ML19253A645
| ML19253A645 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/27/1979 |
| From: | Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 SECY-79-187, SECY-79-188, NUDOCS 7909100616 | |
| Download: ML19253A645 (86) | |
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'c UNITED STATES
-! 'g e. g, ',j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Q hr VM -
g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 h
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p D 5 August la_, 1979 r
COMMISSION DETERMINATION REGARDING PUBLIC DISCLOSURE UNDER THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT OF:
Transcript of Discussion of SECY-79-18 8 -
Tasx Force on NRC Safeguards Policy and SECY-79-187 - Saf eguards Upgrade Rule 1
June 27, 1979 Pursuant to 10 CFR 9.109(c), the Commission has deter::ined that the attached portions of the subject transcript should be released to the public.
The remaining portions of the transcript have been withheld from public disclosure pursuant to 10 CFR 9.104 as noted below:
Page/Line through Page/Line Exemption 30/20 30/20 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 30/22 30/22 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) 30/16 50/17 10 CFR 9.104 (a) (1) n
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P._ _R 0_ _C _E.I_ _D _I. _N G _S CHAIRMAN HENDRII:
The Cc= mission will come to or-(
der.
The Commission meets this afterncon to resume its discussion and briefing on the Task Force on NRC Safeguards Policy and the related matter of the Safeguards Upgrade Rule.
We had started this discussion at a meeting sev-eral weeks ago and reached some stage; maybe one-third of the way through the graph stack, and then had to stop and go on to other matters.
It would probably be useful if you would re for us what we talked about last time, and then we can go on frcm is there.
MR. GOSSICK:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Actually
. you indicated, we have been here en the Upgrade Rule, and also en the matter of the " reasonable" versus "high assurance" questien that we discussed the last time.
I think Bch is prepared to give you sort of a little of the background on that and then introduce che other aspects that we are going to discuss; the threat censider-i e
ation, that he is prepared to go into this afcerncon, as well.
i Bill, cid you have anything?
Nc.
I missed on of the sessions,
,,n I iy
i so I will catch up with you as you go along.
CHAIRMA:I EE:ICRIE :
We will have the recap.
MR. BURNETT :
Actdally, we had gotten through ap-k proximately two-thirds --
CHAICIAN HENDRIE:
Sorry about that.
MR. BURNETT:
-- of the viewgraphs.
I am not sure hcw well we got through them, but during the initial session, we had covered the points that the definition of " adequate" would be drawn basically from the Atomic Energy Act, and that we would design a system that would reasonably protect the populace from the risk of harm and inimi ality to the cc= mon defense of the country. I
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remember that.
And then we launched into the area of "high" versus " reasonable," and tnat it was the opinion of the Task Force that this was a semantics discussion, not one of substance.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That "high" equals
" reasonable?"
MR. BUR:IETT :
Yes, sir.
The Task Force mai. ains very strongly; we at-(
tempted to in our presentation to make the point that no matter what the word is, a rose by any c her name is still a rose.
Trv.ine to sav that, whether we call it "high" or
" reasonable," we are still going to do the same thing, and 1o
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5 that we are not going to be changing of the evaluation cri-a teria and techniques, and we still we will be providing the same level of protection.
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We had tried to say that.
CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
Is that same thing true in 73.55?
MR. BURNETT:
It would be; yes, sir.
So we are trying to maintain that tnis is a semantics change, being keenly aware of the fact that the perception of the word is different, that "high" carries a different perception than " reasonable," and trying also to give credit for past uses of " reasonable," and how it f,
ar. ears to be in crecedent alread.y, both from a le9al r
standpoint and then the justification given to the NROC petitien and is more substantiated by history.
And that was about where extensive discussions started, explcring is it really the same, and things like uwm.a.m.
That got us up to where we were terminated, with I guess it is fair to say no clearcut positicn formu-latdd at that time.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Without prejudice, I believe.
k (Laughter.)
f.
COMMISSICNEF GILINSKY:
Could you remind us if
" hic.h" ec.uals "reascnable," whv. v.ou thou3~ht it was i:Cortant
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6 to switch away from "high."
MR. SURNETT: It was the Task Force opinion -- and we have a viewgraph on this -- that particularly in the NREC s
petition in answering that, by the Office Director Chapman, at that time, he had used, that the precautions did provide reasonably acceptatie -- my words are bad here -- but he used the word " reasonable," and I can pull back to it.
Do you know which viewgraph that is?
MS. MULLEN:
Seven.
MR. BURNETT:
Viewgraph 7.
In answering that petition -- and I will try to quote frem it now -- that existing safeguard programs are adequate to provide a reasonable assurance that the current SNM activities of NRC licensees are not inimical to the common defense and security and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety.
So that we used % them.
MR. SNYDER: Was that Chapman's response, or the Commission's subsequent response.
I think it was the Com-missioner's wasn't it?
MR. BURNETT:
Yes, it was.
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY : Whichever, it was some slM t1=c ago, ;we since Onen --
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MR. BURNETT:
January 21, 1977.
CCMMISSICNER 3:LINKSY:
Since then we have ".alked l2
7 about "high assurance. "
I guess what surprises me is that when you tnink that the same thing is going to get done, whichever word is
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used, you then attach significance to chcosing one or ancther, at least I attach significance to them, because I think different things happen when you "high" and when you say reasonable," but I am surprised that you do.
MR. BURNETT:
Sir, I am looking at the criteria and if our criteria is unchanged, you can come up with yet a tnird word, which is yet undefined, but if the criteria doesn't change, I understand the perception problem, but I don't understand how the bottom line would change, if r
I don't change the criteria.
s CCMMISSICMER GILIN. SKY:
I guess I am surprised that ycu der. say that if indeed you are going to apply the same criteria and arrive, you believe, at the same level of c.reducticn, that vou don' t sav:
Well, from
=v. coint of view, it doesn't really mat'er which werd we use.
But you don't seen to be saying that.
MR. GCSSICK:
Ther: 13 another consideration here, Sct, thar maybe we oughc to review just briefly, md that is the problem that we have between 73.55 and the S
Upgrade Rule, that is what is "high assurance," how it is judged by che inspection activities, which presents 3
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g trying te get at in this Task Force operation, to harmonize tne efforts tcward judging whether it is high or reasonable, or whatever.
There is a difference that needs to be made clear and also resolved.
CFAIRMAN iiENDRII:
Also, we regulate to a rea-sonable cssurance standard on the health and safety issues which are presumabiv the c. rimary thrust of the Atomic Energy Act.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I wouldn't say that.
MR. BURNETT:
If I can answer the question that you asked specifically on how we got to this point, and if you remember, the last time, I quoted from the annual report af which had illuminated this problem in a statement that had been s
Written in the papers that went to the Commission in support of that report and it saic:
"For pcwer reactors adequacy and high assurance have been equated.
Consequently, if any inspection of a power reactor reveals de-ficiencies in implementaticn to a degree that lowers the assurance below high, the reactor by definition is inadequate."
f I guess that is what really launched the A
task force assignment by Mr. Gessick; that one para-(
graph right there.
g It didn't appear to give the necessary leeway that the Com-mission needed.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What did it mean?
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MR. BURNETT :
What did it mean exactly?
CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
In practical terms?
MR. BURNETT. There is some disagreement on that.
NRR is behind me and would be very quick if I answered this off a little.
Some people feel that if a deficiency is such so that it is below "high," you have to --
CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
What does below "high" mean?
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MR. BURNETT:
There is considerable debate on that.
COf@iISSIONER KIN'IEDY:
I am trying to find out what it is that we are talking about.
CHAIRM.?di HENDRIE:
One of the problems is that there are two scales at hand.
On the fuel cycle side under the present rule, there is -- this language doesn' t appear.
It just said,
" provide adequate protection," or whatever, and it doesn't Sd/
f "high assurance," or "reascnable assurance," or adequate, or whatever.
On the fuel cycle side, they have established and have been using new for several years a ccmprehensive o
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10 evaluation, a set of high, good, fair and poor; a report card scale.
And.un,cer the present regulation, why some suit-k able conbination of everything but poor, which requires im-mediation action, with the nean sort of toward the upper end of the scale, constituting an acceptable situaticn under the -- as interpreted under the regulations.
One of the things we are getting ready to do, I will point out along the way here is to build in "high assurance" to the Upgrade Rule; lest we tnink better of it, in which case, if you find any part of the f acility and. judge it to be sinply good, then you are going to have
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to deal with the question:
. How can we reach the regulation "high assurance" finding.
And you are going to then require that your eval-uation teams either find every f acility in every regard in the "high" catenc rv. en the rec. ort card, or you are ecinc.
to shut then dcwn.
It doesn't seem to ne that that was the way, that that was the intent.
But I am very concerned that that is the direction that this, in my mind, incpportune choice of language on the report card scale is driving.
{s Now we can talk about scale on the reactor side, whirre the reactor regulation says "high assurance," in spite cf the fact that the rest of the reactor safety natters are
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11 regulated on the basis of " reasonable assurance," and the reaccor evaluacors don'c have a corresponding report card.
They don't do their evaluation,s in quite the same
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way with multiple team which then come dcwn and average out the team results and arrive at various features, that tnis feature is goed, this feature is high; the featura is fair.
Here is a poor one that has got to be fixed immediately, and so on, and then an overall.
I don't knew quite hcw they do it, and maybe we ought to give Jim Miller a chance to cc= ment a little bit about it.
But in moving toward the Upgrade Rule, toward I
the retention of this "hich assurance" language that is in
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the proposed rule and is new already in 73.55, I have the strongest concern that se are proceeding to tie car shoe laces together and will promptly proceed to trip over them as soon as we get the knot tied.
That is one of che reasons for the discussion.
COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
You are saying that "high" is not equal to " reasonable," that "high" is going to get us into trouble.
CEAIRMAN HENDRII:
I say if we regulate all of k
tne health and safecy aspecrs under the reactor safety side, under the Atcmic Energy Act, to a " reasonable assurance" standard, and your health and safety concerns accut sabotage 4,-
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12 recuire a "high assurance" standard, people far and near t
read this to constitute a substantially higher standard.
Okay?
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Ncw, tne Staff may very well say:
No; no.
We mean the same things; we are aiming at the same level. It is the same fission products that would hurt people if they got out.
That isn' t the way it is generally perceived, publicly, in the industry, in the Congress, and in some ele-the elements that deal at least) of the Staff; not
- ments, directly with it. They continue to think that what they are working to is the same standard.
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It concerns me that we allcw this in what to my mind is an inconsistency of language.
CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
I am not sure of the fact that it is the same fission product. But let me under-stand; are we talking here about just reactors?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
No; we are talking about both 1) side.
4 MR. SCRNETT:
The term "reascnable" would be en-played in both rules.
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CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am for keeping "high" in the fuel cycle sife of things.
Let's say we are dealing with bc=b material.
