ML19249E145

Transcript of NRC 790401 Closed Meeting Re Tmi.Pp 1-45

ML19249E145
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/01/1979
From:	Bradford P, Gilinsky V, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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Text

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si Il I'li UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1,:

2 l!

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k;

3r 1

1.

4' 5

6 7

8 9i 10 '

Sunday, 1 April 1979 11 l

12 13 14 15 16 l l

17 18 19 20 l l

21 THIS TPANSCRIPT 'dAS PP2 PARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING i

l 22 Tape 2-A, continuation of the same meeting.

23 l l

24

.s,eerineoorters,ine.l 2' l 1018 041 l

l 7

n

.. ?

I b

FEL. AUSTIN:

Each release cateogry in WASH-1400 has 1:15 p.m.1 associated with it certain curies release.

2 i

3 ll COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

All right.

Let's say 4

reactor safety studies release, and I would take out the 5

PWR part of it --

6 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I don't --

l 7

MR. AUSTIN:

Mid-level.

I I

8 i'

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Don't forget-this.

You li 9

see, this is what they're talking about.

Here's where all 4i 10 :

those clients come from.

11 !!

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

This will be explained in 12 [

the back so --

s COMMISSIONER KENENDY: Oughtn't we to refer to tha 13 4

1 14 [

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I'd like to have a versio.

I of this that can be turned over to people who dont know 15 16 a thing about it.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Look at this.

17 l

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yeah.

18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

You see?

This is pretty 19 clear.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I know, but I think we 21 can just say that a'll the foregoing assumes this.

22 23

,Okay.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Oh, all right.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We'll get to that.

24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

All right.

2a.

1018 042 i

I'

p

~

i i

I l'

t i

I 1 j' COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We'd like it not to 2

clutter up--

3 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

All right.

I, 4 !.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Safety study of -- mid-S.

5 !!

range?

'I 6

l MR. AUSTI' Mid-range.

l l

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Is that what it is?

7 8

MR. AUSTIN:

Yes l

h.

I II COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Mid-range release.

l 9 jj

?

i COMMISS~^NER KENNEDY:

Does anybody know what l

10 i i

i, 11[!

that means?

I 12 ;l MR. AUSTIN :

I think, can't you say the PWR-4

!i n

category.

13 [

3 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, nobody is going to a

14 know what that is.

I think we could say-- What we're 15 16 l saying is not maximum, less than maximum release, or some-i thing like that.

17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That isn't going to be 18 meaningful, unless somebody knows what a maximum release 19 w uld be.

20 MR. AUSTIN:

Significant release according to 21 l

1 the coefficient.

22 )

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's say that.

j 23 "Y'

24 MR. KENNEKE:

Yeah.

25 i

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

All right.

1018 043

4 4

c COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Vic, you forgot to tell l

1 [

+

t 2 i her to leave the back page, the last column off.

She did l

l 3

it perfectly, but -- tell her she doesn't need to worry, P

4 l!

just white it out.

Tell her on the next one she shouldn't.

li 5

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What did you say?

1 6

j JOHN AUSTIN:

Significant release of core fissionj il products.

Significant releases, you know.

Get the core 7

i 8

in there because it's a core mela.

l ll 9

j!

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I wouldn't put 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

i 10 I

I would put parenthesis in ha-a, time for pressure relief t

11 to exceed containment failure.

i i

12 '!

MR. AUSTIN:

Time for containment failure.

l 13 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Time for containment il 14 !!

failure.

I 15 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yeah.

All right.

Time i

I 16 for containment failure, alright.

Let's put 90-degree 17 secto. over here and that will take care of it, instead of I

18 having an asterix.

Okay?

i 19 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah.

Sure.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, first of all it 21 should have more room here.

COMMISSIO'NER KENNEDY:

It's the same thing 22 down here.

23 I

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Five miles, 90 degrees.

24 I

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

While you're doing that 25 i

1018 044 I

$D)

i!

5 l

3 l

i 1 ['

do it at the bottom at the same time.

u 2

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

and 10 miles, 180-degree sector.

Okay?

And 10 miles, 180 degrees.

Okay?

!}

3 4

Ii So you've got

" precautionary" here.

Stay

'i 5

inside, make sure you're in explosive range.

Precautionary, I

6 i

and now a question mark.

Explosion.

I think you have to i

lI put in the word " explosion" on the next line, just to make 7

!I g

[

it clear.

I lli COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Which one?

i 9

'i l

10 [

MR. THOMPSON:

What a minute, yeah, under releasei 11 ll time?

I 12 l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Under mixture and explosiv; 13 f range.

In the next box I would put " explosion."

No 14j' significant change in reactor.

In other words, you didn't i

expect it, but it went thru.

15 ti COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Ycah.

Okay.

Explosion.

16 li I

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay.

No significant 17 18 change.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

And then next phrase you 19 should say explosion, too.

20 I

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Anv release?

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

No.

22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Here?

23 i

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah, explosion, core e 24 l,

crushed.

23 I

i018 045 e

I

i.

i l

~

1 ll COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Now we don't have here I

2 worse items, significant breach of containment, et cetera, n

3 !;

but--

4 l

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, they sa'd back here-5 They said back here Rupenhouse indicates the pressure l

6 i

vessel would not rupture.

[

l COMMISSIOER GILINSKY:

Okay, because, this is i

7 l

8 l

the one which could really go boom and break open right up.

l 9,i But that's why mixture in the explosive range says--

l g,

10 !!

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

They're working on that I

t I

11 j!

bubble problem.

They've got.a new idea.

i d

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Oh, yeah?

12 [

f MR. SAUTER:

Al Kenneke isn't here?

l 13 -

l

=

',i COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay, lets--

14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Using the sulfide, 15 l!

MR. SAUTER:

Has he talked to you about the 16 1

17 l 8-hour business yet?

i PR. THOMPSON:

Yes, he did mention that.

8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ig MR. SAWER:

You know, to get out.

19 MR. THOMPSON:

I think he's planning to take it 20 Ut*

21 MR. SAUTER:

You want to have some qualifying g

w s

n eew y u can--

23 l

gl (Simultaneous discussion.)

I9 9""

25 l

g 1018 046 i

p

i I

l absorber instead sulfides, and you wind up getting a n

1 sulfate, chewing up the oxygen.

2 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Sulfite?

3 I

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah, sulfite.

4

[\\

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

That righ' ?

5 I

. es.

And then ir chews Y

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

6 i

I 7 !j up the oxygen.

h 8

l bLR. AUSTIN:

The trick, that will only get the i

oxygen in the water.

g COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's work on our chart, 10 i 11 j!

kay?

Later we'll solve the reactor problem.

12 j!

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

If its against the water, l!

d oxygen won't be releasing and increasing the amount of

,*3

!i 14.'

oxygen in the containment.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's see.

Okay.

Here, 3.a Core Crushed, unlikely, and then say release in time--

g I would just put it back here, see 2.

Expected planned 77 event, I would put Core melt here.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah.

19 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Core melt, see 2.

20 Now as your core --

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah. Okay.

22 l

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay?

23 i

ll COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah.

24 l!

l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I'd put on this thing 2a_

10\\8 041

~

11 i

I 1

evacuate.

If something happens in there for one reason 2

or another, anybody evacuates the control room, which I 3

would think would happen.

4

]

On the other_ hand I don'.t know what happens.

n 5 ]

When, do these guys know that there's a core melt do they I

6

,i stay there?

7 d

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

They stay there for a li hli while.

They stay there until such time as activity levels 8

9 j

are so high that the dose rates won't permit.

Isn't that il 1

correct?

10 11 !

MR. AUSTIN:

They should, because there are thing 12 they can still do, containment space --

i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah.

And indeed, they 13 a

0 may leave for a while --

14 15 [

MR. AUSTIN:

To the secondary.

I 16 l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

-- to the secondary, 17 waiting to find out what the activity levels are.

When the activity levels drop, if they do, they go back.

yg COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

And what's the secondary?

19 Control room?

20 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

The secondary control 21 r

m, yeah, which has less capability.

