ML19249B858

Transcript of 790809 Meeting W/Federal,State & Local Officials in Washington,Dc on Nuclear Power Issues.Pp 1-73. 790522 Telegram Requesting Meeting Encl

ML19249B858
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Issue date:	08/09/1979
From:	Gilinsky V, Hendrie J, Kennedy R NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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References
REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 7909050534
Download: ML19249B858 (74)

Text

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N U CLE A R R EG U L ATO R Y COMMIS510 N IN THE M ATTER O F-l 1

1 PUBLIC MEETING MEETING WITH FEDERAL, STATE & LCCAL

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OFE"ICIALS ON NU2 EAR POFTER ISSUES

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Place. ~' Washington,'D. C Date -

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n This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on Thursday, 9 Aucuat 1979 in the Commissions's offices at 1717 H Streen, N. W.,

Wascingt$n, D. C.

The meeting was open to public attendance and observatica.

This transcript has not been reviewed, corrected, or edited, and it may contain I

inaccuracies.

The transcrio.t is intended soleiv for c.eneral informational purposes.

As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the matters discussed.

Expressions of opinion in this transcript do not r.ecessarily reflect final determinations or beliefs.

No pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in any proceeding as the result of or addressed

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CR6348 1l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2l NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l

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PUBLIC MEETING j

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MEETING WITH FEDERAL, STATE & LOCAL 5)

OFFICIALS ON NUCLEAR POWER ISSUES 6i ll Room 1130 t

8 1717 H Street, N.

W.

Washington, D.

C.

9l' Thursday, 9 August 1979 10 l

11 The Commission met, pursuant to notice, at 9:40 a.m.

i 12 }

BEFORE:

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i 13 i DR. JOSEPH M.

HENDRIE, Chairman i

I 14 VICTOR GILINSKY, Commissioner 15 ;

RICHARD T.

KENNEDY, Commissioner 16 PETER A.

B RADFO RD, Commissioner i

17 JOHN F. AHEARNE, Commissioner 18 l ALSO PRESENT:

li 19 "

Messrs. Bickwit, Gossick, Jaske, Tucker, and Cunningham.

20 FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCALS OFFICIALS PRESENT:

21,

Lupe Aguirre; Hon. Polly Baca-1:arragan; Gino Carlucci; 22 Wilma Espinoza; Anette Kearn?y; Mario G. Obledo; Eduardo Pena; 23 l and Jim Seely.

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Acs.oers Reporws, Inc.

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r) R0 CEEDINGS 2

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Come to order.

The Commission 3

meets this morning with a group of federal, state and local 4

of ficials to talk about nuclear power issues.

This meeting a

follows f rom correspondence we have nad with representatives o

of the group.

Mr. Ooledo of California is the spokesman for 7

the group.

Why can't I a sk you to, for the record, b

introduce the people in your party, Mr. Oble do, and go ahead V

and frame the di scu ssion for us, if you please?

10 MR. OBLEDO:

Certainly.

Good mo rni ng.

To my left 11 i s Lupe Aqui rre, who is the state chairperson for the League 12 of United Latin American Citizens; Wilma Espinoza wno is the 13 national president of the Mexican American Women National 14 A sso c i a tion.

To my right i s Sena tor Polly 3aca-Barragan 15 from the Sta te of Colorado.

Ms. Anette Carney, re pre sen ting to the National Council of Negro Women.

We have Mr. Seely 17 representative of Tom Bradley of Los Angeles.

Mr. Carlucci lo representing tne Mayor of New Orleans, Ernest Morial and iv finally, Mr. Pena, immediate past president of tne League of 20 Unitec La tin American Ci;izen s.

21 I first off wish to expre ss my a ppreciation of the 22 accormoca tion by the Commission to mee t wi th u s.

I am the 23 5ecretary of Heal th and Welf are f or the State of California, 24 with jurisdiction over health and saf e ty matters of the 25 citizens of that state.

I am also a pa s t president and I99 O ii 'U l

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general counsel of the Mexican American Legal Def ense ano 2

Ecuca tional Fund, wnich is a national group representing the,

3 Spanish people and others similarly situatec in matters of 4

legal anc constitutional rights.

5 The issue of nuclear puer is one t ha t touches the o

lives of the c i ~. i ze n s o f this country anc we felt'that it

'7 touchea the lives of the peo pl e in our major cities.

The o

major cities of this country are becoming minority dominated 9

and will be in the next few years.

Virtually every major 10 city in this country will be dominated by tne brown and the 11 black communi ties.

Quite a few already are in that posture.

12 Nuclear energy touches on the cities of the se 13 citizens, the poor, the di sadvantaged, the minorities.

And 14 as representatives of the minority community, we felt it 15 im po r tan t, since it appeared to some of us that during the 10 discussions involving this issue, few if any minority faces 17 were ever seen.

It was important to us as community 18 representatives to learn aoou t this i ssue, to focus on, and 19 perhaps to make some determinations about this source of 20 energy, i ts f ea sibili;y, its saf ety, whatever, and alternate 21 sources of energy, if t ha t be tne case.

Tha t is our purpose 22 here to d a y.

23 Me don't want to incict anyone.

We are not he re 24 to put blame of anything on anyone.

We are not here to use 25 this as a forum f or any kind of rhe toric.

We ara here to be 909 200

> 348 01 G3 5

on 1

informed.

Ano just to ga ther tha t kind of information.

I 2

don' t believe tha t any one here repre senting the community 3

is an expert in this fiela.

We are all new to this very 4

complex and sophis tica ted i ssue.

There has been a wealth of-5 information, if you will, published in the last three or o

four acnths.

I have cone quite a bit of reading, not only 7

of reports but of new articles, as I am sure that other 6

members of our group have done.

9 We get all kinds of opinions on saf ety, on the 10 feasibility, on the economics of this issue.

Books have 11 even been written now on the whole si tua tion.

There doesn't 12 seem to be any definitive answers to some of the se problems 13 or questions that have been raised.

And what we would like 14 to nave this morning is, if a t all po ssible, an informal 15 informati ve discussion abou t the se par ticular i ssue s.

lo Now, I touched base with 20 leading members of the 17 minority community tha t were on the correspondence that was 18 first sent to you.

I expre ssed my own concern about some of 19 the se ma tters to the various mayors of Miami, New Orleans, 20 Los Angeles; Dakland, De t ro i t, tne State of New York, and 21 from coast to coast, f rom north to south, all areas of this 22 country.

All were aeeply concerned about it.

All said they 23 wanted to learn of our discussion here today and to get a 24 report f rom us as to what information we have gathered, et 25 cetera.

We will be ge tting back to them on this matter.

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All of us are very, very bu sy people.

I have 2

jurisdiction over 53,000 employees and I manage a budget of 3

sl5 billion.

All of the person here have extremely vital 4

responsibilities, a s you have.

So I think that we ought to 5

utilize our time.

I know we were se t for an hour ana a 6

nalf.

Perhaps we neea not taKe tnat long, and we can 7

p roc eed.

8 Initially ! had wri tten a letter to the chairman 9

questioning a meeting calling a ttention to the fact that 10 this nuclear issue impacted on minorities and poor of 11 America that reside in our cities, and the following 12 questions were raised.

How safe are nuc. ear power plants?

13 To w ha t e x te n t are the nation's cities de penoent on nuclear 14 power?

In the event that nuclear power industry f ails to 15 meet its saf ety obliga tion to the public and is forced to lo shut down,. what i s being cone to a ssure alterna tive energy 17 sources for the urban populations?

la Then we wondered about the impact, economic or 19 o the rwi se, that any daficiency in al terna tive sources would 20 have on the people of our major cities.

The uroan ri sk.

21 Now, since my correspondence in May to the Cormission, quite 22 a f ew articles nave n aen ";ri tten acou t the risk factor 5, 23 about the e conomi c impact of nuclear power, aoout all these 24 i ssu e s.

But perhaps it is a gcod thing tha t we mee t with 25 the bocy that regulates this and get, firsthand, the 909 202.

2346 01 05 7

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answers ta some of the questions that have been raiseo.

2 I received a re s pon se from the executive director 3

of the Office of State Programs, indicating tha t perhaps the 4

Comni ssion was no t in the position to answer the question on 5

economics or the question of the developm.ent of alternative 6

sources of energy, but pernaps you could address the risk 7

factors, the saf e ty f actors to the extent the na tion de pends o

on nuclear energy.

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9 I am going to de t er a t this time to any member of 10 our group to have them articulate any particular concerns or 11 overviews tney might have on the issue.

Why don't we start 12 here?

Co you have anything?

13 MS. ESPIN0ZA:

I still don't understand what role 14 ycu have cefined for yourselves as a Commission.

15 hR.OBLEDO:

Why don' t we def er to that question?

16 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Could you expand a little 17 bit anc say what role?

10 MS. ESPIN0ZA:

I was concerned

'ecause of the c

19 response we received that you could only deal with three of 20 the questions ano tnat three of the others you were not 21 ore pa red to re spond to.

22

'J S. BACA-5ARRAJAN:

I

.ight commant that I 23 represent an area in Colo ra co, north of venver, that has 24 within its boundaries, Rocky Flats.

And al so just f arther 25 nortn, acou t say 20 miles north, is Fort St. Vrain powe r e

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plant.

Of course, one of the problems we have, I am sure 2

you are well aware of the -- n o t -- a ccicen t, but -- at 3

Fort St. Vrain about a year ago there was some leakage in 4

the air, the a tmo sphere.

That presented quite a proolem to 5

the citizens of our sta te anc, of course, the state o

legislature.

One of the things we are constan tly dealing 7

with is saf ety versus jobs, you know, and how do you balance c

the twc.

9 I have got constituents that work at Rocky Flats 10 t ha t I am concerned about in terms of their employmen t.

And 11 recognizing tnat the closing of that f acility would be of 12 great economic consequences to my particular constituents, at 13 the same time I have got o the r consti tuen ts who have been 14 demonstrating for quite some time about Rocky Flats, because 15 of their concern that it is not safe.

There are heal th 16 hazards.

There is real concern in the area with regarc to 17 health hazards to the citizens that live in the area.

The le wa ter situa tion a t Broomfield, not f ar f rom Rocky fla ts, ha s 19 of ten been a poult of concern, th..

it might have been 20 con t amin a tea.

21 So I unink as an elected official we have 22 re sponsio111 tie s tha t are some wha t similar to yours in tne 23 sense that we neea to deal with how you protect citizens as 24 well as provide for the development of this type of energy, 25 i f nece ssary.

I gue ss I just have a lot of questions along 9

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the same line tna t decretary Obledo outlined.

2 MS. KEARNEY: fes, I represent 3

CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

If you will pull the microphone 4

up close, we can hear fine, but for the people in the back, 5

if you would pull it up close.

6 Co?,tMI SS ION ER Kl.t,'NEDY :

It woula be best if 7

you could attacn it somewhow.

b MS. KEARNEY: Let me hold it.

Jr. Chairman, and 9

Commissioners, I represent Coro thy Height, national 10 president, National Council of Negro Women.

We are a r.ajor 11 women's organization, representing a linkage to four million g

p 12 clack women in this country, minority wonen, also.

We are 13 very much concerned about t he issue of nuclear energy.

We 14 have to respond to our corstituents out there in the cities 15 and suburbs and rural areas, and we get an increasing to amount of questions today requesting some answers.

We just 17 don't seem to have the an swers and I don't know if you do lo e i t he r.