There isn't any cuestion in my mind that the problems there rise to a level of seriousness that
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13 I would not want anything icwer than "high assurance" t
that the &rdsf isn' t ge :ing out.
MR. DIRCKS:
You are dealing, then, with some e
problems, I think, } f you judge eva.rything by a standard of
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perfecticn which never really exists in the real world
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are going to have some problers.
Our evaluations have given us this very hign target to shcot at.
And I think the evaluation teams are sent out there looking for holes in that system, and if they lock hard enough, they are going to find some holes, and that is what we want them to find.
And we want corrective action taken.
If you
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hold them always te high, you are going to be very tempted to ra te them at "high," because the drastic alternative is to stcp all operations and patch a tube on a tire, as opposed to really getting at the sericus problems.
CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY :
I don't see why putting a high standard means that one necesarily has to get shut down.
But the fact is, if they are below "high" for any length of : me, they are going to get shut dcwn.
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Cne of the reasons we have gene to "high" in
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this business about --
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MR. DIRCKS.
I: is not alway 3 the same deficiency fcund everv. time.vou o out there.
You may find a pile of w
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boxes in front of a guard porthole this time.
That is nc good.
So you say:
Correct it.
COMMISSICNES GILINSKY: You have got co use con =cn sense in applying all of these criteria.
"High" isn't per-fect.
There still is excellent, and perfect.
(Laughter.)
MR. DIRCKS:
If we went away from "high," we are going to have " super high," " middle high," and "Icw hign."
CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
And then we are going to e
4, have to have some kind of an evaluation program to tell whether ths inspectors are appropriately judging whether it is " super high," " middle high," or " low high," because you are going to get different interpretations, depending on the subjective judgments of the guys who have been providcd the criteria to eliminate the basis for subjective judg-ments.
Right?
MR. BURNETT:
Yes, sir.
If we back to something that I discussed at the last one, that if we hac in the rule itself " reasonable," but then in the criteria which the task force has suggested, should be consistent in the inscection Orccran, in NRR and in NMSS, and go throuch.a
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three-graded system for than evalcation purpose, been; the
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15 desired level being the top one, what you call limited ep-eration, or limited conditional operation being the second one, whicn would have tidh to it a time period for corrective k-procedures to be implemented, and then the third one, in-adequate.
Each are self-defining.
Our goal is the top one.
That gives you some leeway, and then in your rule itself, it would be reasonable to protect the public.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I don't like the word " goal."
" Goal" sounds like something vou strive for; sometimes.vou make it and sometimes you don' t make it.
MR. BURNETT:
Isn' t that really the case right I
now.
. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
That ought to be the standard. The f act that you don' t meet the standard dcesn' t necessarily mean that you turn everything off.
MR. BURNETT:
Maybe I am using the wrong word there.
You have to maintain a "high" standard.
If you don't ycu are given a limited amount of time to get there.
You are subject to immediate corrective actions, or shutdcwn or both, or anything else that we have got.
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I think that would give th e Ccemission the leeway to do what is necessary and not tie our hands.
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g my cwn po'nt cf view, we have cur hands on the regu_ations
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I would like to see the regulations, a: least on the berb materials, pro-tecnion.
MR. BURNETT:
When you say bomb material, you Alb also mean the nonpower reactors which arm high enriched material?
COMMISSIONER GILINKSY:
Anything you can make bombs out o f.
MR. SURNETT :
Anything that would be high enriched material.
CCMMISSICNER KENNEDY:
You are talking about research reactors?
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CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Yes, where the material
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is accessible.
COMMSSIONER KENNEDY:
So we would have two dif-ferent standards among reactors.
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
I am proposing we have a tight standard for protecting material that we turn into bombs. I do see a difference between that and protecting reacters against sabotage.
I don't think it is identical to the health and
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safety problem.
It is =cre like the health and safety problem that we are f amiliar with.
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.n-safety problems don't need to mee: the same high standards 4 --,
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17 as the protection against possible loss of bomb material?
COMMISSICMER 3RADFORD : What I would have say there A
is:
Within the overall franewor,d, as Joe has cutlined it,
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as to reactors, it seems to me that in many areas, given 10 to the minus what ever it is tv.o.es of numbers ycu come up with, in fact, we have "reascnable," to be "high," by any normal definition of what the kinds of assurances that we require, and in exceeding the propositten that there is the 73.55 in reactors, the word, to be " reasonable," it would seem to me we have not reall/--asBobhassaid, we are not changing the result in any way.
We simplv., in that area, generally mean by
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reasonable what society as a whole would normally mean
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by "high.",
In this area we have (inaudible).
I would agree with Vic as to bomb material and the 73.55.
CHAIRMAN HINDRIE:
There is a possible configura-tien that lies along that line.
It certainly means you have get to change the report card gradings.
You can't stand to continue to use "high," "goed," " fair" and " poor" on tne report card readings, and then have a regulation that says "high assurance" because you spend all of your life in litigation, cver hcw the twc are together.
Maybe the repcrt card, as has been suggested,
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could go to --
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1 o' CCMMISSICNER KENNEDY:
Very gccd, Pretty Good.
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CHAIRMAN HENORIE:
And lousy, and you would say
" reasonable.
You get "high assuranceg{ cut of a reasonable grouping toward the top.
The Task Force has gone in the direction of saying:
Lock; we ought to say " reasonable assurance," and retair the present grading.
Well, let's see; the proposal is to go over to a three --
MR. BURNETT:
That is the proposal that NMSS has come up with.
The Task Force suggested that the three offices, I & E, NRR and NMSS, get tecether and come up with a consistent
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U-set of safeguards, ccee un the three for talking, which ac.cears
.A to be -- it locks like it would do the job.
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But I didn't sant to leave the impression that the task force suggested that.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Okav.
MR. GCSSICK:
If accepted -- if it is agreeable with NRR.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Do you want to talk a minute about hcw you make your evaluations, Ed?
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MR. CASE:
The evaluations are made agains t the regulaticn, the licensing part, and we strive to achieve
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a standard regulat_On, which now says "high assurance,"
but in the back of our minds is the feeling that ycu are 4 - <
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19 concerned about release frcn sabotage and the same fission d
products that might be released fran an accident.
And so it does not seem to make sense to us to k
have a higher standard for one way of releasing fission prcducts versus the other.
The regulation uses "nign assurance" for sabo-tage and " reasonable assuranc Q for safety.
By the fact that we all work in safety, and have in the past, I think it is fair to say that either the way Com=issioner Bradfor has said; they are both high.
or they are both reasonable, but tney are the same.
I think it makes much more sense to use tne
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werd " reasonable assurance" for reactors in the regulation, rather than "high."
Ncw what Jim does it to try to evaluate it to make sure it reaches the standarc in the regulations.
After that time there are inspections, and as Bob points out, ne will find deficiencies frca time-to-time in te inspections.
I agreee with him that I would not want to use high, fair, medium, icw, that you can nave the regulations under certain circumstances wnere they are traditionally i
adecuate, or they have to make a change in sc=e reasonable 1
amount of time to bring them up to "hign," or they are so gross that immediate tnings have ts be done, such as 7
j39
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shutting tne f acility dcwn or making i=ediate improvements.
The licensing evaluation is separate from unat vou finc out during operation bv the inspection people, and on occasion, our reactor people.
Do I make myself clear?
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
I tnink so.
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21 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
But as the inspectors go y
cut and look at each of ten aspects of the security system, the specialists don' t go out and grade aspect 1, A,
B, C,
or D, and then 2, and then 3, and then they gather and make -- form a judgment.
I just average cut these to say, okay, overall, let's assume that he comes out thus and so.
That is about the way the fuel cycle thing has shaken down.
MR. BURNETT:
There is a way to get us all talking together, Mr. Chairman.
Right now I&E and NRR are working on criteria; in other words, deficiencies that would carry a certain amount of weight.
And when a certain
/(
proportion of the deficiencies tipped the scales, then it would f all out of the: topmost category and into -- one of the others.
MR. CASE:
It is an attempt, as Commissioner Kennedy outlined, to in effect have more than words; that we are going to try to work with I&E to reach agreement beforehand as to what weight to give various deficiencies to see what three broad categories they go into.
MR. BURNETT:
I have recently made an assignment to do the identical thing for fuel cycles.
I call it a closed dcwn criteria cr weighting criteria.
And using these three, identified levels, which Mr. Case seems to agree with, then each of us would give the inspectors a O~
1:
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22 weighting for certain types of deficiencies and then they could use the same and that would go a long ways into making us consistent.
And that type of logiD was what the task force k
was sponsoring.
But since that time he and Mr. Dircks' office have developed this three-level concept and started to precipitate what would work.
CHAIF31AN HENDRIE:
Your criteria would then give you a way of judging particular security aspects, which in turn would tell ycu whether you are within the top band, the conditional band or the --
MR. BURNETT:
Suppose you had a major deficiency
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that might carry by itself such a large weight that you automatically drop into tbs " inadequate."
Bu*. maybe you had scmething else of a lesser -- the training wasn't found to be right.
It may take a multitude of those to tip the scales, so to speak.
And that's what ISE means.
V2. DIRCKS:
Everything may be 'right according to what is dcwn en paper in the plan but when these teams ccmbine and when varicus tests, although everything may be perfectly in s nc with the regulations, maybe the thing just i
doesn't werk properly.
New that facility may meet high assurance or sc=e type of assurance in the bcck but maybe the thing just dcesn't work right.
I would like to have that
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23 leeway that even though he meets everything right there, I would like to say well, that's fine, just correct this and this and that and then --
Whereas if you put a rigid k
standard in, ! don't whether you are going to get honest appraisals coming back frca the team because they have to be locked into it.
MR. GCSSICK:
We are talking abcut what we are trying to do.
I would like to Mo Howard if there is any-thing he would like to add about the problems we are having j
f now in the field in inspecting on the one handq uel cycle facilities versus reactors through these different require-ments.
(
Mo, is there anything you want to add?
+1R. ECWARD :
No, sir, except inspectors inspect the reactors and they also inspect the fuel f acilities.
They s
are taking a look -- of course, we are working with both high and low incidents.
One thing that we are doing that wasn't brought up here is if we find that a facility is inadequate, we draw that line if ycu can get uninhibited N
or undetected access to detected areas.
We draw the line right there and the inspector doesn' t leave until that is corrected.
(
'Ihe diagram the Chairman is looking on is a logical fault tree that wculd allcw cs to take the 3 jo
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24 numbers of noncompliances and fit them into the diagram i
and see whether we were truly reaching a point of inadequacy or if the points were more indicative of a management problem k
and no t the inadequacy of this facility protection.
MR. GCSSICK:
The point I would think that we should understand, if this is correct, is that currently one of your inspectors, when he gces out to a fuel cycle one day and it's, you know, he's looking for high assurance but he 's got a way of treating with this and making a judg-ment --
MR. HOWARD:
This could be dropped down to his
" good."
