ML19253A271
| ML19253A271 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 07/23/1979 |
| From: | Bryan S, Grimes B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908210201 | |
| Download: ML19253A271 (128) | |
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NRC INCIDENT RESPCNSE
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TABLE OF CCNTENTS I.
Introduction........................
1 II.
Major Considerations A.
Goals of Incident Response Capabilities..
1 1.
Infor=ation Cathering 2.
Evaluation 3
Asuistance 4
Direction 5
u Timing of Response.....
6 C.
Type of Incident.
III.
Basis for Resource Requirements A.
Consideration of Scenarios...............
7 B.
Recc== ended Resources for the IMC............
12 1.
Discussion 2.
Resources a.
Physical IMC facility and organization b.
Pre-collected infer =ation c.
Real ti=e infor=ation d.
Evaluation resources e.
Action rescurces 32 I7.
I=plementation Recc==endations.
0
APPENDICES A.
Incident Scenaries B.
Current NRC Division Responsibilities C.
Current NRC Personnel assigned to Incident Response functions D.
Present Incident Managenent Center (IMC)
E.
Present Agency Authorities for Incidenc Planning and Preparedness F.
Current Infernation Exchange Agencies G.
Current Support Agencies Responsibilicies H,
traft NRC Headquarters Contingency Plan Outline 2
a a
NRC INCIDENT RESPONSE I.
Introduction The purpose of this paper is to consider how the existing incident response capabilities of the NRC might be improved. Present NRC actions taken in response to a serious inciden.t are directed and acccuplished from an Incident Management Center (IMC). The scope and capabilities of the present IMC are described in Appendix D to this paper.
To implement an emergency response plan, it is necessary that the EMC be equipped with appropriate communications services, informa-tion handling and evaluation aids, pre approved action guidelines, and technical and management personnel resources. The present IMC, which is manned during the course of an incident by a team of NRC management and technical staf f, has all of the c in some degree.
This paper addresses whether practical and useful short ters and long term improvements can be.ade.
The approach in the folicwing snetions is to discuss the practicality and need for various EMC resources as a fuaction of the goals of the NRC response capabili:y and the time sequences of a spectrum of incident scenarios judged typical of those that are at least theoretically possible.
II.
Major Considerations Goals of Incident Response Capabilities s.
3y an incic a -t, in this paper, is =eant those events which present an actual or imminent threat to the public health and
A
. safety or the co==en defense and security; specifically (1) an event which has had actual significant er.diological consequences or involved a confir=ed diversion of protected =aterial or (2) an event which has the potential for i==ediate significant radio-logical consequences or the potential for i==ediate diversion of protected =aterial. For exa=ple, an event such as the Browns Ferry fire would, at imast for the first few hours, be classed as an incident requiring activation of the EMC, but an operational pecble: such as channel box wear or pipe cracks would be handled through nor=al organizational channels as they would not require an i==ediate response to protect the cublic health and safety.
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(I= prove =ents in the efficiency of handling longer ter= proble=3 are not addressed in this paper.)
Although a final iudg=ent hts not been =ade en the precise role that the NRC sho.
seek to play in the event of a serious inci-dent, the following overall goal has been assu=ed for the purpose of this discussion paper as reflecting current staff opinion and providing a broad fra=ework for discussion of various alternatives:
The real of NFC incident rescense is to obtaic and evalu-ate infer-atien in order to hava tha carability to make indecandent 4udr=ents with regard to 'he 'tr$ct of licerree and other trenev tettens on 'he Oublic health $nd safety,
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- "a aa--an defanse and ?ecurity and to hava tha Sara-bility te assist 'he licensee ?nd ethar trancies wnere essible $rd 11ract 'he licarsee if aac'!irad.
E!04. 253
. The practicality of achieving this goal is of course dependent on the ti=e available to respond in a given incident and the level of resources co=sitted to achieving this goal. These aspects are dis-cussed later in Section II of this paper.
The overall objective of NRC incident response can be subdivided into several activities which would be pursued by the IMC incident response team. These are listed belew in the order in which the activities would be initiated. Cnce initiated, these activities would continue in sc=e form until the incident response tea = was disbanded.