IV Bu t we ha ve to re spond to them intelligently.

2L Now, cuming.lovencer 11, t ha t entire week we til-ccnvention 21 here in Washington, m. 0.

Approximetaly 4C00 to 5 00 women 22 will come in f or that event. One of the issues on the 23 calencer will oe nuclear energy.

"le n eea to respon; to t he m 24 intelligently wi th your a ssis tance.

They seem to be asking 25 u s now sa f e is nuclear energy, as tne Sena tor has sta ted to Rus 205

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you in tne te l eg r am.

Also, we are very much concerned aoout 2

waste cisposal because many of cur women not only live in 3

cities but in the rural areas, also in tne suburbs.

We must 4

never f orge t t ha t, even thougn we are concerned about peo ple o

in tne cities.

Surrounding t ho se ci ties we nave the suburbs o

and tne outlyin; areas -- we ha ve tne rural areas.

7 So that we are all connectea to g e t ne' r.

.Ve are not e

removec in terms of lanc space ana area.

Those are our Y

concerns at this point.

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14 10 17 ic 19 20 21 2d 23 24 20

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.ta. SEELt:

Speaking on behalf of.'Jayor Bradley 2

of Los Angeles, a ci ty of a pproximately 3 million people, 3

which also, incidentally, own s the largest municipal power 4

c om pany in the Uni ted S ta te s, his concern is that the 5

uncertainty surrounding nuclear energy has created proolems 6

for nir as an aaministrator, octh of the city and somebody 7

w ho oversees the muni ci pal powe r com pany whic h ha s o

re sponsibili ty of either participating in nuclear power 9

plan ts or coal-fired powe r plan ts.

10 The con t ro ve r sy ha s in the pa s t causea the kind 11 of projections by the power company of not being able to 12 supply the kind of energy that will be n eeced by the ci ty.

13 So, we are really caught between a rock anc a 14 hart pl a c e in terms of now you pro jec t f uture demand, 10 project future su.ccly, and how we reach those goals.

10 To rei te ra te, the uncertainties that exist he re 17 make it cifficult for him cersonally to resolve and be la responsiole to the constituents as consumers and as human lv beings who want t ne answers before they embark on either

.cria e xpenai tur 3 s or haal tn ris.:s.

_m 21

'J. JAHLJLCI:

fha city of New Orleans has tnree 72 con:3rns concerning power plan ts.

First or all, I would

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1 123 tc become more familiar with the regulations concerning 24 the exclusion area around the plant.

26 The plant that is being constructed near the city

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of.iew Orleans aas an exclusion zone that incluoes the 2

.di ssi ssi ppi River.

If you were to close off the river for 3

any length of time, it could be devastating to our port, t he 4

thirc largest port in the world and our major source of a

e m pl oyme n t.

o A secono concern is the present regulations that 7

require an evaluation plan, I believe that is true, for a o

I C-mile radius around the plant and control of f ood chain for 50 miles, a 50-mile radius.

A S0-mile racius of the y

10 Waterfora 3 plant include s a large area of wetlands.

As you probably know, Louisiana consists mostly 12 of we tlands in the southe rn part of the state.

ihe food 13 chain that begins in the we tlands ends out in tne gulf.

So, 14 i t woulc be extremely difficult not only to control that 15 f cod chain, but if it were controlled, it would damage lo severely our seaf ood industry and fishing industry.

17 The third area I would just like to comment on, la 3 r oo k ha ve n, a Brookhaven stuay rrom 195^t and a Union of 19 Concerned Scientists' report more recently in the '70s 20 inaicates a po ssi bl e danger area in the event of a meltdown 21 greater tnan the l o-mile raaiu s tha t cre sen t regulations 22 call for an avacuation plan for.

23 I would just like your comment as to t he validi ty 24 of these earlier studies.

An d w ha t im pa ct they mignt have 2a on cnanging the regulations.

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.u t. OblEuo Mr. Carlucci informeo me last night 2

t r.a t New Orlenas is at least 50 percent black.

It never 3

had -- I never thought of New Orleans as a min 3rity 4

dominatea city, fhat i s one of the cities represented on a

our list.

o If you scan tne list, you will see citi e s wi th 7

great, great brown end black co pula tio n s, Hispanic a

po pul a tio n s.

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10 14.R. PEdA:

I don't guess any of you knew at tne 11 time you were appointed now f ast your agency would become a 12 f ocus of great interest on the part of all Americans in this 13 c o un try.

14 Energy, all of a sudden, has become a major 15 concern for all of us.

The s hortage of energy af f ects all lo of us.

But particularly us, the poor people who live in 17 large cities.

la Tne price of gasoline ha s gone way out of 19 pro portion to wha t it usea to be, and it hurts the poor 20 people more than anyoody.

The price of neat and the grea t 21 inflation Lnat the s ho r ta ge of energy has caused has raised 22 prices to a point tnat the poor are the most aaversely 23 affectea.

24 I think i t all comes back cown to the problem of 25 the shortage of energy.

But most im po r ta n t, the shortage of

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1 energy in tne future. I thina, will limit our growtn in 2

joos.

iha t is what it means to us.

Jocs far our 3

co mmun i ty.

The Hispanic community is the youngest community 4

o in this coun try, anc it is growing fast.

And we will need o

t r.e joos t na t need cc be created every year in orcer to 7

main tain an emoloymen t ra tio that is reasonable.

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.\\ n a so tne s no r tage -- w na t I want to say is, we s

went to believe that there is an answer to the snortage of 10 energy in this country anc that there is an answer tha t can 11 be utilized quickly, no t until all the technology is 12 devalopea.

So we neec some quick interim kinds of remedies 13 for our present croblem of shortage of energy.

14 I gue ss aha t my real concern is is truth.

We 15 really need some truthful answers to the questions being lo raised oy the people who are concerned about the 17 environment.

We are concerned about energy and jobs and to lowering tne inflation ratio, but we are also concerned iy about creating a wastelano in this country through the 2v possiole injudicious use of nuclear energy.

il An d so our real concern ha s b e en that wnen people 22 tals about the problems at anergy, Eney talk in great 23 extrames.

It is ei the r the worse thing tnat could ha ppe n to 24 this country, or people on the other side say it is the best 25 thing that could happen to tnis country.

There is very f

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..iayce t ha t is One way tne i ssue is.

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don't know.

3 My great c.once rn when we talk to people and read 4

articles, tney always coint out wnere people testifying 5

eitner on behalf of nuclear energy or against nuclear energy a

always leave so.ne thin g ou t of their statements.

And there 7

is always some area s '.'aere they find that we haven't been entirely truthful.

e 9

You peopl e have been a ppoin ted by the President 10 and ratified by the Senate to be the excerts in this field.

11 I think you have to be way ou t front telling us the real 12 true story of hoa energy a f f ec ts us and how it will affect 13 us.

How nuclear energy aill affect us.

And how we are 14 going to live with i t or if we are not.

15 I think we need answers f ast.

We can't wait to until solar energy is built.

17 MR. OE Levo:

So, from this overview, you gather ic cur concern.

Anu I tnink t ha t as representatives, as 19 citizens of the country, but particularly as representatives 2;

ar U.. o o : tne major ninority groups in tni s coun try that are il j in j to be severely impac ted cy any cecisionc mace by tnis

'a 2c a n i sc io r., we aave a re s pon si bili ty to re por t to our 23 respective communities about this issue.

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!ow, tne Cnair or members of the Commission may 25 wisn to ask myself or any memoer of our group specific

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3 MR. OSL3DO:

All right.

ilo w, wnat is the risk of 1

3 nuclear meltaown, for instance, of one of the einost 10J I say operation.

(ou will 5

plants la c oe ra t io n, or ' at 3re o

na v e *o forgive e,

c2ceuse I don't know now

,q-v er? really 7

ocerating.

Some ma y oe shut down.

CMAIA1AN HE.iDRIE:

Aco u t $d

't tne monent.

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M UdLdDO:

'ih a t a v ar.

IJ CH AIT.t Atl HE.!DRI2:

Yes.

Il MR. OSL5DO:

And, in case of a me l tco wn, wnat would 12 oe tne consecuences to the surroundina pooulation in terns 13 either of death, destruction of crocerty, oroperty danage, 14

': n ow in g the ca pac it y, for instance, of a nuclear plant?

And 10 we could evan get specific.

Any one nuclear plant, :nowing 16 tne capacity, taen a meltdown

- knowing the population of the 17 aree, what might ce tne conse:uences?

The risk is tnere.

Id Cri A I H1 A.'. iE.1D.4IE:

Yes.

Jut /ou cannot 'nswer the 1/

ouestion how s2fe is nuclear oower eithout also answarino, vo-.-. -

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.a I don't know One t erm. inolog y tha t is Jsed ir the oroauction

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-nergy, and you have a meltdo'in, and you knew tnat tne e

25 nuclear oower plan: is close to :hicago, and you kno! tne O-

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Copul3 tion of Ch i:3 ;o.

And it Ioul d 3 30~ to 92, 3s 3 13' l

person, that some projec tions CoJld be 73de.

I saw so9e 3

statistics that had been project ed oy some sc ientists or 4

'.< h a t e v e r.

5 But couldn't a pro jection o ? made or the qu oer a

of -- prcaaale nu,oer of da3:ns, pr232ble nu car or recole 7

that vould be impacted oy radiation, tne ?conomic, the 3

?roperty loss!

Is that go151013!

I am asking.

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not ev?n sure what I ray be a s':i nn, if you will pardon me.

10 CHAI2.1Ai HElDNId:

I.< anted to go on and turn to 11 these aspects that you have raised.

But I want to po int out 12 that you can't -- you do nave to ask -- ask yourself and 13 eventually answer the question, comaared to what, wnen you 7

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14 consider a risk ouastion.

This is trua wnetner it is fo r a

la nuclear or anytning else, de do not live, are not a. ale to lo live in a risk-f ree situation.

17 l1R. OSL530:

I underst3nd.

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CHAIRAAd HSWRIE:

Let me turn to this tha t you z

nave ta1Kec about witn regard to ac cidents in plants.

Inere 3

have been various estimates of both prooabilities anc 4

consequences for large ano small acciaents.

The most 5

extensive of the se is work called tne Reactor 3atety Stccy o

which was completea in 1975.

7 We have reexaminea this study again recently and a

concluced on the casis of the review made f o r us t ha t, while 9

it does represent a substan tial ga thering together of what 10 i s known, that our ability to calculate with precision in 11 this area is not tha t gooa.

And, indeed, that tne 12 probability e s tima te s in tha t work and in ccmparable 13 estimates simply nave large error bands on them.

That is, 14 they are no t very precise.

By not very precise, I mean 15 factors of 10.

Tha t is, a given estimate may be factors of to 10 or more higher, 10 or more lower, or even a f actor of a 17 nundred, pe rha ps, in some cases.

1o The eneral cnrust of those risk estimates studies, v

19 prooability end consequence, comes out that major accidents 20 tnat 'io uic Aeaa to a melt-down night occur or the order of 21 once in 20,000 pl an c year s, something line that.

Ano tnere 22 is a suustantial error on tnat, as we have said.

In fact, 23 wnat we have saia is taa ; re pre sen ting that tha imprecision 24 in t ho se estimates is so great, we don't use those es timates 25 for policy decision purposes.

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Bu t, oeyond that e s tima te, whicn comes from the 1975 2

.stuuy, as I rei tera te, i t's aoout one in a hundrea.