22 l

MR. AUSTIN:

But clearly would have that 23 i

capability for which the condition got you there.

24 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, what would we 25 say here?

The loss of control?

I would say treat like --

i 1018 048 i

[

9 e

1 like major release, semething like that.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yes, that's fair.

2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

We've got to do something 3

4 with it, except very temporarily.

I first, maybe it was 5

just me, when I first read it.

1 MR THOMPSON:

It really doesn't need to be put 6 d 7

in there, I mean because that's really-- if you're just 8

temporarily evacuating, you're not evacuating-the control E

o room.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's right.

10 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Treat like major release, 11 huh?

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah.

Sure.

13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Release Okay'?

F.vacuate 14 :

First of all, we don't have to say " evacuate."

Just 15,

evacuation scenario, right?

Can't we just drop that?

16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's right.

You can. Ye 17 r COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's just drop that.

18 [

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Oh, no.

No, wait, wait, 19 wait.

Yes, you do.

Becasue they're two different things.

2 0 >:.!

I One's evacuation, the other is stay inside.

Right?

That's 21 P

what I was suggesting.

22 i

L COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

All right, good enough, z3 dca't waste time.

All right.

Why don't we just turn this 24 thing over.

2a-I.

!'i 1018 049 i.

10 g

f i-l i

1 1 f (Simultaneous discussion.)

2 i COMMISSIONSR GILINSKY:

Would you get her to type l n~

3 this " Unplanned Events" on the top, please?

l MISS HARDING:

Yes.

Isn't there --

4 1

(Simultaneous discussion.)

5 I I

6

'ilSS HARDING:

I want t'o tell some of the people l

i 7 il there that you could lose the cower.

8 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yes, but the're's a loss of I

9 Tht's in the front sheet.

On the front page, it's a loss a

i 10 ;:

of powe i

li 11 1

MR. THOMPSON:

That was loss of offsite power i

I i

i 12 which goes not--

1 13 !!

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We can say loss of the l

l 51 I

control room.

l 14 l 15 l (Simultaneous discussion.)

l l

16 MR. THOMPSON:

You evacuate a loss of the controlj 17 room.

l 18 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Evacuate or loss --

l 19 MISS HARDING:

-- the control room.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

-- the control room.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay.

For whatever 21 22 i

reason, I don ' t know why. Get.

them to tack ^ hat cn and afd this 23

.okay?

Now, let's, let us now put down the assumption's that 24 l this is being done, because you say that right away.

I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, here they --

i 25 i

6

I 11 b

1 F

l c

n 1

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

They though.this was very 2

important.

What about the stuff right at the beginning?

11 3

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

On the front page?

I:

4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

They thought this 'ci s 5 [

terribly important.

Somehow, it didn't do much for me.

9 I

VOICE:

It actually should be evaluated at the 6

l.

7 f hour of time.

l.'

I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I don't have any problem 8

9 [

with putting it on there.

It didn't do an awful lot for me 10 either, but, you know, if they think it's terribly important h;'

ll,

I think we ought to put it there.

il 12 !.

(Simultaneous discussion.)

1 I!

13 '!

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It's just two sentences.

l 14 'I COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

What's the last one?

15 h COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

An actual release of I

16 potential should be evaluated in there entirety.

17 l

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, that's skipped-- I 18 ;

think it's the last sentence; is the import

'ne.

Am I i

19 i:

right?

I think so.

20 MR. THOMPSON:

Certainly, for making some decision 2,

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah.

I think we ought to leave it there.

22 23 j COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Alright, let's leave.it, I.

24 okay?

!i 25 ll COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

And also, Vic, it pertains to --

1018 051 E?

i' it l

l-1 I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

You know, we could put 2

this on the bottom of the first table.

4 It 3 ;'

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

My suggestion --

4 j

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Why don't we say these l

I 5 i!

tables include another assumption.

l I

5 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

'Okay.

l 7

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

All right?

hl COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yeah.

5 l

9 il COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

These tables include anot il 10- ll assumption.

I 11 ll 1

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Now here are the other i

12 !

assumptions.

I 13 COMMISSIONER GILINSK'i:

Then we say " constitute ll 14l' conservatism."

All right.

Could you get this put on the I

15 bottom of these?

16 MISS HARDING:

You want it on the bottom of l

17 both of them?

I l

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Of the first one, just --

18 19 MISS EARDING:

The first page?

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yeah, just the first page.

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Here are the rest of the 22 assumptiens.

23 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

All right.

Now.let's go l

24 to the assumptions.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Page 7.

25 I

i 1018 052 l

$T h

i.

l 1

, COMMISSIONER OILINSKY:

Is this it,.the weather.

2 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

The weather, heat genera-3 tion, and then, if you need to include some of this stuff--

4 h

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, we'll just attach 5 h it in the back --

i i

6 h

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Because they're part of 9

7 the assumptions -- you don't need this.

l' 8

d COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I know, we'il --

9 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

But that.'s a set of 10 assumptions.

11 '

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I don't know that we need 12 all this stuff having seid it previously.

Do we need that

'i 13 i first paragraph, can we put in a --

14 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I guess I'd leave it there.

I 15 :!

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Because we have the 16

'l conservative business.

i

.1 17 g MR. AUSTIN:

On that first page when you said ii 18 conservativeism of members, I think Steve said that they did

!i 19 i this realistically with the objective of not being optimisti l

20 is his definition of conservative.

So it's not a-- How 21 ll about just say realistic?

22 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

It's not a calculated--

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We aren't being, realistic?

23.

MR. THOMPSON:

Probably should 24 is l

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Realistic. Okay.

But then 2 5,'

i why are we saying conservative. The condition was in the nex j{ (?

1018 053 e

i.

1 I

14 l

j 1 i MR. AUSTIN:

That's how'he defined conservatism.

2 MR. THOMPSON:

I '1 other words, you're not taking 3

the worst meteorology you could have, but look --

[;

C0FBIISSIONER GILINSKY:

Why don't we say realistic 4

5 llthen; it's kind of realistic leaning to conservative, but U

6 ll 1et 's not li MR. THOMPSON:

Yeah.

f,f 7

p 8

i C05BiISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's go on conservative, i

9 5 a li;tle conservatively when we do it.

All right.

I want to !

c 10 put in a sentence:

rain could meet the higher load and local 11 !! radioactivity level.

i j!

12 !!

CChoiISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's fine.

It's the ll 13 virtual truth.

14 ll (Laughter.)

i 15 !

CO.'S!ISSIONER GILINSKY:

Okay.

Heat generation so on 16 ! s o on, so on.

Okay.

l l'

17 l C0hBiISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's fine.

18 l (Simultaneous discussion.)

19

,C O.\\ BiI S S 1 0 b m CTLINSKY:

Now what about this thing?

20 What about this business?

l 21 C0hBIISSIONER KENNEDY:

I think we need th:

I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

What about that o ??

22 l

23 (Simultaneous discussion.)

C0hBIISSIONER KENNEDY:

This one, too.

24 I

l C0hBiISSIONER Gilinsky:

Do we need to take 25 femployeesout?

l 1018 054

.I d

i 15 I

r

~

1 C0hBiISSIONER'GILINSKY:

Not yet.

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

This whole sheet ought to go.

2 t

l; 3 i MR. THOMPSON:

I think you're really --

11

]

(Simultaneous discussion.)

4 5 f C05B1ISSIONER KENNEDY:

Is this the kind of assump-6 tions that are really central to that entire set of calcula-

~

7 j tions that are involved in core melt down sequences.

Now w

8

I think you've got everything you need.

I don't'think --

l 9

ll I wouldn't ti 10 4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

So, those are people --

i 11 several parts --

C0hBfISSIONER GILINSKY:

What about the specific 12 1,

i 13 ' sequence?

14 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Might you have vectors of a LOCA?

1S C0hBIISSIONER KENNEDY:

Which one?

16 17 C0hBiISSIONER GILINSKY:

Just stick that back there.

C0hBIISSIONER BRADFORD:

Would you?

