ML19253A350

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Responds to Request Made During 790515 Meeting of NRC Subcommittee Task Force.Submits Info on Operators Manual Emergency Procedures Re Thermocouples
ML19253A350
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/21/1979
From: Macmillan J
BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.
To: Judith Weaver
NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE
References
NUDOCS 7908210475
Download: ML19253A350 (10)


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Tele;hene: (204) 354 5111 1:ay 21, 1979 Honorable James Weaver Chairman, TMI-2 Task Force Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs House of Representatives Room 12'6 Longworth House Office Building Uashington, D.C.

20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During our meeting with the subcommittee task force on May 15, 1979, I promised to provide the tasi force with some additional information.

This letter is intended to fulfill that promise as well as to provide some further information uith regard to concerns discussed on May 15, 1979.

1.

The first specific task force recuest dealt uith uhether there was a manual available to Metropolitan Edison operators which included information regarding temperatures being read from the tail pipe thermocouple between the pilot operated relief valve and the drain tank.

Three Mile Island Unit #2 Emergency Procedure 2202-1.5, Pressurizer System Failure Revi'sion 1, dated 06/22/77, states:

"SECTION A Leaking Pilot Operated (electromatic) Relief Valv_e (RC-R2)

A.1 SYMPTOMS 1.

Relief valve di.scharge line temperature e::ceeding the normal 130 F.

Alarms on computer at 200*F.

2.

RC drain tank pressure above normal on the control room radwaste disposal control panel and temperature above normal on the local raduaste disposal control panel.

3.

RC System makeup flow above normal for the variabAe letdown flow and RC pump seal in-leakage conditions.

4.

Boric Acid concentration continually increasing in the prc suriner.

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A.2 ItCEDIATE ACTIO"S A.

Automatic Actions 1.

None.

B.

Manual Actions 1.

Close the Electromatic Relief Isolation Valve, RC-V2.

A.3 FOLLOW-UP ACTION

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1.

Repair during ner:t shutdown.

2.

Limit rate of change on ICS to less than 1% per minute wnile RCV is closed except for runbacks.

SECTION E Inoperative Pilot ocerated (electromatic)

Relief Valve ( EC-R 2 )

B.1 ST::PTOMS 1.

RC System pressure is above 2255 psig and RC-R2 fails to open.

2.

RC Systen pressure is below 2205 psig and RC-R2 fails to close.

3.

RC-R2 discharge line temperature is above the 200*F alarm.

Cc=puter Point (402).

4.

The RC drain tank pressure and temperature are above normal on the control roon radwaste disposal control pandl SA.

B.2 II~.:ZDIATE ACTION A.

Automatic Action 1.

For a failed closed RC-R2:

a.

Pressurizer heaters off at 2160 psig.

Spray valve RC-Vi is open above 2205 psig.

b.

Reactor trip occero at 2355 psig.

Pressuriner code relief valves open at c.

2450 psig.

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For a failed open RC-R2:

All pressurizer heater banks on full belou a.

2105 psig.

b.

Reactor trips at 1900 psig or variable pressure temperature.

c.

High Pressure Injection is actuated at 1600 psig.

B.

Manual Action l.

For a failed close RC-R2:

a.

Shift spray valve RC-V1

) "?-IANUAL" and open further for additional spray flow.

b.

Insura all. pressurizer heaters off above

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2160 psig, c.

7.f reactor power is being changed (c:: cept for a, runback) stop the power change until pressure is returned to norcal.

d.

Isolate RC-R2 by closing RC-V2.

2.

For a failed open RC-R2:

a.

Close Electrc atic Relief Isolation Valve (RC-V2).

b.

Insure all pressurizer heaters on below 2105 psig.

B.3 FOLLOW-UP ACTION 1.

Return system pressure and temperature to normal.

2.

Reduce ICS Rate of Change to less than 1". per minute (except for Runbacks)."

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e BabecckaWiicox May 21, 1979

s These procedures indicate that the isolation block valve should be manually actuated by the operator to isolate the leaking or stuck open pilot operated relief valve from the system to preclude loss of primary coolant.

This caergency Procedure was apparently not followed.

2.

Additional specific inforpation was requested by the task

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force regarding location of the tail pipe thermocouple and whether the tail pipe is insulated.