It's 3

e s timated that about one in a hundred of those cases would 4

re sul t in a near term fatality in the general ouclic.

O It seens to me that i s about the o

MS. E5 PIN 0ZA:

I s t ha t abou t one in a nuncred?

7 CHAIRMAN HENORIE:

Yes.

About one in a hundred a

melt-downs woula leac to an off-site fatality in the near term.

Tnat is, a radia tion ex posure large enough to cause 10 someone to die within the first several weeks.

11 Anybody remember wnether I have got the right order to 12 that?

13

S.

BACA-BARRAGAN:

This is of f-site?

14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Yes.

15 MR. OSLEDO:

The statistics I looked at last 16 evening -- I think i t was car t of that report, and, 17 Mr. Carlucci nas that, two or three page s -- were qui te le alar aing insofar as deatns,from raaiation, the economic 19 loss, tnings of t ha t sort.

20 C07.!"I 3S I D.'!ER GI L I No;; Y :

Thi s is from tne 1957 21 B r oo k ha ve n n e po r t ?

22 Md. CARLUCCI:

Union of Concernec Scientists 23 Meport.

24 MR. OBLEDO:

That is where I was ge tting th a t 25 kind -- d he the r i t's t rue, has any validity, I don't know.

..-n 1

$ ~ ~~

34c u3 26 v~

ip I

CHAIR; TAN HEJJRIE:

Nell, as one T. oves to accidents 2

whicn are estimated a t least to have lower and lower 3

prooability levels, t ha t i s, the le ss and less likely then in principle, at least, 4

e ven ts, then you can come to a

you can get the cul.< of the fusion products out of the a

reactor, and that can laad to sone substantial loss of life.

7 MR. OBLEDO:

Yes.

See, wna t we have here is this o

ris4, even tnough i t may ce a minimal risk, and the f ac t y

that such an occurrence could take place. You take your 10 statistics of one in 20,000.

What if that one were to occur this month or next month?

And the lo ss of lif e that might 12 come about.

And so wnen I was speaking to some people, a 13 minority group, the observa tion was made, well, what good is 14 it to get nuclear energy, perha ps, a t a more economic -- at la lower scales than other forms of energy to where poor peo ple lo might be able to afford the ra tes -- e ven though there is 17 scoe question about whe ther i t's more expensivo or le ss to e x pen si ve

- if i t were to wipe out, you know, hundreds of 19 t housanos of ceo pl e, only one accident.

You're saving money 2C but you're facing a loss of life.

21 CH \\ lf..oA u HEuJRI E :

.4y cwn view i s t ha t tne 22 nundrecs c thousands numbers are simply not --

23 Md. 03LE00:

Realistic?

24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Well, not only not realistic 26 but sic. ply coulan' t be reached.

But there are others wno

,n i

Cit t' J

tc u

340 0 -+ U 4 27 1 9 I

holJ tho se views.

All I can tell you is wha t I think.

2 MH. OBLEDO:

From the fcllout in later years?

3 People with tnyrcio cancers, e t ce tera?

4 CHA IR:4AN HE.ER I E :

Yes.

5 MS. EdPIN0ZA:

Eut 20,000 is bound to ha ppen o

winnin the century f or sure.

We have 71 plants operational 7

now.

Inere are 29 under construction and 30 on the drawing a

ocaras.

Tha t sounds to me like the chances f or an acciaent v

to nappen are very, very great.

10 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Well, I can't tell you whether 11 the one in 20,CCO is really the number we should f ocus on.

12 All I can tell you i s that that was, as I recall it, the 13 result f rom the saf e ty study.

But, there are about 2CO, as 14 you say, eitner operating or in the pipeline, although 15 whe ther all of those, in fact, will be finished oeing built 16 is an open question.

17 But suppose f or purposes of discussion the re are 200.

lo Oxay.

Inen if the statistic is right, one would expect 19 t ha t, if we make no f urther saf ety improvements over the 2v plants f or wnica the s tucy wa s done, which were a cair of 21 plan ts tnat were re cen tly s ta r ted o pera tion, in about 1972 22 or

'3, t na t on the average, every hunored years there would 23 he a melt-dcwn accident, and, an the ave" age, avery hundred of those 24 times, or every 10,000 years, if my recollection is correct, 25 the mel t-cown woula resul t in serious, more or le ss serious

.) n q n

0-I ')

234d 04 05 26 1;

I off-site consequences.

That is, radia tion levels tna t would 2

cause immedia te f a tali tie s.

3 Now, everyone will have to decide f or himself whether or 4

not, if these numbers are, in fact, reasonable and to be 5

c redi te d, w he t he r or no t that is an acceptable risk.

6 l.;5. ESPIN0ZA:

I want to ask you, is it true t ha t 7

this comt:y is a ccepting wa ste f rom o ther countries to be c

buriec here ?

9 CHAIR. TAN HENDRIE:

Not I think in the sense in 10 which you mean, a t least thus far.

Because I think --

11 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

Why don't you go through, 12 t hou g h, the research reactor and -- Because there is waste 13 coming into this coun try.

14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

I think what you have got in lo mind are the power reactors making electricity someplace lo else, and we're ge tting the waste from it.

For tha t the 17 answer is clearly no.

Ho we ve r, t he re are a number of le researcn reactors which were given to o tner countries by the 19 Unicea itates over the years at various universities and 20 researca inst itu tions acread.

ino se use a special enriched 21 fuel whicn typically we export to t he m, and we take back, in 22 many cases, the spent fuel from these

.n order to reproce ss 23 ana recover cne unburned enriched uranium.

So that there 24 nas been anc there i s, that i s, i t's an ongoing situation, 23 spen t f uel elements f rom some of tnose re search reac tors.

9 ') C,'

C.6 - '

c-I Q

,3-a C4 06 29 1p i

I guess maybe nost of them, because I think tne 2

a rrangements typi cally includea a reprocessing provision as 3

best I can remember.

4 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

S 'J t it is waste, it is 5

coming to the country anc after processing that waste is o

ceing stored.

That i s co rrec t.

You nave to recognize, 7

though, that when the Chairman talk s about an enriched fuel, o

ano ther way of talking abcut that ma terial is also usat.e 9

for bombs.

T ha t is one of the reasons for ge tting it back.

10 CD AMISS IONER KENNEDY :

Indeed, that is why the 11 Non-proliferation Act s ugge sted the o otion this country 12 mignt wish to cursue to cover f uel in order that, to 13 discourage the re proce ssing of this.

A 15 g,

lo 17 10 19 2C 21 22 23 24 25 C, i i 4 y

334o 00 01 30 on i

MS. SACA-SARdAUAd How is it ceing s to rea ?

2 CHAiHi. TAN HEJJRIE At government installations, 3

probably Savannah River,

'ut po ssibl e, procably some also in c

4 Idaho ano the State or Washington, at major government --

o COMMISSION 2d Ad hA R.15 :

It woulc ce a very small o

part or very similar waste trom U.S.

Jo v e rnme r. t activities 7

also being stored t he r e.

T he foreign part is e small o

portion.

V CHAIRAAN HEuGRIE:

Let me Kick off on soma of

t. he 10 other questions.

Il COMMISSIONER KENNEDY :

One po i n t, a minor point 12 per na ps, t ha t ought to be cleared up.

Very early on, 13 Senator, you commented on Rocky Flats.

It should be 14 unoerstoco that this agency, Nuclear Regulatory Comaission, lo doe s no t have regulatory authority over Rocky Fla ts.

We do lo not have any responsibility or authority for that.

17 MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:

I understand that.

You do lo have, you oo regulate Fort St. Vrain.

19 COMMISSIOJER KE!,UEJf:

Yes, indeed.

20 uH AI R..iA.,

MENud i c :

'i e license Fort St. Vrain.

21 C0:. ltI SS ICJ ER. sci..iEdi :

And inspect it ragularly.

22 CHAIRMA.. HENJdIE:

You were asking some specific 23 questions acout exclusion areas and so on.

Let as see it I 24 can give short answers to tnose and so on.

It i s not 25 uncommon ror tne exciusion area arouno a clant to include f,

CL' t'.

i-I y

t

>34c 05 02 31 on i

some thing like a waterway, in the case you are ref erring to, 2

t he Lt i ss i ssi ppi, or -- if the plant is, say, on the shore of 3

one of the Great Lakes, then the exclusion area will include 4

an arc out in to t he lake.

o The intent of tne exclusion area is simply to have o

an area close in rignt arounu the nuclear unit itselr in 7

which tne licensee c'an control acce ss wnen that is o

necessary.

It aoes not mean tha t peo ple ha ve to be kept out

~

9 of that area all the time.

And in fact, at numbers of 10 plants there are recrea tional areas, public recreational 11 areas within the exclusion area.

Wha t does have to be true 12 i s t ha t if anything happens, tne licensee has to be able to 13 get peo ple ou t there in a hurry and has to be able to 14 control the a cce ss then, wnich you can do on a waterway.

15 Tha t is, there is no interf erence with the traffic up and 16 down the Missi ssippi.

17 On the o the r ha nd, if there were an emergency, the 16 licensee on one of the se wa ter site locations has to nave 19 f acilitie s to signal, you know, coth, fishermen or whatever, 20 wno may be right off-snore at the plant to please move on 21 and get nelf a mile away or whatever the distance is.

50 it

,22 is no t, I would tnink, not a problem f or traffic on tne 23 A i ss i ssi ppi, recreational or commercial.

24 MS. KEARNEY: My concern was if there were an 25 acciaent, how long woula it be nece ssary to restrict traffic Y

2348 05 03 32 bn 1

in tot area?

2 CHAIRMAN HENORIE:

I can only say in a general 3

way.

My gue ss would be, at most, for a day or some thing 4

like that.

T ha t i s, I gue ss it could be longer, but the 5

c haracteristi c of -- the c harac te ri stic s of the large o

a ccidents tha t we have oeen concerned about, at least in the 7

past, is t ha t the leakage of radioactive material, the major 6

cart of it woula prooably occur over a relatively short time 9

s pa n.

Either a period of hours or a day or two or some tning 10 like t ha t.

Tha; 15, it wo uldn' t be months.

Il COMMISSIONER G:_INSKY:

As you say, you can't 12 really be sure.

13 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

You can't.

14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

?le would ao whatever is 15 necessary to protect the publ ic in tha t area.

16 COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

And in the proce ss, it 17 would be under a continuing monitoring, so that as the 16 situation changed, we would be aware of it and actions would 19 be taken as appropriate, ei tner to e x tend, re tain the 20 exclusion or relax it, cepending upon the resul ts of the 21 actual monitoring.

22 CO'.iMI SS IONER BR ADFORD:

In a major accident today 23 t ha t might be pretty optimistic.

24 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

Well, the sorts of cases tha t 25 have tended to attract the a ttention are those in which

') "i u-c,.,, s u

348 Ob 04 33 on I

the eff ects on people are t he greatest, and the effects on 2

people are the greatest if it all ha ppens very f ast, before 3

very many people have a chance to move away, to get out of 4

the arsa.

S CO'.tMISSIONER KENNEDY:

And the containment is o

brea c hed to permit a T,ajor release.

7 CHAIR..lAN HENDRIE:

So that the stuff ge ts out, o

yes.

,.i S. SACA-BARRAGAN:

The concern we had in our 9

10 area, of course a little over a year ago, was when 11 radioactive dust, a cloud of radioactivity, whatever it was, 12 at the Fort St. Vrain escaped.