We do not judge on that basis.
(
MR. GOSSICK:
And the next day he has a reactor
~
and it has to be high and nothing less.
MR. HCWARD:
Any one noncompliance judgment has to be made.
MR. GCSSICK:
I think this presents a problem to our inspectors for consistency and the ability to explain it, for that matter, to anybcdy who inquires about it.
MR. CASE:
I don't see that problem.
It seems to be possible that you can have different standards --
CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
For one thing, it is a different problem.
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e
25 MR. CASE:
You can have different grading systems for the different standards.
MR. BURNETT:
I think there would be dif fer-k ences.
I think the three levels would be the same.
The dif ference is due to the sabotage scenario as dif ferent from theft.
You know, if you had an uninhibited diversion path, dnat would automatically drop you, where they would have an uninhibited sabotage path.
MR. SNYDER:
I have a question.
Is there an attempt to continue the evaluations, another round of evaluations with the fuel facilities?
That was a one-shot thing originally.
And the second question, if I may, is
(
there any intent to do something like that for the reactors once you get 73 --
How about the first question?
How about the first question?
MR. DIRCKS:
I think those ccmprehensive evaluations served a very valuable purpose.
And whether we do them the same way or do them all over the lot as we have been, I think we should continue them in some form or another.
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MR. sN'tcER:
That is above and beyond the
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MR. S 57YDER:
Jim, are you planning to continue 1
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25 the sane v.cde?
Have you given any chcught to this?
MR. CASE:
We have given thought to it.
And we think, since we work very closely with inspectors doing the evaluation, that it is not necessary.
The initial evaluation to make --
MR. SNYCER:
I mean once it is in place, once the sys tem is in pl ace.
MR. C ASE:
We worked with the inspectors to get it in place.
We think tha t provided enough ficw between the two of fices that we can rely on them to see how well it's being implemented, without necessarily making ccmpre-hensive evaluations every so often.
We are going to try the
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same system we have on safety and see if it works.
If it s
doesn't, we 'll try something else.
We think it will work.
MR. SNYDSR:
One of the reasons we went to the M
cceprehensive evaluation is we wanted to bl_...
- t these g
operations.
The inspector doesn't really do that I don't think.
He sticks to the book.
He sticks to his inspection
'mA re+n-r and I think that is scmething we need to think about MR. DIRCKS:
That is why I think there is scmewhat of a difference.
MR. SNYOER:
I am not sure there should be such a difference.
They shculdn't proceed, once the standard 73.55 program is in place for the reactors,.: seems to me
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si the next step is black hat :ype evaluations on the reactors i
to see how ocd those systens really are; not just by the book.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Let me get back to the difference between fuel cycle facilities and reactors.
We treat them dif ferently in terms of protecting the informa; tion about them.
In one case, the information is classified.
In the other case, i t isn ' t.
CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That may or may not be correct.
MR. BURNETT:
At the mixed facilities, they aren't declassified -- by DOE regulations, not by ours.
r i
Some of the data is classified by DCE --
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
-- it is recognized there are two views on that.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIZ:
Let 's see, didn' t we go ahead and classify?
MR. SNYDER:
We approved that.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
We approved the classification of detailed security plans for fuel cycle facilities, as I recall.
J t
MR. SNYIER:
That rule is ap for public cctment.
t but, in principle, you approved that a numbe r o f mon th s ago.
CHAIPM N HENIRIE:
So what you are saying --
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That doesn't prove any thing.
4 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You mean whether it is 7
rignt or not.
COMMISS!CNER KENNEDY:
That that has any applicaticn to this question.
CCMMISSICNER GILIUSKY:
It is just another area, related aren, where the Ccmmission has drawn a distinction between protecting fuel cycle f acilities and protecting reactors.
COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:
That gets to the theory
(
's that nothir.g prospectively has any precedent value.
But; having said that, everythir g turns out of this Cc= mission to have had.
(Laughter.)
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
That reminds me, we occasionally used to put in ec==ents en actions, that this doesn't constitute a precedent.
CCMMISSICNER KENNEDY:
But we don't bother with that any =cre because we know better.
( Lauch ter. )
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The mind beggles in the face of these safeguard matters, I must say.
And I an
(
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29 trying to see if I can get
.cid of it.
I have got a feeling that it wo.n't be all at hand until we talk about threat statement propositions.
It may be cut of discussion thus far that I perceive what might be the basis for general agreement.
At least some things we have discussed thus far, but I think we ought to go ahead and gear their discussion about the -- the reccmmendations of the task force on threat statements and hcw that ought to lie between the various rules and be treated, because that may be as difficult or more dif ficult than these other matters.
So why don' t we hear -- why don' t you charge i
ahead on that and then let us see how --
MR. BURNETT:
Yes, sir.
As far as we are aware, in the threat area, any discussions that might come
.up are in the reactor threat area, not necessarily the upgrades th re a t.
We haven' t heard any ques tions on the upgrades thre a t.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Remind me for purposes of background, the upgrade rule, threat language goes along what kind of line?
t MR. SURNETT:
A small group, highly dedicated, highly motivated, highly crained, well equipped, able to CHAIRMAN HENCRIE:
If we cculd only hire staff 9
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S k.
30 members --
(Laughter.)
MR. SURNETT:
Able to divide into smaller groups, aided by an insider, or protection against a conspiracy between.
CC.5fISSICUER KIN'IEDY :
Where are these?
MR. SURNETT:
I haven't seen any lately and I hope I never do.
CHAIPJIAN HENDRIE:
Make him an offer.
( Lt.ughter. )
MR. BURNETT:
That is an upgrade threat as opposed to a highly-motivated, well-armed several persons f
A or single insider, so there basically are your two threats.
I guess I went through them rather quickly.
I have it in written form.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
You went through it fast enough so that they merged as they went past.
MR. BURNETT:
The big difference is -- in the staff we don't use numbers but to make it easy, it has been published 3 and 1 for reactors and for the upgrades.
When we make the analysis and study the plan, although we don't use numbers, we are thinking in sc=e respect So that I think bottca lines the two threats.
Okay?
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3 31 CHAIFJ!AN HENCRIE:
Okay.
MR. S'.YDER:
There is an important distinction.
For the reactors, we don't all,cw for conspiracy.
I think
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4 we all have to keep that in mind.
MR. BURNETT:
That will ccme out in detail a little hit further down.
Odk/
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CCMMISSICNIR KENNEDY:
We will discuss E9tr MR. BURNETT:
I have a statement in my speech h tu about-?rR. [~That's why I don't want to discuss it.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
The other fellow's machine.
( Laugh ter. )
MR. BUFJETT:
Yes, sir.
(
I think I should call your attention to an
~
open dcor paper that was directed to the Commission written Ron Brightsen.
He is present.
I will try to relate just some of the important issues he raised.
Any direct questions, Ron is here available to answer them.
Ron called attention in his open door paper Ehat the threats should not be based on consequencas of the dif ference between what wculd happen if you had a severe accident or sabotage at a reactor f acility and the thef t of material which resulted in a nuclear weapon.
Basically the i
r task force agrees with that, that the threat as designed is not premised on consequence but rather cn the motivation o f v
32 the adversary.
That, too, is slightly different frcm the past.
In the past it was ifentified by targets of interests:
reactors versus fuel cycles.
What is being presented to you
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today is slightly cifferent in that we are telling you to look at it from the motivation of the adversary rather than the target.
So essentially we are agreeing with Mr. Brightsen on that.
COMMISSIONER 3R;CFORD :
I have a little bit of trouble seeing that the consequences aren't in some way relevant.
That is, if you took the material, set off a weapon in a place of the group's chcosing, wouldn' t that in all likelihcod be even more serious than an act of r
ei sabotage to a reactor?
MR BURNETT:
It could be, Commissioner.
The problem is we don't have sufficient studies; at least, we i W ;_
believe we don' t have. enough to categcrically say /9wer that will necessarily produce.
If you had a severe accide.it, a meltdcwn with a significant release of the fission product inventory of a reactor in one of the more populated locations, and looking at the long-tern latent cancers and what not, I don't think anybcdy can tell you what that number is.
And it may not be a whole lot different than the other numher.
Maybe by a magnitude of 2.
Maybe by 3.
Bu: the number may be so large that th at difference is not necessarily big.
1 7
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33 COMMISSICNER GILINSKY:
It is a different problem, I
cne you can you deal with by guarding that one reactor.
MR. BURNETT-We agree.
All we are trying to say 1s that rather than des,ign, vour system based on conse-e base it on the' p H av1mu_.-
..o un and capability of the
- quence, adversaries that you think will be ccming.
That is the way to do it.
In the threat work, we have pretty well identified that generally more people are used in tieft than in a sabotage.
That has nothing to do with consequences.
That is a fact based on our historical studies.
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY :
Is there anything in this system that wculd allcw us to requird more protection, say, f't at Indian Point than at seme other reactors?
MR. BURNETT:
Based on local proble=s?
CCMMISSIGNER GILINSKY:
Yes.
Do we have the flex.ibility to do that?
MR. BURNETT:
We always have that through the IAT.
We try to monitor immediate threats.
And if an immediate threat is detected --
CCMMi-' TONER GILI" SKY:
No, just as a matter of course.
Just because there are a lot of --
MR. DIRCKS:
Because of the consequences of
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that target versus anot?
type target.
MR. SURNETT:
~ hat is not built into the syste.m.
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to
),
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That's standard.
It depends on local law enforcement i
and how well those cc=munications are.
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Has any thought been given to that?
MR. BURNETT:
In all honestv, I have to
/
LW answer you the negative.
This has been thought of a 4
4 generic rule up until ncw; reactors as an entity, fuel cycles as an entity.
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Is there some cbvious reasons why one ought to reject that sort of a notion?
MR. BURNETT:
Well, I guess' the reason that
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I would bring back is that to assume that in this highly mobile population that we live in, to say that that one is any more vulnerable, you know, to an adversary, I find it difficult to justify in v.y own mind, because the adversary
_w
- --e going to hit the weakes t link.
So let's say you do argue for a minute to beef up that security because of "the neighborhcod," okay, th en they are just going to walk across the street.
MR. DIRCKS:
I can see ycur point and I guess the I
answer is there is no reason why it shouldn't be locked at.
I guess the thing is just like a facility near the populated t
=cne gets a ict more safety treataent. I guess sc=ebcdy might 3
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35 vant to take a look at che consequences.
We can take a
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lock.
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
We do take pcpulation into account in deciding what sort of safety and engineering safeguards may be required.
And it seems to me perfectly reasonable to take the same approach on the protection side based en the pcpulation and degree of exposure that would result.
MR. BURNETT:
Rather than the direction I was ccming fron a minute ago as being a hostile area.
I understand.
I was off target there.
.MR.
DIRCKS:
It is the payoff of the attacker.