18 C0hB!ISSIONER KENNEDY:

This?

I don't know.

19 MR. THOMPSON:

The weakest thing is going to go fi.

20 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

That's probably what we sa) 21 22 about everything else.

MR. THOMPSON:

Well, you will still get that water 23

. hammer.

That water is going to have a force that will knock 2;

i l o m a building.

25 1018 055 e

p 16 I

i i.t C0hBIISSIONER BRADFORD:

So, in fact then, how 1

2 would you get water back over the core?

3 MR. THOMPSON:

I'd say you'd just use the normal 4

j injection system.

Unless your piping were ripped off.'

S COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I couldn't understand what

'i 6

i Kenneke was telling us.

But, it is'all changed.

I i

7

.i MR. THOMPSON:

You mean the whole thing; when?

8:

8 h

- COMh!ISSIONER KENNEDY:

No.

il 9

ll MS. STETLER:

No.

10 )

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

More than that.

i!

3; 11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

You mean the injection

.I 12 [ actually sprays from underneath?

13 1 MR. AUSTIN:

That's designed to relieve the 14 pressure.

It's not like the BWR.

15 j C0hBIISSIONER KENNEDY:

That -- Well, you could put l

16 ' that whole thing on there, back of the back, and nobody has I

17 l to read it.

You can just call it the appendix -- just the 18

' way it is.

19 C0hB!ISSIONER GILINSKY:

But that has cons ~iderate 20 stuff in it so, I don't know --

21 j COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, you take all those 22 l things out, and you put this, this, this page and this; l'

23;jthese, and you take this one out These 4 pages.

H.ow's that?

4 24 !! We've already got this one.

We've got this one in -- con-

!i 25 [ clusive summary.

U 1018 056 h

1 e,

17 I

I l

1 I, COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But that makes.the assump-l 2 ' tion there too.

ll' 3

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

No.

I don't think so.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

But you see what's avail 4

,l k

5

!able, and what we need to find, and this whole thing will l

6

~ have gotten away.

7 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Yes.

That's right.

8

- COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

We need this b'usiness I

9 i

all right.

10 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

We need that business and

~

l 11 we need --

12 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

This would be here.

This 13 is summary of action alternatives.

That's what this is.

l i

14 Why don't you have him put that together, 15 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

-- with the other thing, 16 he is.

He's suppered to be putting that other table --

17 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Did he do it?

18 MS. STETLER:

It is, just take out the in eight l

19 hour2.199074e-4 days <br />0.00528 hours <br />3.141534e-5 weeks <br />7.2295e-6 months <br />.

Do you have an explanation for that now, or are you 20 going to wait.

(Simultaneous general discussion.)

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

What is this?

We missed 22 23 something, Victor.

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

If you don't have any 24 warning time, that's not a precautionary evacuation.

25 1018 057 I

il

18 i,.

j.

1 1i COMMISSIONER'GILINSKY:

This is on the. basis of 2

l knowing that, it's indeterminate.

i, 3

ll COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

No, Darrell Eisenhut told 1

l,1i me this morning those were all (inaudible).

i 4

a 5 l MR. AUSTIN:

That warning time is to a dose.

~

6 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It's flammable.

I 7

MR. THOMPSON:

I just talked to Case and Case 8

j said it kasn't.

He didn't think it was an explosive -- I il 9

U mean flamable.

I.et me talk to Eisenhut again.

il 10 !!

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I think at this point we're I

11 j saying that it's (inaudible).

i:

12 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

It's what?

13 [

, COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

All right, if Darrell says i,

14 f this morning it's for all intents clear, then --

15 !

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, why don't I ask him?

16 f COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Well, it says something 17 about that right back here, about what this is based on.

I 18 ', Hydrogen explosion.

i 19 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Right.

20 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

No, but ! think that --

21 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's the pressure vessel.

22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yeah.

23 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

That's the pressure vessel.

Il h

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

So is this, though.

24 MR. AUSTIN:

This is merely your pending case.

25 l

l l

1018 058

19 1 i C0MMISSIONER KENNEDY:

All right.

It says it 2

could rupture the vessel and/or flush the core.

Rough 3 l analysis indicates the pressure vessel would not rputure.

4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Joe thinks it would.

One 5

rough analysis against another, or at least Joe thought it P

6 might.

7 MR. AUSTIN:

I think what this says is what this s

warning time is to when you get to a certain dos'e.

At this 9

level you have yet to have an explosion.

If you don't know 10 you've got the mixture there, what is your response to it?

11 According to this you would say a precautionary two-mile 12, evacuation.

13 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

I would say undetermined.

14 -

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

But how can yt 2 -- How can i

15 you -- put down on the same line, core crushed.

Mixture in 16 the explosive range is somewhere earlier in the sequence of 17 events.

18 "

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Right.

i 19 {!:

j MR. AUSTIN:

This one's the explosion, core 20 ] crushed.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yeah, but this one actually 21 22 took place.

MR. AUSTIN:

We added the word, explosion 23 1.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, you could put in here 24 L

25 ( p tential hydrogen explosion, and here hydrogen explosion.

I.

i 1018 059 h

5

i 20 I

l l.

l 1

Shall we do.that?

i 2

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I wouldn't.

I think it's

-j i

3 ; all right the way it is.

i 4

h COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Well, but then, if you 5 0 carry it on into the evacuation scenario, what you're saying 6

j here is there is no evacuation, there's no precautionary

!i 7

1 evacuation.

8 l

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, you're not going --

9 This one is not because it's happened -- and nothing has i

10l changed.

f 11 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Well, this is after the l

1 12 explosion happened.

j g

!i i

13 '

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

It has happened.

i 1

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Nothing changes.

14 15 COhBiISSIONER GILINSKY:

Here it just takes you up to-16"the core melt scenario.

n 17ll COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Why do you need the u

18 3 hydrogen explosion in there.

Before I'd -- it takes some

!i 19 itime oe. fore you learn nothing has changed and you have this 1

I 20 i:

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

No, no.

But you know you're il ti 21:;not getting -- The auestion is of course the only thing you're 22fconcernedabout as to the specific event, the thing you're l!

23 ij concerned about here is releases.

You're going to know h

24 Lwhether you've got releases --

25 ';

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Right. But I

L 1018 060

c 21 i

i i

se e

1 [

CpF!ISSIONER KENNEDY:

-- as a result of that very

shortly after the event.

2 3 '..

MR. AUSTIN:

It's being degraded.

I:

4 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

But that's a different 5 !j situation.

6 ll MR. AUSTIN:

If you don't'know about it now.

I!

l h

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

You see, but it's going to i

7

!i I

8 i take some checking at that point before you are aware of the j

9 il extent of the damage, and I would think before you -- If you i:

10.l had a good quantity of the core rattling around.

11 ll COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Well, why don't we --

12 MR. THOMPSON:

You want me to report back on where 6

13 j we think' we stand on the hydrogen buble?

Rightnowwebelievel i

g 14 !! it takes 5 percent of oxygen to become flammable; 11% to be 151 a detonation mixture.

Right now we think we've got 5 percent.l l

16 And they're doing some quick recalculations because they 17 think the 5 percent flammability number may be high, like it 18 may be 4.8 or 4.7.

But so, for all practical purposes, 19 we've got to assume the mixture is flammable, but I~ don't 20 think anybody is assuming right now that he thinks it's an eXP osive mixture.

l 21 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Darrell specifically says 22 MR. THOMPSON:

Those are Darrell's numbers.right

,3 i

l lthere.

gj 24 25 !

COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

Okay.

i MR. THOMPSON:

Darrell wrote that.

But they --

l

-l

I',

22 i

I l(-

1 Saul Levine, is on the' phone, telling somebody to.run addi-2 ;

tional --

3 I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

-- hard numbers that they 4

know of because yesterday, they said it was 2-1/2 percent.

4 S

t, MS. STETLER:

Did they give you some feel for the i

frate?

6 7

MR. THOMPSON:

Generation rate?

I didn't 8

- MR. AUSTIN:

Is that at 1,000 psi?

.I 9

g MR. THOMPSON:

At 1,000 psi.

