ML19250C278
| ML19250C278 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 11/06/1979 |
| From: | Pappas H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911230139 | |
| Download: ML19250C278 (2) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:/ s * **auq'o UNITED STATES l ' 3,, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n REGION 111 3 g v[/ 'I 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD o corn atovu. itusOis som NOV 0 1979 State of Illinois Department of Public Health ATTN: Mr. Gary N. Wright Chief Livision of Nuclear Safety 535 West Jefferson Street Springfield, IL 62761 Gentlemen: The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 79-26 titled " Breach Of Containment Integrity" was sent to the following licensees on November 5, 1979: American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company D. C. Cook 1, 2 (50-315, 50-316) Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company Zimmer (50-358) Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company Perry 1, 2 (50-440, 50-441) Commonwealth Edison Company Braidwood 1, 2 (50-456, 50-457) Byron 1, 2 (50-454, 50-455) Dresden 1, 2, 3 (50-10, 50-237, 50-249) La Salle 1, 2 (50-373, 50-374) Quad-Cities 1, 2 (50-254, 50-265) Zion 1, 2 (50-295, 50-304) Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point (50-155) Midland 1, 2 (50-329, 50-330) Palisades (50-255) Dairyland Power Cooperative LACBWR (50-409) Detroit Edison Company Fermi 2 (50-341) Illinois Power Company Clinton 1, 2 (50-461, 50-462) ?P6 3ll 19 3 7911230 9?
NOV C 1979 6 State of Illinois lowa Electric Light & Power Company Duane Arnold (50-331) Northern Indiana Public Service Company Bailly (50-367) Northern States Power Company Monticello (50-263) Prairie Island 1, 2 (50-282, 50-306) Ohio Edison Company Erie 1, 2 (50-580, 50-581) Public Service of Indiana Marble Hill 1, 2 (50-546, 50-547) Toledo Edison Company Davis-Besse 1 (50-346) Union Electric Company Callaway 1, 2 (50-483, 50-486) Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach 1, 2 (50-266, 50-301) Wisconsin Public Service Corporation Kewaunee (50-305) Sincerely, & hM M 8M Helen Pappas, Chief Administrative Branch
Enclosure:
IE Information Notice No. 79-26 cc w/ encl: Mr. D. W. Kane, Sargent & Lundy Central Files Reproduction Unit NRC 20b
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SSINS: 6870 Accession No: 7908220133 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 November 5, 1979 IE Information Notice No. 79-26 BREACH OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY Description of Circumstances: On Ssotember 14, 1979, the Consumers Power Company (CPC) notified the NRC of discovery at the Palisades Nuclear Generating Plant of a valve misalignment that had resulted in containment integrity being breached for an indeterminate length of time. While preparing to perform a Type "C" leak test between two manual valves in a 3" bypass line around the main 48" containment purge valve, plant personnel dis-covered that both of these manual isolation valves were locked in the open posi-tion. These valves should have been locked closed. Investigation by the licensee indicated that the valves may have been improperly positioned since April,1978, when an efficiency test of the bypass line filters was performed. The plant has operated at power for the major portion of that time period. The valve misalignment had no actual impact on the public health. However, in the event of a design basis accident wherein fuel damage and release of primary coolant inside the containment are postulated, the open valves would provide a significant patt for a radioactive release from the containment. The initial design purpose for the bypass system was to provide a long term hydrogen contro basisaccident.-{capabilityforthecontainmentatmospherefollowingadesign It was intended that after approximately 30 days following an accident, when containment pressure and activity levels dropped sufficiently to permit venting, this system would be manually valved to vent the containment atmosphere, through high efficiency and charcoal filters, to the exhaust stack. Thus the components in the bypass line beyond the two manual isolation valves were not designed for the severe service they would be exposed to with the valves open during the initial pressure surge of the design basis accident, and signif-icant uncontrolled release would result. High radiation in the vicinity of the bypass line would also make immediate closing of the manual isolation valves, even if identified as the source of leakage, an extremely hazardous operation. The principal cause for this event was inadequacy of the procedures addressing proper use and positioning of these valves. The master containment integrity valve line up checklist, which is per 1/ Current NRC requirements call for DUPLICATE DOCUMENT Eydrogen buildup. Palisades has reco Entire document previously entered into system under: ANO N o. of pages: W}}