1.
Infer-ation Catherine -
a.
Obtain early, factual infer ation in as cc=plete a for= as practical to deter =ine and initiate the physical and per-sonnel resources likely to be required by NRC and to inform responsible authorities within and cutside NRC in accordance with pre-planned action guidelines.
b.
Monitor and record the course of the incident and the response actions taken by licensees, NRC and other in-volved agencies.
2.
9taluatien a.
Evaluate the information obtained with respect to the likely future ocurse of events within the facility and 54
. likely offsite consequences and determine whether the actions taken up to that point by the licensee and other agencies will assure that effects on the public health and safety and the co==en defenso and security are minisized.
b.
Determine the alternative courses of future action avail-able to the licensee, NRC and other agencies and the consequences of these actions on the public health and safety and cc==en defense and security to fers a basis for interaction and discussion with the licensee and other agencies as deter =ined to ce desirable, c.
Determine the additional resources required to provide assistance er direction.
3.
Assistanee On the basis of evaluation of infer ation obtained, deter =ine what assistance to the licensee and other agencies is feasible and useful and initiate that assistance. The assistance :ay be in the form of discussions in which opinions are exchanged or advice given or in the form of caking technical (including security) expertise availnble re=ctely or at the site, 4
Oirectien Cn the basis of evaluation of infor:ation obtair.ed, decer=ine whether the actions er lack of accices taken by the licensee 804 255
. warrant for=al intervention by the NRC and initiate this action. This direction could take the form of cral and written directives by a responsible officer of the NRC or, in the extreme, could theoretically involve on-site direction of actions.
B.
11pinc of the Fesconse The timing of the NRC response to an incidect is a significant consideration in deter =ining the resources required for incident response and the practicality of accc=plishing the above stated goals of the response activities. The physical resources which
=ust be held in readiness for respense increase dra:atically as the desired response ti=e is shortened. For exa=ple, the NRC can presently place an inspector on-site in frc= One to six hours.
To significantly shorten this ti=e would require additional re-sources such as arrangements fer helicopter use or en-site inspectors.
(This is not to say that alternative ec==unication
=eans with the site could not supply a substantial a= cunt of the infor:atien that could be obtained by an on-site inspector.)
Another exa ple of the relationship between tising and resources is the activation of the IMC. The present reaction ti=e fer IMC activation is about I hcur follcwing notificatien of 1.1 inci-dent. The 'iriting censiteratien in this activatien ti=e is
6-location of the appropriate technical and canage=ent personnel and their travel time to the IMC. To significantly shorten this activation ti=e would require the continuous petsence of qualified staff at the IMC or quicker notification and travel =ethods (e.g.,
pagers and helfcopters).
The incident scenarios discussed in Section III of this paper illustrate the types of incidents and the ti=ing of decision points.
It is clear that for =any i=portant scenarios, a response ti=e of an hour to a few hours is adequate if adequate factual infor:ation is available to the IMC in the sa=e ti=e fra=es. Sc=e scenarios, on the other hand, have i=portant decision points early in the event sequences. To be reasonably sure that a response is the correct response in a short ti=e frs=e, however, carries the i=-
plication of the availability of a very large a=ount of plant specific infor=ation and the large concc==1 tant physical rescurces associated wiM4 obtaining this infor=ation (for exa=ple, re&dout of plant process infor=ation in the IMC via ec=puter heckup with the reacter).
C.
Tvre of Incident
'4hether an incident is internally er externally caused has a direct bearing en the role of the NRC in the incident. For exa:ple, fcr plant related accidents the NRC has lead agency b]
.. responsibility, but for external threats, the FBI assu=es this role. While this paper contains discussions of events related to plant security, the primary thrust of the paper is toward incidents caused by equipment failures, unusual natural phe-no=ena or transportation accidents. Certain resources in additica to those identified as practical and useful in this paper will be forthcosing in the near future. An outline of the considerations that lead to the determination of the re-sources required to respond to safeguards incidents is given in Appendix H.