10 9 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

I would think that any I,

11 hydrogen explosion in the reactor vessel would lead to l'

12 evacuation.

i 13,

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Oh, hey, we're not doing 14 f,j anything for the plant.

a 15 l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

No, we haven't done anything.

16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Let's do the same thing.

17 Can you get a blank.

Let's see, how do we handle that?

COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

You need a blank, just like 18 19 we had.

COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

See if you can get a 20 I blank so we can write --

21 MS. MUCCHETTI:

One of those blank charts again?

22 l

I COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Yeah.

,3 i

C0hWISSIONER LENNEDY:

Me anwh il'e, I'm going to 24 check to see of the President is arriving at the site.

25 1018 062 i

1

i i

d 23 r

i i

C0, MMISSIONER ' BRADFORD :

It's a test of. significance l

1 2 ' whether the President's arrival is more important than the h

3 arrival of another percent of oxygen.

C0hBIISSIONER KENNEDY:

I think it's more likely to 4

i

!,I 5 " have an increased level of carbon dioxide with the increased 6

numbers of people.

7 C0hBIISSIONER BRADFORD:

True.

Well, I don't i

8 lknow what to put here.

If you knew that the mix.ture in the 9

d explosive, range would precautionary evacuati.on be two miles, i

P J

i 10i five miles?

Two,you think?

'l 1

11 lI MR. AUSTIN:

I would assume you'd have loss of I

12 vital functions somewhere so I would go to --

l 13 ti COMMISSIONER BRADFORD:

This is more like an 1

14 f explosion isn't it?

This is after you discover that --

l MR. THOMPSON:

This is just the first one right 15 l.

16jhere.

i 17 C05BfISSIONER BRADFORD:

If you knew that you could 18 Ihave an explosion.

19 MR. THOMPSON:

Makes it just in the explosive 20, range.

I 21 l

MR. AUSTIN:

Precautionary 2 mile evacuation.

COhBIISSIONER BRADFORD:

Yeah.

Yeah, at least that, 22 F

ut.my question was whether you stop at b

2.

063 23 94,l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

I would.

h 25 i; C0hB1ISSIONER BRADFORD:

I was going to prepare a chart with different views.

97

24 (Laughter.)

1 (Recording difficulties.)

2 r

3 MR. BUDNITZ:

More than 2 together, not in that 50 pc=

4 j room.

Look, I'm sorry, that five minutes was getting a t-r 5 !

helicopter to get the stuff.

i h

6 l We now have two different. groups doing calcula-7 l:' tions, one in Pittsburgh, one in National Reactor Research Il a.h Lab, andfa third group in Idaho working with them.

And we 1:

9 now understand what the flammability problems are with that 10 stuff in the upper head, and I'll give you the numbers, if I'

,, I can find them. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Now this is at peak. But you 12 4 1. need something like 600 degrees Farenheit? 13 o 4j MR. BUDNITZ: Yes. Well, here's what I'm talking i about. We've got a vessel the pipe's out here, and~up 5g !iM here, there's gas. All right? We now think there's 3 to 6 P i 4 Percent oxygen, and the rest is hydrogen. Okay? There's .7 ; hydrogen and oxygen bubbling up because of continuous ioni a-18 l tion in this thing. It builds up. There's a point at which that oxygen will get to 20 l be enough so that if a fire were to start, it would burn. 21 i Right now if you put a spark plug in there it would quench; 22 not enough oxygen. At standard temperature and pressures, 23 l that limit is 6 percert; it's actually 5.8. 24 :j 25 [ The guys did calculations of 70 atmospheres, which [~ n 1018 064 h d)[)

25 1 is where we are, and it turns out it's 4.8 percent, we were saying 5. There's now a guy saying 4.8. I said, gee, that's 2 t 3 " two significant figures. And he said yeah, but it's 4.8. 4 h I've got another guy that says it's 5.0. So that's what it is. I 5 Now at 5.0 if you light a spark it will burn, and i' it burns for about 10 milliseconds, during which time all of 6 the oxygen that's in there is used up. H,0, twice as much 7 li 3 y hydrogen-is used up, and that's where it stays. When that !! burn takes place in a 10 or 20 millisecond process you get 9 B a pressure pulse which is proportional to the pressure.there, 10 n 11 ll not an increase in pressure but a factor. It turns out the it factor is 5.5. At 1,000 psi, that's 5,500 psi. 12..!: 4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: When it's bu.ning? 13 : MR. BUDNITZ: During the pulse. Duri~.g the burn. ]ad During that millisecond of -- During that 10 milliseconds you' l a_ i, h going to get a pressure pulse which is a facter, and I was 16 2 surprised there wasn't a pressure increase, but it's not. I 17 ; I 18lunderstandthephysicsofthat, which is -- which was kind of 19 ;. surprising to me. Okay? j So if you get that burn up there and it goes to 20 l 5,500 psi, we're in trouble, and the reason why we're in 21 trouble is with the yield stress of.: hat vessel, which we 22 l thought was a little higher, we think is around 5800 or 23 l it might be 6100 psi. 24 ' i CCoNISSIONER GILINSKY: How come it pulses? 1018 066 c l-1 D/

26 9 1 MR. BUDNITI: Ten milliseconds long. I'have the 2 joules but 3 C0hMISSIONER GILINSKY: What does that mean? Is it i 4 , one big -- f MR. BUDNITZ: It's a ten millisecond pressure 5 ); pulse, 6 y. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, what does it do? 7 I l' s ji Is it a spike? E: MR. BUDNITZ: It will cause -- It's a hoop 9 i li 10 stress problem and it will cause a crack which, if you 11 ll! were looking out, it would be like_this. s, 12 ll COMMISSIONER AHEAPNE: Bob, when you say it's a 1: 13lltenmillisecondburndoyoumeanit takes ten milliseconds 9 14] f r the whole wave to go through? 15 l MR. BUDNITZ: That's right. For that whole -- I! .6.!!, For that whole ~7l! COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: For the wave it to go through. lli But now is the detonation wave ten milliseconds long? g l MR. BUDNITZ: Yeah. g COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: When that happens -- l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: It is a fairly sharp rise? 21 l MR. BUDNITZ: It's a sharp rise, ten milliseconds ' long, and then it comes back down. ~ 23 i 24 il. l CONNISSIONER BRADFORD: What happens to the surface l of the water -- 25 1018 066 l; /f2-

i 27 1 ha. BUDNITI: Veah, that pressure pulse is going to 2 be everywhere. The most important -- li COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What's the detonation -- 3 4

i MR. BUDNIT::

But most importantly -- No, the li S ji explosion's a little later I'll come to that. This is 6 not an explosion. This is a chemical burn, but it's fast. !i j! Most. importantly is where the gas is above the 7 E{ water, j there's the head. Okay? It really goes'like this, s c 9 and then there's the head, and then there's. bolts. And the ll 10 water is like here. And it's here that you're going to get i; 11!! that you know. 0 11 ii And from the inside out it's gaing to be like that. 4 13 ] That's the way it's called hoop stress. And we might lose a 14ll that vessel, which we can't afford. Although, by the way, 15{losingitat the top is going to be like a LOCA; it's not 16;l like losing it at the bottom, but it still is bad. Il C0hNISSIONER BRADFORD: Do you expect any kind of 17 Iij time sequence? 18 MR. BUDNITZ: There is going to be a prop ~agated 19 pulse everywhere in the system. We're going to lose valves; l we're going to lose seals; we're going to lose the pumps. We I just can't stand that. 22 There was a time only yesterday when peop1.e were 23 l l if it burns, it burns. 24lsayingthatWell, jj COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: I just said that. 2S L i \\\\

i il j' 28 MR. BUDNITZ: Now there's another thing, there's 1 2 another point li 3 l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Another source of misinfor-4 l mation. 5 MR. BUDNITZ: -- which you have to say -- an'd that 6

is if that oxygen gets to the 5 perc'ent, 4.8, nothing I

7 d happens unless you set if off with a spark. The spark you l i need is about 1800 degrees Kelvin, a very high s' park to set 8 9 jj lt orf. If you have any -- But of course any small thing

i 10 E gives you that for the nanoseconds that it takes.

