ML19249D163

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Responds to Encl Waldinger Ltr to Commissioner Gilinsky Re Vulnerability of Nuclear Power Reactors to Sabotage. Discusses Feb 1977 Revision to 10CFR73.55 Establishing Onsite Security Against Industrial Sabotage
ML19249D163
Person / Time
Issue date: 08/16/1979
From: Harold Denton
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Waldinger J
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
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ML19249D164 List:
References
NUDOCS 7909210154
Download: ML19249D163 (1)


Text

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,k UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION y D.,-, ( 3 g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 kggj j 7 W)

AUG 161979 Ms. Janna Waldinger 6621 Picasso Rd. #6 Isla Vista, CA 93017

Dear Ms. Waldinger:

Your letter to Commissioner Gilinsky expressing your concerns on the vulnera-bility of nuclear power reactors to sabotage has been referred to me for response.

The Nuclea" Regulatory Commission (NRC) has always recognized the possibility of attemptes sabotage against a nuclear power reactor and consequently, in February 1977, the NRC revised the requirements (10 CFR 73.55) for a licensee to operate a power reactor.

These revisions require each reactor site to establish and maintain an onsite physical protection system and security organization which will provide protection with high assurance against successful industrial sabotage by both of the following:

(1) a determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons with the following attributes, assistance and equipment:

(a) well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (b) inside assistance which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in both a passive role (e.g., provide information) and an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communi-cations, participate in violent attack), (c) suitable weapons, up to and including handheld automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long-range accuracy, (d) hand-carried equipment, including in-capacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or othemise destroying the reactor integrity, and (2) an internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position).

In meeting these requirements, each reactor site must establish a security system that iacludes armeo guards, alarms systems, and barriers.

This system is reviewed and inspected t,y the NRC to insure it provides adequate protection.

If you have further concerns, please feel free to contact us.

Sincerely, lf/ c~ ? G w "k Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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