On the basis of the NMSS review of this paper to date, nothing has been idenc fied that would cause a major revision to the rescurces proposed in this paper that were selected on the basis of incidents resulting in radiological consequences.
CI.
Basis for Fascuree Fecuire?qrfu A.
Censiderstien of scenaries To determine what resources would be practical and useful for the incident =anagement center, a number of possible incident scenarios were postulated, developed and reviewed to detarrine whether ce==cn characteristics could be identified which would lend weight to pre-collecting a particular set of plant or site inferstien for use in the CM.C, octaining certnin standard incident status inferratien frc: plant and sita, establisning 804. 258
. standard evaluation resources, or specifying that certain psr-sonnel be consulted. The scenarios were also erneined to determine which of the response activities previously discussed (information gathering, evaluation, sdvice and direction) would be feasible en the ti=e scale available for influencing the Many of the scenarios were taken frem the course of the event.
WASH-1400 study and involve core-celt sequences of very Icw proba-Other scenarios are = ore credible and one, the large fire, bility.
In =ost cases faults in addition to the has actually occurred.
initiating event were postulated to produce a scenario in which the potential offsite consequences would be great enough to war-The rant NRC actica if the utility did not perform adequately.
postulated incidents for which detailed scenarios (which are pre-sented in Appendix A) were developed are as folicws:
Radiological Ccnsequences Large Loss of Coolant Accidents (16 scenarios) 1.
2.
Small LOCA's (5 scenarics) 3 Reactor Plant Transients (4 scenarios) 4 Refueling Accidents Casecus and Liquid Waste Releases (2 scenarios) 5.
6.
Large Fire (3rewns Ferry)
Abandoned Centrol Rocs at a Nuclear ?cwer Plant 7.
(2 scenarics)
Crasa of Spent Fuel Cask wi-h Release of Racicactivi y (2 scenarics) 804 259
e.
_g.
9 Major Flooding or Other Natural Phenomena at a
' Nuclear Power Plant (4 scenarios) 10.
East Coast Blackout Radiological and Safeguards Consequences
- 11. Seizure of a Reactor with Threat of Sabotaga Safeguards Consequences with Potential Radiological Consequences 12.
Penetration of Physical Barrier at a Fuel Facility with " heft of SNM It shculd be emphasized that the scenarios presented in Appendix A
^
were selected as situations beyond the expected to illustrate the ti=es by which an NRC response, if any, would be required. A design basis accident which followed its expected course would involve only infor=ation gathering and evaluation by the NRC to confir= that ade-quate actions were being taken by the licensee and other responsible agencies.
It should also be noted that the need for active NRC involve =ent in an incident is predicated on the failure of preplanned utility and State actions either because an event different than planned for has occurred or because of a breakdcwn in the execution of the preplanned actions. E=ergency plans and procedures developed by each utility ar exa=ined during the course of licensing reviews and are required to ba based on tne asst =ption of no NRC interventien.
804 260
.. _ _ Several observations with regard to the ti=ing of operator action to prevent core celting can be =ade on the basis of these scenarics.
For example, in 11 of the 16 large LCCA scenarios core melt was calculated to be initiated in 20 minutes or less and a major fission
.2e hour was calculated for these product release within abc The proportion of the large LCCA sequences that would re-cases.
sult in a relatively quick fission product release is not i=pertant, but the fact that a large nu=ber of scenarios would require essen-tially instantaneous response to affect the cutocce of the incident After consideration of the and prevent core melting is i=portant.
type and tising of infor:ation and actica plans that won ' have to be available to a coriinuously staffed IMC, we have concluded that NRC action to change the course of in-plant or off-site events in a ti=e frame of less than an hour is neither feasible nor desir All action within such a short time fra=e =ust be tal en by those with the best information, the best knowledge of the facility, and the best chance to influence the outcc e of a sequence of events--the Even if it were possible to arrive en-site plant operating staff.
of accident at specific action plans for response to a large nu=ra-scenaries which would theoretically allcw re=ote directica of an in-cident, the best use of these action plans would be to Oake them available to all operating plants for incor;oraticn into their e:ergency procedures.