And then c 11 l it just goes. Now if you don't have anything like that, if 12 i 13 j there's no electrical things or anything like that, you f ~ could raise that oxygen and just keep raising, raising, raisin 14 il 15 ll and nothing happens. In fact, the guy said you can get all the way stoichiometry, which is one third, two thirds hydrogen 6 I H,0, and it would sit there forever. 17 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What does stoichiometry mean. MR. BUDNITZ: That means we're in -- Hydrogen and oxygen H O is exactly two thirds, one third. It's the perfect 2 j mixture. 21 I COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: And that's the most 22 i explosive? 23 l MR. BUDNIT : That would be the most explosive. ll On the other hand, the closer you get, the lower 25 i that 1800 degrees Kalvin gets, until you're awfully c:ose to jgg 1018 068 a trigger.

29 1 But the point I'm making is that you can raise the 2 oxygen level if it's absolutely steady, absolutely steady, 3 and nothing happens forever. But it's just not something you 4 would ever want to do. ~ 5 C0hBIISSIONER BRADFORD: When you say lower it until 6 3 you are close to a trigger, trigger means that it would 7 ,' happen at the -- 3 ',i - MR. BUDNIT:: The amount o f -- 9 C0hBIISSIONER BRADFORD: -- amount of oxygen that's 10 in there now? MR. BUDNITZ: No. Let me say. As the oxygen goes 11 up from the 5 percent at which it would support a flame to 12 ne-third, which is H 0, the amount of energy it takes to 2 13 start it becomes less and less and less and less, until at 14 two-thirds, one-third, the amount of energy is really quite la_ small. It might even be induced by things like shloshing. lo, At that. g So that's a -- But of course you'll never get j! there for a number another reason -- 1 9 ;, h C0hBiISSIONER AHEARNE: Many, many, many percentages h of -- 2 MR. BUDNIT:: You'll never get there for another 22. i reason that I'm going to tell you, that is if the oxygen were 23 ' ~ to go from 5, 6,7, S or 9, and at just over 10 percent -- 24 yesterday we thought it was 12, we now -- all agree it's 25 around 10 percent. At 10 percent we reach a regime where 1018 069

30 1 if it starts, it doesnt burn, it explodes. A burn would be 10 or 20 milliseconds, and an ex-2 t 3 plosion will be microseconds. And a microsecond explosion e lihisatrue, coherent, complete combustion all at once. And it 4 d 5 ll turns out that you get a pressure pulse which is again a il factor above the present, and it's a factor of 13-1/2, 13,000 6 g! iypsi. Gonna lose everything if we get that. 7 it 8 - C0hBIISSIONER AHEARNE: What's the diff'erence li 9 [ between yesterday in this portion? h 10 MR. BUDNIT : Okay. Now again -- i C0hB1ISSIONER AHEARNE: You've got a 14,000 -- ~ 11 12 ii MR. BUDNITZ: You've got 1400? f. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE-14,000/ 13 14j! MR. BUDNITZ: 14,000. We're getting 13-1/2. That's , _ 't i about the same number. 3 9 OMSMOER MEAE Yes. 16 i. 7q MR. BUDNITZ: Okay? So if you ever got to 10-plus l,.j percent, then you got the spark, you're going to blow every-o l thing. And this business about 5500 being closer above the g yield stress here, it's just way above it, and we're going to i lose everything. 21 i Now there's a more important point and that is 22 that again, if you're at 10 or 11 percent you can sit there 23,1 ll and not mucb happens until you get a spark. But the key point

j. in this whole thing is that that's all at the present 25 i temperature --

l 1018 070 l- / D (o

30-A 1 C0MMISSIONER AREARNE: Tell them about the ringing. MR. BUDNITZ: -- which is 280F. 2 6. 3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Tell them about the ringing, MR. BUDNITI: I'll tell you abut the ringing, too. 4 Lj 5 i' COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: -- which is important. l l. MR. BUDNITZ: It's another point. 6 I! 7 This is all 280 degrees F., which is where we are. ll 1! Now in either case, if you have this m'illisecond 8 i I; 9 ;jpulsewhichistheburnorthemicrosecondpulsewhichisthe eXP osion, the pulse doesn't just happen once and it's over. l 10 ' _ _ 'l,, '. It's like a wave which will bounce back and forth because i I! there is no way to damp that energy rapidly except by the 12 ii u mechanism of t'ne H O which you made in the chemical explosion, 13 2 1 14 9 .i 15,l 't 16 : n 17 '! nh 18 1 i 19 l l 20 l 21 i 22 23 /; ~ 24 ' l1 25 ! i [ 1018 071 0 1.

1: i t: I i i l l 1 l congealing one on the other and finally you get condensation ~ 2 and it will damp out. 3 l The millisecond thing could last for seconds, one f 4 N or two or three seconds. The microsecond thing should proba 5 bly only last ten's of milliseconds. 6 ji It's still very bad. We just-- 1 il 7 COMMISSIONER AEEARNE: Instead of one sharp spike.l i; I P 8 MR. BUDNITZ: So it's one sharp, followed by a i n" 9 bunch of rings. Okay? There's just no other way to get 1 10 1 that energy out of there. a 11 d Well, now here 's the key point. We're at 280 d 12 [ degrees F. If you gradually raise the temperature up, you i! 13ll finally get to 680. 14 I! COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Isn't that the bulk? i 15 MR. BUDNITZ: The bulk temperature. Okay? The Ii 16 l bulk temperature of the water and the gas. b As soon as that gas gets to 680 degrees F., 360 17l! l 18 l degrees C., it will spontaneously combust without any 19 ignition, and that's true at any mixture about the 5 percen which will sustain combustion. 20 i If it was at 10 percent and you reach 680, it 21 i I would explode, and~if it's at 5 to 10, it will burn. Okay? 22 And that's now calculated by a couple of people, and one 23 says 680 and the other one gives me another 20 degrees abov 24 l that, so we're trying to use 680 to be conservative. 25 1 i k0\\0 /of

32 .e F i l-i I 1 Now that tells us that we've got to keep that wate 2 below that, because the water and the gas are in some sort o 1 3 contact fairly rapidly. Okay? ~ n 4 4 These calculations are now close enough to being 5 i reliable, I think we have to operate on them. l .ii; 6 s COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: What is the temoerature N 7 likely to be at the top of the wate-o e i 8 e MR. BUDNITZ: The temoerature at the tooe of the t 9 water and in the gas are, we think identical. It's all 270 10 or 280 F. Very close. i i 1 11 If the water-- Now we've done the transfer, by 12. the way. We've done the transfer calculation. If you raise i 1 3 the water by 10 degrees instantaneouslyk it takes only a I 14 i fraction of a minute before the gas is at that temperature. ' 15 ] Just put the temperatures up there. 16 !! COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: There wouldn't be likely i i' .i 17 j to be hot spots in the top of the water as a result of I i' 18 if hotter-- 19 l MR. BUDNITZ: We've thought about that. We've 20 l thought about that. Nobody seems to think so because there' i 21 a film of water, and that provides homogeniety. I Now theres one-- There's only one thing that's l! 2~9 l e 2 3 :l killing us-- There are actually two, and I'll tell you wha 'i h 24 they are. c Imagine that here's the top of the water, and 25, I-

2) f 1018 073

i 33

i I

~ i: 1 ! here's the. gas. And this is -- what did we say? -- 4 per-2 cent and 96 percent. Okay? But what's coming out of here ~ l, 3 two-thirds hydrogen and one-third oxygen because it's H 0. 2 Now suppose that there's a thing sticking down in 4 l i 5 II the thing, a piece of metal sticking down through the level l 6 i everybody see what I'm drawing? -- and suppose that that ha 7 a thing that's like this. Do you know what's in here? Two 1 8 thirds, one-third. l! 9 y Now if that were true it would probably sit there a i: 10 i at this temperature. 11 l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Oh, I see. 12 MR. BUDNITZ: Okay? We don't know that that's tr I 'i 13 : We have no idea what the geometry is right near this. I 14 There may be little hoods with two-thirds,.one-15. third in them because it's going this way and this other st t 16 L is settling. If that's true and the water level were to dr 17 below, we could have a mixture -- 18 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: . Spontaneous-- I ) 19 MR. BUDNITZ: -- that might be closer. 20 It still won't ignite until it's at the right tem 21 perature but several things could give trouble there. 22 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: What if they're hot. 23 l MR. BUDNITZ: Whether or not that's hot.. But we 1 24 don't have any idea what the geometry is there, and it's l l been studied carefully; people have looked at drawings. An 25 I \\0\\ 6 l