I don't Know quite the 13 correct terminology, but it did esca pe.

de were very 14 concerned about t he w ind, where it was going to olow tha t 15 cloud and the ef f ec ts i t would have on people should it, you 16 know, hit a populated area.

Denver, of course, is just 30 17 miles to the south, 30 to 40 miles to the south of Fort to St. Vrain.

ly I think that is an area t ha t I would like some 2G cc.nent on.

Are you coing research, do you Know how to deal 21

.titn tha t kind of proolem?

22 CHAIR lAAN HEN RIE:

In terms of -- we have a 23 substar.tial research program on reactor saf ety wnicn aould 24 have as a fundamental aim in a general way, you know, not 25 le tting the stuff get out.

n o,.u' L ;J U

>34c 05 30 34 on 1

Md. B AC A-E A.'d A GAu :

It came as a great shock to us 2

that it aid get out.

Tha t is t he concern, if it oces get 3

out, what happens.

It got out of For t St. Vrain before it 4

was at f ull opera ting capacity.

I understand ye sterday wa s 5

the first day it went in to f ull o perating capacity.

6 CHAIRMAN HE:!DRIE:

I dion't know it was.

7 MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:

A gen tleman on the way wi th me o

told me t ha t on tne way out here.

It hit full operating capacity yesteraay.

Th'e question, of course, that will go 10 oack dcun because of the continual checking, moni toring of 11 t he powe r plan t.

But my question is that if a year and a 12 nalf ago the cloud was acle to e sca pe, and tr concern in 13 Coloraco, en the part of the Governor and the otners, was 14 how would that effect the rest of the po pula tion ?

15 Of course, this di ssipated eventually.

T ha t could to conceivably happen again.

I gue ss wha t I am concerned about 17 is how do you -- is there any, what i s t he effort being made Ic to be eole to di ssi pa te that clouc or ceal with it when it 19 cets out?

2m CH A I.Li AM HE.wn I E :

Unce -- the form in unich 21 radioactive naterial.nignt get out in tne event of an 22 acciaent, or in tng case of a small accicent, smali 23 accidental release of t ne Kind you nad a t Fort St. Vrain, 24 the stuff tnat is of in te re st, that you worry aoout, is a 20 gas.

Is is simply atoms of racioactive atoms of xenon N

e ;or,

3 4c C6 06 35 bn 1

wnic n is a gas, Krypton wnicn is a gas, or iodine wnich is a 2

gas, ano so on.

So tho se a toms just move with the 3

atmosphere just like they were molecules of oxygen or 4

nitrogen and they go in the direction the wind is blowing.

5 So tnat is the direc tion of one's concern.

e can't do mucn 6

about it once tney get ou t.

7 If there is a hign enough concentration so that a

the racia tion fields are a concern f rom a health s ta n d po i n t,

y then you try to move people away f rom the path of the cloud, 10 ir you nave time and it is practical to do so.

11 COMMI5SIONER AHEARNE:

There is also some po ssible 12 acvancea precautions tnat can be taken, cepending upon wha t 13 the material is.

For example --

14 MS. 3ACA-BARRAGAA:

Pardon me?

I5 CO:1MISSIONER AHEARNE:

Depending upon wha t is lo releasec.

If it is radioactive iodine being released, there 17 is a blocking agent, potassium iodine I believe it is, that Ic the FDA and we are looking at the possibility or 1y recommending it being stored in certain areas.

du

'J S. BACA-BARRAo;j:

i.o u u t t ha t nelp dissipate tne 21 cloud?

22 C0iaISS IuJEd AndARNE:

It uoes not help dissicate 23 the cicuu, but what it doe s i s hel p prevent some of the baa 24 e f f ec ts if you nappen to br ea t he the stuff.

2b 31 5. BACA-dARRAJAN:

So it would be mixed in?

Y j

l L

(n to'

> 3 40 35 07 36 on 1

CO. L!l 3610a ER ::E!.J EJ Y :

Just take a pill or 2

something.

3 MR. PENA:

Af te r you burn, you ge t a pill.

CD:.t:4I5S I0aER KE:,i!Ev't :

No, you oon't burn.

You o

are inha ling the gas, o

..; R. P c:i A :

.ina t na ppens to you when you inhale?

7 C0'4MISS IONER :;ENiiED(:

It conceivably coula result c

in la tent cancer aevelopment.

y CHAIRt4A1 HENDRIE:

If you inhale enougn.

10 COMMISSIO;iER :;ENNEDY :

Thyroid cancer, and if in 11 fact, the substance functions as it is presumed to, the 12 blocking agent, presumably tnat would substantially, if not 13 totally, eliminate the likelihcod of development of cancer 14 resulting rrom that innalation.

15 COMMISSIOWER AHEAR:1E:

But you have to inhale a 16 lot of it.

17 C01.fMISS IO!1ER KE:!NEJY :

That is right.

It is not Ic as thougn you took one quick breath and were immediately 19 deomeo to develop thyroia cancer.

That just would no t be 2J tne case.

It.tould be a retner suostantial amount that 21 would have to be innaieo.

22

..i R. P E.4 A :

How about storing gas masks instead of 23 pills?

24 CD'tMI SS IONER GI LI;; SKY :

cie l l, the best thing if 25 you are threatenec with exposure to radioactive cloud like

'i

,s-

't U

3 -. a G5 Go 37 an i

t ha c is to get people out of the way.

Tha t is tne our po se 2

of e.aergency plans ano preparations wnich we are now taking 3

a far greater interest in than we did before the Three Mile 4

Islanc accident.

o id. BACA-SAARAGAN:

Is there no effort being made a

in terms of rasaarch to.co ssibly find a neutralizing agent 7

cr some means of dealing wi tn a cloud to neu tralize it or o

d i ssi pa te it or ao something?

~

CT3.'.II SS IO:iER.:EhM EDY :

It dissipates anyway.

x 10 CHAIRt,iAN HENDRI E:

!o, because it dissipates il anyway.

12 ud. B AC A-B ARR AGAN :

?!itn time.

13 COMMISS IONER c;ENflEDY :

And distance.

14 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

And air turbulence as it moves 15 downwind.

Io MR. OBLEDO:

Talking about the plans, the GAO 17 report which I also scanned through last night, but haven't la really reac, seemea to be quite critical of the Commission, 19 par ticularly in the area of the response from the Carmi ssion a

bac.< tc UAG; there wa s en ad.ni ssion of scae failures.

U.e r e 21 were also sa ne statements that the Commission felt tne d.W 22 r e po r t ia s qui te T.i sl eaJing in several areas.

And that if I 23 recall inco rrec tly, id r. Carlucci has a copy of One recort, 24 that the Com:aission f el t in most circumstances, in r.o s t 20 circumstances, there were edequate plans.

') ci n?

t'

( i t 'i si

3*o 03 C9 30 an i

I focused on the word "adequa te

cecau se I cidn't 2

K no.1 exac tly wha t was meant by that.

Acequate is a minimal 3

requirement being met?

4 COTMISEICJER AHEAR:iE:

I taink the quick answer 5

icula tc tha t tne re are many people including us.ino are o

coing a lot of re thini.ing af ter Three Mile Island.

7 MR. 03LEDO:

The Governor of Calif ornia informed me or a revie.- group tna I celie ve is still ongoing that v

s f ormu la ted some plans f or emergency situations.

One of them IC I know incluJes one of the de partments in the lealth and 11 welf aire agency, cepartment cf heal th servict s, woulc be 12 c narged wi th cistributing the pflis, po ta ssium iocide, in 13 the case of emergency of some kind.

I woulc think the 14 Commission probacly nas a copy of the Go ve rno r's --

Io CDiMISSIGNER AHEARNE:

'1e do.

lo MR. 05LECO:

You ao.

All right.

I am sorry.

17 COMMISSI0 tier UILII. SKY :

I aon't tnink that letter te represents the view of tne Co mm i ssion.

I.

"R.

03LEDO:

I Knew it was signed by staff memoers 2L

~.i ni c a "a s su r pri s in g.

dl

20. ' I 5S I O J f..? GILI:16:3 :

Tna t often is the case 22

.t i c h UA0 r e,0 3 r t s, given tne timing.

22 CHA I R:JA.1 HEdDR I E:

The stafr always comments on 24 the craft report.

Then the staff comments are in cluded in 25 Ene final i ssue of the OAO reoort.

.,.h t '

e s s-o s

> 3 40 Ja iO 39 on l

R.

OELELO:

I opera ted a oit cifferent --

2 CnAidtiAu HEduRIE:

The Commissioners re p1v to tne 3

GAO re port se para tely --

4

.sR. O S L E D O :

-- my juri scic tion, one of *he 500 5

orograms, I also responacc as the Secre tary.

Not a staff o

per son.

Because I want to make sure that --

7 CHAIRMAN HEilDRIE:

l4r. Obleco, the Commission has a

responcec.

v MR. OSLEDO:

Yes, sir.

10 11 1

12

(

t 13 C/

14 15 lo 17 le 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 C)QO

J48.06.01 40 i

CHAIRMAN HEdDRI :

ihe resconse of tne Ca n'. i ss ion 2

is not in tne GAO report.

The resconse of tne Commission was 3

some weeks -- close to two and a half montns af ter tne GAO 4

report.

I would be glad to supoly you with a copy of tnet.

5 It is rather different.

5 MR. 03LEDO:

Okay.

7 CO MMISSI0 DER AHEARNE:

The po int the Chair an is 3

naking, the way the GAO cycle works is that tne Co mm iss ion's 9

resconse is af ter the report is issued -- ncrmal federal 10 agency resconse.

11 I would like to reiterate tnougn, my earlier pcint 12 that the GAO rep ort came out orlor to ihree lile Island and 13 many people are rethinking --

14 MR. OSLEDO:

This is not the f o rm to address tne 15 process --

16 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

It should nave reviewed 17 it.

I think you are right.

13 MR. OSLEDO:

~4y re scons e goes in the recor: inen 19 that report is issued, cecause tnat is the recort tnat gets 2J out to the cuolic.

I was not aware of tue suase:uen e p v.c s 21 of t he Co nn i ss io n.

3)

'dAIR4Ad HEJDRIE:

(ou %no.i, I can't ;e esconsicia 23 for tne traditional practice of tne Generel Accounti

.y

affica, 24 you know.

There is a ce rtain ca ttern o f resconse.

ihe 25 agency formal reponse cones 60 days afterwaros.

)

1.

hC

u4c.06.02 ai i

i MH. OSLd]O:

fou might, even t"~'gh you ara e -inor 2

o f f ic ia l in this whole bureaucrecy, have an impact on now 3

government works.

4 CHAIRMAll HEilDRIE:

Let ne assure you that ny aoility 5

to influence the cattern of ouolicetion of UAu reports ;s nil.

5 Let me talk eeout energency plencing, however, cec aus e we n ave 7

been dealing with some p roc edur a l -- in e f f ec t -- some 3

procedural matters on wno spoke first in :ne UAL reaert enc 9

what and when the Commission resconded.

1J The essence of the matter is that the Commission 11 went forward pre tty aggressively witn very consideraoly 12 enhanced emergency planning ac tivities.

Je are working witn 13 a ll the states including California on state-level plans, ne 14 will os puolishing sets of guidelines for improved state 15

plans, de want to, are going to be working and are acrking 16 with local authorities to improve the local civil defense 17 planning around plants.