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CHAIRMAN HENDRII:
It seems reasonable to take a look at th a t.
I don' t know that in terms of these things that I would go totally to scme judgment as to the motivation of people who might want to steal on the one hand and make a bcmb, or sabotage on the other.
It seems to me the potential consequences do have some effect en the judgment.
At least in the sense of the overall protection levels.
Well, I guess maybe we ought to see what the
/
we wanted a recem=endation --
MR. BJRNETT:
Where we are trying to lead is --
CHAIRMAN HEMIRII:
And see where they lead, s
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36 MR. SURNETT:
Lccking at the history of past inci-dents, none of which have been directed against the nuclear community, they are mostly analogcus iheidents, t
it was evident that generally more people were involved in where you have to get into a store or get into a facility and renove, as opposed to a more surreptious 4
entry to deposit scmething and then leave.
Generally speaking, there are more people involved in the first one.
That is, the removal or the thef t of merchandise.
Thereby saying that the threat is different, which generally does support two levels of threat.
If I could have viewgraph ll, Mr. Davidson.
f.
(Slide.)
All of what I have been trying to say at this point -- and I would like to go back just for a mcment to Mr. Brightsen's paper -- he suggests that the industry is exposed to a single threat.
And that is another important issue in his open door paper.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Would you say that again?
MR. SCRNETT:
He suggests that the cc=munity or the industry is really subject to a single threat, whatever I
that is; whichever one the Commission would decide upon, it
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should be uniform Oc all nuclear faciliH.es. No matcer whether
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they,are_ reactors or fuel cycle facilities, the threat is X.
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of the task force was that, in our cpinion, there was really at least two threats out there, and in all honestv.
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What does it mean, there is a threat out there?
MR. SURNETT:
We have no data to say we are under any imminent attack.
We are again looking at a analogous incidents.
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
But it seems to suggest there is a group lurking out there --
MR. BURNETT:
No, sir.
f COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
they may go af ter one thing or --
MR. BURNETT.
No, sir, the data is just the occosite.
CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
Or that there may not be now, but there may be at sc=e time in the future.
MR. BURNETT:
We are saying that if there is one in the future, it will probably have the same degree
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33 same way that you protect candy stores.
You don't say what is the threat.
MR. BURNETT:
The task force totally agrees with you and we support at least two threats.
I was trying to relate Mr. Brightsen's paper at the point COMMISSIONER KENNECY:
Two levels.
MR. BURNETT:
Two levels of threat.
A postulated th reat.
We do not have a threat that we knew of right now.
CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:
Rick, I think you come to trying to -- I think you keep getting driven toward the threat enunciation in some form and somewhere down in the regulatory structure, in order to have a basis for judging
(
whether you are providing an appropriate level of measures now.
You know, in 73.55, it's built into the regulations for pity's sake, and we'll see some reccumendations on that.
I don ' t know that, in fact, that it is necessary that it be built into the regulations.
But even if it is a
no more than ac concept in the senior reviewer's mind when he tries to judge level of protection, I think you inevi-tably get driven scmewhere to try to have a picture --
MR. SCRNETT:
It's a building block with a resulting security system.
\\
COMMISSIONER GIEINSKY:
But we have had -- ekay, I guess you are saying we have two security problems and so d
l s
39 for each one you are going to have a --
MR. BURNETT:
A different security system.
That is exactly right.
MR. CASE:
The design basis.
And in doing that you protect for other levels.
MR. SURNETT:
In the future you might say we have some degree of threat at a low-enriched plant.
It is a different type of threat.
So I can perceive yet another type of threat to the industry.
But we do, however, believe that these are compcnents or component threats to a single threat statement.
We are suggesting that pulling the threat out of 73.55, out of the " upgraded" --
COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:
What does that mean?
MR. BURNETT:
And then we put it into a single statement that says that we believe that you shculd design for protection against these two ccmponents, and they make up the threat.
Cne is sabotage; one is theft.
COMMISSIONEk GILINSKY:
I don't knew that it does any harm to say that.
I am not sure I knew what it means.
j MR. DIRCKS.
I think in order to make a requirement on semebcdy, you have got to have scme idea --
CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY-Well, each o f these ?
40 is, in effect, a kind of template or a checklist for s judging the system. Scme things to judge the protection against sabotage and then _other things are done for protection against thef t. MR. BURNETT: One very quick advantage to this, Mr. Ccm=issioner, is that we have to guard in the fuel cycle world against sabotage threat also. So by putting it into a single statement and then saying fuel cycles have to protect against both threats, then I am satis fying both components. It is just an easy way to do it. If you remember my first presentation, I said ( that this is the most difficult paper I have presented. s I think that was an understatement. (Slide.) If I could b. ave -- CHAITd1AN HENDRIE: If you think it is hard to understand from that side of the table, you cught to be over here. ( Laugh te r. ) MR. 3CRNETT: I guess we deserved that. I Could I have viewe.raph no. 12,
- c. lease?
g (Slide.) I would like to recap -- ! tJ
41 CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I thought it was written fairly simply, if that matters. (Laughter.) t MR. BURNETT: If I could recap for a minute past Commission actions in this area. During the past several years the Staf f and the Ccamission has spent enormous amounts of time debating the exact relationship of these threats. I wrote that before today 's deliberations. This slide is an attempt to show some of the major actions that have happened during this period. I would like to call your attention to the first two, with the date of 12-23-76. Both of these, the 1 Co= mission put out and established the two threats as we s know them. " Later they were =cdified to do away with the numbers, to go to the severals and the small group. And still later, the fuel cycle one was modified to include conspiracy. So both threats have been before the Cc= mission and have ccme back from the cc= mission saying these are the threats. MR. DIRCK5: The point is, you have had a long history of looking at the threats, and you wculd rather t i not be troubled any more. t (Laughter.) MR. BURNETT: The task f rce, when it finished f. JU
42 its deliberations back in March, it was the view of the task force at thac time that we reviewed all of the docu-mentation in support of the upgrades r3 e and 73.'55. - 1 A Could I have viewgraph 13, please? (Slide.) And then all of the data constituted af ter that date, that being the generic adversary study, it was the task force opinion that we were not going to recommend to you any change in the policy that the Cc= mission had established on the two threats. Taking into account, however, that the Cc= mission has asked RGS to lodc into a broader or expanded insider threat, which was an ll-month project which / i is due in about six months from this =cnth. In addition to that, since that time, there has been an incident-at Surry. I am now not speaking for the task force, because the task force was not able to convene and =ake a collegial opinion as to recommendations, what should be done on Surry. It is now an NMSS pcsition that the Surry incident should be studied as it may affect or impact the reacecr threat. And it is premature to make any judgments on hcw that impact may or may net result at ( this time. The task force did not have a chance to s deliberate that question, so that's stri ly ccming from NMSS at this time.
43 (?ause.) I am just ge :ing my thcughts to ge the r. CHAIEMAN HENDRIE: The proposal -- (, MR. BURNETT: I'm en my last viewgraph, gentlemen. CHAIFF.AN HENDRII: The recommendations, if I can go to that viewgraph that says -- is that the one I want -- revised rules. MR. BURNETT: Yes, that is the one that I am coming up to. 13-A, please. (Slide.) This was my summary viewgraph, which basically i i the task fc ce is saying that NRR, NMSS, ISE should strive for a consistent policy; that we should use the " reasonable assurance" statement in place of the "high'!; that we should consolidate the threats into a single paragraph, making the two ccmponents; and that the Staf f dces not believe th at there is any difference between the "high" and reasonable" and that these changes would achieve a more consistent policy in NRC across the varying safeguard offices. CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Can I just ask ycu, leaving tne,,Ocnsequences" out wnat was :ne significance C:. of the threat? What was that again? MR. BURNETT: The cask force was not able to 4 k I
4a rescive that there was a significant arcunt Of difference between consequences of a weapcn being fabricated and exploded at a position decided by the adversary and the worst possible reactor sabotage scenarie. CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY: Well, it seems to me, it is the difference in consequences that causes us to distinguish between the twc cases, in particular, the fact that the consequences in one case can appear anywhere including at 1717 E Street. MR. BURNETT: That is agreed. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Please. (Laughter.) ( ,MR. BURNETT: What we are trying to say is the difference is the protection system -- COMMISSICNER GILINSKY: Or the Capitol or the Trade building or wherever. MR. BURNETT: Is more really dependent upon the expected adversary that you have to hold off. MR. DIRCKS: What we are saying I guess is what it takes to do the jcb. And it takes probably more pecple to ecme in and steal material and transport it scmewhere -- I 4.a a~ a.: n.m. 1 D w=.r e.- V. a. v., D.%y. 2,, v v.4 a
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45 wi th i t. And that is why we are worried. \\ MR. DIRCKS: Yes. CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY: And Shat is why you conclude that you don' t want them to get away with this stuf f and therefore you have to have a certain a= cunt of protection. Now you have to draw the line somewhere and say, well, provide this much and no more. But th at is driven, it seems to me, by -- MR. BURNETT: A possible dif ference in consequences? CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Yes. MR. SURNETT: There is only one report on f ( the subject -- COMMISSICNER GILINSKY: Not only the size of the actual explosion or the area that would be af fected by some release of radioactivity but also just the qualitative dif ference between the two cases. MR. BURNETT: There is only one report on this subject and it is not complete. It tends to show that the consequences are greater through a CFE explosion Shan an accident at a reactor. But in the last page of that repor I it says -- which is the reason we haven' t used it -- is ( it says they may have overestimated the damage due to the C.T T C g \\ 9 ( l in I ( v s.
we CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: But this is getting i down into fine de: ail. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think I agree with you ( and I think first that we agree th'at it is not inappro-priate; i.e., it is appropriate to take scme account of what is known about the characteris tics of groups that tend to steal and make bcmbs, or at least steal stuff versus groups Ehat do sabotage. You know, it is our input to your evaluation. So I think that it is certainly useful to bring that in. For myself, I continue, I guess, to speculate .that the consequences indeed make a difference, and I think It they are probably worse on the bomb side on the following basis. If you go to wcrst case scenarios, you get a lot of people killed. MR. BURNETT: Either way. CHAIDIAN HINCRIE: Either way. Your judgment as to risk from these two sorts of dif ferent hazards, if it is to be a re allv. rationale one, has to find sene way to, as WASH-1400 did, lay out a spectrum of things that can ha.ccen, trv to estimate the likelihood of each class I in the sc. ectrum and then the consequences and then form t scme overall iudc. ment; in effect, an integration across s l that consequence probability join: spectrum. I kind of got a netion if you were able to 4 i
47 make that, and I think that it is really beyond our capability in an; quantitative way, so everybody will have to let his cwn and her own intuition tel1 them how ( they come out on it. Mine is that on balance, you come out worse on the bomb side than the reactor side. MR. BURNETT: Everybcdy feels that way. CHAIPlG.N HENDRIE: It is an intuitional matter and not scmething I could defend in quantitative terms. COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: One thought there, I suppose, is that your worst case bcmb scenarios start to include more than one bcmb. CFAIRMAN HENDRIE: Yes, and they get to include ( yields much -- you know, if get the worse reactor case, presumably you have gone way down to very low probability levels. At comparably low probability levels, I think you have -- you have tens of kiloton yields perhaps from more than one weapon in metropolitan areas, which you knew, holy =ackerel -- CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY: Even before you get to the point of actually dealing with the ef fects of acts of sabotage or an explosion, suppose sc=eone were to take over ( a reactor, evacuated the surrounding area. MR. SURNETT: There are lots of things you can do to protect vaurself. ( 4 ( / I C L.