804 261
. A number of the scenarios considered (including some large and small LOCA's, se=e plant transients, the large fire, and some hydro-logical events) require reaction ti=es in the order of a few For this type of event, NRC inter-hours after event initiation.
actica with the licensee would be feasible but =ay not be desirable because of the need for.ation by eperational personnel with access to the best available plant and incident knowledge.
Despite the i= practicality of obtaining and adequately evaluating plant and site infor ation i= ediately after initiation of an incident, there are a nuisber of scenaries where acticr.s taken =any hours after initiation of an incident are of high significance.
This is particularly true in plant transients initiated by =echani-cal or electrical eqiup=ent failure, fires, loss of offsite power, reactor seinure, abandoned centrol recs, and =ajor flood event.
Sven in these cases, hcwever, an intir. ate knowledge of the facility by the operating staff would have to be ecsbined with any additicnal evaluative resources that the iMC =ay be able to bring to bear to The IMC plant-related activi-imple=ent actions within the facility.
It ties are therefere expected to be at = cst advisory in nature.
would te an extrecely unusual situatien where directives would need to be issued with reSard to specific plant ac:icns in response to A screwnat better case can be :ade fer :MC directicn cf inc 'ents.
eff-site actions, ainly because cf the additicnal -ize availacle o^S 262
ht 12 -
during which the radioactivity is being transported to the population and the fewer nu=ber of physical parameters required for decisicus regarding off-site actions. Even for off-site actions, however, the IPC role would be =uch = ore likely to be adisory than directive.
On the basis of the above discussion, we conclude that *,he =ain focus of the resource require =ents for the IMC should be en those infor:atica gathering, evaluation, and cc==unication capabilities which will allow the IMC to function effectively in an advisory capacity in the ti=e period starting at least a few hours after an incident.
'de also conclude, however, that it is prudent to provide the legal and cc==unication resources to assure the caeability to direct a licensee should the need ever becc=e evident during the course of an incident.
B.
Recet-anded Rescurces for the EMC 1.
Discussion As discussed above, we recc==end that the resources for the 4
IMC be these that allcw efficient collection and evalua-icn cf infor=ation to assure that the iMC can function in an ad *iscry capacity within a few hcurs after an incident is initiated.
The ad=inistrative and cen=unication rescurces suculd be such that shculd the unlikely situation arise where the NRC needed to direct a licensee, the cacability to de so would exist.
804 2-(53
--: The approach of this section is to set forth the recc== ended IMC resources in five categories:
a.
Physical IMC facility and IMC organization--physical, cot::=unications and personnel require =6ats for the IMC; b.
Precollected infor=atien--infor=ation on the plint and site that would be available to the IMC staff at the start of an incident and with which it would be generally familiar; c.
Real ti=e infor=ation--lists of plant and site para =eters and interactions with other agencies likely to be required during the course of an incident; d.
Evaluatien resources--personnel, co=puter and other tecls needed to evaluate infor=ation obtained.
e.
Action resources--cc==unication and transpcrtation capa-bilities and =anage=ent tcols needed to assure that any necessary advice or direction reaches the site in a timely =anner.
These recc== ended rescurces are then discussed in section 27 with respect to whether they shculd be i=plecentec en a short-or long-ter: basis. In :any cases, the content of a particular list of recc== ended infer =ation will need to te furtrer developed by hbl specialists in the particular area. Such cases have usually been designated for long-term develrpment.
2.
Resources Physiesi IMC facility ard Oceanizatien a.
The present arrange =encs depicting authorities and responsi-bilities and the existing layout and arrange =ent for NRC incident response are described in Appendices B, C and D.
These existing arrangements have been reviewed jointly by NRR and IE.
A proposal to =eet NRC's needs to accecplish its =ission for incident respc.ise is given beicw:
(1) Oretnization for Ir.eident Peseense Cn the basis of a review of the existing organization for incident response, w
IR ACT SUPPORT STAFF OPERATIONS STAF F N
N M
w Staf fed, According to Type of Staff of Executive Of fice for w
O Incident, by any or all Operations Support, ole, Who NRC Of fices Maintains:NRC Operations Center I