13 So the suostance, or wnatev3r comment I nave to make 19 aoout eme gency planning is we think it ought to be cetter and r

20 we are noving pretty herd to try to eke it astter.

21 CohN I SS I O.!E R :(E N.4 ED ( :

cet me add taere t n s '. c.

22 course, resoonsibility fo r emerg ency 31anning ay rest i r-23 tnis agency, but responsibility for en e rg a-c y ? lans, :"': is, 24 their e xecution, must inevitably rest with :ne state ana local 25 authorities.

.e

'h T

C}i

\\

e J43.06.J3 4

i I

.iR. 03 LE DO :

I was wondering if the Co-n is s io-

,e /

2 nave resconded to its suosequent recort oy sona Congr e ss i ona l 3

committee, also I 'elieve on the.olaaning orocess.

I forget o

4 the nane of the Congressperson ano s igned of f on nat report.

5 CO 'O I SS I O.IER

.<E J3E DY :

Yr.

cic f f e tt.

6 MR. OBLEDO:

ihat is r ight.

If there les an 7

o fficiel response to that we would ce glad to have it as well.

3 CHAId.. TAN iE rid RI E :

I don't tnink

.<e nave received 9

the official t r e n sm i ss ion.

In some f esh io n 1 hes been 10 published in the ne wsoa pe rs, out we haven't been a llow3c to 11 have a copy.

12

.12. 08 LEDO :

.le have -- I tnink we might he ve --

13 (Laughter.)

14 CHAIRMAN HE:lDRIE:

Do you tnink you could slip us 15 one?

16 CO MMISSIOJER AhEARNE :

de are serious.

de have not 17 received it.

Id COVMISblodER KEnocDf:

.ie have not receive. one.

19 CHAIRMAN HEtiDRIE:

I am not sure it is f orme lly e) published.

21 COMt.tISb ia.iEd <E iGED (:

I na/a asked for it.

. ' ave 22 not re c e ived it.

I have asked for it.

23 CO ?l.t I 3S I O.iE R GI '_ I.iS:' t :

I nave s een a draf: copy.

24 CHAIR'4AN HENDRIE:

I oelieve what's heroenec is thet 25 various draf ts of the.to f f e t t subco mm i tt ee report 'are oeen T/ 39 C

e-u \\)

348.06.04 43 1

1 made availaole to tne pre ss.

So I read newspacer stories 2

aoout it.

But I don't get eitn'. tne drafts thenselves, and 3

certainly the final report so far as I know has not oeen 4

aoproved by the Committee and published.

So I an sort of 5

helcless.

5 If you ha ve go t it, if you nave got a copy I zcul; 7

ce fascinated to see it.

d CO MMI5bIOJER XENJdDY :

Let me say tnet some - tna t 9

f rom sone of the newspaper a ccounts, I think the report 10 deserves and will get, as soon as we get a copy, careful 11 a ttention.

12 CH AIRMAN iEdDRIE:

3enator, let me try to ?ick up 13 or at least introduce a couple of the other cuestions on your la telegram and some of the others that have been mentioned at 15 the taole.

What is the urban risk?

16 My own view is that your uroan ris k is fairly 17 small.

For the most part the plants tend to be siteu away 13 from uroan areas oy delicerate calicy.

And particuliriv for 19 the nost recent plants, the re has oe5 a e s t r ong e r e ulatory 2]

policy to keep tnen in l e ss-poo ul et. d ar 3 7 3.

21 I tnink there is a plear, taat, mnvoe 2; miles --

22 C0 '"d I 55 I O.!dd KE 'DED (:

Zion.

23 CHAIR: TAN iEJDRId:

-- 0'tsi 3,

nor:n o f.. s" (crk.

24 Zion, I am not quite sure how far it is from Chicago.

25 Md. 03LEDO:

People wna. ive -- you ha ve de t ail e d D

,r a a

{,U -

L-

3343.J6.05 i

i information on people wno l i ve vithin i s, 2s miles f r om the 2

plant?

3 ColHISSIOJER KEMIEDY:

Yes, detailed information on a

the olant, out to a distance of over 50 miles.

5 CHAIRMAJ HENDRIE:

En e tnird quest io n, to 1het 6

extent are the nation's cities j3 pendent on nuclear potier?

7 In a general way, ye t sort of tak ing it on a national oasis, d

you could sa y, w e ll, tne cities are dependent to tne sane 9

extent that everyco dy else is.

On a netional oasis

• net is 10 aoout, I gue ss in 1973 it was acout 13 percent of the 11 electrical e nergy supplied was nuclear generated.

12 Obviously, the si tu ati on in any carticular city vill 13 be specific to the generating patterns in that area.

or 14 Chicago, I suspect that the nuclear ge nera tion is m?ita hign.

15 Md. 08LEDO :

5U percent is the figure I have read.

16 CHAIRMAN dENDRIE:

It may be.

(es, Su I would think 17 easily.

Probably high in.;ew York.

Elsevhere, perh30s lower 15 than tne national average.

19 Md. 03LEDO:

I think it decreases as you n ve JJ westward generally.

21 CH AI RM An *it.iD A IE :

I tnink that is true.

22

12. 03LEDO:

Jithout really < no a ing, pern e s 7 0m >

23 plants wers first constructed in the East.

24 CO W4ISSIO.iE R 3R AD,;0RD:

East coast anc California.

25 CO :ed I SS I OiiE R.< E.'iNE DY :

There is probably same s

l r..c 5 sj

24 3.05.05 43 n

i relationsnip with other fuel sources, availaoility o.

otner 2

fuel sources in : nose areas, and relative cost co parisons 3

that were made early on.

4 COMMISSIoldd HEdDRI5:

The re we re some ques tions o

over here about the -- that relate, I suspect, to the o

Co nission's ener;ency planning zone dacuments and craposels.

7 The thrust of a joint NRC-d?A study on emergency plannin; 3

matters out a li ttle f urtner fro, tne plant tnan we morna lly 9

work, sugges ted that altnough the cn3nce of meltdown accidents 10 which would breacn the containment and oe a serious ;roolen o tside is not large, nevertheless, it is prudent to have 11 u

12 scne thought in mind as to what one would do, enc reco rended 13 a 10 -n il e radius emergency action zone, and out

' e vo n d th3t, c

i la a 5C-mile radius action zone for inte rruption of the food 15 chain if thet became nece ssary.

16 You were conce rned about the food chain in tne Juif 17 and so on.

Wnat is of interest in the f oo d chain, the main ld tninc one nes in n'ind is concentretion of racio-ioii.ie up tn i i

ve7 etat on-cow-nilk can to human being chain.

And if inere were 19 2J a lot of radio-lodine released in aa accident, /cu i-2) to interrupt tne milk sucply for a enile un t il that ic :.i :

22 peak had cassed and the levels tere oack dovn.

23

e cnecked tne iodine levels et ihree

't ile l i. ?c a,

24 for instance, pretty carefully to see that they vere low, 20 which they were.

n (tiO kL

,y

34=.GS.a7 a s t

i Md. CAnLUCCI:

dut 97 question ves relatin,

• 0 the 2

wetlands surrouncing the plant in Louisiana and ir tre 3

radio-iodines that were to enter the f ood cha in, that the 4

ecology of the wetlands is interrelated with the Julf.

5 Co."s ISS l ocis d HE;iDRIE:

Yes, out on ti. e c ycl es,

a wnich are I tnink Te ne r 711 v l o r :. a r thln --

,/

M..M.

v a n L,J u~v. l dight.

3 Co.";4 I5JIO.;Ed HEWJdIE :

Long enough 50 tnat 9

MR. CARLUCCI:

Eh a t is my quest ion.

IJ CO MMI SS IO.1ER HEJJdI::

The io d ine in carti: ula r --

Il that is obviously not the only tning that I would ce concerned 12 about, out it is one that one looks et, cecause ther7 is a lot 13 of radiation in the core.

The iodine has acout an S 1/3-day 14 half-lif e or something like that.

On tne time cycle for tne 15 food chains that you are talking aoout to get out in the 15 Gulf -- why, it just washes out, disecoears -- that is, it 17 decays.

13

'4R. PENA:

Isn't there cae elenent that sart c.

19 ouilds up, one radioactive ele,ent that cJ ilds up, e cc u ule t e s,

23 say if the f is h --

di CHAId1AH ME.iDAIE:

ihere are sever 91.

22 MA. PEWA:

So if a fisa witn so mucn of t"'t ele m "'t 23 eats another with so nuch of that element, it vri nd s ;:: twica 24 the amount and just sort of accumulates in tne body?

25 CHAIRMAN HE:1DRIE:

fhat is vhat I ear, wnea : tel%

c-a l

cieq c

' U

348.06.08 ai 1

1 aoout effects taet are amplifieu u? tne fooc chain.

2 Md. PEuA:

elhet ':ind o f e ff ect would that aave, say, 3

in the New Orleans area, if you were to have a discharge of 4

that elenent?

5 CHAIRMAN HE;iDdIE:

fhet is vnet we just talked 5

eocut.

7 MR. PENA:

You said iodine is a proolem, o;; you J

didn't say about anything else.

9 CHA124A:! HE.iDRIE:

I tnink iocine wouldn't ce a 13 proolem in the food chain out to the Gulf.

Iodine could ce 11 a problem if a batcn of it got out, could be a proolen in tne 12 m il k cha in.

You would want to cneck the milk.

13 MR. PENA:

What would oe a proolem in the food chain la o f t he fish and oysters and stuff like thst?

15 CHAIRMAN HE.iDRIE:

One dould went to cneck 13vels 16 like cesium and strontium.

Tnere ere e numoer of elements 17 that are of int 3 rest in these f ood cha in questions.

13 Md. WEI;A:

. io u l d n ' t tnose ele +ents c !use 3 severe 1) problem in the ecology of the 3ree?

2)

C. : A I S M A.

.iD 4 II:

I : : u o ". in vary muc.

0; ne /3 21 to have a wnale of 7 lot of it ; ;; t o ^ = ': 3 a ;rooie.

J r. l. c e 22 the io dine, strontium and casiu-era,3: ge es et e.13-:

23 temperatures.

So although tha v can 03 cerri3: elorg fi:n e 24 cloud in the form of atoms of that material on a dus:

25 part ic le, it is still a stage renoved es e transpor:

echenis, i

'ht

\\t

343.06.Jv a.

i i

from having it ne directly a gas itself.

Ard ir zou ; jus:

2 go o f f do wn --

3 COMMISSI0ilER 3dADFodD:

But yo ur cues t ion i s, if 4

they get out, are they a proolen?

The answer is cartainly yes.

o 5

"1. P.!A:

Are tn3y less likaly to ;3t out Snan 7

iodine?

d CHAId:4A:I iE.iDRI :

Y?s.

9

'4 R. PEI. A:

"uch 1ess 1ike1y?

IJ ColStISSIOJER.'d:1:lEDY :

Yes.

Il CO MMISSIONER GILI ! SKY:

ae ll, tne iodine is a gas.

12 Along with the xenon, it would come our first.

/.o re 3esilv.

13 Primarily the xenon came out in the Three Mile Island it accident.

15 CH AI R.4 AN HE.iDRIE :

And finally you were as%ing is 15 a 10 Dile zone enougn?

I auess some would say it was to o 17 much.

Others would say it wasn't enough.

nhat you era k na et nere are e set or are ty unlikely a cc i;en.3, the 13 100 i

19 core melt a c c i de nt s.