,4 2 CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: If someone had ( material and you have scme reason to t' link -- you knew, you have to assume that he would turn this into a bcmb then, you are in very difficult shape. You may get threats all over the country. MR. BURNETT: We are not trying to say that the consequences are totally disregarded. CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It i3 a quantitatively different problem. And one that I think would be very much more difficult to deal with. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: But whichever way one wants to look at this, I think we sort of ecme out -- we ccme ( out -- individual intuitions and feelings sort of lead us to diverge a little bit in the evaluation. But we are ccming out in the same place, which is that there is a difference; that it is reasonable for the design basis protection levels to be different. The proposal here is to enunciate them so there is that difference and to enunciate them on the basis of sabotage and the diversion of material. So you come out, whether we all like the way each other -- that isn't going to be grammatically gced ( ind but whether I like the way '. got there, why I like what you got. And I think the things th a t 10u are tending to accent )
49 more, I would accent less. On the other hand, I certainly wouldn't want to ignore the things that you are doing. Now with regard to the recc==endations and, ( let's see, they are -- let's see if I can understand them. They are to incorporate the 138 paper -- do I call it a " thre a t statement" new or -- MR. BURNETT: We would consolidate into a single threat statement, 73.1. CHAIPP.AN HENDRIE: Yes. In a new section 73.1. MR. BURNETT: Deleting 55 and 20. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It would cover the two levels. MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir. ( h b3 The reactor side in 55 would refer to that, tnuu. M and you take that threat thing out of 55. The proposed upgrade rule in section 20, again it would be deleted and refer to the new section. Okay? And also -- now that chunk seems to me to have -- to be pretty good. I would like to encourage th a t. What I understand goes with it in terms of staff implementation is an attempt to, both from the fuel cycle side and from ne reactor side, to try to make a more quantitative ( enunciation of hcw ^vou weight various aspects of security .\\ systems in the two kinds of places to help the inspectors decide whether they have got a big problem, medium problem, f
50 little problem. Is that -- admittedly crude, but does that i reflect what you unders tand you are doing. MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir. CEAIRMAN HENDRIE: That would seem to me to be a reasonable proposition,like results of forward motion on one of the longest-running acts here. Now to go on to the question of "re as on ab le " and "high," there I get a division of the Commission at -a c A -. the table. I would be inclined to -- let me if I can deal with the " reasonable" business. Vic and Peter think at least the fuel cycle ought to carry "high" as the la I vote for " reasonable" across the board. D.n uage. l u 'Yte-would vote for " reasonable" across the board. And John is not with us to break the tie or add to it, whichever way it might come out. ( Laugh te r. ) Well, you said you want "high" on the fuel cycles, you haven't said on the other hand that, you knew, that you are adamantly against making the reactor side read " reasonable assurance" to be consistent with the safety side. I New I don' t know, if I proposed that as a way t to go, what kind of prc'cle=s dces the assorted safeguards ( experts of the Staff see as prcblers in that? ie l / \\.
3. MR. SURNETT: That gets to a ques tion tha t you asked us really, you asked us in the last meeting to come back on with three answers, four actually; where ( are we in the self-protecting icvel? 1G0 rem exclusion, if you remember. There was a study group going and Mr. Miller can answer that. Basically there is a paper en route. You asked us to come back with, if we went with the "high assurance," how would we write that in the rules so that b it would be a goal. That has been here. We can distribute 4 that right new. And you asked us to expIain randem searches. f i And the paper was sent up to the Ccmmission on May 22 to do that. And we have a person standing by to do that. And yet a fourth issue, which I think is probably the most impcrtant, Mr. Miller during the last meeting indicated that they would not be able tc achieve the 100 rem exe=ption at =cs t of the nonpower reactors and that the 27 facilities could f all under the Category I requirements of this rule. We have answers prepared on all four of these ( which will allcw the Ccmmission to =cve forward on this rule. COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: To go back to the 4 (' ! : l l)
at "high" and " reasonable assurance" level, can we go back s to that one? That is still open? CHAIRMAN SENDRIE: That is still open, I think. s CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The question is, the S ta f f has repeatedly through our discussions asserted that from its perspective the two things are equated. If we now in one rule say, en one side, say "high," and the other side say "reasonabla," because they are not equated, it is perfectly clear that~they are not. New -- if it said ti ct, what effect will that have, I think is the Chairman's question, we can no longer say that they are equated, they are not. And if they are not, what difference does that make? r ei MR. BURNETT: I guess I don't understand why they are not equz ted. CCMMISSIONER BRAOFORD: Yes, I'm not sure -- MR. BURNETT: I don't knew how to answer that. CCMMISSIONER KENNE;Y: If they are,. then they oucht to be bo th the s ame. MR. BURNETT: And if they aren't, how do we justify the di.fference? - e. m..r e - e u.. r_ R v, e.s.-s. r_ s~.f ..w. a. s ,, w. % i. o. e ..u. MR. BURNETT-I can't answer that. I think i. nchody has answered it very well. d m s - .u.,..,, 1. ,. - s,s, o a- -., =.y z -,r..= a~., .s,. g p e
53 seems to me, that needs to be resolved before we put a rule on the street. Because we ought to know what it is -- e if we don't know what we are talking about, it seems pretty e i difficult to me for the public to, or indeed, licensees. CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, you are dealing with different problems. There's no way strictly to-compare them. in one case, a certain way of dealing wirh safety problems has developed. There 's a long history to what these words mean and how they are applied. The history on safeguards is shorter and we have used the standards involving "high assurance." I would not like to see any slacking up of those standards. r i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: If the standards are different, then the question is how do we describe hhem and why we need do that. CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: They are just different problems and I don't think there is any way to -- COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I am not arguing that. CCMMISSIGNER GILINSKY: I understand. I don't knew that there is any way that you can clearly compare them or indicate that -- the risk of dying as a result of a 'z failure in prote: tion of one kind is greater er less than that posed by, you knew, the o ther problem. CCMMISSIONER 3R.;CFCRD : To the extent that you s !uU
54 are talking about the judgment that that inspector cc=es to at the end of - thrcugh a f acility, I wouldn't expect him to -- this is a gut feeling -- to feel less confident with regard to the " reasonable assurance" against sabotage in the reactor than I would expect him to feel with regard to "high assurance" against thef t of material under 7 3.20. The proposition I am accepting is one that has b fen outlined as the history of the " reasonable assurance" as to reacters, it does meet a high standard in that the history as to fuel cycle facilities is a little clear. CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: In regulations, things are what we say they are. ( CCMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Within limits. CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, yes, sure, cbviously. If we say "high assurance" means X, that's what it means. And if we say," reasonable assurance" equals X, that 's what it means. We define it in regulations. We are ncw defining it as two dif ferent things, or alternatively, we are saying the same thing is called Sc?ething dif ferent. And if the latter is the case, i ', ;- s=s to me, the public ought to have sc=e understandin- ;; it is that we say that. i Now your reason, Vic, .3 perfectly reasonable. If such is the case, we cught to say sc=ething in the regulat, ions se everybcdy understands wh3 we are saying that, I,!p O/
30 if that is what we mean. MR. SNYDER: We went through this a year and a ~ half, two vears ago. I don't remecher exactly when. But it i came down to the issue of -- it came down to the issue of minia.am guard force size. I remember we went through that discussion. de had a long, involved discussion on Ehat point feeling that you could specify a minimum guard force size that was an absolute minimum below which you wouldn't allow X facility to operate if they didn't have it. And it was / different for reactors than it was for fuel facilities. I think that is still in the regulations. Jim? f MR. MILLER: Yes. It's in ours. MR. SNYDER: And Ehey are different. One was five. MR. MILLER: Minimum of five, nominal of ten, minimum of five. MR. SNYDER: And that was one way that it was reflected that you didn't need as many. It was those kinds of measures that implemented that kind of thinking. And it seems to me maybe that is what you need to da here. Just going around and around on words. t CHAIRMAN HENORIE: Let me get back. I am the eternal ce.timist. I see hcpe. And I keec..cushinm. y,v, e ( Laugh te r. ) 'J
56 CHAIR.'4AN HENDRIE : If one wanted to conterplate a set of rules in which you, in fact, talked about "high assurance" in scme terms on the fuel cycle side and ( " reasonable" on the reactor side in order to conform with the normal safety things -- MR. CASE: You mean diversion of theft, sabotage CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Theft, sabotage. I lose the ability than to write that one general performance section 73 -- what is it,. 2 8 -- 7 3.1 ( a). And have both 55 and 20 refer into it. That seems to me,. it has some undesirable aspects to it -- what I am trying to think is whether it is better to have the safeguards language for both thef t and /( sabotage, have.the same sort of language and accept this difference 'then with the classic reactor safety standard of " reasonable assurance" or whether I ought to keep pushing for " reasonable" at least for reactor safeguards. It isn't clear to me. One thing that is -- that we have at hand is this draft. Should that be 73.1, by the way? MR. BURNETT: No, if you are going to go with this, it wculd have to go in 20. See, you asked us at the "hiv-h,' how de.vcu "high" in the upgrade rules. CHAIRMAN HENORIE: Ckay, I see. MR. BURNETT: Sc it wculd go in 20. i
57 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Bu. If we decided to make them -- MR. EURNETT: Consolidated, it would go in (, 73.1. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It would be 73.1. MR. SNYDER: Your problem arises in the two separate sections, 73.55 ( a) and 7 3. 20 ( a). That's where the dilemma is. The threat statenent is cc= mon. MS. MULLEN: The use of the word "high" and r DW " reasonable" remain fer 73.20 (a) or 7 3.55 (a). 4 MR.. SNYDER: The bottom b llet is where ycu have your problem. f^ g MR. BURNETT: Would be consolidated in 73.1. The others would still stay in their perspective sections. Y MS. MULLEN: Ec.lf -a7 're #hatever type of assurance you aculf agree en would stay in 20 (a) and 55 (a). CHAImiAN HENDRIE: I see. Gecd thing you straightened me cut. It was about to go off in the wrong direction. - think I understand. I don't know, what do you think? Is __ reasonable to contenplate " reasonable" en the reactors and "high" on the other? ( CCMMISSIONER GILIN5RY: I think I would sav ( "reascnable" -- I think 2 reas o nab le arrangement is to use the word "high" for theft of SS" and " re as c n ab le " for A l l l w
