ML19249B086
| ML19249B086 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/1979 |
| From: | Essig T, Shackleton O NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III), NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7908290618 | |
| Download: ML19249B086 (44) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:) i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CCMMISSION I In '.ha Matter of: i 2: IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 31 of l Sydney W. Porter, Jr. Health Physics Consultant i Si 6i 7! Sl Trailer #203 9! NRC Investigation Site TMI Nuclear Power Plant 1 01 Middletown, Pennsylvania 11! Aoril 26, 1979 12! (0 ate of Interview) 13: June 21, 1979 (Date Transcript Typec) { 14: 85 i, l lei (Tape Numoer(s)) 16 l f IT t l 18i i 19; 20i l f)k 0 21: NRC DERSCNNEL: 22! Thomas H. Essig i 23 i Owen C. Shackleton l 2'; 893 336 2s: 'l t 1 l
i i j i I f lj SHACKLETON: This is an interview of Mr. Sydney W. Porter, Jr. (First 2; name is spelled S-Y-D-N-E-Y; middle initial "W" as in William; last 3 name Porter - "P" as in Peter, o-r-t-e-r). The time is 1:29 p.m., I 4, April 26, 1979. This interview is taking place in Trailer #203 at the Sj Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant. The trailer is located just 6 outside the south security gate. Present to conduct this interview 7 from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is Mr. Thomas H. (middle 8 initial "H" as in Henry) Essig (last name is spelled "E" (as in easy) g; s-s-i g)). Mr. Essig is the Chief of Environmental and Special Projects 10 Section, Region III. Also present to sit in on this interview a+. the 1 7{ request of Mr. Porter, is Mr. William H. (middle initial "H" as in Henry) Behrle (last name is spelled "B" as in baker - ehrle). Mr. Berhle y is a Project Engineer with the Metropolitan Edison Company. The moderator speaking is Owen C. (middle initial "C" as in Charlie) Shackleton (S-h-a-c-k-1 e-t-o-n). I am an Investigator in Region V l for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This is the second inter-wiew (ah) on tape with Mr. Porter and ah, just for the record, ah, Mr. Porter do you recall the advisement document that we gave to you , 81 1 the last time we talked with you on April the 24th, 1979, advising you i 19 i of your rights? And that you do not have to give a statement? f 21I l PORTER: Yes, I do. 22! 893 337 23! i 241 25! t 3 l 1
f i I 2 i tlj SHACKLETON: Fine. And wobld you like a copy of the tape of this (ah) 2 interview as well as you did last time? 3! i 4[ PORTER: Yes, I would, please. Now, I ask for the transcript rather c; than the tape. wt 6i 7l SHACKLETON: Oh you'd rather have the transcript rather than the tape? l 81 PORTER: Yes. gl 1C! _SHACKLETON: OK. That will be arranged. l 12; PORTER: Is it possible to get the tape of the last ones since I did 131 not have a personal tape of it? 15; SHACKLETON: Yes. Certainly. 17! PORTER: As well as the transcript? 181 1 19! SHACKLETON: Yes. 20f i 21j PORTER: Very good. May I be on record as asking for both the tape 22l l and the transcript of ah, the ah, session that we held on the 24th of 23i j April, 1979. 24' 893 338 .s; l 1 I
i s, i 3 SHACKLETON: 0K. We'll make record of that and see that it's done. l 2j Ah, for the record, Mr. Porter is the owner and Chief Executive Officer i 3 of his own company, Porter-Gertz Consultants, Incorporated. That's 4j spelled capital "P" (as in.'eter) o-r-t-e-r, dash, "G" (as in George) e-r-t-z (as in zebra), Consultants, Incorporated at 76 Rittenhouse m Place (Rittenhouse is spelled "R" as in Roger, i-t-t-e-n-h o u-s-e) 6 located in Ardmore, (that's A-r-d-m-o-r e, Pennsylvania, zip code 7 19003 and Mr. Porter can be contacted through his company area code 8l 215/896-5353. And now Mr. Porter, inasmuch as you have put together 91 information that you spoke of last time that you would like to get on 10l i the record, please go ahead. 11: 12! PORTER: Ah,.I'd like to just review some of the timing of the receiving 13\\ of the emergency radiological environmental monitoring program data on 14! the 30th of March. The samples were picked up on the 29th of March, 15 in the afternoon, and essentially had 1 days worth of exposure from 16i the TMI Unit 2 event on them. In talking to (ah) Dr. Gertz from my 17. I home office, (Dr. Steven Gertz) he tells me that he called me on 18! approximately 8:30 a.m. in the morning in Unit 1 control room of Three 19 Mile Island and gave me information concerning the TLD results and 20: essentially the statement was that the first day and a half (ah) there 21' were no offsite results that were in excess of approximately 10 mR. 22l And that was the highest onsite results. All of the rest, many were 23l significantly lower than that by the way. Secondly, he gave me the 2L 25; 893 339 i i i l
i t l l i { 4 lj results of the air iodines, and he thirdly gave me the results of the 2 iodine in downstream water plants, all of which were negative, all the i 3j iodiner results were negative, both in the air and in the water. He i 4j also tells me that by 11 a.m. that morning, he had personally contacted g{ Mr. Robert Bores of the NRC Region I and Mr. Bores was given these 1 6j results by him personally. This was a point that I believe Mr. Donaldson 7j was trying to establish in the record, during our meeting 2 days ago. 8 And so I just wanted to get these times. I told you I just did not g know what the times were if you remember, and if you remember, Mr. Donaldson must have asked me three or four times for the time. And I said I do 10 not know the time of day that this information was relayed. I had to get back because I had given very strict instructions that every time 13li anybody called me they were to put down the date and the time of day and the subject of the call so that there would be a record made of 1C this because I knew that with the pressure that we had on us in the control room those early days, there was no way that I was going to be able to keep those records straight. 17l I l 1Sl ESSIG: Are these records available? 19' 20 SHACKLETON: Yes, these records are available for your review, and as r 21! you know Ardmore is quite close to your King of Prussia (ah) headquarters 2 2 ', i and you're welcome to send somebody down to see the records and to 23l l talk to Dr. Gertz. l 24! 2s; I 893 340 i i l i