And there are e scectrun of r">se; 2J that is, th3y c3n occur in 73ri]Js G yS 3^i

' eve V1rinl5 21 consecuences.

22 And att2 mots *. eve ceen nede :o estiret?,

211, mat 23 is the orocability distribution ?

How 11 % e l',

is it t

it 24 could occur this way?

How likely is it tnat it wcula occur 25 that way?

And a 10-nile zone is tak en to acco nacet+ 3 vary

.. c c>qJ n'I is u u

gia

134.J6.10 4

1 1

large fraction of all tnose accioents.

7nat is, Onere is a 2

r es idua l tail wnicn you nignt went to tori ou to 12 mi.es or 3

15 or wnatever.

But those are such a small fraction of a ll 4

core melt accidents tnat you woula sa/ for practical.013nning 5

purposes -- it amounts to saying the following.

5 Fo r prac tical pla nning purpos e s. it is n 212.e r 7

nece ssary nor reasonable to plan against the worst po ssible 3

tning that could occur in tne wnale worl2.

In tnat c as e, I

7 think it is cons istent with the kind of quicelines tn at one 10 s

u es in making puolic decisions.

11 MR. CARLUCCI:

My cuestion related to tne Union of 12 Concerned Scientists report that estimates the radiar. ion 13 can be fatal as far as 65 miles from tne plant.

That is what 14 led to my nuestien, sinc e :lew Orleans is 25 to 30 -iles from 15 eiaterford 3.

16 CHAIRMAN HENDRIE:

tes.

17 COMtISSIO.lER GILINS.<Y:

.ie ll, tne 10 -m il e li it 13 doesn't take into account the very worst cases.

19 MR. SEELY:

ohat would be tne milea;e for the very 2) worst case?

21 C3Eil SS 10 4cx J I L I. iS :, ( :

I : T i- % it

.3 hara to out 22 an ucner limit nere.

3ut tne iJea

_s "nat, in fac;, i.1 tre 23 worst cases, tne radioactivity is moving rather slow;v, 24 because it is in f airly staole conditions tna t you can get an 25 o

am unt of radioactivity oving out - staole w3atner C,

i,G

') 4 h y

c v

' 34 3. G6.1 1 5.

1 I

conditions, yes.

If the wind is, tne more vigorous ain

?,

2

.the radioactivity gets out further faster, cut it gets 3

dispersed, also.

There is a lot of mixing.

i~h e notion is 4

that if you should have to move oeople oevorc the 10-mile 5

radius, you have some time to arrange for that.

ahat yo u 5

have to decide is Nnere are yo u ;oing to j r d ri t!' e line 7

oetween making f airly suostantial preparations and ra g ions V

S where you will in a sense improvise.

U 9

That is wnere the group drew the line.

lJ CO MMISSIO.iE? AHE AdHE :

But I think you ougat to 11 realize that we are trying to rethink what are tne a op ro pr i.3 t e 12 actions, what are tne aopropriate regulations.

ae have asked 13 for public comment on a proposed change in our rules and 14 cegulations on emergency clannin ; and what those ougnt to be.

15 I would certainly encourage all of you to provide co,mants 15 on that.

17 COMMISSIO.IER BdADFod]:

Jo you nave the docu ent 13 soliciting oublic comment?

19 MR. 09LEDO:

io, I do not.

3ut it would os a g oo.i 2) thing to distrioute, tnet is coutc J'Jt-iouro.

21 CH AI R M A.'! HE.iDdI E :

fes, tae:

.o u lt ce vm useful.

22 Co.".a I SS I O..E R AHEAD.u:

Some of the questio,= :ne 23 you are raising are the ones that we are tr/inc to rethink.

24 25 c) n, 7I ei, t

'V

> 3 4o 07 Ci 51 1p 1

MS. SACA-BARRAGArl:

This is a result of Three Mile 2

I slonc?

3 COMMISSIONER AHEARi1E Yes.

4 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY :

-Of course these 5

recommenaations came before that.

o CO !MISSI0t1ER AHEARNE:

Well, a lot of i t, t houg h, 7

is seriously as a result of Three Mile.

3 MS. BACA-BARRAGAN:

I had understood in the manner Y

in which you were rethinking your position as a result of 10 Three Mile Island --

Ii COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

Marcf. 28.

12 CO.'!?4I SS IONER GI LI NSKY :

We all remember.

13 COMMISS10rlER AHEARNE :

We remember it well.

14 MR. OSLEDO:

Tnree days later, the GAO recort l5 i ssued Jarch 30 --

to COMMISSIONER KENNEDY:

They worked very rapidly.

17 MR. OBLEDO:

Oh, is that right?

Well, that i s --

16 the fastest any governmen t agency cver worked.

Iy CalTMISSIONER KENNEDY :

I'm joking.

2u MR. 00LE00:

So:r.etimes proolems come up ano we 21 react to then.

And, of ccurse, things surrace tnat seme of 22 us never really think about until the oroblem is presented, 23 until tnere is an occurrence of t hi s sort.

It's fortunate 24 t ha t no one was killed in a major accident and t na t w e ha ve 25 the opportunity to really focus and make our plans to mee t 2 kkb m,

2346 07 u2 52 1p 1

any kina of emergency, snculd nuclear power continue and 2

nuclear plants continue to be built.

I don't kno w if 3

someone else f rom the group, or whether the Chairman 4

wishes --

5 MR. PE?i A:

I would like to hear from the other o

Commissioners as well.

7 MS. BACA-3ARRAGAN:

I think we should finisn d

analyzing t ne nuclear -- Well, your response?

v COM141SSIONER KEN?iE0ie We want to be sure before 10 you leave tha t you ao get a copy of cne notice tna t has gone 11 out.

12 MR. OBLEDO:

Oh, yes.

I would like to get that 13 and then the response to the GAO as well.

14 CHAIRMAN HEiiORIE:

Yes.

15 I)R.OBLECO:

Those two at least.

16 MS. KEARNEY:

Sena tors, as the Commissioners 17 r e s pond, I wish they woula say a word about di s po sabl e le nuclear was te.

19 COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

I in tena to.

20 CHAIRMAN HEf4JRIE:

Start at one end or tne otner.

21 Go a he a d, Peter.

22 CalJMISSIOJER BRADFORO:

Let me just touch on a few 23 of the points that you have raised, in no particular order.

24 As to tne question of how saf e nuclear power i s, a s already 20 indicatec, E ne re is no definite numerical answer to t ha t 9G

'/aO 0

L 4l

33ac 07 G3 53 1p 1

question.

I finc my self sometimes thinking about it sort of 2

as though one lived 500 years ago and asked how big the 3

solar system was.

It would be similar.

It's clearly big.

4 By most socie tal standards, nuclear power in terms of its o

a cciaen t ra te is pre tty safe.

But, as far as measuring o

relative to o ther tnings, we just don ' t. hawa ye t t'he data 7

base and abili ty to come cown with a numerical answer that o

means very much.

v I woulo caution you not to take the one in 20,000 number 10 or other numbers involving procabilities away from here as a 11 basis f or your own thinking.

We explicitly don't do that 12 because the uncertainties a ssociated wi th those numbers are 13 just too big for policymaking purpose.

14 A reiterated question to that is the question of what is 15 a cce ptac l e.

iie regulate in large part on a acce ptacle risk 16 standard.

And no t only is it not po ssi bl e to state the risk 17 itself with precision, it's also not po ssi ble to state what le socie ty considers to be an acceptable risk wi th any. grea t 19 orecision.

20 In recorts, of caurse, ceoole use standards like beyono a 21 reasonaole couct for some types of verdic ts. One could 22 c e ve lo p, I su ppo se, ccmcarative standards as to other risks c3 people accept in their daily live s.

But, the definition of 24 a cceptacle risk is really an ongoing one and is part of a 20 poli tical proce ss tha t involves the states, localities, the

- r, v[ U d O ill!

iu

2340 07 04 54 I'm quite 1p 1

Congre ss and u s.

Ana I don't know chat 2

con f iden t tna t if you wen t around the table, you would ge t a 3

number of alff erent definitions of what is a cceptable.

4 And to the extent tnat you can articulate it for 5

yourselves in your communities through the Congre ss, t ha t is o

a proje;; well worth coing because it's an area in which, as 7

to nuclear power, there is, I don't think, a working e

definition.

We talked a li ttle bit about areas in which reassessing, 10 I think, the emergency re sponse planning, also site selection, waste management all come to mind.

I find myself 12 looking at the Three Mile Island accident not as a single 13 e ven t that has f orced a rea sse ssment but as f ar and away the 14 most dramatic moving force in the rea sse ssmen t process that, 15 in fact, has been going on for three or f our or five years 16 on a large scale.

17 Prolif eration risks are being reassessed in the 16 in te rna tional fuei cycle evaluation.

Low level radia tion IV risks have been 0:ider debate f or some time, and the federal 20 government is now reorganizing tne way in whicn it intencs 21 to deal with tnem.

Costs are being reasse ssed cefore puolic 22 u tili ty commi ssions lef t ena right in many different guises 23 arouna the country ana have oeen since oefore Three Mile 24 Islanc.

25 The waste question as well has gone t hrough the

,o

2348 07 05 65 1p i

interagency review group exercise ano are now at the 2

oeginning of se tting up a regulation ano licensing process 3

f or high level 'va ste.

4 A lot of the Old Piorld a ssumptions are at least under o

question.

The ::ennecy Commission and Three Mile Island c

suituation are the most drama tic example of the

?

reassessment, but they aren't unique, b

one i ssue I Know I have some dif f erence s wi th my v

colleague on.

As state and local representatives, at least 10 seme of you, I na ve f e l t, a s a f ormer state o f ficial myself, 11 that the section of the Atomic Energy Ac t which says that 12 sta te and local authorities should have no voice in the i3 se tting up of radiological health and safety standard: in 14 thei r own communi tie s, that i s, you can' t ragulate what a 15 nuclear power plant will emit, is a mistake on a couple of 16 levels.

17 One, we don't deal with other pollutants f rom stationary 16 sources tnat way.

As to air and wa ter pollu tion and most 19 o ther source s, the state is allowed to go beyond the 20 fejerally set ninimum s tandard s if it feels that that is 21 necassary.

I toinK tnat t aa t regula tory regime o ugnt to 22 a coly to raciological emi ssions a s well, and I am urging you 23 to tnink abou t it.

24 The second adverse consequence of that ir that it means 25 that states and localities having been excluced f rom many of

..m

,/ D 'i u

o.. s u

u -d 07 Jo 50 lp I

the cecisions, or at leas t, having not had a maniatory role in 2

those cecisions, setting the standards are only really 3

o roug ht into the action when something goes seriously 4

wrong.

They may be le ss precared.

I know, in main, even 5

as a ouolic utili ties commissioner, I caid much le ss o

e t ten tion than I woula nave to the status of.4aine's 7

emergency res ponse plan simply because all the steps leacing e

u p to it were not in tne s ta te's hands.

v Last po i n t.

One of you mentioned Edward Teller's 10 acvertisement in the,1all S tr ee t Journal.

On a auick 11 reading or that, I notice several things that seem to me to 12 ce significant overstatements.

13 The re is no real reason to touch on them, bu t I wouldn't 14 take the ad as a policymaking guide.

I would, to help pit it in 15 perspectivo, note f or you tha t the company that sponsored lo it, Dre ssler Incu stri e s, is sponsoring the claim t ha t Edward i/

1eller was the only casualty of the Three Mile Island lo accident neglectec to men. sn that they manufacturec the 19 relief valve that malfunctionec during the Three Mile Islanc 2C accident.