34 I t everything looks like its flat. But anybody who has ever l 1 ! ~ l seen something with bolts on it knows that not everything is j 2 ~ 3 flat that's got bolts on it. So that's a pretty tough, pretty F l hlhardconstraint. i 4 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Are you pretty confident 5 d now about the volume that makes up the denominator of that 6 l'. calculation? i 7 1 1 I ll - 1 51. BUDNITZ: No. 8 t COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: So that 4 percent might be 9 10 ', 5 percent.? i I MR. BUDNITZ: The 4 percent could be 5, but not 6. 11 jj c I I think you have to operate under the assumption 12,f ^i n 13 ] that it'~s close. l l l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Are you pretty confident 14 ' 15!l about the 580? l 'l i MR. BUDNITZ: The 680? The 680 degrees at which it; 16 17 [ g es spontaneous? Yeah. I had one guy that said 360 degrees, l COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: That's centigrade. 18 MR. BUDNITZ: That's 360 degrees Centigrade, and yg an ther guy that says that's just baloney Joe, it's 380. And 20 i so it l they're arguing about a small term in some equation, 21 l can't be far. 22 i l MISS STETLER: When you'r in doubt -- 23 I (Simultaneous general discussion.) 24,I I 'iR. 1ENOGUE: (Inaudible) -- how many pounds you 2a want to inject. t 1018 075 / o

a l-t 1 [ MR. BUDNITZ: That's right. That's be.ing worked. I 2 These guys here, and for systems over there. Okay. We 3 1 want somebody here-- Nobody here can do 4' .l I l MR MINOGUE: We need somebody here to draw to-I 4 y 5 gether problems l II i 6 !! MR. BUDNITZ: That's me. I've been in contact with i 7 them about once an hour. One thing I've found out, this h l 8 li agency needs chemists. I: His name is Bob Tucker and he's at this number and 9 10 this extension, and you get anybody else who can stay on 'l i 11 the phone with him continuously, but I've been on the phone i 12. about once an hour with him. This is the.fulfite-chemical I t-scheme. l 13.! 14 j We started yesterday with about 10 different 'i 15g chemicals-- FLR. MINOGUE: What chemists have been involved with 16 17 '; how it relates to the other part and ratios? Has anyone i from B&W been involved in this discussion? 18 ! 19 j MR. BUDNITZ: Yes, through Bell. I i MR. MINOGUE: These people are coordinating-20 l everything? 2'1 MR. BUDNITZ: Yes. You can call them if you want, 22 t but I and Bernie Weiss as recently as just before I,came in 23 ! n l' here-- I'd like to have some other NRC guy work on this. 24 ll 2s f (Simu t^neouS sener 1 discussion-) li 1018 076 /

e ac i 1 p1R. BUDNITZ: I understand that. They've been 2 working this for a day. Yesterday morning we had the idea, 3 but we started off-- 4 j (Simultaneous general discussion.) MR. BUDNITZ: Put it in suspension in little h 5 u 6 tiny particles. If there was any soloshing of the water I 7

! around the gas because even though it would be hot it was

!i 8 h lighter.- We had to give that up. n 9 [ Then we went to iron oxide. Iron oxide doesn't 10 j work fast enough with hydrogen, Fe0. So then we went to -- I don't know, about 10 dif-11 4 a ferent chemicals. They're now working on chromous chloride. 12 13,l I don' t' know any chemistry so I can' t help you on this. COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Is there a hydrogen gas 14 ] 15 y called platinum or palladium? E 16 j MR. BUDNITZ: Platinum chloride or palladium ~7 l! chloride are almost identical. l COMMISSIONER AEEARNE: So they would then have 18 similar troubles. yg COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Bob, have you had any 20 chance to bring Joe up to date? 21 MR. BUDNITZ': Yes, I spoke to Je as recently as 10 22 j 23 j minutes ago, just before you grabbed me, and I had,to go make l! 2 *, [, a call before this, so they're all up to date on this. j, COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Thanks Bob. 25',! / 1018 077 ll /3

h ~ D i- ~ 1 F (1R. SUDNITZ: Now I have to make one other point, i 2 which is that we have a problem -- i; l' 3 !! MR. GOSSICK: Can you reach over here? b 4 l MR. BUDNITZ: -- in understanding this gecmetry. ,i 5 !! This problem could be very bad for us, and we have no way to 1 1 6 understand what these things are like as built. il (Simultaneous general discussion.) 7 j I i MR. SUDNITZ: We just really don't kn w how these 8 1 i 9 things are as built. We need pictures. Drawings don't do it.; U i .i 10 ': COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: It sounds like the exclosion 0 i 11 ;I is going to be worse than we're letting on here. Hey Bdo. i! 12 l COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: No, the core crushing. li 13 ll COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, no, no. This is an 14 ' assumption, it there is an explosion something happens -- if 15 ', there's an explosion not much happens, an explosion it Ii 16 j happens.

• f li 17 MR THOMPSON:

Well, I think that-- No,-- 1 l 18 l MR. BUDNITZ: Once you have the core crusing its 19 the primary vessel that takes the worst. CCMMISSIONER BRADFORD: It sounds as though there 20 is not much chance of an explosion. 21 MR. BUDNITZ: Not unle s the temperature goes up, 22 or.unless this-- 23 I 24,l COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: Let me say it this way, I I there's not much chance of a harmful explosion, that we're 25 i i not prepared for. 1018 078 .i / &,

38 1 [ COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: So in a way you've just 2 brought this thing out. 3 MR SUDNITZ: There is no such thing as a harmidss 4 explosion. At least, you had better not count on that. y 5 !j COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You mean to say now that, if a 6.. core disruption of -- MR. BUDNITZ: The primary vessel -- g COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: The primary vessel -- c MR. BUDNITZ: -- is in danger anyway. The yield 10 stress if 500 -- That 200 hoop stress is calculated at 10 11 1 milliseconds times. I 12 (Simultaneous general discussion.) y l-MR. BUDNIT3: But the one thing that Joe didn't hear 13 14.. was this problem. I thoughthe got that through. That's the .1 15 p int of course. U COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Is he talking to Joe right 16 o now? 17 ~ il (Simult ':e us general discussion.) 18 li COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: They say -- the vessel woul 19 - may rupture. 20 n si COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: May rupture. y MR. THOMPSON: Oh the exolosion I think vou -- 22 b 23 ll I got the feeling it wasn't very much of a question _. i.'! COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Okay. 24 i. 2 a_ f COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: The question is whether it [ _7q f 1018 Oli i ? //6

= 43 ll U = I r i' I 1 [ ruptures or not. i 2 MR. THOMPSON: Right, right. i l COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Now let's see. Suppose it o 3 9 ] did. We have a chance of all kinds of things. 4 5 MR. AUSTIN: With an explosion it does make a i- 'l i 6 difference if it's core crushed which is -- just major damage.1 1 7 t COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Then the other-- 1 il h.. COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Well, let's just cross all 8 9 . this out and say-- i 10 _ COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yeah. lt i i 11l'; COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: -- major damage. i 12 '{ COMMISSIONER 3RADFORD: It sounds as though pipes j 13 ;! and valves destruct. i 14 sdimultaneous general discussion.) i MR. MAZUZAN: Wait til you hear this tape. j' 15 MR. BICKWIT: Do you understand what the schedule 16 i i 1 7 'i is here on television? I MR. MAZUZAN: No. l l ig ^ l 19 l (Simaltaneous general discussion.) (End of Tape 2A) 2:15 p.m. 20 I i 21 l 22 23 l. 24 !! !l 25 [ 1018 080 c li //6

40 7 i. I f 2:15 p.m. (3egin Tape 23) 1 ap ~ 1 MR. COLLINS: -- acknowledge that massive evacuations 2 maybe would be required, but we simply wanted to assure our-h. 3 [ selves that he felt on top of the situation and that he could b 4 ;; do some important things and that he was ready to do these 5 !: things. He said he understood this he was willing to answer I I: 1 may questions. 6 g! 7 The first thing I asked him was if an evacuation I. i' 8 i: should be ordered, do you feel that you have enough transpor-li 9 ,1 tation and other resources to successfully carry out such 10.. evacuation? b il 11 0 And he said it depends upon the scenario, how large i i 12 is the evacuation. He said that if it is a five-mile circle I! 13 :i all the wav all the way around the plant, 360 degrees, he il 14!! feels he has 99 percent of his resource needs met and he

l 15] can carry that out.