[. I i l 5 1: ESSIG: OK. (ah) Syd, I think that does fill in (ah) the question that 2{ we had the other day (ah) fairly well. Ah, just a couple of additional i 3j p ints for clarification. Ah, you indicate that you were called by i q Dr. Gertz at 8:30 and that was on 3/30? Si l PORTER: Yes, that's correct. On 3/30/79. Si 7 ESSIG: OK. And the date and time that he, Dr. Gertz called Bores was g at 11:00 on that same day? g 10l PORTER: Yes, he said approximately 11:00 a.m. for Bores. 11: l ~ 12; i ESSIG: OK. Now you indicated that, on the TLD's, that there were 13} none offsite greater than 10 mrem? 15i PORTER: Yes, that's correct. 16' 17i ESSIG: And that was for the (ah), for the exposure period running 181 from, I believe, did you say that was for the day and a half, or what i was the exposure period on that. On those TLD's? 20i i i 21; PORTER: The exposure period on those TLD's was considerably longer than that, but they ah, they were picked up on the afternoon of the 23 l 30th, the late afternoon of the 30th. They had run, some of them for 24! 2st 893 341 l
i { 6 l Il! 1 month, and others for 3 months. However, we do have good records on 2{ what the environmental backgrounds are. 31 1 ESSIG: They were picked up on the 30th or the 29th? 4! t $l PORTER: Ah, excuse me. They were picked up on the 29th. 6 7 ESSIG: OK. OK, so some were for a month and others were for the full 8 gj quarter? i 10[ I PORTEF: That's correct. But we do have good records on what the 11! background is for the month and for the quarter here at Three Mile ,2l 1. l Island. And just for the record, these particular TLD's ah, are the 131 calcium sulfate, very high sensitivity TLD's, and we also have a number of in-transit controls as well as normal background signal 15i controls with those. And so we put fairly high reliability on this data as being accurate with the minimum possible of errors involved 17: with the data. We don't really know how to do anything better than 181 what we're doing. Let me put it that way, l i 19I 20! ESSIG: OK. 21; 22l PORTER: Ah, for the record, we also got iodine in milk samples, a day 231 later, which would be the 31st from the grab samples on the 29tn. All
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P>Q<sX; /19 c [ i i l
( / \\ 1;l of those were, ah, all of the cow samples were less than detectable i 2l which was 0.2 picocuries per liter. And there was that one goat which i 3} is about a mile away and one goat was 1.1 picocuries per liter. Ah, i 4,! as I told you the surface waters were less than detectable for iodine 51 and then a few days later we got the tritiums from the surface water i 6l and they were normal. Normal ranges from around 100 picocuries per ~ 7 liter to maybe 3 - 350 picacuries per liter. That's the normal range g for the tritium and surface waters. As I told you the air iodines, gl which were picked up on the afternoon of the 29th, and by the way, the 10 air iodine had run from 3/21 to 3/29, offsite they all read less than detectable. yg And less than detectable was.02 to.03 picacuries per ' cubic meter. 131 1 ESSIG: OK. i 15: i PORTER: There was one onsite iodine that read 0.47 picccuries per lo! cubic meter. That was at station 152 which is the north / northeast 17ll ~ sector and was barely above detectable. But, you know, it was a real ,8! 1 number, but quite low. i 19i i i 20; ESSIG: That had also been, had operated during that period of time -- 21, 3/21-3/29? 22 I, ?,A7, 23,: f. ^ i 24l 25i ) i i a
il f i 8 i 1 PORTER: That's correct. 2: i 3l ESSIG: OK. 4! gj PORTER: All three offsite and one onsite air iodines had operated 6l fr m 3/21 through the afternoon of 3/29. 7l ESSIG: OK. g 9l PORTER: And the discharge waters that we talked about were a 1 below 10 detectable before that period. As far as iodine was concerned, let me see now, ah, excuse me, let me say the surface waters were, the surface I waters and the dri:1 king waters that we got downstream at the 4 downstream 13! water users. And the list of'these water users, their distance away from the plant are all well documented in the environmental report. 16; ESSIG: Yes. OK. 17! 18! ESSIG: Syd, I think we discussed this a little bit last time, and I 191 would like to just to go over it a little bit more. The decision to 20j collect the samples that were collected on the 29th was as far as 21: you know, who made that decision? 23l b/ I 2 41 I 25: i l 4 )
I i l t 9 i 1: PORTER: Well the decision was made jaintly by Met-Ed Reading, Dr. James i 2! Mudge's group, who are the people that an, from Metropolitan Edison i 31 who are responsible for the environmental monitoring program, and that 4; decision was made jointly between Dr. Mudge's group and Dr. Steven 5l Gertz of my group. l 6i 7' ESSIG: OK. 8l gj PORTER: And that was a joint decision which was discussed and rediscussed. 101 ESSIG:
- 0. K.