The tail pipe and its design arrangement was n'. t in the SIN scope of supply for TMI-2.

It was provided by Metropolitan Edison's architect-engineer as was the piping from the coda safety valves and the quench (drain tank) which I referred to during the May 15, 1979 meeting.

.The thermocouple is attached to the outside of the tail pipe at a location approximately 42 inches fron the pilot operated relief valve.

To the best of Babcock & Wilcox's knouledge the tail pipe is not insulated.

The qualified nature of this statement is based upon the fact that 2&W did not supply the piping and has no record of its installation; however, the same pipe on TMI-l is not insulatcd.

3.

.The tark force recuested additional information regarding the details of the tailpipe thermoccuple as to its temperature range.

The ther occuple wa s supplied b-; 32bcock & Milcox under its contract for its scope of supply for TMI-2.

Tne thermocouple uas manufactured by Chronel-Constantan and is a Type E.

The thernocouple temperature will read out on the plant computer 0 - 700*F.

The cc=puter alarr set points alarm at 200'F.

Metropolitan Edison in its preliminary sequence of events dated April 16, 1973 identifie.d the follouing:

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"00:00:13 The Elcctrocatic Relief Valve (this is (0400:50) the pilot-operated relief valve) solenoid Approximate de-enargized gi/ing a non-open indication to the control ro = operators.

00:01:00 The Pressuriner Safety Valve high discharge (0401:37) line temperature alarn was received.

00:24:53 The operator requested computer printout (0425:35) of the Electroratic Relief Valve outlet temperature.

Tha reading was 255.4'F.

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Babcoi&Wi!cox May 21, 1979

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01:20:31 Operator requested printout of the Electro-matic Relief Valve outlet temperature.

The reading was 233.0*T.

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02:17:53 Operator requested Electromatic Relief (0618:30) valve outlet temperature.

The reading was 228.7*E.

02:22:00 The Electromatic ?.elief Block Valve was shut.

(0622:37)

Approximate During our discussions on May 15, 1979, I did.not have this specific information available nor the specific emergency pro-cedure information referred to previously which supports my statecent that information was available to the operator and procedures were in place that should have resulted in isolation of the pilot operated relief valve long before the passage of approxinately 2-1/4 hours.

4.

The task force asked a question during the meeting regarding the contract General Public Utilities had with B&W for the B&W por-tion of supply for the plant and how nuch money was involved.

During the meeting I indicated that as a general rule the cost to the utility of the Ecbcock & Wilec>. scope of supply for a nuclear plant would be 10-12% of the total cost for the plant.

For the TMI-2 project B&W's base contract price -for the nuclear steam sr :en was $21,000,000 which was escalated in accordance with n 1fied indices during contract performance and was also adjusted for contract changes.

Afditionally, B&W had a contract with General Public Utilities for the supply of nuclear fuel fabrication for TMI-2 which had a base contract price of approximately $10,800,000 also subject to adjustrent.

BabcocP &

Uilcox has no information as to the total cost of T:II-2 to General Public Utilities.

5.

The task force staff presented a specific question regarding the design range and accuracy of the incore. thermoccuples. ~

The incore therroccuples were tested by the nanufacture prior to delivery and installation and the accuracy was 13/ ~ s at the test temperature of 600 *r.

These types of therr. occupies are suitable for cperation in temperature in excess of 2000*F but their accuracy is somewhat reduced at enparatures in encess of 1650*F.

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BabcocMM'i!cox May 21, 1979

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Following the incident at Three Mile Island tests were per-formed in attempts to determine the accuracy of the thermo-couples presently and although tests could not deter.~.ine the I>c-me_nt degree. of accuracy uith total and complete accuracy it is believed that the present accuracy is within 10*F.

6.

Tne task force requested information regarding che training program.

The training, operator qualification, and meeting, of requirements is the responsibility of the operating utility.

In the case of Three Mile Island Unit Two, this is the Metro-politan Edison Company.

Licenses for nuclear power plant operators are issued after examination in accordance with Title 10, Code of Federal P.cgulations, part 55 and administered by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operator Licensing 3 ranch.