That's 99 percent of the things that he 1 trucks, transportation, other things. d, needs: 16 17 He is working on the worst kind of a situation. l 18 i And I said what in your view is the worst kind of situation? What are you planning for? 19 I 20 l He described this as a 360-degree evacuati_n li ranging anywhere from 10 to 20 miles from the site of the 21 22 plant. Now that certainly covers anything wnich we have 23 l ever considered. 24 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: How much time does he give i 25 you, John? l l 1018 081 i .l //

J 41 i i i I 1 i t!R. COLLINS: He is not giving any times on any of 2 this evacuation. They have never rried an evacuation like 3 I this. For the small towns it will go very easily, but of 1: o 4 ] course his biggest problem would be, you know, metropolitan s 5 I areas such as Harrisburg and Harrisburg -- the 10-mile circle ~ 6 ' goes through the city. I 7 0 All right. 'N 8 d ~ Now with respect to extra needs, which includs I t. 9 g transportation, for a large evacuation ranging in the order of 1 10 10 to 20 miles, 360-degree, which is far bigger than some of .I l 11 ;; the things that we're talking -- we've chough about, but 12 ;, nevertheless represents the upper,end of the spectrum, he ,1 13 said that he has in his office a man by the name of Robert 14.; Adamcheck, who is the Federal Disaster Assistance Administra-1 15 ' tion-HUD coordinator of all federal assistance to PERMA. 16 This man, Adamcheck, is in the Pennsylvania L. 17 y Emergency operating Center now, which is manned continuously. I, e 18 ' Now Adamcheck is making arrangements to augment ~ i lHenderson'sneedswithrespecttoa2arge-scaleevacuationon 19 20 the order of outside the 5-mile range. He told me at one I o' clock that he hoped to have all of those arrangements -- 21 l 22 his needs past Adamcheck by 2:00, and it's already 2:25. He 1 23 l feels he's getting good cooperation from Adancheck, the I lI 24 p federal coordinator. 1) 25 [ Now another question which was asked was what do h h 1018 082 1 0 //

l ~ ? 42 [ p I l b i.' i 1 l. you think about the state of readiness in PEMA to evacuate? 2 All right, he said he is hoping for at least a four-i 3 I hour advance notice. He feels that's ir.portant. He said he I: 9 4 can do a much better job if he has a 'four-hour advance notice 5 !) than if he only had a one-minute notice. i 6 j COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Four hours advance notice i I 7 d before he has to -- i 8 l MR. COLLINS: Before he has to -- for'-- In other i. 9 words, sencone tell him now that he has to evacuate -- r.

i 10j' COMMISSIONER AHEARNE

In four hou'rs he has to a v 1 1 '! make the -- i b i 12 j MR. COLLINS: -- at 6:30. i I COMMIb.aONER BRADFORD: But he 's not going to 1 3 "l i i 14f evacuate everybody at 6:30, so how much time is it then going 1 Il 15 to take him to evacuate? l t 16.! !iR. COLLINS: It depends on the size of the area, Il 17 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You mean -- l, 18 l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But you know the answer i I' 19 for any area because -- what you need to know about it in order to know how much time in advance, you actually have to 20 21 have four hours plus some nur, oer that I guess we don ' t know. MR. COLLINS: What he's saying is-- He says I would 22 like to have someone tell me four hours in advance that I 23 4 have to start an evacuation. That's what he's saying. 24 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: You mean he wouldn't start 25 l i 1018 083 l /H

43 e ? i-i- i i se = 1 until 6:30? 2 MR. COLLINS: People are now on a four-hour alert 3 b2 fore they get to work. The State Police and the National 12 (! Guard are on a four hour. 4 i 5 ll Let me finish what I'll tell you and then we can

i 6 ll maybe go back and even ask him more questions.

a" 7 He would like to have at least a four-hour advance ti I! notice to implement an evacuation -- all right? - -- because 8 I !-v 9 , the way things are set up now, the National. Guard and the 'i 10 j State Policy are his primary resources for implementing a P 11 ll evacuation. All right. They are on what he calls a white d 12 [ alert, a white notice, which is, according to Henderson, o 13 essentially a four-hour alert status.

I 1 4 'i Henderson said he would like the National Guard

3. a 15 and the State Policy to be on a shorter notice or a higher 16 level of readiness than four hours, but the Governor of the 0

17'l State does not want to increase the readiness level because bi he does not want to panic the people. This is what he told 18 i 19 me. All right. 20 Henderson also said that'he is meeting for the first i 21 -l time some of the outlying county civil defense directors out i 22 j in this 10- to 20-mile radius, and other people associated i 23 l with civil defense who previously showed no interest in this 1 I 24 kind of emergency preparedness simply because they were so i 25 far away from the facility. i 1018 084 /20

e e h, But he's ontacted all of those people and they're 1 i a getting geared up. 2 I asked him who was in charge of this whole evacua-3 tion operation, is there any question about who's running the 4 e And he said No, he is in charge and he said at this thing? I - e 3 i e moment, though, Pennsylvania Rad Health and the Nuclear 6 1 Regulatory Commission are on top of things with respect to 7 8 ll radiolog_ical surveillance and assessment of potentials. I Once the assessment is made and once the decision g has been mafe to carry out protective measures, hw said as far 10 i as he's concerned, Pennsylvania Rad Health and NRC are out of' y it and I am now in charge and I carry out.the Governors 2 n rders with respect to evacuation. There's no question in his 3; mind that he's in charge. 14 .I Once the word comes from the Governor there is no l a,.

i question in my mind that PEMA has the prime responsibility 16.,

H to implement evacuation and protective measures on the h l,i i I 'i Governor's orders. 8 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: John, did you get.the sense 19 from talking to him that he is really considering all i evacuations are 360 degrees? 21 i MR. COLLINS: No, he is planning for-- The worst 22 l situation he's planning for is 360, 10 to 20 miles, and he ,,ca j said of course anything less than that causes me less problem 24 io That's what-- He said I have to plan for a worse scenario. 25 i 1018 08rb l al

P 45 1 1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: 'Sure 2 MR. COLLINS: And he said the kind of things I'm 3 hearing-- You know, he's picking up bits and pieces here and 4 there, and he knows that the biggy is 360, 10 to 20. Okay. Now another question which was asked was how 5 n. ] about prisons, hospitals, nursing homes, places where people 6 7 are confined, people who are sick at home and could not shift 8 d for themselves, and so forth and so on. ll 9 l Henderson said that he had plans for taking care of 10 prisons and jails and hospitals and nursing homes, but 11lparticularlywithrespecttoprisonshedidnotwanttogo 12 - into the details of these at this time, for obvious reasons. 13 With respect to people confined in homes, he said 14, that these homes have already been predetermined by the count, 15 ' civil defense directors. They have already done that piece 16 ' of business as to who will need help in leaving, and it's a e 17.: county responsibilility. P 18 h How will the counties get the word to evacuate or li 19 'i do wha.tever the Governor orders? I 20 i Okay, he said, the way this will work is that when s 21:! the Governor makes his decision, he vill go on radio and tele i, 22 lb I vision to issue the orders. Once the orders are issued, the I 23,' counties will act on this, as will the state at this time, i, 24 The county will not wait for the state to transmit a message h 25j! to the counties to evacuate. 1018 086 I 2L