There was apparently a balancing then of trying to get 11. 12 inf rmation on the impact versus, getting quick information on the 13 impact versus leaving them out longer so that the ah, maybe accumulate, 14; integrate more of the event. I guess one wc 't have to maka some kind of trade-off. Is that right? I presume that was brought up in these 3 discussions? w 17! PORTER: That very definitely was brought up in these discussions and g that's what the discussions were all about. g 20; ESSIG: Right. 21i { 22h il PORTER: Now we knew we had to take the samples. And question was 231 'what was the optimum time to take the samples?' However, Met-Ed did l 24j j i 25i l I 893 345 i f 2 i
l. I i 10 F 1l say that during the very first day of the event, that they wanted 2 things to settle down and essentially security didn't want anybody on 3 the site except for Met-Ed employees during the first day, which is 4, very understandable. Si i ESSIG: Yes. 5 7i PORTER: And because of that and other reasons, it was decided that on g the 28th of March, that there would be no samples taken and that g 10l everyone was in a holding pattern and ready to take them within (oh) an hour's notice was all they needed at the most, probably half hour's notice would have been, they could have started within a half hour to ] take samoles. Everyone was standing by as of late in the morning on the 28th ready to take samples. 15; ESSIG: OK. There is one other, I think two other points that I want to discuss with you, Syd, and I think that's probably, then, all that 17,: I can really think of at this time. I have in my hand ah, a copy of ,S a, I think it's sort of an organization chart which was given to me at i your trailer today, that shows the relationship of Parter-Gertz con-sultants to the radiological environmental monitoring program data i 21! center, to NRC, to DOE, to ah, Mike Buring from TMI and other consultant 22; laboratories -- RMC, Teledyne, and so forth. And ttis was dated 23l 4/4/79. Was this in effect before that? I guess it's not really an 24i 25l 893 346 I i
i p i f 11 1l organization chart so much, but its sort of ah, how the information 2 was flowing from ah, one party to another. 3l PORTER: The answer is yes. This particular chart, by the way, is the 4 Sj hand-drawn chart that we made up to give to the Pennsylvania DER 6i Bureau of Water Quality. Mr. Walter Lyons who is head of that Bureau, 7j specifically asked for this information. 8j l ESSIG: Oh, I see. g 10I PORTER: We had a meeting between the Pennsylvania DER, Mr. Lions and 'some of his staff members, there was some Three Mile Island, (ah) Metropolitan Edison people there ah, Mr. John Collins from the NRC was representing the NRC personally at this meeting, it was a very important meeting, as a matter of fact, as far as the effluent control and relief was concerned, as far as Met-Ed was concerned, and the State. 17l ESSIG: OK. ISI l 19 PORTER: And its there that we decided on what information on the 20! water data would go to the State on what time basis. And we had a 21, whole series of data charts that we ah, are continually telecopying to 22! the State up in the Fulton Building in Harrisburg. And these are 23! telecopied to the Bureau of Radiological Health and there they are 24; E i ~ 893 347 l l i i .i
I i 12 l 1 taken within that same building and copies are immediately given to the Bureau of Water Quality. In this particular setup, we were giving 2l 3l it verbally to the Bureau of Radiological Health over the Rad Health g Hotline, the Pennsylvania Rad Health hotline, which goes from Unit 1, Si directly to from the Unit 1 Control Rcom at Three Mile Island directly to the Bureau of Radiological Health in Harrisburg. This hotline was manned 24 hours a day for the first 3 weeks of this incident. 81 ESSIG: Uh huh. 9l 10i 11;! PORTER: Ah, now this, I think, we should probably enter this particular I ' diagram as part of the testimony because this was given to everyone, 12; i John Collins was given a copy of this of the NRC, ah, and there were 131 several copies given to the State, the Bureau of Radiological Health was also there at this particular meeting and they were represented by 15: Mr. Bill Dornsite ah, at the meeting. l 1T ESSIG: OK. 18! 19i PORTER: As a matter of fact, at the first of this meeting on the 4th, 20! no, there was a meeting on the second, ah, I believe, yeah, there was 21i 1 a meeting on the second of April. And on the Second of April there 22 were also people from EPA at the meeting. I never quite understood 23l l why, but they seemed to want to know about this. There were lots of 24j 25! 893 348 I
l i { 13 i t 1! people there and this particular setup is the setup that was ah, i 2{ essentially established on the 28th and it was in effect on the 29th. I 31 i ESSIG: OK. 4 Sj PORTER: And the data started to flow on the 30th. 6 7l ESSIG: OK. I'll just make a note in here that this was ah, established g ah, essentially 3/28. g i 10l i PORTER: And data flowed on the 30th. No really, 3/29 would be the 11;. ' establishment of all those interagencies there. 12! i 13) ESSIG: OK. 14! 15 PORTERWe didn't talk to Bores, you knew, to, or the NRC, until the 29th.about this. 17' 18! ESSIG: OK. 19! i 20i l i PORTER: Established on the 29th -- data first flowed on the 30th. 21 22! l ESSIG: All right. I'll just note that right down here then. 23i 24! 25) 893 349 l I I I I i
i I, t 14 I' !l! PORTER: Oh, it s important to note though that the NRC haa in Unit 1 2 control room, arcand the clock, from what I could see usually 3 to i 3 maybe 10 representatives there in the Watch Engineer's office at all y times. 5! ESSIG: Yes. 6 f 7l 1 PORTER: Around the clock. And they came in and got all the data they g wanted, right on the scene, at the time it was being generated. 10l l ESSIG: Right. 11l i 12l l PORTER: And I think that should be on the record. I not sure that 13l thats on the record anywhere. But that needs to be on the record. 14! 15: ESSIG: OK. 16; 17! PORTER: That there was complete ficw of information from the very 18! beginning of the event as far as the Commission was concerned. And I j think.that needs to be clearly established. 20! 21l ESSIG: Right. 22l i 23! on7 7,1;r .,Jt) 07s 24! 25! i 3)