To the best of our knouledge, the Unc requires that operating utilicies utilize the American Mational Standard for Selection and Training of Muclear Power Plant Personnel (IMSI N1S.1-1971 or E:SI/A'IS 3.1-1978).

These two AUSI documents are essentially the same with respect to operating parsonnel with the later revision describing the requirenents for additional support personnel.

To the best of our knowledge, Metrcpolitan Edisen qualified personnel for reactor operator and senior reactor operator license in accordance uith 10 CFF. part 55 section 22.

In

.the venacular of the industry, these licenses are termed

" Cold license,"

i.e.,

licenses issued prior to irradiation of the fucl and its becoming hot or having decay heat.

Subsequent to the initial grots of " cold licensos' we believe they have qualified and licensed approximately 10 operators.

Ce believe that Metropolitan Edison followed the guidance provided in ANSI 18.1-1971 for their " cold license" training program which was the applicable document.

The applicable portion of ANSI 18.1-1971 is as follows:

5.2.1 Training of Candidates for AEC Cold Examinations candidates for AEC cold examinations shall be qualified by a combination of participatory assign-ments at operat'ing reactors or suitable reactor simulators, participation in const_uction or startup activities at the nuclear power plant involved, and related technical train.'ng.

Applicants for cold examinations shall have had extensive operating experience at a reactor facility which is ganerally classified as com-parable in complexity cr.d operating characteristics to the nuclear ocwer clant at '*hich the examinatir..s

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are to be recuirdd.

icquisition of this experience may be demonstrated by:

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DWoch tNli'cox May 21, 1979

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Holding or having held a reactor operator's or senior reactor operator's license at a comparnble licensed rea tor facility; or 2.

determination of such e:.:perience at a com-parable reactor facility not subject to AEC licensing; e.g.,

reactor facilities operated by the military services; or 3.

satisfact'ory completion of an AEC-administered written examination and oparating test at a comparable licensed reactor facility without ~

issuance of a reactor operator's or sen?or reactor operator's license; or 4.

certification of satisfactorir comple. tion of an AEC approved training program which utilizes a complete and accurate nuclear power plant simulator as part of this o.rceram.

Based on our records, Metropolitan Edisca qualified 15 senior reactor operators in accordance with 1 based on their previous e::perience on Three Mile Island Unit I and 16 reactor oparacors according to paragrao.h 4 based on ccanletion of an Ac__oroved Training Program.

A typical Approved Reactor Training Program as excerpted from the revision to AUSI 13.1, i.e., ASSI/ANS 3.1-1973, and is sat forth on the next page.

The actual program as utilized in the training of the operators for Three Mil e Island Unit Two was agreed to be,reen the NRC and :*etropolitan Edison.

Eabcoch & M;1:0x participated in a portion of the program to the extent that an eight week sinulator training program as described in Phase II part (b) was conducted at the Babcock & Uilcox simulator in Lynchburg, Virginia, and instruction was provided by Babcock & Milcox instructors.

A practice NRC type reactor oc.erator examination consistinc, of a two hour oral examination, a two hour simulater operating examination including a reactor startup and power operation with a least one casualty, and an eight hour written examination was administered during the eighth week.

3&M examiners who administered the practice examination were previously licensed senior reactor operators by the NRC.

The subjects covered in the practice exanination vere these which were identified in the Met Ed program and conse uently some subjects were not a part of the C&W training and vould have to have been rovided by others.

A satisfactory grade was 2

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Babpoc!aWi! ox May 21, 1979 s

required by DLU on all three parts of the examination.

Satisfactory completion of the total program and the Babcock

& Wilcox examination was required prior to the NRC being willing to examine the individuals for " cold license".

Eabcock & Wilcox also provided one week plant operations review courses for 31 personnel uho were to be examined for reactor

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operator and senior reactor operator.

The courses were con--

ducted between June 6, 1977, and July 8, 1977.

Six students were in each course and simulator operation was conducted with three students at a time.

The course was conducted using the Babcock & Milcox simulator and cephasized the conduct of plant-operation and response to casualty conditions including loss of feedwater and loss of reactor coolant / loss of reactor pressure conCitions.

";he students were'each required to correctly inter-pret plant condition and take the correct action.

Three Mile Island procedures were utilized to encourag'e the students to become familiar with their own procedures.