58 sabotage. f COMMISSICNER KENNEDY: That would apply to sabotage of fuel cycle facilities as well. That's ( reasonable. MR. SNYDER: That is the dilemma. Ne were just mentioning that. CHAIPMAN HENCRII: I don't think it cuts quite that way. COMMISSICNER KENNEDY: If you are talking about a sabotage -- CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The configuration would be to have this one threat statement in 73.1, which would say ( t it would protect against these highly competent and evilly intentionedindividual,bortheft, you have got this one thing, and for sabotage, you have got the other. And that n is where you get the equivalent of the three jdi one, CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY: In practice, I don't know that it matters how you do it be. ause the fuel cycle facility has to have a certain degree of protection. CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY. It's gcing to have it anyway. ( CCMMISSIONER GILINSKY: There may be a peculiar i distinction that comes in. I suspect not. C-GMMISSICNER KIN'!E!Y : Ycu have tc have it anyway. s / / $ / j
59 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I think that ma; he -- COMMISSIONER KENNEIY: Except that it wouldn't apply at a fuel cycle -- no, a fuel cycle f acility that did not have high enriched material or plutonium would be subject to the "high" question anyway. COMMISSIONER GILINKSY: There may be certain kinds of -- that's right. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Because 73.20 says a licensee, fuel plant formula quantities, strate,Aic special nuclear -- COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: There wouldn't be any difference; that 's right. If because they had formula quantities of SNM, then they would have to have high assurance. And if they didn't, they would be just like reactors because -- MR. BURNETT: That means all your nonpower reactors would have to be "high." CHAIRMAN HENERIE: We will talk about that in a minute. But for the mcment -- CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The nonpcwer reactors asife, as to the pcwer reactors and fuel cycle facilities, they wculd now be the same. That is, thef would all be { covered by the same general description, but because the threa t in one case wculd be essentially sabetage, it would ( ccme out one way and if the threat were the the f t cf material,
60 it would come out a different way. That seems to me to t be reasonable. i. MR. BURNETT: Basically what is happening here \\ is what happened to the task force. (Laughter.) h the other react:3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: New CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Wait a minute. MR. SURNETT: It gets terribly dif ficult if the names aren't the same. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: The question is) then)whether we are better off with the same nomenclature even if it is "high." i 1 MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir. CHAIRMAN HENORIE: And I don't know, is there any comment from the peanut gallery back there? ( Laugh te r. ) MR. CASE: If you want to do what Mr. Gilinsky wants to do, which I understand is to have high assurance for theft for the special formula quantities, regardless of where it is, and " reasonable assurance" for sabotage regard-less of the facility, it is a drafting problem. It clearly f can be done and it won't make any difference in the imple-( mentation as far as reactors are concerned. g - 1 I l j
6.' ..n.. c ~.-,'- *+- c'-.'. o o "'.t :-.%. ,.,a. -' 3 .q. x,. r.... ~._ _. if that would be the way to go? lI CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Hang on. Don't get too far i l , ahead o f me. You know I am not talking about the drafting a croblem. I am tryinc to see from the standecint of reactor I i , security regulation if there would be advantage, net advan-tage, cr:-disadvantage in having an assurance level in which the 1 i word was " reasonable" versus "hich," when the fuel cycle side i j of :the house a on "high." n e' i MR. HOWARD: That wouldn' t cive us an.v orob-q j lem as long as we defined adequacy and inadequacy. i CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: I hope the effort which goes f,. forward anyway, is to say here is how you look at these dif-l ferent elements, and this helps you to decide whether your .lltopbandisokay, fix it within a certain time, or shut down l.' .j and do it i==editely; those three categories. i j' I assume t'-at is sert of in any of these schemes, i ih'I as a way of making more consistent and rational the whole b P.! system. !i ?! 'l y I take that as a given en the prcposition. Sun L. t. l 0 am trv Ln g to -- il l 1 i CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY: I wasn't opposing the j .r i i !. use of the word "hich" in the Other conte:<t. i l i i a t I. P 46. (5 '.i I )UN, Y) , [ t i
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u. t i (Laughter.) i I l il d MR. SNYDER: There 's an added advantage in_that n there must be 50 letters to Congress in which the word "high" a a 9 is used. isalreadyintheirrulein)S b i. MR. DIRCKS: It i and it wasn't in our rule. a .I 9 MR. BURNETT:
- n our first draft it uses "high,"
1: 't !y and the draft that is now before you moved to" reasonable." .i 14 If the other draft had gone, then we would both he using the ..!' same term. tl i' et CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: They are arguing over there. j (Laughter.) 9 MR. CASE: Is your question: Does it make any 1, 'l 1 difference en the reactor side if the fuel cvele side savs n t "high assurance," if for diversicn or theft it says "high 1 assurance." COMMISSIONER KE'NEDY : Yes, of course it does, as t0 ncnccwer reactors. s t*r 9' MR. CASE: Leaving that question asife. i (Laughter.) l' l ...r.an r s..
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t 63 l l t e.,,,, 2,-_.,a- ,mr. , o... w.e ..._-.2 a I (Laughter.) e CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Where did I find this thing in here? 1 i' MR. CASE: The answer to the question I pose is no; it does not make any difference. CHAI?21AU HENDRIE: I am trying to find the pro- ~ posed 7 3.1. ( a). 4 .l MS. MULLEN: Page 12 of the Comm.ission paper. i> W l
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ri jl MR. BURNETT : Page 12. Maybe you should have a l ll copy of the rule as proposed. 2 n s e COMMISSICNER GILINSRY: If we could decide this a "l today, we could take the summer off. f. u ~. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That is why I was keenin g. vou 3 l-drilledito the table; hoping. MR. BURNETT: In here is that, as it would accear i,p !.!! in the rule; that is, 73.1. t (Handing document to Chairman Hendrie.) I [ CHAI?2'AN HENDRIE : Lock; we have two things: i. h . The proposed 73.1 would be the centralized threat definition, fg i r i 1] applicable to all threa~ ""'=i"s, "" " ~ would have two i j pieces in it; sabotage and theft, and the -- to put it } I i
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64 1 9 r crudely and in shorthand, it has got the two threat levels; 1 I design basis threats. It doesn't say in that section anythingi t,' d about reasonable," or anv. thin.c about "hich." 3 >l Now, you go away from 73.1, proposed 73.1 whfch 4 is the generali::ed two-part threat definition, and now we are i .i j trying to decide whether in Part 73.20, it ought to be "high" i or "reasonabie, and whether in 73.55 _; : ; g'r - *'a " a w r-I i e...;," it ought to be "high" or " reasonable assurance," or i. there is sc=e new language which would provide a little n. ', regulatory flexibility, which would read -- have :as its t ll objective, to provide .high assurance that activities," et
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1 s1ce, enen ruel cycle r_acilities faill be judged against those enunciated threat levels as apprcpriate, depending on whether they have SUM in them, and so on. I r And the language will say "high assurance," oriI we liked it, " objective to provide high assurance." 4 o_.e would c ~.. 2 ' e _- .v ".. a. ". e _-... s _ _- -4a A., a.'.., o. _ m_ _, -. n.. l reactors that get caught on the special nuclear naterial or not would get -- would deal with it on a "reasonelle assurance," nc undue risk and so cn, sort of classic reacter l I f i i. '"{'{t3 / .. '!{! h
1 00 I safety language. t So that is a confieuration that is possible. i 8 My question is: Recocnizing new that we have i n got the language, "high assurance," or "cbjective to provide I ll h i g h a s s u r a n c e, " on the fuel cycle side for the bonb f acill-I e ties at any rate, and " reasonable" on the other, dces that i ,, difference create enough problem so that you might as well sayi t
- I "high" both ways, since I seem unlikely to carry the day with il
- I: " reasonable" on both sides.
4 And so that is the question I am asking out ,; there. n s MR. CASE: I wouldn ' t do it that way. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Wouldn't do it this way? 3 .ij MR. CASE: The way you just' described. i pI CHAIRMAN HINDRIE: You prefer to leave it "high?" c j MR. CASE: No; I would leave it "high" for di-4 ,,y: version, for the threat, level as specified, and " reasonable" i l 3 for sabotage, regardless of the type of facilitye l y CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That is a permutation which is I t, ' t ..ti not incossible, but at least has 5.0: been drafted and God il l 1 knows what einfalls lav in it. L i, t 3, I would prefer to censider the enunciated optiens it which are -- 6 ( ) i
- i l
16 N ,p ' l I Ud I l i:t it::= w. :x esu. 4. .t
66 f r i - -,. 2 3,,], .e -.,.r ~.
- r..w. ~,, : w. ~-
r C m.1.y r .c r. r.<.r e.. 2 .z ...<_ w -. t thought that was one of the opticns. If one ere talking i i ll about two costulated threats,
- 7. 3.1.
ii Anyway, aside from that, coming to this other, i 't 9 the other procosition: Is there a difference? I don't know. 'q That was my question. d '1 If you say on the one hand that you have high j assurance and over.here you say " reasonable assurance," then the question is: What is the difference? t And the answer is: None. a, (Laughter.) il. ,1 And then you say: Well, why did you use the word here? Ch, because there is a difference. And -then you say: ld What is the difference? And then the answer is: None. n
- 1 t'
(Laughter.) a '.i You will pardon me if I have some difficulty in following the logic in all this. I am just trying to make sure, if I think I am 1 having trouble, I have sat throug' all of this three times. t Nhat about all of those people out there who haven't. They tr 3, are probably better off now that I think about it (Laughter.) l l But we ought tc be able te be a little clearer i o el e f l ,I s-I' I 1
8 67 i I i i about this. lf re do .e a., there s a difference, e ought to describe it and say wha
- .
- is and thy it is.
That is all. l! And I agree with Vic that I don't want something less than what we now are defining as "high assurance" for d the fuel cycle facility. I don't want that. But if that is t the same level of protection that we are talking about in ,.i i reacters, then I can't figure out why we can't find a way to f harmoni::e the two words. 8 .i, MR. DIRCKS: The reactors already say "high 4 4 assurance." .i h ? COMMISSIONER KZNNEDY: I know that; I understand
- l r
fh that. But thev wish it d'idn't because of another problem. ii n ll (Laughter.) t c ll CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: It is a question. 4 a fi CCMMISSIONER KENNEDY: We are having an enormous 1,,
- i argument about a semantic problem that has nothing-toldo with the substance, because I think we are all agreed on the sub-n-
stance. MR. BURNETT: That is what the task force said. 11 ii CHAIRMAN HENDRIE. Isn't semantics a big part ti !!l! of regulation). O "s"..'.F_','.'. ".'.._..'.. ^ "."..e ecc - =% "'_a_.- s ,,,,v.,.,.. d a.C ".T o.. .r i n k i t tee. [
- j
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68 } 1 i' t t t ~ C *.'..s'.' =..' ;. ' ' =,._= ". '...* = - -f~.^-:'""*.'.""~'"---. ~ - Either ycu say for security matters, for theft and sabotage i-I j protection it is "high assurance," what ever the facility, a. !land then you are stuck trying to explain why reactor security l 5 is "hich assurance," but reactor safety matters are " reasonable t If t,i assurance" in the regulations. 1 And that is sort of the wav it is now. And it e. .; might be that it would be better to leave that configuration. 4 1 The other way would be to make reactors *"reasen-
- l.