2i 4:1. USLELO :

I nignt men tion that I hau 3 meeting 22 wi th Dr. Edwara Teller when

.e wa s in the ho s pi tal, Cedar 23 S ina i in Los Angeles.

He relatec to me then that ne had 24 been the only casualty.

25 C01MISSIONER SRADFORD:

I wisn him a speecy

\\ \\ k L-

>m

,a40 Ti 07 57 lp i

recovery, but I tnink we will be in very serious trouble if 2

we ever come up with the conclusion that he was the only 3

casualty.

4 COMMISS10tER GILINSKY :

I don't really have much a

to add to wha t's b een saio.

It mignt ce wortn sayincj a wo ra o

acout tne dif f erent nature of the s a f e ty preolem we're up 7

against here as compared to some thing like automobile a

safety wnere we know that a na te ve r i t is, 40,000 or 50,0C0 V

people ge t killac every year.

We wouldn't e x pec t tnat 10 number to change cranatically f rom one year to another.

'd e 11 have pretty good statistic s, and people can cecice whetner 12 or not Oney're ccafortacle with t ha t.

13 nere we're concernec about small chance s of rather large 14 he epen ing s.

'ie can' t have tne data.

Our best estima tes on 15 the chances of these occurrences are just our own experience lo up to now.

But it really isn't su f f i c ie n t to give you a 17 firm handle on an e stimate, le do you're thrown to your own intellectual resources in 19 trying to calculate tne a n swe r.

Various people attempt to 20 calculate tnis in di f f eren t days.

And you try La do it t ne 21 cest you can.

3ut i t's a nece ssarily imprecise proc e ss.

22

..e have JiscoVerec tha t Ca l C ul a tion s that 7any perscn 23 have relieu on now look to ce a good oeal less reliable than 24 were thought.

The Commission concluded that they were 25 considereu too unreliable for use as a guice to i

33, o 07 Oc 5e ip I

decisionmaking.

2 do in this situation, i t's very im portan t that since 3

we're dealing witn pretty complex, tec hnical que stions, that 4

there been a body of ex perts as there are here, and that 5

they act ind e penden tly.

T ha t i s why i t's so important that 6

this agency be inae pencen t of tho se agencie s tha t are 7

concerned with producing power, so these calculations and c

juagments eren't af f ec ted cy other concerns.

v And, it's also important t ha t the process be open, 10 a cce ssiole, so that others can check the answers to see what 11 we're coing and comment on tnat.

19

'd R. OBLECO:

Tha t is precisely why we're here.

13 With all conflicting reports about all of these things.

14 COMMISSIONER GILINSKY:

Right.

15 MR. OBLEDO:

We thought we would meet with the 16 persons the regulate.

17 Co.'JM I SS IONER GI LINSKY.

Right, so you get an icea lo of ho w it's done and also so you can have your other 19 experts take a look et what prof e ssionals in this agency are 20 up to.

Anc if they nave comments to make on the process or 21 find errors or ce tter ways to do things, certainly, t ha t is 22 terta.i aly hel p we can u se.

~J 1 tim a t el y, you have to maka 23 some Juagment on how mucn saf e ty you're going to r2 quire 24 because t he re really isn't any limit t o now much saf e ty you 2S can pile on.

Ultimately, there is a jucgment on what is

/ ~

h k) s

23aa 31 Os 5Y 1p i

reasonaole, now much is enougn.

2 There are a lo t of f ac tors tha t en ter into that 3

Judgment.

There isn't any rule.

The re is nothing laid cown 4

in the law except tnat the law requires that there be 5

acaquate pro tec tion f or the public health and safety.

b Hi sto ri cally, a certain s tanda ro has developed on the basis 7

of t ha t language. Put into -- a little more specific in our o

regulations.

Eut ul tima tely, it is a kind of hi a tor ic al

~

y p ro c e ss, a cumula tion of requi remen ts that this agency has 10 im po sea ove r the years.

And a situation or accident at Three il Mile Island cause s one to rethink and go back to the drawing 12 board anc say unere cid things go wrong, we have to 13 recalculate.

14 i!e may have to come to some new conclusions.

I think 15 it's a Kind of iterative process.

There probably is no lo other way to approacn it if one is to get into it at all, 17 but it is terribly important that it ce a pproached in a Ic nignly prof e ssional and inoependent and sober way.

iv MR. SdELY:

Somebody made the point this is pa r t zu of a political process.

I woulo say i t i sn' t just 3 21 scientific pro ce ss.

ce went througn the L:!G si ting proclem 22 in California, w he_tne r o r no t in terms of jobs we w:Uld lisa 23 it -ight at Long Beach, Los Angele s Harbor in terms 'of 24 health ano saf ety, which was uncertain.

You ha d a big event 25 with a minimal risk whicn we nao to deal with.

l %)

234d 0/ 10 00 ip 1

An unf or tunate coailtion in the darbor brought 2

everybody's a ttention to the poten tial of that happening 3

with minimal risk.

So we a ppreciate the process that you go 4

t nro u g h.

5 In tnat case, our politicians were, our leaders were c

quick to compre ne nd tne poli tical process anc the ascision 7

was mace.

'cle a re concerned the commi ssioners wno are o

outside the poli ti cal proce ss are also re sponsive to w ha t V

coliticiins have -- and I think you are.

Th e f a c t yo u ge t 10 out your statemen ts, respond, you have listened to this group, all is reassuring.

/le have been througn tha t with 12 earthquakes,

LIG si ting, skyscrapers, anc we know it.

We

)

13 have structured a process in Los Angeles that responas.

I 14 "R.

PEl;A:

I don't know why anybody wan ts to live 15 in Calirornia.

They nave all the problems.

lo 17 to 19 21 22 23 24 26 c;.3 '-

'2 ' : i

)34c Oc Ol of c

1 C0;,6!ISSIdadH UILIUSK r :

Let me aad one more 2

point.

Because you are going on tne basis of calculations 3

and one doesn't have enough experience to really get a firm 4

e stimate of what the risks are, it is terrioly important 5

that we make use of wha ta ver data we have available.

And o

that we watcn the proce ss very closely, watch the operation 7

of these plants very closely and make use of wha t we learn o

form the various occurrences there.

v Une of the things we have discovered af ter the 10 Three Mile Islanc accident is t ha t we didn't wa tch caref ully 11 enougn.

In fact, there was at least one similar accident or 12 incicent at ano ther plant, had one taken sufficient no te of, 13 would procably have avoiced the Three Mile Island accident.

14 I think there is a great deal mora awarene ss of IS the need for this close attention now.

And we are in f ac t to starting up a new office to specifically pay attention to 17 the saf ety oata that comes f rom ocera ting reactors.

MR. OSLEUO:

One of tne ma jor poin ts tha t 19 Or. Teller has made i s tne fact that the personnel operating 20 tne plants ought to ce more..g nly trainea.

21 COl/l.!I SS ION dR J I L INS 2,Y :

Tha t is one of a uncle 22 list of imcrovements tnat are ceina icokea at anc will in 2a fact ce effecteo.

24 ltR. PENA:

But you raiseo a question that has 20 ceen in my mind, tco.

That is while you are learning from 5

y o, m sv

234c Jo em 62 c

i prool ems tha t cevelop in tnese existing plants, snould there 2

oe a continuation of cuiloing of plants, you know, should 3

you continue to build plants that you are going to be 4

learning from cown the line as well?

I can't snow.

o Snoulo all the learning.taxe ciace with the o

existing plancs tnae axist, or shoula te ce bui1 Jing more 7

plants, o

Co.d I SS I O.. :n AndAn t :

.u e ll, at tne coment, as you procably know, there is a pause in the granting of y

10 permits for constructing plan ts, and the granting of 11 licensing for operating plants.

12 T ha t certainly is one of the issues tnat -

.! e 13 have got a varie ty of groups tr.a t are trying to review what l~

are the major lessons learned from tne Three Mile Island IS a cciden t and pulling togetner a lot of the suggestions and lo thoughts tha t have oeen a round.

Some of those re ports ha ve 17 already been presentec and some will be presentec in coming 10 montns.

19 One of tne questions is tne one you just askea.

2v

..u. P!-;;., :

fou.:now, we came to ge t reassurea.

I 21 gue ss this is sort of a unique grou p.

I don' t tains you 22 have ever had a group nere nnat you nave tal, sed to snat 23 isn't commi tted to eitner being for or against nuclear 24 energy.

2b COMMISSIOWER K:NNdDY :

It is refresning.

9 L C) oti9 eJ I

b

>343 Cu 33 c3 c

1 1.Q. F Eii A s To a la rge ex ten t, we are nere to get 2

information so that we can make up our own minds aoout it.

3 Maybe that is wny the mee ting so rar has been ratner low 4

key.

We haven't had any snou ting or gesturing as I o

understana at other mee tings.

o 3ut I still feel unfulfillec.

I aon't know what 7

the hell to tell people when I ge t cut of this meeting, a

w ne t r.e r i t is good or baJ or wha t?

/

COl/"I SS I 0i' E.R K E: h EL Y :

Tnat ul tima tely is as it 10 properly snoula be.

Sorae tning for you to think about ano 11 concluce.

tio t f or us to try to tell you or lead yo u to.

I 12 ho pe it woula be tnat we have not.

13 Le t me just, ir I might, add only a few comments 14 to tnose that have been already made, inere is ;ucn tali 15 about tne question of a cceptable risk in various lo contentions.

I woula only urge that as you think aoout i t, 17 and inceea t na t you do so, bu t as you do, manifestly it.s a la very, very comple x ques tion.

iv And to go back to something t na t ur. Hendrie said 2U earlier, it is e scen tially as comparea witn what, cacause 21 one can't go acout, I cnink, making a series of inuepencent 22 judgmen ts of acceptability of rist.

If ne ci, it is 23 conceivaole ne woulu come out witn a tero risk socie;y wnic a 24 coes not exist.

T hu s, some tning woulc have to give.

25 And there was a 10 ; of calc T.any times as eacn of n

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5

2348 Od v4 c4 c

i you was acvancing concerns, aoout joos ano economics.

Those 2

are some of the f actors that nave to be t noug n t aoout wnen 3

one is talking about what is an acceptable risk.

4 If no thing else is at stake, I guess you woulo b

certainly say zero.

I don't want any.

But life isn't that o

way.

bo, it is a very. very complex question.

7 I would Enink t ha t in the process of looking a t c

the question, tnen, one would have to take in to a ccount what v

the options, what the alternatives would be to determine

' ')

wna t level of -- wha t level is really acceptable.

11 As to the question of waste, I will just simply 12 make an assertion.

I would be glad to spend lots of time 13 and talk aoout it.

I don't think we have tha t time.

My 14 assertion i s si.n ply t na t I believe the waste problem to oe 15 solvable and to be soivaole now.

There are acceptable ways lo to resolve it.

17 The only question in ?v juecment now is, which is Ic bette r, wnicn is tne ces;?

act 'ine Ener there are acceptacle 19 ways.

There are, in my view.

I rave gone out anc lookea at 2U a numoer cf tnem, anc ! am satisfiec.

21 Jasec on the judgments of the technical expert.i 22 cealing wita them, even 7.o r e sa tist ied, naving gone an:

23 1 cored at tne ways to doing this that taose sol u ti on s 24 exist.