Babcock & Wilcox participated in the training of the " hot license" candidates by providing a tuo week sinulator training progran covoring the material as shown in SUREG-0094 (Rev. 1 to WASH 1094)

URC Operator Licensing Guide Appendix ? section D Simulator Training.

The Babcock & Wilcox part of the " hot licensing" training and qualification program is only a small part of the training progran that is recuired of the utility prior to nomi-nating an iadividual for license exc7.ination.

The total require-ment is stated in AUSI/ANS 3.1-1979 section 5.2.4 and is as follows:

Hot Examinaticus.

If not already eligible by experience and previous train;ng, candidates for 5?C hot examinations shall complete related technical training in the subject areas iden-tifi2d in 5.2.2.

In addition, such candidates shall participate in a program of on-the-job training which involves manipulation of the nuclear power plant controls during day-to-day operation and during at least two training startups and shutdowns of the reactor; and informal programs of self-study and counseling from more e::perienced personnel to facilitate the candidates '

understanding of overall plant operating characteristics, and operating procedures.

An appropriate reactor simulator may be used in candidate training and in such a case the need to perforn startups and shutdowns en the reactor may be eliminated.

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The first group of het examinations applicants at a facility shall nartici?a.te in reactor and plant operations during the commissioning phase which includes preoperational and s.tartup testing and initial power operation to approximately 20% power.

Hot examinations may be perforref on an NRC approved simulator.

In conclusion, Babcock & Wilcox will assist the Task Force and the full Subcommittee in its investigation and to that extent recuests that any further specific information which would assist the Task Force be forwarded to our attention.

Very truly yours, THE BAECCCX & UILCOX COMPA:E D

J.H MacMillan Vice President, Nuclear Power Generation Div.

JHM:ddr ec:

Hof.orable James Weaver Chairman, TMI-2 Task Force Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs House of Representatives Room 1226 Longworth House Office aldg.

Washington, D.C.

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Henry Myers 34 V

Science Adviser Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs House of Representatives CI'DF Washington, D.C.

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I Honorable Dan Marriott D

Room 1133 Longworth House Office Eldg.

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D.C.

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w F.r. Robert Torrell Ainority Counsel

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jm wQ Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Housc of Representatives

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(This Ap;* rdit is rnt part of A:v.-rican Etin:nl S:anefsr:! b-N!.ch i sE*!, Trai.ing of.%rl-se Power l'hnt lir><>nnel ANC/ANS 3.1 1973, (try. to '.1:i 1 1371) but i.s incluad f..: 3.hrrr.atna c 'a Typical NIIC Approved llcactor Training Pro;: ram

/.;>pticants,vrith r:o previous nuclcar experience r.re recuired to cornplete the c.-:!re trairdn::

pre; ram indicated belo.!

Phase I Dasic fundamental course, including the operation of a research reactor during whirh a trainee p:rforms at least 10 reactor startups. The tirne required is normally 12 weeks.

Phase II (a) Observation of the day.to. day operatior. of a nucler.: power plant. This observation must bc sup:rsised by a knowled;eable individual and the trainee is required to cbserve a rainimum cf operations, surveillance testing, and radiation procedures evidcaced by a completed, previously ap.

proved, checklist. The time required varies from one to three me::ths based en the o.erall training pro;'; rain that has been apprcved. Considerationshould also bc given :o p! ant equip nent availability.

(b) Operation of a nuclear power plant simulater similar in dui;n to the facility fer which the trainee will be seeking a !! cense.The time for these pro;ramsvaries frc:n one to thrce mond s bamt on the overall trainin; prgam that has been approved.

The rnini:nurn Phase II time is four months of co:abined po.ver plant and s!=ulator n aining it. all cases. The training must be administered consecutively.

Phase III This pha'sc of the training consist.s of a design lecture series that is intended to far. !!!arize the trainee with the desica features of his facility.The time reqmred is normally six vec::s.These lectures rusy be devoted strictly to the individual's plant and adrninis:cred af r-Phaic II or par of the Iceture edministered prior to or af:cr Phase II. When the ccurse :s s;.' : the : ainec v.iti no mi ! carn the I;SSS venders basic desi;n features and his plant's speciCes deri.; :he sec:nd s:.ssion.

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