11 V I f { 15 lj PORTER: And I believe that that will be verified by whoever the head 2{ I&E person was that was onsite at the time. I 3l ESSIG: Right. OK, ah, I thir.. that the other area that I wanted to 4 gj ah, that I wanted to clarify with you, well, before I get into that,, 6 et me, I visited your ah, data center this morning, and, ah, talked with ah 7l I 81 PORTER: Mr. Lester Slayback or Mr. Gordon Lodde? i 101 i t ESSIG: Gordon Lodde. I don't know why I couldn't think of his name. 11! I Ah, now he indicated to me that he was not as familiar with the environ-12( 13l! mental data as, as you were. 14! PORTER: That's right. 16; ESSIG: And I had talked with him about the data and ah, I said 'could 17' you show me what you have'; and he removed several folders from the 18i 1 ah, drawer, as well as a red three-ring binder, and 'I ah, I went through those and would you, just to clarify a little confusion in my 20! mind, would you clarify for me that, are you still in the process of, 21 would you characterize your environmental data effort right now as 22! being one of where you're still trying tc characterize the data that 23l l was collected early in the game, or I mean early af ter the event, or 24! i 20 895 351 I i L
i i t I { 16 l d y u feel that most of what is available has already been collected 1! 2 by you. Or would you like me to clarify that? 3l PORTER: 4l Please clarify that; I'm a little confused. i Si ESSIG: OK. el 7k PORTER: .. with your question. g 9l ESSIG: OK, OK. I'll restate the question. I was over in the Unit 2 turbine deck where the, ah, a lot of data is being coordinated over 'there and I found the file folder which was ah, I don't even recall 12l now how it was labeled, it may have been labeled something like 'Early i 13l Analyses' ah, well this isn't' the exact title on the folder, but it w said "RMC Early Sample Results", something like on that order. And I 15. looked at it and it contained basically a lot of inplant ah, samples, air samples had been collected in the control room and such. But 17' there was a fair number of samples collected offsit as well. And so, 181 when I went over then to your data center, I expected, based on what I 19i thought you had indicated to me the other day, that I would see essentially 2ui l a duplication of this there. And I didn't find it. So I was wonderina 21l if you hadn't yet gotten to that point as far as backtracking some of 22l l the early data. That was really sort of restating my earlier question 23 then. Ah, data such as what I'm holding in my hand now, which is ah, 24l 25i 893 352 a 1
0 i I f 17 li an analytical data sheet ah, labeled ' Radiation Management Corporation 2 Sample Identification W-ll' and ah, date collected between either 3/29 3l or 3/30/79 from 0542 to 0547 its an iodine in air, ah, an offsite 4; sample. And there are several ah, well I didn't count the number of Sj sheets here but there are a number of them. Are you still in the 6 process, are you in the process of gathering this type of data and you 7 haven't yet gotten to it, or, or where do you stand? 8l gj PORTER: OK. Ah, we have to be quite clear on that point because its an important point. There are two sets of people taking data for 101 Metropolitan Edison right now. One set are the set of people that originate from the Island, from Three Mile Island. They're, and they are on a series of eme"gency monitoring teams and essentially since g for the first three weeks of the event, there were 3 to 4 emergency monitoring teams out around the clock. Roughly, their jobs were, one of them would be onsite and taking a profile in and just adjacently out af the pluma along both the fence perimeter, the outer fence perimeter, and also along the building lines to the inner fence perimeter so to speak. We're as close into the plume as you can get without walking into a building. And that's what one of the teams did. Two other teams, one would be on the west shore, one would be on the east 21; shore. 22l l 22; 893 353 2e 25! i I
I l l 18 l ESSIG: Right. 11 2! I PORTER: 3; Then also, there was a team in the helicopters when we were 4 expecting certain releases that were taking data from the helicopters. S that we had from three to four teams out. I believe that we're 5 down to three right now, ah, but the point that needs to make, that 6 needs to be made is that this data was, 90% of the data roughtly, was ah, beta gamma or gamma readings from a portable survey meter. g 9[ ESSIG: I would agree with that. 10l 11: l ' PORTER: Then, ah less than 10%, probably much less than 10% of the 12! data, they took air through charcoals, charcoal filters. 131 14! ESSIG: Right. 15i 16; PORTER: And these charcoal filters were sent to RMC and and then SAI 171 l when they arrived, in order to, and also some of 'em went to B&W in 18l the early days; some of them went, a few went over to the ah, to the 191 TMI Unit 1 Ge(Li) detector which I believe never counted any because 20t I of the high background, and then.they were rerouted. And these samples 21( are part of the emergency monitoring team evaluation. Ah, I looked 22 i over, all this data was, literally on my desk for the first two weeks 23{ of the incident. All the data you're talking aoout. 24 25j 893W! l
l l 19 6 I ESSIG: OK. l! 2j 3f PORTER: The Sample Coordinator sat next to me for the first two weeks of the incident or next to one of my people. I S ESSIG: OK. And so we continually evaluated that. Any my general 6,! I evaluation of this is that all of the, ah, Island data, with extremely 71 few exceptions, were negative, were less that, detectable. 9! ESSIG: No. I wasn't trying to imply that it was any other way. What 10! I was just, I was just trying to straighten up a little confusion in 11! ~ my mind based on what you had, what I thought you had indicated to me 12! the other day; which was in essence that you were in an oversight 13! capacity with your operation in Trailer #115, the Health Physics 14! trailer, was to try to pull together a lot of the data that was presently, 15; that had been gathered so far and try to make sense out of it. There 16i are a. lot of people gathering data and I think you had indicated to me 17'! and Gordon Lodde told me this morning that it was your, one of your 18 missions anyway in life was to, not in life but here'on the Island was 191 to, was to ah, gather the data and try to make sense out of it. 20j 21 PORTER: That is correct. Now 22 I i 893 355 24i I 25 i i t i
t j. I { 20 lj ESSIG: And so when I didn't see this particular, these data here, in 2 amongst the data that you were supposed to gather, I just wonderec if 1 3! y u hadn't yet gotten to it, or well certainly you were aware of it, f based on what you just said. i Si i PORTER: Yeah. Well now for the first two weeks of the incident, I 6l ,l looked at every piece of data that was collected, ah, as a matter of 8l fact. Since then I've done spot checks on that particular data looking 1
- g at those charcoals.., charcoals, and I won't pull it all together.
