out whole procedures 19 on and off, and I think that would ce dangerous. 2J COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: But there is an assumption, 21 isn't there, the assumption underlying, f or example, to 22 limit the general applications for new opera ting licenses 23 f or next year -- the assumption is that in the review of 24 those two, you're going to be generally satisfied? 25 JR. MATTSON : That shovidn't ce the assumption if s i503 133

74 02 05 15 mgcDAV ~l we find errors that are significant errors. For example, we 2 founo in this procedure review the kind of thing we now know 3 was in the 3&d operating procedures f or a small break, that 4 the pressurizer level weuld go done with the pressure, and 5 we said, " Wait a minutet that's wrong." 5 It's probably wrong in all of them, and it's s f undamental t; th; operator's response, and we hav e to f.ix / 8 that. That shouldn't ce implied. b COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: I guess mora I was ( 9' 10 wonaering is, if you f ound in this review procedure a 11 suf ficient number of problems, wouldn't that then le ad you 12 to conclude you would have to turn to the operating plants? 13 DR. MATTSON: Yes. 14 ('s la la ll 13 13 23 21 22 23 24 25 w 1503 134

02 06 01 75 gshDH I Md. DENTON: The act plan he's refe rring to is ~ 2 an ac tion plan really more f ocused on what is to oe done in 3 operating plants. That would.f all into the same kind of ~' 4 t ime-fr am e. 5 DR. MATTSON : Recommendation 5 had to do with 6 verificatior. of correct perf ormance of operating activities. e CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Roger, before you go on, let ma 8 just note for the guidance of all and sundry, I think I have 9 to break out at 4: 00 and several others at 4: 00. I' d 10 suggest we'd go ahead and run to 4: 00 and take this item. Il ne have nad on some of these points extended discussion. 12 But I don't find any of it not to good purpose. Did I say 13 that at the last minute there ? And we'll schedule back in and take up wnere we l' f t e 14 k. li o ff. Okay? lo Charge. See if you can get 5 tucked away. 17 DR. MATTSON: 5 said that we've got to verify some 16 of tnose operations. Mistakes are oeing made, valves were 19 ceing closea, oils not being put in right, or what have 2] you. The way to get verification and to get it better is 21 independently. 22 .ie said that we'a like to do it two ways independently, 23 one oy status monitoring equipment and oy machine 24 verification and the other was by human verification. 20 Inere's an interesting point here that relates back to m 1503 135

)2 06 02 76 gshDH I the shif ts technical advisor and how some people turned to 2 it and did a good joo while others were cellyaching. 3 Before this report came out, this Rancho Seco, which is 4 one of our smaller licensees, they decided that their shif t 5 technical advisors would be done exac tly the way the lessons 6 learned tas4 force had recommenced in its snort-term i report. And they figured out a shif t arrangement that we 8 hadn' t oeen smart enough to come up witn. But they were 9 going to use the same folks to evaluate operating experience 10 and be on call for immediate response to the control room 11 with engineering competence with this continuing f eedback of 12 opera ting experience. 13 And one of the other duties that they assigned tnem to 14 was independent verification of operating procedures, which 10 was exactly where we were heading with the final report. lo So it was a good check to me during a very acrimonious 17 meeting several weeks ago to have some of these, people stand 18 up and say right on, this is what we are thinking of doing. 19 fnis cackfit of Reg Guide 1.47 is a potential difficulty. 20 1.4/ is a oit of a checkerea career. Those who originally 21 conceived of it got into details that didn't accomplish what 22 its intenced function was. de will have to look at 1.47 23 ratner carefully oefore we just arbitrerily say backfit it 24 the way it is. 25 Tnat may take a 1. 'tle more time than was implied in the 1503 136

D * }J fu}lfDebNf' Y-32 06'03 ee cu gshDH I wording of this recommendation. But you notice we said one 2 kind of human verification oefore the equipment was backfit 3 and maybe another kind af terwards. 4 Recommendation 6, having to do with operating experience. 5 Essentially, what we say in the report is that everybody 6 seems to be doing the right thing. Everybody's reviewing I operating experience with some discipline these days. Each S licensee is required by our short-term report to have a group reviewing operating experience by January 1. P rogr am 10 offices have it. The EE0 has an o ffic e. NSAC has a group. 11 NPO will have a group. Vendors will hav e groups, and then 12 we said, wait a minute. With all the se groups, they'd 13 better De talking to one another lest we have operators 14 being told something diff erent day in and day out acout the 15 same operating experience. Pumps on, pump s o f f f rom 14 16 diff erent sources. 14 So like the President's commission, we said that there 18 ought to be some kind of network, and they said 1/ international. We saic national, to f actor all these things 23 together so that the right le ssons are learned and not 21 conflicting lessons f rom operating experience. 22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Wnere oo we stand on this 23 pumps on, pumps off? 24 DR. MATTSON: I snouldn't nave mentioned that s_/ 20 witnout knowing tne anwer. The pumps are now turned off, 1503 137