.!j able assurance," both security and safety, but now you have
- got the difference between the fuel cycle and reactors, and j
- that is a head scratcher.
So it sort of depends on which ear you want to 'ftuginpu::lement, and it is not too clear to me what the -- in fact, which way is best. i.. my preference would have been to sav. As I sav, " reasonable assurance" across the board, simply because that has been long established in reactor safety. e CC.ti!SSICUER KENNEDY: Let me coint out that if 1 i they both say the same thing, it eliminates a different -- a problem that we haven't discussed yet, that we keep pushing I aside, which is the nonpcwer reactors which may have formula .6 w h 6 e b .5 I i I 1. 0, i 4
69 l i between " reasonable" and "high," aver if there is no distinc-t tien, we are going to have to be clear that rea s o nab le " I [ .! equals "high," or nonpower reactors with these? formula quan-t, tities will be treated differently, or be seemed to be i } treated dif ferently from fuel cycle facilities. MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir; that is exactly what I i ,I t was trying to say a little while ago. j COMMISSIGNER KENNEDY: So that is a permuation i that has to be dealt with. ,} Now that problem goes away, you see, if you use st 'l the same word in both places, and the same word means "high" t !! what ever it is. J t. COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: It doesn't go away, but i it is somewhat less if you use one standard for diversion and i,. !I '] one for sabotage. 1 COMMISSICNER KENNEDY: It goes away, because if they have a formula quantity of material, the sabotage -- I t 4 !! mean the theft problem arises. If they don't the diversion nroblem is the ene .ij that governs. I mean the sabotage problem, just as with the u J power reactor, you see. t a
- l 0
But othe rwis e, you are gcing to have to explain i o ll i if vcu use one werd in reactors and a different word Over I 9 i t I t
- 'l,.
m a\\n, ' i \\ .~ 8
t 0 + i t, i a 4 ii ,s.o, , e a,. a-a .=.-e. ,a s,1- - -. -,.i-.'- the fiversier problem or the fuel cvele side. You use one word, and you use a differ-a ent word for a circumstance in which that may be the govern-i d ' ing concern. l You have got to be sure that the :two words mean I u ]thesamething. And therefore, you are going to have to t 6 / explain it :.f they mean the same thing, but they are different, i i ! words. You have to exc. lain that the.v mean the same thinc.. .I if 1 / And then you have a problem: Why in heaven's I .' t ? name are you using different words? o, s,l1 MR. BURNETT: Power reactors would be " reasonable" / A il whereas nonpower reactors becadse there only threat i's theft, g would hav,e to meet "high." 4 MR. SNYDIR: There is another o.rchlem here. i .r T MR. BURNITT: All three high,' there is a lot of i l logic in that. CHAIRMAN HINOEII: I daresay there is a group -- there is a rotation matrix which relates all of these things, e. 4 I am sure. ( t. _= u 3 "... =. ) ~ i Mcwever, now I don't kncw. Co you want to con- .i a.. 3_ 7 2. s og,o 4 3 : *.
- o. y, aJJ+e.
., dgo. 6 n u .v. v a n. g v 2e... ~h _7 s g, .--- - i~ w .. k. 2 - w-f a a k o ~- '. y-=. a..* "."6.'7".." ~. '. e = ~ v ~ ~u.' w w ~ w.. A ' w v~'....=' .~ .sw, I I GDI 'IId 5 [ 7j ljlM lidbi. 3 a. S, ., ~, c_ l
i 71 t u i + i, ~n.., c= ,n- -.... e.a,- ---a a .w -. I lan guage, I don't think. i f! CCMMISSICNER GILINSKY: I don't see what problems that could ecse-s i COtt1ISSIONER KENNEDY : Except for the one I de-i l scribed. l i COD 1ISSIONER GILINSKY: I didn't folicw that. 31aybe Dick can explain it. J f It ][ COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: That's right, it wan't 'i pose a problem. It wenbt pose a problem. a -l ) MR. BURNETT: The theft, everybody at this table j has agreed, is subject to consoiracy of an insider. i ti COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Yes. e N MR. BURNETT: Thatmakesnonpowerreactorssubjecq { to a conspiracy of insiders. That is a mitigating circumstance _l/. / hj CCMMISSIONER GILI'iSKY : It is reactors that have -- i MR. BURNETT: Trigger quantities. CC>t4ISSICNER GILINSKY: Which are not irradiated i i' MR. BURNETT. It should be articulated that that Ii t h IIy is what is going to crecicitate out of that. i .I i
- l C C.".'A. _~.~. c~.' v^.v= a' u --..' 'l o' K'.'.-
=.'"..'~.e-*a- 'n_a, ' "he ) m ~" 4 i,! 4 material as accessible or we don't. Ma'zbe we have cut the 1 i-i i; wrong -- we -ade the wrong -- have the wrong criter:On :Or i I. a t )] l ic .a c m.:,,,.s. s-m,
,9 t-f t I how nuch irradiation provides protection. I MR. S CR::ETT - I am not saying it 's right or wrong. I am saying that it d exisg.t) i -l 1l MR. DIRCKS: It comes down to the other point, I; My though. You have two safeguards rules, one saying "high" I and one safing a reasonable," and I think you are going to a have to explain what is the diffdrence between "nigh" and t " reasonable" and that is going to take a lot more than I? two or three sentences. Il l!; It is going to take some work, and that is going '6
- ]tobed&layeddownthetrackagain.
es 'I. CO!OiISSICNER KENNEDY: Particularly when the Staff ii y og d keeps asserting there really isn't any difference; it is just ll ! words. 1 i s' il MR. DIRCKS: And it takes longer to write scme-n, thing when two words mean different things -- 4. j' COM:1ISSICNER GII.INSKY: The simplest thing is to
- conform with current practice, keep the word "high."
d 9 I don't see a problem in having the word "high" r l ,i used for protection, and the word " reasonable" for health and ea,, i, i safety dete ninations, in that they are just different kinds t i of dete minations. a In the one case you are protectinn ac.ainst hu=an ,i f ) A' / s i (y j h 1 Jdd'H!)melkdl
I 73 r i i i n g e n u i t', and i.- he other case, you are dealing with nature. i t They are just different. ? 4 ] CCMMISSICNER KDINEDY : Can't the problem be -re-9 4 footnoting the thing, that -- to indicate solved bv some how I precisely what the fact is, that as to reactors, power reac-i
- tors, not possessing formula quantities of SNM, this standard r
F shall be deemed equivalent to the standards as they are set
- )
) in health and safety reviews period. . ',l if MR. MESCH : I just had a thought. I think part 9 of the difficulty may be that people are thinking of different things when they use " reasonable assurance" and "high assur-1 4 J i ance " lIn the safety area, when someone says ' reasonable i O assurance.is the overall standard, they don't mean to convey p 18 f with that term any sense of the risk, because the same i I I,! "reasonabic assurance" standard is applied to minor small e ,1 il g i releases as acclied to protection against the most severe A -- o a, types of accidents. i o' On the other hand, when we have been using the a b $1ij words "high assurance" I think the cecole who have been using! i,1 Id, it mean to convev with it some sense of the severity cf the i ':i, !l consequences of a diversica or sabotage.. 3 i To make "rdascnable assurance" exactly equal to
- i "high assurance" you would have to add to the cencept of i
1 le t 4 b) 'UU <t it: u. >:ncm. a t 6 h
i 74 I, v I f I h i, "reascnable assurance" a notation or thought that the "rea-i 1 sonable assurance" concept needs to be applied with recogni-I ( i tion of the high risk or high consequences of diversion. h, I think people have been mixing un the concepts, H .I ll and the question'is whether the statement high assurance, or the statement reasonable assurance conveys with it sone i I4
- sense of the risk, or whether it is neutral.
- 1 ca
) In the safety anea it is generally neutral because l it applies to all sorts of hazards. When we use "high" as-M surance, we are conveying scme sense JAG are talking about a
- p. serious risk.
One alternative would be to use '? reasonable i h assurance" for both reactors and for strategic SUM, but add n, i, I a note or some thought in the thinc as acclied to diversion .I aI! that says: Listen; in this case you apply reasonable assur-i.. ll 1 i, ance with the concept, with the idea in mind that you are i t .i talking about potentially serious consequence events. i CC:eIISS7.0NER B?a: FORD : Which means to say "rea-Qi sonable" in this context. i..a n s n u.a_ o _e u o m m..r. S S v m.. = v. ., = m. 4.=.r.~. e w,, vs..,a a_a vv 1v.. h 'li m v. o r o.c c s i ti O n, which would be t0 fCctnote it to say that da when we are usinc, "hich assurance" we are talki-. -==ctors, p MV we are taa.,<ing about One Concents associated with reactor .i safet';. It means the same thing. .i I 1 1 'l ) s t - g:w - - -,s l
l. 75 1 ~'he only ca-t seems 50 .e t seems to T.e 2,,, , e. u,,
- u... a
- s.,. ..u.. n.,. .-a -a l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: The Staff could require I
- l..
the licensee to meet the standard within a reasonable time, i and there you have the word " reasonable." (Laughter.) i 1 1 -i C'd.AI??.AN HENDRIE : If you'can't win them all, you d take what yot can get. 1 h 1 (Laughter.) 6 Il 1 This is a way to say that in shorthand. -i COMMISSICNER GILINSKY: If it is understco to ll., mean that, I guess it is all right. 9 CHAIPJ1AN HENDRIE: The question I was raising .l 1 here was Icoking at the difficulties back and forth, and also conterclating that we have been on the Upgrade rule since M I wer along -- when I cane here it was well under way, I v thought: Good; ne.n month we will get that out. y I. n (Laughter.) I'
- I d..
It seems to be outliving me in the agency. j i si i 's i 4 CC'S1ISSIONER KENNEDY: What are =.11 these neocle il y I i i going to do? I ) i? (Laughter.) i a, l i
- t. 3..w.
4....3.a..,.. .13. o u..
- a.
i t l 1 P00R OlllGIE_ i. 1:
76 i I l l .m.. e ua..;o u, a- -a -=--, a==- .~v,,.-,.. .u w 1 I on balance, or I would be better off on balance, to give un i
- l y!