I ~ have not pulled that together because there is other data which is 101 positive and much more fruitful, and I think more worthy of my group's t 11; ' time right now. Now we will get to that and write a summary statement. , 2,, 1 I It's going to be a fairly easy summary statement when you essentailly 131 l have all negative data. 14i 15i ESSIG: Right. I 17' PORTER: And so therefore, I didn' t feel it was important for me to ISI keep yet another set of those records. The records'are up there with 19! the sample collector and he's responsible to see that they don't 20; wander. I 21; l 22! ESSIG: Okay. 893 35(') 24j l a 25i I I r 5 0 L l
i { 21 PORTER: 1l And eventually we'll get up there and do that and that is 2! part of our job, but since it's all negative data. 3t ESSIG: Okay. l 5 PORTER: And since it was disseminated at the time, the NRC came over 6,1 every 2-3 hours, and asked for copies of those in the early days. I mean the NRC has an incredible amount of that data themselves (ah) the g (ah)... I thought then that since it's all negative, I did, I just i did not feel that it was necessary to spend much time on that data 10! now, because we have lots of positive data that we're gathering from lli l 'the HPR samples. 12l l 13l ESSIG: Right. 15i PORTER: And also we have much positive data, or better, statistically negat,ive data that we are gathering from the offsite radiological 17l environmental monitoring program. Now we do not have every piece of ISi 'I data, every piece of datum on, ah, that ah, exists on the offsite 19i emergency radiological environmental monitoring program here onsite. 20t i We have summaries of it. This is all being carefully being kept in 21! both Reading and my offices in Ardmore, Pennsylvania. And I just get, 22l at tais point, I'm getting oversight reports on these. 2 31 24l 23: 893 357 I L
I p i 1 22 lj ESSIG: OK. I 2' i 3f PORTER: Does this clear that up? l 4l ESSIG: Yes, I think it does. Would you say the same ccmment that yo,u 5 just made applies to the early B&W data also? Would that be over in O! the, as far as you know, would be over in the Unit 2 turbine deck area 7 where the, where the Coordinator is? 8! si PORTER: No, I would not make that comment. Most of the, first of all, one has to realize that there, that for low level counting, the 'B&W system is not designed for that; its only a 5% efficiency Ge(Li) .2 i detector. 13l 14: ESSIG: OK. 15i 16i PORTER: That system is designed for plant process samples. Now 17l occasionally an air sample would wander over there, and get counted 181 with a "less than number" and we try to grab these and then send them 19! back over to RMC or SAI in order to get them counted. 20l 21l ESSIG: OK. 22! 893 358 23 24l 25! I i f
f l - l 6 { 23 I 1l PORTER: And so the B&W ah, system, in general, is just not designed for that. Now they're being reset up on the Unit 2 turbine deck floor 2 3 with a lot more shielding and with much more, and you know, and they're t 4j supposed to be getting efficient Ge(Li). At that point, it'll be a 5 whole new ball game as far as what we use their counting system for., i 6 But, for the environmental data, the B&W data, the B&W system is not applicable for counting. 7 8 gl ESSIG: OK. I think.that clears it, sufficiently clears that area up. 10j! I would like to move on to, to one last area, if I can. It's ah, related to, since I last talked with you, I've talked to Mr. Dubiel i 11l ' and Mr. Mulleavy of Met-Ed also. 12! 13l I' SHACKLETON: 145 Tom, I hate to i~nterrupt you, but I think we' re gonna have to change the tape. We're just at the point where it's gonna go 15! off. The time is now 1:59 p.m., April 26, 1979. We'll be off the air for a few minutes while we change the cassette. 18! SAHCKLETON: This is a continuation of the interview of Mr. Sydney W. Porter, Jr., and the time is now 2:01 p.m., April 26, 1979. Mr. 20t Essig, would you please continue your quest.ioning. 21; 22} ESSIG: Yes. I started to say before, ah, before we had to change the 23'i tape that since I had last talked with you Syd, I talked with ah, ah, 24! 25j 893 359
f i { 24 l lj Mr. Richard Dubiel and Mr. Tom Mulleavy, both of whom are in the 2I Regional Protection Organization for Met-Ed. And there is just one i 3l area that I'd like to get, I'll tell you what the impression.. the 1 4j impression I have as to who is directing the offsite survey effort 3f after speaking with each one of those and I'd like to get your impressions gj as to, as to what was going on. Again, we're focusing on the first 7l three days following the event. gl ESSIG: When I talked to Mr. Dubiel, he indicated to me that, that for I 10j the first several hours after he arrived on plant he tried to keep on l 11l top of several areas simultaneously, which is understandable; there is ] 'a lot going on and ah, he was the only one here. Ah, or he was the highest, ah, ah, level of Radiation Protection management here. When 3 Mr. Mulleavy came in at, I th' ink, around 7:30 or 7:45, I've got the exact time written down somewhere else, ah, from the time that he recalled coming in, ah, he, after getting here went to see ah, Mr. Duceil , o,. _i ,,/ -, right away, and, and ah, shortly afterwards he was, and Dubeil filled A him in on what was going on at that time, shortly after that and, according to Dubiel, he essentially, ah, turned the, turned the respon-sibility over to Mulleavy for ah, running the offsite monitoring effort. Mulleavy's story is just slightly different from that. He 21l indicated that the coordination with ah, with ah, Dubiel was extremely 22l l close, and that ah, he was touching base with Dubiel on the order of 23l every, every 15 minutes or so and, in essense, asking ah, well maybe 241 251 893 360 f l
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b I I 25 llj not asking is t.ie correct word but, but, ah,'well I'll say asking 2 since I can't think of a better word, asking for Dubiel's approval on, 3 on ah, well for example, I'm going to send the team ah, in the southeast 4 direction toward Bainbridge, or south / southeast towards Bainbridge and 5 we're going to collect air samples, or we're going to make these kinds 61 of measurements and he would almort, the impression I had was that 7 Mulleavy was asking for ah, Dubiel ccncurrence on many of the actions that he was taking. Whereas, from what I got from Dubiel was that he 8j g pretty much Mulleavy a loose and told him, and the fact that I've got, the thing that I wanta worry about now is the inpirnt health physics. 10l[ , r, ; Ah, I think you've got your feet on the ground firmly enough, he told 'Mulleavy. Why dosi't you worry about the offsite surveys. Now you were there after ah, after about ah, let's see well I guess you j arrived at the observation center at 7:00 o' clock on the 28th and then I not too long after that you were in the ah, in the Unit 2 contro1 ,5! lo_ ; room. What was your impression as to what went on as far as the who 17.I was in charge of the offsite survey teams for Met-Ed? Could you, could you speak to that briefly? 181 i 19; PORTER: Yeah I can, I can speak to that. Ah, from what I could see ah, when I was there it was the person, the person th;t was, that was 21, e i running them on a minute-to-minute basis was certainly the person in 22l the Unit 1 control room because he had the direct radio that he was 23 using to talk to them. And he would say, you know, 'go to here, go to 25! 891 00! a, i l 1
i 4 = l ( 26 1: there' Now something that is happening which I did not mention in my 2f earlier conversation, by the way, I haven't discussed this with either 3 of those gentlemen, I might add, at this point. 4l Sj ESSIG: OK. Si 7l PORTER: At all. It hasn't come up, huh, at all. Uh, but what would happen is you know there's a hotline between Unit 1 and Unit 2. 8{ 9l ESSIG: Right. 10 11! PORTER: 12 Now, ah the person in Muhleavy's job, and you remember I 3[ could not remember who it was because it, it, it changed every 8 p{ hours, and I was there for miny, many, you know for many hours. I was there for about 215 days. g 16 ESSIG: Right. l'7 !' I 18! PORTER: And so, it kept changing. But what, what happened is that 19I there would be, whenever there was any, anything significant or whenever 40l there was a question, I do know that whoever had that job would simply 21; pick up the hotline and talk to someone in Unit 2, in the Unit 2 control room; because there's a hotline between the two control rooms, and when you pick up the phone it rings in the other control room 24! immediately. 25! 891 'J02 i 4 L e
l r [ 27 l l! ESSIG: Right. I 2l i 3t PORTER: Now, I don't know who was on the other end of the phone. I i 4: have no way of knowing that. I was very busy doing what I had to do, i Si and, and was not privy to who, whoever Mulleavy, or whoever it was I 61 that had the job was. But the thing is, there was continual, that 7l phone was just always, always ringing. I mean you know, either one 1 8j way or another, either somebody's picking up or it was ringing back i gj this way. i 10f 11j ESSIG: Tr.ese were calls that either were coming in to Dubeil or being 12 rigin tt;d by him? I 131 PORTEE: I don't, I don't know who was on the other side, on the Unit g, 2.