78 )2 d6 04 gshDH I out I don't know where we stand. 2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Is there a criterion for ) 3 turning them off at some point? 4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE Well, this is a month that ends 5 in R. 5 (Laughter.) 4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Just think of oysters. 8 DR. MATTSON: The pumps are off and the analyses 9 still shows that it's the right thing to do. Tnere are a 13 numoer of people whose best judgment is that the analyses 11 are s uperfic ial. There must be a good reason for having 12 them on. 13 I don't happen to ce one of those. 14 CO MMISSIONER GILINSKY: But every operator.has a k _. lo clear set of instructions on what tney're supposed to do? 15 DR. MATTSON: Ye s. le CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: He eithe r turns them on or o ff, 18 one or the other. 19 DR. MATTSON: It's my understanding that they all 23 turn them off. 21 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I aon' t know whether I'm 22 glad or sorry that I asked. 23 MR. DENTON: The last time that we activated the 24 response center, the pumps were turned of f. 25 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY: This is the North Anna 1503 138

02 06 05 79 gshDH i case? 2 MR. DENTON: No, the Perry Island case. And we've / 3 not seen reason to change that. 4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Is everyone turning them 5 o ff ? Nc 21d everyone turn them off ? 5 MR. STELLO: They've all oeen instructed to do It's my understanding that they've all accommodated. e so. 3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Does that mean turning 9 them off immediately? 10 MR. STELLO: I think it's witnin three minutes.

1 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Three minutes? 12 MR. STELLos It specified in the oulle tin. 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It 'specified in terrs of 14 time or in terms of some other criteria. Io

MR. STELLO

My recollection is time. 16 COMMISS IONER GILINSKY: Okay. 17 COMMISSIONER BR AD?ORD: Roger, do you have any IS group that's meeting with I&E or ELD as to these various 19 recommended changes with an eye toward what the inspection 2] enforcement framework behina them would be? 21 It comes tack a little to the question that we were 22 kic.<ing around on the first one. Would it ce a good idea to 23 cegin crocessing these things into some kind of inter-office 24 g roup at the same time, speaking of what the framework that 25 lies behind them all wo61d look lika ? +

)20606 80 gshDH I DR. MATTSON: I think so. A t this point, there is 2 no working inter-office group processing these q 3 recommendations or the President's commission's 4 r e co mmend ation. We need to be heading in that direction. 3 MR. DENTON: The inter-office group was on the a team that wrote these and we have now or are about to put in motion development of this grand action plan that sweeps e 3 them all together. 9 That will be an inter-off. ice effort because each office IJ is doing certain things that need to be accomplished on 11 certain time scales. 12 MR. ShAP AR: I think it's a good idea. 13 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Ina t's a li ttle 14 di ff e rent. That is, it's good to have the input of all the 15 offic es as to whether or not these are good ideas. But then lo the whole process of getting them done and what the 1/ appropriate penalties are for not doing them, unat the most IS expeaitious way is to check and see whether they're being 19 cone, those kinds of questions. 20 .V e need to look as well -- 21 4R. STELLO: Clearly, you have to do that. But I 22 think that this refers to some of the things that Harold 23 mentioned earlier. Get this out, get further input and 24 interaction and sharpen up what requirements you have and 23 crop out those that you're going to drop out. ~ 1rq?

1' JGJ

't v

02 06 07 81 gshDH I So that, really, when we finally get to that point, we're 2 working on the proposed set, in answer to the question of 3 enforceaoility and what one might need to do to enforce 4 them. 5 But based on my understanding, I don't think that we're 6 at the point yet where we're ready to do that. There's an I awful lot more f eedoack nece ssary. And I think 3 consolidation of an awful lot of recommendations that just 9 sit everywhere within the commission at the moment. They 10 have got to be pulled together. Ano that is a big 11 e ffort. Not just these recommendations but the 12 recommendations that we've had from GAO, the Kemeny 13 Co mmi ss io n, and all of the internal studies that have gone 14 on. 15 They have got to be pulled together and put in some 16 master plan with an action plan developed for each. That's 1e got to ce cone. IS DR. MATTSON : Rememoer our response to 19 Recommendation A-8 of the Kemeny Commission when we went 23 through, develop some objectives and cull all of these 21 things together. 22 All that needs to be done the way Victor's just described 23 it. 24 COMMISSIONER BRav.-uGC. Let's s ee who's doing 25 that.

22 06 08 82 gshDH I MR. DENTON: We've started. 1 think Howard has the 2 responsioility for you to pull it all together. And then I think in each office we're planning on how we're going to 3 3 4 get all of these coxes filled in. 5 And many of the things that we said in our letter to the 6 White House, some of them weren't all that fleshed out as to I what we were going to do in a given area. 9 So we need to develop that and then put that in some sort 9 of time-frame. And I think that's going to take us -- 10 that's what I originally said -- it's going to take us, it li will take us a while. And I was thinking aoout the middle la of Jecemoer oefore we could get a matrix developed that 13 would have all the recommendations aoout how they might 14 apply to all the VEricus classes of plants and factor in the 15 various office inputs. 16 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But if I wanted to call up 1, and ask how that effort was going, should I call you? IS Should I call Norm? 19 MR. DENTON: I think you should call Norm. 23 MR. GOSSICK: Yes, to answer four cuestion. 21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Who will you call after I 22 call you? 23 MR. GOSSICK: I will call Norm. 24 DR. MATTSON: We could try in five minutes to jump i 25 through the man-macnine interface. 1503 14?

32 06 09 83 gshDH I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE Since we've got to go on with 2 this, we will have another meeting. I would just as soon 3 not a t this point. (Mhereupon, at 4: 00 p.m., the hearing was 5 adjourned.) 6 / 3 iO 11 v 12 or 13' 14 16 16 le 18 19 23 21 2.2 23 24 1503 143 25 -}}