1 I on " reasonable" and go back to saying "high assurance," on l l security protection, with the proposed threat statacents, the l j two level threat statements. But it would be a help, it seems to me, :. f we could get a little flexibility into that "high assurance" 1 .r ] standard, so that the regulation doesn't just baldly read, so that the minute anything goes below "high assurance," it llj fails to meet the regulation, and at least in principle is If not -- requires an exe=ption to go forward. ' i li The language that was suggested here, to go in, ,I '} A this was suggested for 73.2^ on the fuel cycle side, is 1 O cre c2 the things we asked you to think about -- would say, .,I ,1- :., you have got L,u.s terrl,te stu;,,:. 4round, esta...ansn, main- . a i tain or make arrangements for physical protecticn systems which will have as its objective to provide high assurance that activities wiIl not upset the defense and security and create an unreasonable risk, and so on, which gives you a ) little flexibilitj which allows you to operate that 'nigh assurance, of conditional operation for some time, to make a fix cr do :.: now, or shut down. l I c -. m S.s..l. ..o..e 4 e .c---... 5 C,.n,._7.-.--..-.,c a. u.. ;..s i 3, c om. -o 1 d j ie "q' E 1, e 0 f
77 I I t ice car' cparate indafinitelf belot-this stan-dard. l} IIR. SURNETT: Clear? !I CHAI?f1AN HENDRIE: I think clear. t I' What is it, Peter, the lawyers say? COM:!ISSIONER RENNEDY: So long as -- .i CHAIPP.AN HENDRIE: I would agree to that. COMMISS!CNER BRADFORD: Stipulate. fl CHAI?3 TAN HENDRIE: I would sticulate to that. j CCMMISSICNER BRADFORD: It is not cuite what the i,
- ,[ lawyers would say, but --
l 'l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: It seens to me -- ( 8 e
- l e
P COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: The lawyers would call it 5.. jI 't.h a rotating matrix. 1 !i e-J COS1ISSIONER KENNED'I: That is okay if the power il reactor guys understand that to mean consistent with the way >: thev inspect against reactors. t CHAI?31AN HENDRIE: Yes, I think so. -l l' It says: "Hish" now, and they have been tryinc n I, to maintain that ecurvalence, as I understand it. d, i. 1 MR. SURNETT: I think we can achieve that. MR. CASE: I am not sure what you are talking a il 4 about. You are going to say "hig'r" for sabotage acainst I t. 1 ~~ i l
78 l 1 l r reactors? C HE R.'1AN Hz::D RIE : It would say: At the present ( time, your regulation -- well, you see, what I would progese if the flexibility phrase, " objective to provide hich assur- .h. I t . ance," would be acceptable, would be to use it in both 73.20 ^ n 9 j for fuel cycle, and :.n 7 3. 5 5 for reactors. Then it would be l
- uniforn.
That kind of language would be unfform on both I i sides. I j Since your language -- l CCPliISSICNER GILINSKY: There is more flexibility +1 t +t-vou have now. 1 1 CHAIPliAN HENDRIE: That's right. The language i now says "high assurance," and that is that. I would think !j that this kind of languace orovides a direct entry to that n 11l'il three-level categorization en the evaluation. 1 CCB1MISSIONER KENNEDY-Let's go to One more l thing, Scb. ..f.n. .A Lm. N'T mm. Y. o. s, s.4 i s 2 C C FL.,, -. n,s. R.<.,s.s. -,., : Ar,nat is ucne, you just ...co. r
- . u.
cited a prchlen case: '4 hat abcut fuel reprocessing plants? CHAI?2921 HENCRII: No; no; no. You lock at the q S p u e g un de r iv. :=.n. t anc. ua c. e anc :.n e q g n e>.aa, instead c:. s a v. 'e n c.
- lativ.
9 "high assurance it wOulf sa'/ n 4 o I a j I e.
- k 3.
't es, j t l
i 79 1 I I e "I: w ;i ". a ve as its obje :ive to provide high i assurance.' I l* !I
- tR. BURNETT:
Just a double underlined section. a i H' I CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: Which is certainly more flex-t I, ibility that you have got now, and it would allow that system 1'J then, of okay, high assurance conditional for a short pericd I of time. i MR. CASE: I am not worried about that system. J 4 I have got that regardless of what these words 't ii
- i. say.
i. CHAIRMAN HENDRIE: That is the way you are trying j, to operate it, but I am not sure you are going to succeedi.in ,\\ j the long run, 'nd that is one of the reasons I have been try-n fingtoget " reasonable assurance" language in there. k Dut I &n heginning to think thattit complicates I the whole security picture enough so we are better of f to try to have uniform language, n i:. So the proposal I would make to vou would be to ,c !'li use this objective to provide "high assurance" in both 20 i, [and55, and to put the threat in that censolidated 7 3. l(a), s h j delete the threats in 35 and 2 and re f er to the 7 3. l(a). i 3 How dces that strike you? ,1 ~~ O COMl!ISSIINER KENNEDY - It would nCt Create the ^ } I i iUlJdlj'hib!Paa f .memm ,-m, i
80 f r i I t problens you were gust ca. king abcut a minute age, of the insider cuestica and -- i l MR. CASE: So you have that problem regardless. i 'l MR. SCRNETT: You are going to have that problem 4 j in the long run, because the detble threat establishes that, .i i j and these facilities are only subject to theft. But NRR and l q my office have already been talking about that, and we think
- i
- I that we can handle that.
't i COMMI~ ~IONER KENNEDY: Okay. MR. BURNETT: I think we are on the verge of an .I ,i agreement here, gentlemen. t: l MR. CASE: I don't want to have anything to (.o 1' with anything I don't understand. Y ',i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: I tell.vou what you need i !! to do. My suggestion would be that they take all of this $ now, go back, redraft this language in each piece, in each part where we have effected it, and send all of that back up here. ( Maybe at that point, then, we can act on it
- a. a
..e n. ;. r t n.., r.. s. m 4 n-.- r..n..r S.s-v.. r w e., d a..- .a. ~r . m. - _ 2., _. I a. I agree in principle. -t CHAIRMAN HEND0'7-7 'Jas abcut to -- } i I l t \\. J W I.
I Q., e i L C,v c.. _.:.......Dy 7 .v., t. 3 a, i u. ca a a, n _3._. _..co.. . e.-. CHAI ?2*A2; M E :; 0 R I E : I was about to nove forward andi -lsay: Since -- you knew these discussions are tough.. You i spend about the first hour after two or three weeks' lavoff t I on it, you spend the first hour or two hours trying to sort off t i .! g e t up to speed, and then you come into a time, you know, at l i , the end of hour two, when you begin to think you have got the thing in ~'ind, and I think we have, tolerably well, right ,t !j now. I i 0 .l If it would be the agreement on this side of the I 4 d table that this seems a reasonab7 configuration, I would likei f h,totannouncethat it is the sense of the Commission to go in f
- this way.~
t 1 l1 But we would like to see the particular language, l i,l. y COP 2!ISSICNER KENNEDY: That's fine. ,1 3 MR. BURNETT: Okay. k CHAIR"AN HENDRIE : And when we see the particular is g language, we will want to talk about it and vou knew, inevi-t o i. ,:' tably -- n t '. ?, XR. BURNETT: That would be broader and you would,- J. itl not want me to lead the discussicns. { lj (Eaughter.) 1 g g CHAIR".AN HENDRIE : All ri c. h t ; I will bu'., that. i! i i I 4 d e ,j N( (, I I + 1, I[,Y I*[) k ' *1( 't I i
8, t., i i, 1 ~ But wha: : was going to sav as that when we see that language and ccme back to leck at it, I would like to hear 1 ' some more about what are ve going to do with the ncnpower i machinet, because that centinues to be a difficult area. ',l You know, I am very reluctant to just drive the , university machines off the map with the publication of these ',! rules. It might be that if the 100 ren at a meter, and so I 'l!! on, locks like it is not going to cover them in mest caces, ii and that was the most recent conclusion, that we need to take I iq a rather particular look at it and see if seme special provi-
- j sien,.or an interim.cericd c3 t:Tre, a year ar two, is actro-
~ GI priate to hcw many of then can get onto 20 percent material. s And we could see if this groun. of research reac- < t, ll tors, which are likely to be just terribly impacted by these n'l requirements, couldn't be reduced by a good many of them i h going on to the nonweapon grade f ue l. And then we could see what it means for the ones that just can't, frcm a performance standpoint g I n MR. SURNETT: That's exactly what we were pre-e a 4L pared :: do. CRA:RMAN HINORII: Which may come down to a ,l I fairly small group, like three; Missouri -- who else -- RP !, and the Natical Bureau c f Standards, and ebe 9 6 I< j a r g N ) f*;S
- 4*,-
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83 4 t .w - -. ~,,_ s .'.'., b " - .=.a-a c_. a. - ...e.. .22 > n c..
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- .1 ' a.
'n-4 o. ....a.n. a 3 e. -,,. ". a.,r o'%~...^ "e 4. ~ + 4 . creased security measures better than some o.cor university q, 'l ' department of engineering. i I CO:01:SSICNER GI'INSKY : Oces this rule not cover 1 l the research reactors? MR. BURNETT: Yes, sir; as it is now written, it dces. t CCIC4:SSIONER GI*INSKY: You want to take uo the J question separatelv. I CHAIR.'GN HENDRIE : Yes; I want to see if we have u 1 to drive these ceoP e out of business:-the minute we oublish l A. li 1 the rule, you see. Because it may be that four odt of the j 27 could, given a couple of years to accomplish st, gosto the n,, nonweapons grade fuel material.
- i ri And it might be reasonable to provide a specific j exemptica, or some special crovisions to helo. them through anl 1
I interim period and to prcvide an incentive to cet there. i I t 4 t MR. BURMETT: Basically, we were goin~o to suc.cestj i t d =..# a..-. a. d .4. '.o. ' a... a *. " =. 4.+.. c....., r w a..- .w4- ..3 ., a ..w. 3. ....a I. a m..= ". b...i. I' e v "e.' - d eac.c s t.. 4.,. .,a. s.a## ~^ 3..a.a'c' - ~a i s j p CHA:??%S HENDRIE: ". e t ' s talk about it when 70 ? 1 ,a.m.. o a.4 m.m. a. . 6. a. .7 o. 2. .7
- h. a.
a g.n. a g g g r 3,g wgg, '.m.,.,. ..4 3 v v w.. w 1 4 a 4 9 ] 6 a j s f,, d [ s 3 4 .e ict 4::!u, c:a+:,t, c s. 4 I i.
84 l new that we tr. ink we kncu what the acnfiguration of the . Uc.e.rade Rule, 73.55 is, what would a.o with it, or follow a with it, what it ought to be. (Whereu'en, at 4:40 p.m., the hearinc in the L I } '! above-entitled matter was adjourned.) i; 1 J 't i f .l c, ? I a O li b .6 si il r 11 .I
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