- was in Unit 1 control rocm.
15; 16i ESSIG: Well, no but the unit 1 control... okay, Unit 1 would have g! been 19! PORTER: I was in Unit 1 and that's where Mulleavy was 21l PORTER: ..Or Mulleavy's replacement. And there were a number of 22l people that replaced him over those few days. 24j 2si 891 003 I l l l h
3 ? I l { 28 l If ESSIG: OK. 2 l 3l PORTER: And so therefore, he was picking the phone up and talking, 4j now who he was talking to, and whether he was talking directly to 5 Dubeil or whether a message was being relayed to Dubeil, I have no way I 6j af knowing that. i 7l ESSIG: OK. g 9! 10l PORTER: There was a lot of work to be done and, ah, and when, there ig was, you know there somebody there like Tom, then you know, he was "doing what he had to do, and all I did was, it was, it was the overview unction that I talkad about earlier. 3 14i ESSIG: Right. 15; 16i PORTER: Now I was not on the radio talking to those teams. 17L 18j ESSIG: Right. 20l PORTER: Occasionally, I would, I'd pick up the microphone and ask i them questions. But I, as I said before, I was not running those 22l l teams on a minute-to-minute basis. And, you know Mulleavy was one of 23!l the people doing it and certainly Len Landry was another one who was 24{ 25} l 891 004 i i f
.I i ( 29 i 1l doing it, but I did't remember who war, there when. Which I think I 2 made that clear in my testimony two days ago. l 3i i 4j ESSIG: Yes. OK. So I, from what I hear you're saying then, it, it 5l sounds like ah, you were in the Unit 1 control room with ah, Mulleavy,. I 6i and others that relieved him and as far as you're concerned the radio 7 was in the Unit 1 control room and ah, the direction of the teams that g, was really taking was, was being made by either Mulleavy or subsequent individuals that may have relieved him and that there was close coordina-g 10; tion between that individual and someone in Unit 2 and we'll presume i for the moment that it was Dubeil. 12{ l PORTER: Yes. I don't know who that person was. The otner point tnt 13l I needs to be made was that anyone that wished to in the Unit 2 control 14: lo_ l: room could listen to the conversations over the radio. They have a follow radio there also. And so if someone was interested in what was happening with the teams, all he had to do was simply walk over to the 17 desk where the (ah) follow radio was there, and he could listen to 181 what was being told to the teams and what the teams were saying back to the Unit 1 Control Room. Which (ah) this is sonething we set up a 20' i long time ago just in case that we would have an emergency like this. 21l So that both control rooms could follow the offiste data if they so 22! wished to do that. 23 24' 891 005 25! t l' t
i l l 30 i li ESSIG: Okay. I think there's one other area that I'd !ike to. 2 that car-in both the interviews with Dubiel and Mulleavy and I'd i 3i like your comments on. I have a.. just because of their inability t 4j to recall exact times. I'd just like your impression of when this Si particular item happened so that we can maybe have then three, possi'b.ly 6 three conflicting opinions of when it happened. (Ah) in the interview 7j with Dubiel, and the item in question is both gentlemen said that, g that at one point in time, the direction, the management of the offiste gj survey effort was turned over, not by their choice, but someone had decided - someone as yet I don't know who - had decided that the 10t direction of the program would be made by, from the Observation Center g 'and it was to be done by the (ah) the Electric Boat (ah), another ~" " 13 i 14; PORTER: Of which program, please? 15i 16! ESSIG: This would be the offsite survey effort, as I understood what they had said. The (ah) (ah) Dubiel indicated that it might have been as early as ' ate in the day on 3/28, or perhaps early on 3/29. The program direction was, was ah, essentially over in the observation center and that all the ah, offsite survey data were being relayed to 21! the observatio" center by radio, rathe.' than to the ah, Unit I control 2 21 Now Mulleavy indicated that ah, the program wasn't really room. 231 switched over to there untill, until approximately either late in the 24 2El 1 894 006 3
} l [ 31 1; day on 3/30 or maybe even Saturday 3/31. and ah, because he had 2 received a call from Mr. Graber? Grabber? Graber? l 31 4 PORTER: Graber. Bill Graber Si l 6 ESSIG: Yeah. From Flectric Boat. And ah, he had called both 7: Mulleavy and Dubeil to te'11 them t., as of that time and, and its g that time that, that I'm, that these two gentlemen differ on presently. gj But Mulleavy feels that it was, as of about 7:00 a.m., 3/31, that they 10! in effect sere working for Graber and that's what Graber told them i 11l that as of this time you're working for me as far as the ah, I believe 12 that the time was limited to the offsite survey effort, but I'm not 13j sure. Did you have any, any such, "ere you aware that had, that that g conversation had taken place and that a ah, a ah, a switch in the manageme a a ccurred and H, so do you know why M migM han 15 occurred? They, they both indicatel they were rather confused by it. Would you, could you comment? 18! PORTER: OK. Two things: first of all at that point ah, I might add that both Dubeil and Mulleavy were incredibly busy with other things, I think that comment needs to be made. And they had worked many hours 21! at that point tco. Now my impression of what happened is slightly 22l different from that. 23l\\ 24l f 894 007 25! i
e d I i l 32 1 ESSIG: OK. OK. 2! 1 31 PORTER: And that'; why I think I'd better put this on the record, 4} too. Ah, ah, the first overriding comment that needs to be made is 5[ that we have to define the term ' management of the teams' is that the. 6 tec you used? 7l Si ESSIG: Yes. I 9! PORTER: Or ' direction of the teams'? Which term? 10! 11l 121 ESSIG: 13 Well, according to Mulleavy, Mr. Graber said 'you are now g working for me' He used those words. Now whether he actually meant that, ah, and as a consultant I ah, the contracto: brought in, I doubt that ah, well unless it seems rather unusual tnat he would have been 16i given.that much authority. And maybe Mulleavy was overstating the
- case, Now that's quite possible.