It is only a question of deciding.

25 dince tnere is time to nake that cecision, it is o (' i

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05 Q40 de Jo c

i wortn taking that ci:.3 co see nicn is tne pref eraole course 2

among a cceptable ones.

3 As to the state and local authori tie s que s tion, 4

it is true tnat stata and local authorities nave b3en, I b

think the woro i s " preempted" in the law.

r e rson ally, I o

tnink t na t unrortunate.

7 an the o ther hano, I submit to you, as you are o

thinking acout that question ano what rule states anc v'

localities ought to play in radia tion protection questions 10 and so on, one also has to Unink again, coming cack to nat 11 busine ss abou t economy, Joos and all the rest, one ha s to 12 realite, remember, that joos and the economy, whi ch you know 13 be tter than I, oon't rest wholly on local circumstances, but 14 ra tner are reflec tion in the long run of the totality of the 15 economy and social s truc ture.

Io And it all decisions can be made, each individual 17 of all others, it i s, I think, possible at least, at least 10 worta tninking acout, tnat you might wind up witn a lv situation in which the sum of a serie s of correct decisions 20 at indivicual levels cecomes a very cau cecision on a 21 iarger, more national level.

22 30, tno se que stion s ha ve to be thouant acout, it 23 seems to me, as one aporoaches tne question of now much 24 a u tonomy, now mu c n total authority can lower and lower, sraller 25 and smaller units ce given in such questions.

n O l t (;'

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0 334o Oc Oo id c

i I woulc urge t na t ir you nave not cone so, t na t 2

you meet wi tn of r icials or tne ve cartment of 2nergy, because 3

in he ren t in this whole question is the one that you cid 4

raises F'w does one see this technology as part of the 5

total ene rgy pic ture ?

o It has been saic, it seems to

r. e rigntly so, tnat 7

cne energy problem in tnis country cannot ce sol vec,

o certainly in this genera tion, without the use of all the y

forms tnat we now have, c ecau se po ssi ble substitutes are 10 somewnere cown the road.

One can argue aoou t how far, but 11 the re is no question Enat it is some way down the road.

12 An d w e are talking acout 13 or 15 percent of the 13 electrical generation now being produced by this' technology 14 leading, reacning to perhaps something over 20,;ercent in la the relatively near future.

The question is what s u pplan t s lo it if it isn't there?

17 I woula also urge that if you -- t ha t you no t le consider thi s o pcor tuni ty, tnis talk, which I found lv particularly helpful and beneficial to me, the end of your 20 ciscussions <ita our agency.

I.;oula sugyest tnat it ougnt 21 to oe considereJ only Ene beginning.

22 I unink if you

.t an t to talk safety, y o u o c c ". c to 23 talk with tne experts in sarecy in thi s agen cy, ano are tne 24 staf f members wno are orking on it day cy day doing the 25 calculations to wnicn ref erence has been mace.

7

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>340 Co 07 67 c

i I think you ougnt to co that for two reasons.

2 First, you can pursue the i ssue as far in Jeptn as you. tant 3

with them.

Secondly, you can in the proce ss ge t an 4

a parecia tion of what you think about w ho they are and what 5

you think of them, oecause, after all, in the last analysis, o

a lot of this just de pend s upon trust.

Lo you trust the 7

people who are coing the work?

c If you do, then the answer to the saf e ty question y

means one thing.

But if you n't trust the people who are 10 doing tne work, the answer to the saf e ty question means 11 some thing else.

12 So, I woulc urge, and I know that tne s ta f f would 13 be more than happy to sit down and arrange further 14 discu ssions at any time on any subjec t.

I would urge that 15 you do this.

And it we can help arrange that, we are he re 16 to ao so.

17 Let me just say tnank you very, very much for the ic o poor tuni ty to mee t with you anc to hear your thoughts.

IV COMMISSIONER AHEARNE:

If you could bear with a 20 few more minutes.

21 MR. OBLEJ0:

/,' e wa n t to near f rom the swing vo te 22 on une Commi ssion.

23 COMMISSIONdR AHEARNE:

I see.

Inen pernaps I 24 shoulcn't say anything.

25 COMMISSIONER BRACFORD:

Jus t k ee p swinging.

4

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23-d 06 Oc 66 c

1 COM!/ISSIONER AHEARNE:

As you uncoubtedly Knew 2

cefore you came and as you can see, we ara a Commi ssion, 3

which means many times we have five diff erent views.

4 Perhaps a committee --

o MR. PENA:

Usually ten.

6 COMMISSIONdd AH3ARNE:

Fernaps a commitree on 7

which many of you people ha ve ser ved of f anc on, I am sure, o

or various commi ttees, you know the dif ficulty of ge tting a 9

uniform po si t ion.

So, I symonthize with you trying to come 10 away witn a crystal clear or a clear picture.

11 Let me just go through some of the -- my c o mme n t s 12 on some of the ques tions.

Many are just a reitera tion of 13 o ther points.

14 Insofar as how safe plan ts are, in the cast, many i;

people have either taken one of two parts of t ha t.

One to group has said, well, let us look at how likely an accident 17 is.

Anc that group has tended to say, well, accidents are la very unlikelyfto haopen, and we will concentrate on that.

/

19 Ano the r group has s aid, well, if an accident 2C accurs, let's consider no'.<

can it can be, the results can 21 be.

They have tenced to concentrete on no '.. serious the 22 re sul ts would be.

23 I think, ac tually, you have to 1cok at both of 24 them together.

unf or tuna tely, that ends up being very much 25 a balancing judgment, as you mentioned, that you have gone O, i s q 2bJ o

2346 Oc Jv o9 c

I through in Los.ngeles.

I think as most cao ple involved in 2

the governmen tal process ena up making calancing judgments, 3

and it is not comple tely clear.

4 Again, that is one of the areas we are scending a

more time reviewing, looking at the two of t ho se in o

comoination.

7 It is certainly true that cities end up naving, just because of tae large density of oopulation and a

9 difficulty of moving that population recidly, probaoly the 10 highest risk if t he re is a major accicent close to them.

As was mentioned, that wa s one of the reasons gradually the 12 empnasis was to move plants f arther out.

13 And I wouldn't be surprised over the next few 14 months Inat we would be focusing in one of those reviews on 15 tignter siting criteria and perhaps other additional actions C/

lo to oe a t least adaressed to some of the plan ts tna t are c/

17 close to the se ma jor uroan cen ters.

10 f ou aao men cianed t arly on, wny coulan't we 19 answer sone of the questions.

1 think the point has been 2v aa;e s veral ti.ies that one of tnose was oecause of tne role 21 tnat we have versus t r.e role cf t ra Energy oepartment.

I 22 will mention that tnat touc he s some ma t on a deoate we began 23 to aave earlier this year here.

24 (ou may recall that the Commission took some 25 action to snut aown five plan ts cecau se of earthausse k

2543 va lu 70 c

1 problems.

2 One of tne questions we cegan to get into at that 3

time is to wnat extent uo we try to 'calance some of the 4

economi c im pac ts wi th re spec t to action taken solely in 5

healtn ano safety.

As tne Chairman had pointeo out, the law a

s eem s to ce very clear, nealth ano safety.

7 In my mino, I con't go tnat far.

I tnink t he r e o

are some otner calancina poin ts.

3u t certainly not to the i

ex ten t I think was emb eac eo in your question, the 10 consioeratior of al ternative energy f o rms, if you close cown ll a nuclear plant, w ha t al terna tive energy f orm is there 12 available.

ie naven't gone anywhere near that far.

13 The empnasis upon alternative energy f orms anc 14 wnat sinc are availacle anc how tan they be utilized to mee t la uroan neeas is much more sopropriate to John Deutch or lo peopla at the Energy Department.

17 The question of waste, I procaoly am not as lo octinistic as my colleague on cne left.

I taink that t he re ly are a number of problams that have to ce solved.

.eceral vovernment in tne last cou;1e 2v I think the 21 of.cors ha s go tten a lot of its e f fort together, aucn more 22 Enan it nas in tne cast.

23 I tene to celieve that tne so-called 24 in s t i tu tiona l problems are the largest ones.

Tho se are the 25 ones that oe o cl e in ;ne sta te s ano localities are going to

/

34c Do 11 71 c

i nave to ndv3 r unc aJ.] n ta l Say-so, beCause just as Endr9 are a 2

iot of acbatas on rala tiva risks and now safe is a nuclear 3

plant, there will be similarly many debates on the relative rists or va riou s ty pa s of was te d isposal anc now safe is a alsposci sit 9.

a A cisposal site na s an acdi tional T.ajor problem 7

the nuclear oower plan t ac2sn't have.

The nuclear oower plant ocviously is genera ting a lot of e13;;ricity that ties y

into clear cenefits in the locala, che waste disposal site lu coesn't at least nave tnat strong advantage.

Il Finally, you mentionea you need some t ru thf ul 12 answ3rs.

I think, as f ar as I can tell across the scectrum, 13

.ceople who are ve ry pro, people very anni, pe o ole in the l*

middle, the Corni ssion, ~oy and large, p eo pl e are trying to 10 give trut hf ul answers.

Iney are certainly sincere in their 10 answers.

17 Jne of the difficulties is most people are using is different se ts or a ssum ptions.

ihey start out "i ta a larce lv range of assumptions, and t ha t leads then to positions inicn L

can ce s. te o.frerent unan co.ecne e l s e '.i r.c starte; Out di w i ti, a cifrer3nt 5e t of a:suc.otions.

24 Un Ene surfaC3. it may appear one person Can'! b3 23 tei.ing tne trutn JeCause E nd ansW0rs are so different.

It c4 migbc ce useful to try harcer to.ase sure that in probing 20 into those areas tha t you understanJ clearly unat are t ne PCBR BMINAL u,

~-

is,3 aC i&

4o C

l 3 ss'Jia ct ions CeCple are starting witn.

In many casas, t ha answer is founa in the c

3 a ssumptions.

Like I think all my colleagues, I am also very 4

glad to have been able to neat with '/nu.

a CHAIN..A.

nu. M I2:

"r.

Gblecc, I can't aave o

any.niny elaa to ada.

It chara are o ther cuestions, le nave 7

run a little longer tnan we e x pec ted, but I think it has c

ceen a very useful excnange.

li.l. O E Lisu :

I t ha s.

I didn't have anything else 10 on our agenda.

11 I f eel much like other persons, proaaoly, around 12 the table, t na t there is no aefinitive a n s w e :..

It depends 13 on anat assumptions you start with.

I think it is just a 14 ma tter or trying to work together on the se. ssue s f or tne IL ben 2 fit of tne publi c generally.

.Cor our country.

10 fhat i s -- m a y c e I will get this information and 17 will stay in co mmuni c a t io n.

Your executive a ssistant has lo oeen very, vary helorul witn my office in arrangina the 19 meeting and communicating witn us.

I am appreciative of

_v e

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2i ae'.onc caat, pernaps na can arrange 2.eeting 22

..ta the ua pa r t:..e n t as inergy ir t h e n e n f e.".vaaks to get a;

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s/e ry good.

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2a Thans you all ver/ mucn for coming.

It ha s beer br)

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i Very inddra3 Gin:, dnu O USeiui JG3Sion.

2

.. a y c a n ' s..la take five.ninutes.

3 C.1he re u con, a; i1:41 a.m.,

the meeting 4

acjournac.)

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