46 l' r i I ~ PEMA will, though, also transmit the evacuation or I 1 l 2 protective measure order to the county civil defense emergency:I operating centers as a backup. So there's a two-way link. Th' 3 '.. 4 d Governor announces and everybody does it simultaneously, c 5 ' whatever is decided, and then PEMA in Harrisburg also transmit, 6 il the orders to the county CDs. And there's basically four l'! 7 counties involved. i 8 - That's about the extent of what I was-able to find l ,i 9 ? out. He was very busy and he had to leave. I would have 10 asked him ore had he had the time. He said I'm sorry, I have, ,i 11 ' other things and he took off. i 12 i. The impression I get is that this guy's on top of l i il 13 i it. He seems confident and, you know, you can ofte, tell by 1. 14 ll a person's voice whether they are or not. And he seems 15 j confident that he can carry an evacuation out, even a large ii 'i 16 '. one, providing he gets these federal resources through this i 17 guy, Adamcheck, who I'm sure is, you know, spending no li 1 8 ll effort to acquire these things. 0 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Another thing you-mentioned, 19 i 20 l John, I gather that the four-hour time is really because that' i i 2, i the stage of alert that his people are no on, i SLR. COLLINS: That's primarily his -- 22 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: -- the State Police and the 23 24. National Guard. MR. COLLINS: He could improve that if the Governor 25 [ 1018 087 i- / 2. 3

l 47

l. '

~. would put his primary. evacuation resources up on a higher 1 alert status. 2 .3 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Right. MR. COLLINS: These folks of course are the State 4 r;, When you look in the Pennsylvania Plan -- Police. 5 l' 6 ji COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And the National Guard. 'i MR. COLLINS: The State Police are the folks in 7 c 8 !,, charge of evacuation. And of course he would need the National Guard as well. 9 Ac he said, the Governor is reluctant to do this 10 't because he doesn't want to panic the folks. 11. 1 S if we want to change that situation then I sup-12, 13 ] pose we have to say something to somebody. I don't know. It w uld have to be said to the Governor. Now 14 an ther thing about putting the National Guard and State 15 1g]Policyonshorternotice, if it was done too early, unless r there was a real good reason why this agency thought it ought 17, li 18 o: to be done, if it's done too early it can become counter-i g ls productive because the longer you have these guys on this kind of alert, why, you know, the less interest they have 20 i i in it -- 21 I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yeah. 2 2,, ii MR. COLLINS: -- and the thing kind of drags off and pretty soon everybody -- i 2% COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: You can maintain them on 25 - n 10\\8 300 a g

.i 48 I t I ~ 1 four-hour alert for days. It's difficult to put them on 2 one-hour alert and maintain it. 3 !i MR. COLLINS: Yeah, yeah. It's difficult. i 4 lj See, they can hang in here now. The way he ex-c 5 [, plained it to me was if they go to a higher readiness level, I 6 this means they've got to call people like State Police who I 7 are off duty out of their bunks and they've got to come down i 8 d to the police station -- P g COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yeah. Oh, yeah. !i 10 ii MR. COLLINS: -- and suit up. li COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: We understand. 11 il MR. COLLINS: And the Guard has to do the same thin. 12'l: 13 l So that's a balance, you know, that you have to 14 always weigh. And if you put the people on too early, of i 15 l course you'll burn out more people because they'll get tired il and then you won't have any relief. 16 p 17 j COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: And also, as the Governor i p inted out, that when you trip, bump up the state of alert 18 yg l of all of those people, you also then give a very strong i 20 l signal to the residents. i 1 MR. COLLINS: But Henderson did say-- Henderson di 21 say if you told me, y'ou know, right now -- 22 23 j COMMISSIONER AEEARNE: Oh, of course. S u,re. .4 ) MR. COLLINS: -- go, he said we'd go with what we h could muster. 25. I 10\\0 009 t I / Zg

49 I i ~ 1 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yes. I i i 2 MR. COLLINS: But, I get the impression from this 3 man that he's-- There's confidence in his voice, and he's on i. 4 ] top of things, that he is in charge. 5 li COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Obviously also another I! 6 il factor is, as you point out, he says he's meeting with l' I: l i 7 d those county officials, that the longer we go before putting j I fj into that alert, the better prepared he is, the ' more-he' ' s~ 8 \\ He's getting more of these pieces to begin shaping up.' 9 taken. 10. COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: And the more, the better h l 11 the people are, the better evacuation. I l, 12 I COMMISSIONER AHEARNE: Yeah. l 13 ] COMMISSIONER GILINSKY: Right. ~ 14 MR. COLLINS: It looks like he's thought about a 15, lot of things. n COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: When they say evacuation is 16 ; done not under a crisis situation but is done, as they are 17 ; s' trying to do, with some dispatch, are they talking about 10r l 18 i 19 percent, or are they talking about 90? I i 20 j MR. COLLINS: When they're talking about evacuation j they're talking about everybody except I guess what one 21 could deem emergency personnel who would be there to the 22 I F very last. And, you know, I don't know whether all,the 23 ll emergency personnel would ultimately leave. Some police migh] I have to stay in certain areas for a certain period of time. l 25 l' t [ 1018 090 i ] 16

? 50 l i 1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But if the guy who's 2 in charge of emergency planning tells you that he can evacuate 3 I a five-mile area --a five-mile radius, i; 4 li MR. COLLINS: Does he mean 100 percent? i; 5 ] COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: -- is he saying with 100 I 6 I percent assurance he's going to get 100 percent of the people? 7 MR. COLLINS: I don't think he'll ever give you that I guarantee. g i I; 9 ll COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: How far down would you have i 10 y to go to get something close to a guarantee?- l! 11 l! MR. COLLINS: I don't think you can ever assure I I 12 I; yourself you're going to get 100 percent. 81 3 13 '1 COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: I mean how far down-- What l ,i 14 ) percent would you have to get down to before he'd say Yes, I'm 15 j, sure I can get that much? il MR. COLLINS: Oh, I would say way up in the high 16 i 17 l 90s -- l COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Yeah. 18 I MR. COLLINS: -- way up in the high 90s. 19 Y u know, when evacuations have been conducted down 20 in Florida for hurricanes and things like that, there's always 21 22 ] about one percent of the population that doesn't want to go, 23 l and they hang on. And the way some states at least,have handled this is they usually ask those people for their names 24 and their next of kin, and usually that breaks them out becaus 25 ? 1018 091 l' /2-

p d. 51 r l, i j i fthentheygetthemessage, you know. 1 2 l: E'tt there have been people who have absolutely and this has happened b, refused to leave and have been killed, 3 o 4

in florida and in the Gulf states.

They have refused to leave 5 ' and they have been blown into the sea. And what do you do, 6 you know? Do you drag them kicking and screaming out? COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: But he is saying then that 7,. ~ 8 ', except for those who refuse to leave; he's pretty sure he l l can get just about everybody. 9 I,i 10lJ I 3Gl. COLLINS: Just about everybody. 11 i COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Surely there is the point - l 12 i where there wouldn't be people there, there will be police b 13 :l or National Guard simply to prevent looting after people il Il 14 y evacuate. COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Which is one of the down 15 j 16 - sides of evacuation. I suppose if somebody comes back in 17 il an area where the policy have to shoot to kill orders. ll rB 18 ll COMMISSIONER KENNEDY: Well, they had that problem 1: 's l' Put the curfew on and ircreased the policy 19 ;l in Middletown. 20 !, patrols when the people left. l MR. COLLINS: I would say it's up in the high 90s. 21 I 22 ] COMMISSIONER BRADFORD: Just in the last few days? l l 2 3.' MR. COLLINS: Yeah, right. 2: 30 p.m. 24 (end of Tape 23) 25[' 1018 092 I n}}