But he indicated to me that this Grabee had told him that as of, whatever time it was within the first two or three days following the event, that he had more or less been 40 i given charge of at least the offsite survey effort and, and anything ,, l . J. more I Lon't know. 22l 23 891 008 24i 25! I i l l ?
f i i I f 33 lj PORTER: OK. I'd like to speak to that. I have four or five comments 2: on that. First of all, editorial comment ah, Mr. Graber is, is sort 3l of known for ah, his proneness to over:;tatement. Point 1. I think and that's a fairly objective comment on my part; kind of sitting back 5l and watching him work. Ah, now let ne tell you, we have to define l 6i . carefully what we mean by management and direction, direction of the 7! teams. First of a11, the, the direct control of the teams in the 8l field never left the Unit 1 control room, it is still there as of this moment. I think this point needs to be made very clearly. g 10j ESSIG: Okay. 11; 12' g PORTER: The direct control of where that team goes, was never given to Mr. Graber and it is now not in Mr. Graber's hands still, and there's a technical reason for that. The person that controls where the team goes has to be looking at the metert logical data to knc.: a lor where the wind is going. 17l i 1Sl ESSIG: Exactly, and that's 20l I PORTER: And there, and that has never, and also Mr. Graber did not 21l get on, as far as, in my recollection.)ecause boy I was really close to those teams for the first two weeks. I never heard Mr. Graber on 23 the radio telling those teams word one. Now what Mr. Graber was given 24i 253 894 009 i i d 1 i
i l 34 i e 1) was, Mr. Graber was in chrge of the large Health Physics Technicia-2! Manpower pool and also had a fair amount of health physics supervisory i 3 pe ple working for him directly. And so I would call this operational 4j health physics. He had operational health physics. He was, he was 5l given that. Now out of that manpower, people were assigned to these 4 radiological emergency survey teams. He was in charge of seeing that 6 the people were there te relieve the teams when their time was up. You know they were first on 12's and then moved back to 8's, and I 8 l gj can't remember when they were moved back. I think that's immaterial in this conversation. But the point is that he had the manpower and 10l l therefore he was told to make sure that there were replacements for 11l 'these people, for the teams on a timely basis. I 13! ESSIG: OK. 14! 15i PORTER: And, and as far as I know, I never heard Mr. Graber's pflone, ic: in other words, I, my desk was only about 12 feet away from the radio and I could essentially hear everything on the radio and I never 181 remember hearing Mr. Graber's voice, which is very disti ct, I know 19; what it sounds like, I never remember hearing his voice, ever, on the 20l l radio giving those teams direction #1 even. And I think that's a very 21l important point that needs to be made here. And thay're still being, 22! j I think you've been up there several times, haven t you Tom, up to the 23! control room, unit 1 control room? 24l 25{ 1 4 i y
I f I l t ( 35 l 1.i ESSIG: Yes. Yes. l 2! { 3: PORTER: And everytime you were there, they were still being run from q on the radio right there; isn't that correct? I Si ESSIG: The map is... 6 PORTER: g Right, the map is there and that's where they are run from. 9! P 9 10 11: ' PORTER: So, I tnink that you should get ah, Dubiel and Mulleavy back I and remind them of this and then ask him about my statement. Because 13t I was fairly close, I was much, see they were essentially weren't offsite where I was onsite and offsite, I was running back and forth. 15i 16; ESSIG: Right. 18j PORTER: And, and trying to get ah, make sure, you know, make sure we 191 had a hold on a lot of these things. And I think Mr. Graber just ' 20! j a slightly, he's wrong to tell everybody that they're working for n*, 21! at the time. 22 23 894 011 24 r 25l I I f I l
l - [ 36 i i 1: ESSIG: I see. 2l 3 PORTER: And, and so the thing is that, ah, and these guys were battle i 4j weary at the time that this statment came in. You have to remember 3 that. i 6l 7{ ESSIG: Oh yeah, I do. I 8! PORTER: They had ah, very little, very little sleep. But ah, ah, up gj 10 until ' moved into these trailers right here, I, I which was, gee when did I move into these trailers, Bill it was what about 4 or 5 days ago 'at the most, ah, ah, I, I could hear the radio either in the obser/ation center or either in the Unit 1 control room where my two desks were. 3 And I never heard Bill Graber's voice once on the radio. 15i ESSIG: OK. 16 17! PORTER: As far as I know, Bill Graber, I never saw him in Unit 1 control room. Ah, except for a few times when he would come in ani ask you a few questions and ge out. In other words he was never aware of meteorlonical data or even the procedures usAd for r'Jnning the 21t 22j And so it a.ight be important to get him in here to clarify teams. l that point with him. 23l 24l 894 012 25i l [ i
f l I { 37 I t 1l ESSIG: OK. I 2; PORTER: But ah, I believe that my version of this is pretty well on 3i i 4i track. SI ESSIG: OK. 6l i 7\\ PORTER: g Does this, ah, is there anything else you want to ask about? 9I i 10l ESSIG: No, I don't think so. It just seemed to me that it was worth clarifying on the record because it, it would appear to be a little ' bit ah, cumbersome to run e operation such as the offsite survey effort out of the observation center, where as you say, there is no 131 Met Data readout out there. And the ah, one would have to radio the 14! control room to g.t the wind direction and speed and then tell the, tell the teams that th2y should be in this or that sector at tnt time. 17l 18i PORTER: Now. 19! 20t ESSIG: It would make mort sense for me to run it out in the control 21! room and that's, I just wanted your impression as to whether indeed it 225 had been turned over to the observation center or if it was still in 23 the control room. 2q ggq g;3 25i I, i I
i l 38 i 1: PORTER: It has absolutely never been turned over. Now, let me add r 2! one other point here which I think needs t, be put on the record. And I 3l that is that the observation center had radios, had and, had microphones, 1 4 4j and could contact the teams and talk to them. But essentially what 5l they did was they, they were, they wer a group that ah, got the up. I m , date data from the teams and plotteo it there so th=.t Jack Herbine 7 and other management people, such as myself, could walk in and at i 8 anytime see what the highest level was onsite and the highest level was offsite. g 10! ESSIG: knd I was doing the same thing myself. 7 12! 9 13 14! 13; ESSIG: walking in the observation center and doing that very thing. 16; PORTER: So this was a follow data center is what it was. 1,/ ; ISI ESSIG: OK. 19i 20l l PORTER: And it was also set up that in case we had real problems and 21; had to evacuate Unit 1 control room, which is very unlikely because it 22; i does have its own air system and it awn filters, etc., and so that you 23l could just put it on 'recirc' and you'd have your own air which would 2 41 be good for days. 25j 894 014
.i I [ 39 lj ESSIG: Right. I 2! i 3j PORTER: But just in case there was a fire in there or something and t people had to leave, then the ' Plan C' was that ah, we would have a, a 4j Si person stationed at the Met tower, where there is also readout at the. I g; base of the meterological tower, with the radio, and he could have y radioed the data to the observation center and the teams could have been running from the observation center. And so that's an alternate 8 plan that we've always had, just in case the control room got wiped g, 0l ut for one reason or another. Which is, you know, highly unlikely. i 11; ~ ESSI Right. I 13} PORTER: And see, it was my job to make sure that we always had " Plan 1+,, B" and and " Plan C", and that they were viable plans, and so, and so, cnd, and that was a very viab'.e plan; that's another reason why we had those. radios all set up there; just in case, you know. And thank God 171 we had these because all these alternate communications have been used 18: 100% of the time, they're, they're, you know, ah, they were used up to 19i what, 4 or 5 days ago as a matter of fact. 20: 21i ESSIG: Um hm. OK. I think that ah, that about takes care of the 22! questions that I have for you today, Syd. And I, unless you have some 23} further comments, I appreciate the time that you've taken to ah, to 24! I 25-894 015 f I
( 40 i i 1{ ah, be interviewed by us and the answers that you've provided to our 2{ questions. I think the information will be quitr helpful. I 3i PORTER: 4; I have one ah, one correction to mcke to my ah, testimony two gj days ago and just a little bit nore information to to a little bit 6 better, more fully answer one of your questions, ah, Tom. Ah, you 7f asked me about the survey meters that were used by the teams and I had g ah, ah, answered ah, by saying that they were essentially ion chambers. And then I made one close, incorrect statement. I said among the g chambers was E5208, I migM not have used de letter "B", but an E520. 10f And you said that you thought that was a GM tube. And I said ' gee, I 'thinx its an ion chamber. Well you're right. It is a GM tube. I 13! ESSIG: OK. 14! 15i PORTER: Point 1. Ah, Point 2 ah, they used an HP270 probe, ah, which is e GM-tube probe with the E5208, but the other tube service meter used, and there were many.of them used, were, are an Eberline R02A, 1Si and an Eberline PIC6A, both of which are ion chamber instruments. Now 19! for the record, I would like to give you some data on tha response of 20j these three instruments. These are the three major instruments used and I verified this with team members since we last talked. 22I 23, i 24I i 894 016 25i I l
I t 41 i 1 1! ESSIG: OK. 2l 3 PORTER: These are the three major instruments used and I would like 4f to tell you the response of these to the 81 kev gamma which is a the Sj gamma ah, that you get from Xenva-133 which is essentially what you're l 6 1 oking at during this entire incident. 7 ESSIG: Right. 8 4 ORTER: OK. Let's start with the GM-tube. With the open window GM-10t t 11,! tube, for gamma only, we had a response of 200%. 12l ESSIG: OK. 13 i 14! PORTER: With the closed... 15: 16 ESSIG: This is relative to the response say for, cesium or cabalt I gamma? 181 IS! PORTER: This is relative to the cesium response, the cesium 137 I response, which is what they're calibrated with. i 21l 22' I ESSIG: OK. 2 89ff O[ 2d; 25l i i f [ l
1 I i f 42 t 1{ PORTER: So this is relative to their calibration. Relative to their 2f calibration, the E5208 has a 200% men window response and a 92% I 3i closed window response. i l 4l 5{ ESSIG: OK. Si PORTER: OK Bob, I got these, I got this, the response data from Eric 7 Geiger who is the Chief Health Physicist for Ebarline Instrument 8l Company. And I called him in Santa Fe and got the data directly from g him. 10! Ah, ah, because I knew that he had more up to date data on the i j ah, instruments that his company makes than I do. i 12! ESSIG: Right. , 31 14! e n a. seney meter, the open window 15! response is 110%; and these are all fcr 81 kev gamma and the closed 10 I window response is 105%. 17! i 18! ESSIG: OK. 19' 20i PORTER: And for the PIC6A, the open window, ion chamber survey instrument, 21; the open window response is 120% and the closed window response is 100%. 23 891 018 24, 25l l 4
hs l 43 i tlj ESSIG: OK. t 2! PORTER: Now ah, when one considers the fact that these things are all 3 4l calibrated to roughtly plus or minus 15 or 20%, then I think that we 5! can say, except for the GM-Tube, which, ah, with the open window, has 6 large over response, then all the other responses are essentially 7j 100% and no corrections needeo at all. And the only correction that gl would be needed would be for an over response and we don't bother with that one when we're doing emergency survey; and we only worry about g un er resp nse. 10l 11; ^ ESSIG: Right. 13 PORTER: Would you agree with that statement? 14! 15i ESSIG: Yes, I would agree. i 17! FORTER: OK. I have, I have nothing else here, ah, ah, for you all except that if you want to talk about the effluent ah, data then we 19i need to schedule another meeting. 20! 21l ESSIG: Right. And I think we'll just ah, we'll. probably have to 22 schedule that for ah, we're gonna be taking a break here until next 23l l Tuesday, and ah, so we can probably schedule that on Wednesday, Thursday, 24! 25l 894 019 t 4 !l
h, { 44 i lj r Friday. I'm not sure what our interview schedu.e is at this time, 2 aut I'll certainly try to set something up and give you sufficient 3l advance warning. 4i gj SHACKLETON: Very good gentlemen. Tnank you Mr. Porter for your ~: cooperation again. All the work you put forth in getting all this data together for us. We're bringing this interview t. a clnse at 7 gj 2:26 p.m., April 26, 1979. 91 894 020 lli i 12! 13l 14! 151 16-17-18t 19i 20i i 21; 22l 23l i 24l 25l l l .:}}